Lucretius devotes some sections of his De rerum natura to the treatment of dreams. He is particularly interested in the phenomenon of dream deception, namely the belief that the dreamt object is the object itself. This psychological phenomenon has some both unwanted and philosophically interesting implications. Firstly, from an ethical point of view, it can stimulate uncontrolled worries and feelings in the dreamer that undermine his/her mental tranquility and health. Secondly, from a physiological perspective, it seems to reveal a failure (...) in the mechanism undergoing the formation of mental representation. Thirdly, from the epistemological point of view, it seems to compromise the veracity of mental representations. This paper aims to explain how Lucretius dealt with this phenomenon. In particular, it will show how he succeeded, on the one hand, to explain the nature and the origin of dream deception and of its emotional aspect, and, on the other hand, to preserve the informative contents of dreams and their correspondence to reality. For this purpose the present essay will address the following issues: which is the condition of the soul and of the mind while sleeping; what kind of mental activity is dreaming; which is the nature and the origin of the simulacra responsible for dreams; which is the contents of dreams and how dream deception comes about; and finally why and how dream deception emotionally effects the dreamer. (shrink)

En plus de concevoir la vue et la pensée comme des processus empiriques capables de reproduire les caractéristiques des corps, Épicure reconnaît un processus psychophysique intermédiaire par le biais duquel les phantasiai ou représentations sont produites dans l’esprit et synthétisent les caractéristiques des objets sensibles. L’objectif de cet article est de monter qu’Épicure a retravaillé la doctrine de Démocrite dans cette direction, à la lumière de la critique aristotélicienne de certaines théories de la perception et de sa réflexion sur la (...) formation du phantasma. Nous étudions le processus physiologique à l’origine de la phantasia chez Épicure, et nous montrons son lien avec le processus psychophysique adopté par Aristote pour expliquer la représentation. (shrink)

Aristote estime qu’une vie consacrée à gagner de l’argent ne mérite pas d’être vécue, dans la mesure où elle est sujette à des contraintes et fondée sur une conception pervertie de la richesse. Cependant, il assigne à l’argent une valeur instrumentale en tant qu’il est indispensable au bonheur, et il reconnaît qu’il y a des tendances naturelles à la richesse en tout agent. Cet article se propose de clarifier les thèses d’Aristote concernant la fonction de la richesse dans son rapport (...) à une vie bonne, concernant ce qui garantit l’usage correct des biens et comment il est possible de promouvoir la pratique de la chrématistique naturelle face à l’extension des formes perverties de recherche du profit. L’article entend ensuite montrer quelles vertus sont liées à la richesse – générosité, magnificence et justice ou équité – et comment elles se rattachent aux vices opposés – c’est-à-dire : prodigalité et avarice, tendance dépensière et pingrerie, et injustice ou inéquité. L’intention de cette étude est d’expliquer pourquoi l’enquête aristotélicienne sur les bonnes et mauvaises habitudes liées à l’usage de la richesse est complémentaire de l’enquête sur la genèse des phénomènes économiques, et pourquoi elle vise à garantir dans la pratique une chrématistique parfaitement intégrée à l’éthique et à la politique. (shrink)

Epicureanism is not only a defence of pleasure: it is also a philosophy of science and knowledge. This edited collection explores new pathways for the study of Epicurean scientific thought, a hitherto still understudied domain, and engages systematically and critically with existing theories. It shows that the philosophy of Epicurus and his heirs, from antiquity to the classical age, founded a rigorous and coherent conception of knowledge. This first part of a two-volume set examines more specifically the contribution of Epicureanism (...) in the fields of language, medicine, and meteorology (i.e., celestial, geological and atmospheric phenomena). Offering a renewed image of Epicureanism, [volume 1] includes studies on the nature of human language and on the linguistic aspects of scientific discourse; on the relationship between Epicureanism and ancient medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen; on meteorological phenomena and the method of explaining them; and on the reception of Epicurus's legacy in Gassendi. (shrink)

