The creation of artificial moral systems requires us to make difficult choices about which of varying human value sets should be instantiated. The industry-standard approach is to seek and encode moral consensus. Here we argue, based on evidence from empirical psychology, that encoding current moral consensus risks reinforcing current norms, and thus inhibiting moral progress. However, so do efforts to encode progressive norms. Machine ethics is thus caught between a rock and a hard place. The problem is particularly acute when (...) progress beyond prevailing moral norms is particularly urgent, as is currently the case due to the inadequacy of prevailing moral norms in the face of the climate and ecological crisis. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack risk misleading people about the cognitive underpinnings of the belief in a privileged “now moment” because they do not explicitly acknowledge that the sense of existing in the now moment is an intrinsically temporally dynamic one. The sense of happening that is exclusive to the now moment is a better candidate for the source of belief in a privileged now.

In the nineteenth century, astronomers thought that a planet between Mercury and the Sun was causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury, and they introduced ‘Vulcan’ as a name for such a planet. But they were wrong: there was, and is, no intra-Mercurial planet. Still, these astronomers went around saying things like (2) Vulcan is a planet between Mercury and the Sun. Some philosophers think that, when nineteenth-century astronomers were theorizing about an intra-Mercurial planet, they created a hypothetical planet.

Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.

In a series of recent publications, Jeffrey King (The nature and structure of content, 2007; Proc Aristot Soc 109(3):257–277, 2009; Philos Stud, 2012) argues for a view on which propositions are facts. He also argues against views on which propositions are set-theoretical objects, in part because such views face Benacerraf problems. In this paper, we argue that, when it comes to Benacerraf problems, King’s view doesn’t fare any better than its set-theoretical rivals do. Finally, we argue that his view faces (...) a further Benacerraf problem, one that threatens to undercut his explanation of why propositions have truth-conditions. If correct, our arguments undercut King’s main motivation for accepting his view over its rivals. (shrink)

Sometimes people desire that their lives go badly, take pleasure in their lives going badly, or believe that their lives are going badly. As a result, some popular theories of welfare are paradoxical. I show that no attempt to defend those theories from the paradox fully succeeds.

Many political realists reject the idea that the first task for political philosophy is to justify the existence of coercive political institutions. Instead, they say, we should begin with the factual existence of CPIs, and ask how they ought to be structured. In holding this view, they adopt a form of political naturalism that is broadly Aristotelian in character. In this article, I distinguish between two forms that this political naturalism might take - what I call a ‘strong’ form, and (...) a ‘weak’ form - and argue that both ought to be rejected. (shrink)

David Benatar argues that creating someone always harms them. I argue that his master argument rests on a conceptual incoherence.

In "Demonstratives or Demonstrations", Marga Reimer argues that quotation marks are demonstrations and that expressions enclosed with them are demonstratives. In this paper, I argue against her view. There are two objections. The first objection is that Reimer''s view has unattractive consequences: there is more ambiguity, there are more demonstratives, and there are more English expressions than we thought. The second objection is that, unlike other ambiguous expressions, some expressions that are ambiguous on Reimer''s view can''t be disambiguated by using (...) subscripts. This suggests that, contrary to her view, those expressions aren't really ambiguous. (shrink)

Millianism and Fregeanism agree that a sentence that contains a name expresses a structured proposition but disagree about whether that proposition contains the object that the name refers to (Millianism) or rather a mode of presentation of that object (Fregeanism). Various problems – about simple sentences, propositional‐attitude ascriptions, and sentences that contain empty names – beset each view. To solve these problems, Millianism can appeal to modes of presentation, and Fregeanism can appeal to objects. But this raises a further problem: (...) namely, to explain why the proposition expressed by a sentence that contains a name matters in some cases but not in others. (shrink)

Several recent writers have argued that the rejection of hypothetical constructs is one of the defining features of radical behaviorism. The present discussion argues that this claim is ill-founded and based on an erroneous distinction regarding different kinds of theoretical constructs. All constructs, including those commonly employed by behavior analysts, are argued to be inherently hypothetical, because they provide a causal basis for extending empirical findings to new sets of variables. Moreover, the constructs employed by radical behaviorists are not qualitatively (...) different from those often employed by cognitivists . The result is that much of the basis for recent criticisms of cognitive psychology by behaviorists disappears. To the extent that differences do remain it is not in the qualitative nature of the two enterprises, but instead in attitudes about parsimony in the relation between data and theory. (shrink)

This paper draws on Juvenal's intertextual relationship with comedy to solve a textual crux involving fish-names. The monograph by Ferriss-Hill will no doubt warn scholarship away from the treatment of Roman satire's intertextuality with Old Comedy for a time. Yet, Greek comedy's influence on Roman satire is far from exhausted, and this paper will show that this influence goes more widely, and more deeply, than is usually seen. In time, one might hope for a renewed monographic treatment of the subject.