Epicureanism is not only a defence of pleasure: it is also a philosophy of science and knowledge. This edited collection explores new pathways for the study of Epicurean scientific thought, a hitherto still understudied domain, and engages systematically and critically with existing theories. It shows that the philosophy of Epicurus and his heirs, from antiquity to the classical age, founded a rigorous and coherent conception of knowledge. This first part of a two-volume set examines more specifically the contribution of Epicureanism (...) in the fields of language, medicine, and meteorology (i.e., celestial, geological and atmospheric phenomena). Offering a renewed image of Epicureanism, the book includes studies on the nature of human language and on the linguistic aspects of scientific discourse; on the relationship between Epicureanism and ancient medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen; on meteorological phenomena and the method of explaining them; and on the reception of Epicurus's legacy in Gassendi. (shrink)

In this paper I will examine a difficulty (aporia), which Aristotle raises in Physics B 5.197a20-25: whether fortuitous things can be held as causes of luck. I will show the meaning of the passage and its relevance within the context of Aristotelian extended analysis of the notions of ``luck'' and ``chance''. I will claim that, in facing the problem, Aristotle has a twofold aim. Firstly, he wants to explain why luck is, after having enquired whether it exists and what it (...) is. Secondly, he wants to prevent his pupils, among others, from denying causal efficacy to luck, by reducing fortuitous events, that are the result of accidental causes, to the action of per se causes, such as nature and human deliberation. (shrink)

Critical notice of Tim O’ Keefe, Epicurus on Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

There is ample evidence from literature and clinical practice indicating mathematical difficulties in individuals with ADHD, even when there is no concomitant diagnosis of developmental dyscalculia. What factors underlie these difficulties is still an open question. Research on dyscalculia and neurotypical development suggests visual perception of numerosity (the number sense) as a building block for math learning. Participants with lower numerosity estimation thresholds (higher precision) are often those with higher math capabilities. Strangely, the role of numerosity perception in math skills (...) in ADHD has been neglected, leaving open the question whether math difficulties in ADHD also originate from a deficitary visual number sense. In the current study we psychophysically measured numerosity thresholds and accuracy in a sample of children/adolescents with ADHD, but not concomitant dyscalculia (N = 20, 8–16 years). Math abilities were also measured by tasks indexing different mathematical competences. Numerosity performance and math scores were then compared to those obtained from an age-matched control group (N = 20). Bayesian statistics indicated no difference between ADHD and controls on numerosity perception, despite many of the symbolic math tasks being impaired in participants with ADHD. Moreover, the math deficits showed by the group with ADHD remained substantial even when numerosity thresholds were statistically regressed out. Overall, these results indicate that math difficulties in ADHD are unlikely to originate from an impaired visual number sense. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 4, Page 981-998, October 2022.

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply–and, especially, what they do not imply–for agent-causation theories. Here, we will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections (...) against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a ‘quantum-libertarian’ approach to the problem of free will. In particular, we will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate Nishida Kitarō’s way of philosophizing in the light of the concept of “transition” in order to deepen our understanding of both Nishida’s philosophy and our thinking about and in transitions, using the concept of “boundary” or “border” (Grenze) as a catalyst. For that purpose, we focus on Nishida’s essay “Place” (「場所」), passing through different parts of the text as if through successive gates on a path of transition between one place and the (...) next, until we reach the final place of “absolute nothingness.” Dwelling on this place, we turn our attention to its internal structure and try to depict it along the outlines of a boundary, following the movements taking place in Nishida’s essay. The second part proposes an interpretation of the place of nothingness as an interminable practice of boundary-crossing that doesn’t come to a halt in a final, all-encompassing place, but dynamically situates itself on countless intersecting planes. After a more or less abstract analysis of the concept of “boundary,” we will apply and concretize this approach by using the example of the skin. To this end, we expose five main features of the skin as boundary: permeability, enclosure, excessiveness, interstitiality and reciprocal self-formation. (shrink)