This article has the aim of bringing some fresh observations to the interpretation of a Martial epigram. Beyond the individual poem, it seeks to read Martial's poetics more broadly, particularly with regard to the presence of Greek avatars, of various kinds, in his poetic production. The strategy will be an exact reading of the literary avatars in 10.4, with an attempt to specify the tone with which individual writers are associated. Once this strategy is developed in the case of well-recognized (...) intertextual models, it will be used to explore an underrated intertext in 10.4. (shrink)

The Defective Image develops the argument that Darwinism is predicated on a profound epistemological flaw and proposes to demonstrate that the limitations in Darwinism can be illustrated by its inability to furnish a credible explanation for communication. The author argues that Darwinism is more faith-based ideology than scientific theory and that its character as a faith-based ideology accounts for much of the rancor that characterizes the current debate over evolution.

This paper intends to illustrate the monuments of the Periklean building programme as embodying acts of temporal configuration; organizing synoptic episodes into an ethno-cultural continuum. A required element to this process is the issue of space, both in its experienced and imagined aspects, as the framework by which temporality is fixed and recounted. By viewing the monuments and accompanying iconography as spatio-temporal configurations, we can see the generation of those elements necessary for the formation of cultural identity via memory. This (...) includes the provision of axial points in time, set in space and wider temporal chronologies, and the election of totemic, and semioticized personages. Moreover, as the configurative action is both framed and informed by its enunciative context, the monuments indicate the promotion of biographical memory, as relating to the Persian Wars, into the register of Athenian cultural memory and temporality. (shrink)

in Values and Morals, eds. Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Reidel, 1978), pp. 186-214.

Argues that acceptance of one’s place in the natural world involves an acceptance of free will. Free will is also necessary for the continuation of a social society in that we need to accept the doctrine in order to administer justice.

Is love best when it is fresh? For many, the answer is a resounding “yes.” The intense experiences that characterize new love are impossible to replicate, leading to wistful reflection and even a repeated pursuit of such ecstatic beginnings. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev takes these experiences seriously, but he’s also here to remind us of the benefits of profound love—an emotion that can only develop with time. In The Arc of Love, he provides an in-depth, philosophical account of the experiences that arise (...) in early, intense love—sexual passion, novelty, change—as well as the benefits of cultivating long-term, profound love—stability, development, calmness. Ben-Ze’ev analyzes the core of emotions many experience in early love and the challenges they encounter, and he offers pointers for weathering these challenges. Deploying the rigorous analysis of a philosopher, but writing clearly and in an often humorous style with an eye to lived experience, he takes on topics like compromise, commitment, polyamory, choosing a partner, online dating, and when to say “I love you.” Ultimately, Ben-Ze’ev assures us, while love is indeed best when fresh, if we tend to it carefully, it can become more delicious and nourishing even as time marches on. (shrink)

This study addresses the conceptual affinities between F. W. J. Schelling and Félix RavaissonRavaisson-Mollien, Félix by focusing on the genesis of the link between nature and thought in their respective philosophies. To achieve this, it considers the role of diagrammatic representation in depicting this link—particularly in the figure of the spiral. I argue that, for Schelling, the spiral is a real pattern that suggests the polarity of the mental and the physical whereas, for RavaissonRavaisson-Mollien, Félix, it is a memory of (...) the condition of action and a condition of grace. I cash out this argument by considering not only Schelling’s philosophy of nature, where the spiral is manifest in the vortex of the First Outline of the System of the Philosophy of Nature, and RavaissonRavaisson-Mollien, Félix’s OfHabitHabit, but also RavaissonRavaisson-Mollien, Félix’s essays on fine art, Leonardo da Vinci and the serpentine line. (shrink)

The state's commitment to educating all children can be framed as a matter of human capital development, or the economic benefits accrued to individuals and society as a result of educational attainment; it can be framed as a matter of capabilities, or the development of functionings that enable human flourishing; and it can be framed as a matter of rights. In this essay Sigal Ben-Porath considers the relative merits of the three approaches, elaborating the implications each of these different frameworks (...) has for the education of children with disabilities. While the capabilities approach, which arises from and relates to the rights approach, is sensitive to the needs of individuals with disabilities (more than the human capital approach is, in any case), Ben-Porath concludes that a rights framework can best express through educational policy the state's commitment to the education of all children, regardless of ability. (shrink)

Borrowing from the philosophy of Kierkegaard, one way of understanding the apparent conflict between science and religion is to frame each as a discourse in terms of ‘about’ and ‘of’ languages that appeal to objective-explicit and subjective-tacit aspects of experience. About languages are discourses that are about something else, where science is nominally about nature, empirical events and objective descriptions, whereas religions are about doctrines, rituals, liturgies, institutional structures and so on. About languages are those things that can be stated (...) propositionally, explicitly and objectively. In contrast, of languages refers to lived practices that are socio-historical. It is not just the doing of those practices but also the background conditions that contextualise them. This language is experienced tacitly and subjectively. Whilst we might be able to work from definitions by explicitly-objectively stating what science and religion are about, the tacit-subjective element eludes such reduction. Christianity, for example, may be about Jesus, Love and the Gospels, but we might be unsatisfied in saying that is all that Christianity is. Equally, we might be unsatisfied in claiming science is only about experimental verification, consensus building or falsification when history offers scientific counterexamples that fail to meet our definition. I argue that this unsatisfactory result is due to a metaphysical conflation of two discourses, which then create their own pseudo-problems, such as proving the existence of God as a route to the ‘Truth’ of religion or supplying a scientific basis for being ethical as a way of ‘disproving’ the religious experience. (shrink)

It will be argued that the “problem of demarcation” and the defining of “expertise” share common structural features that can lead to either a type of strong relativism or ultra-scepticism. Appropriating notions from Thomas Kuhn’s. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions it will be argued that an “expert” in a field that has a dominant paradigm is different to an “expert” in a field that has multiple competing paradigms. To illustrate my argument I will look at the field of economics and (...) the competing claims of experts over the likelihood of a global recession circa 2005. To this I will apply Goldman’s criteria for expertise assessment and by-way of a hypothetical non-expert show that this criteria becomes deficient in expertise assessment if we only hold to what I have called a “methodological” definition of expertise. I will also introduce the notion of the “anti-expert” who is an equivalent expert, but their whole field is dependent upon the dominant paradigm for its meaning. That is, its existence is parasitic upon the success of the paradigm, rather than as a “revolutionary science” which looks to overthrown or change the paradigm. (shrink)

Without suggesting that Kant is responsible for the rise of hermeneutical philosophy, there are some developments in his philosophy which are important in relation to hermeneutics. Kant made the distinction between things‐in‐themselves and phenomena or appearances (see Article 2, kant). The world we know depends on a conceptual projection of categories of our mind; we do not have access to the things‐in‐themselves, but only to interpretations of things such as they appear to us, after they have been edited by the (...) understanding. This domestication of rationality led to the fideism of Jacobi: if reason can not bring us to reality, the only instance that can give us any sense of an objective and real world is faith with a kind of “knowledge” which is higher than our rational knowledge. In his early On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799) Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) followed Jacobi in denying the pretensions of rational knowledge and determined religious sentiment to be a source of “knowledge” which transcends rational understanding (Vedder 1994). This background of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics is important to acknowledge. Therefore in this essay I will emphasize the fragility of hermeneutical knowledge for Schleiermacher. First I shall explain the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher; then I shall examine the relation between hermeneutics and dialectics. (shrink)

In topical philosophy of religion the word 'given' plays an important role. However the meaning of this word is ambiguous. The word refers not only to the factual reality (datum) but also to what is given as a gift to someone (donum). This ambiguity leads toan unclear mixture of philosophical and religious positions. Therefore an analysis of such mixture is necessary. The main question of this analysis is how faith and religion on the one hand, and ontology and reason on (...) the other hand, influence each other? Isn'tit so that in the religious domain nobody can be convinced with and by rational means? In the first section, the question on the reality of the ultimate meaning as the momentfrom where man is motivated to lead his life, is explored. In the second section the idea is developed that philosophical insights are meaningful with regard to religious meaning only if they are referred back to religious faith. In the third section the question posited is whether philosophical reflection does not loose its original motivationalcontext if it isn't referred back to its original point of departure. This analysis is worked out against the background of I. Verhack's book: De mens en zijn onrust. Over het raadsel van de beweging. (shrink)

In this article the author presents a comment on Ludwig Heyde’s last book. This book on autonomy, transcendence and mortality was published a few days before he died. Heyde analyses the concept of autonomy, transcendence and mortality from a philosophical point of view. He especially pays a lot of attention to the notion of mortality. Here, he tends to strengthen the Kantian postulate of immortality by giving it an ontological claim. But what kind of “being” can we ascribe to what (...) on the other side of death counts for the immortals? Isn’t this a question about the relation between philosophy and religion? Many philosophers tend to approach religion in a reductionistic way. By their point of departure they ignore beforehand the specific religious aspects of life. But isn't it the task for philosophy to approach religion in such a way that religion preserves its specificity? To achieve this, maybe it is also necessary to ascribe ontological claims to religious truth. With his concept of transcendence Heyde approaches religion not in a reductionistic way. However the question remains whether philosophy can do justice to religious truth. Since religion is, as Heyde says in the beginning of his study, sui generis, can philosophy ever do justice to it? Or is religion neutralised by philosophy beforehand? This book therefore, leaves us behind with the question: can philosophy do justice to religion? (shrink)