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

Metaphor has been considered as a cognitive process, independent of the verbal versus visual mode, through which an unknown conceptual domain is understood in terms of another known conceptual domain. Metaphor might instead be viewed as a cognitive process, dependent on the mode, which leads to genuinely new knowledge via ignorance. First, I argue that there are two main senses of ignorance at stake when we understand a metaphor: we ignore some existing properties of the known domain in the sense (...) that we disregard or neglect them; we ignore some “non-existing” properties of the known domain in the sense that they are not a piece of information belonging to the known domain, but emerge in metaphor interpretation. Secondly, I consider a metaphor as a reasoning device, guiding the interpreters along a path of inferences to a conclusion, which attributes to the target some properties of the source. In this path, interpreters might discover the ignored existing properties of the known domain and/or recover the “non-existing” properties, inferring or imagining the missing piece of information. Finally, I argue that, especially in visual metaphors, this process is guided by a “sentiment of rationality”, tracking a disruption of existing familiar conceptualisations of objects and/or actions and a recovery of ignored properties. (shrink)

Despite the remarkable advances in behavioral and brain sciences over the last decades, the mind/body (brain) problem is still an open debate and one of the most intriguing questions for both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Traditional approaches have conceived this problem in terms of a contrast between physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism. However, since the late sixties, the landscape of philosophical views on the problem has become more varied and complex. The Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) claims that mental (...) properties can be (or are) realized, and mental processes can be (or are) implemented by neural correlates of different kinds. Thus, MRT challenges the psychoneural type-identity theory and the corresponding reductionism. Many philosophers have acknowledged the a priori plausibility of MRT. However, the existence of empirical evidence in favor of intraspecific, human multiple realizations of mental processes and properties is still controversial. Here we illustrate some cases that provide empirical evidence in support of MRT. Recently, it has been proposed that foveal agnosic vision, like peripheral vision, can be restored by increasing object parts’ spacing (Strappini et al., 2017a; Crutch and Warrington, 2007). Agnosic fovea and normal periphery are both limited by crowding, that impairs object recognition, and provides the signature of visual integration. Here we define a psychological property of restored object identification and we cross-reference the data of visually-impaired patients with different etiologies. In particular, we compare the data of two stroke patients, two patients with posterior cortical atrophy (PCA), six cases of strabismic amblyopia, and one case with restored sight. We also compare these patients with unimpaired subjects tested in the periphery. We show that integration (i.e. restored recognition) seems to describe quite accurately the visual performance in all these cases. While the patients have different etiologies and different neural correlates, the unimpaired subjects have no neural damage. Thus similarity in the psychological property given the differences in the neural substrate can be interpreted in relation to MRT and provide evidence in its support. Finally, we will frame our contribution within the current debate concerning MRT providing new and compelling empirical evidence. (shrink)

What is a gene? Does it represent a natural kind, or is it just a tool for genomics? A clear answer to these questions has been challenged by postgenomic discoveries. In response, I will argue that the gene can be deemed a natural kind as it satisfies some requirements for genuine kindhood. Specifically, natural kinds are projectible categories in our best scientific theories, and they represent nodes in the causal network of the world (as in Khalidi. Natural Categories and Human (...) Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Khalidi. Synthese 195: 1379–1396, 2018; Khalidi. Are Sexes Natural Kinds, In: Dasgupta S, Weslake B (eds) Current Controversies in Philoso-phy of Science. Routledge, New York, 2020; Khalidi. Philos Sci 88:1–21, 2021). In Sect. 2, I will present a brief history of the gene and the controversy over its status. In Sect. 3, I will introduce the account of natural kinds considered in this paper. In Sect. 4, I will first present the relevant definition of genes and how they can be classified. Then, I will argue that the gene can be considered a natural kind as it satisfies the criteria for natural kindhood. Section 5 concludes. (shrink)

Criminal liability for acts committed by AI systems has recently become a hot legal topic. This paper includes three different contributions. The first contribution is an analysis of the extent to which an AI system can satisfy the requirements for criminal liability: accomplishing an actus reus, having the corresponding mens rea, possessing the cognitive capacities needed for responsibility. The second contribution is a discussion of criminal activity accomplished by an AI entity, with reference to a recent case involving an online (...) bot, the Random Darknet Shopper. This discussion will provide the context for the analysis of commonalities and differences between criminal activities by humans and by artificial systems. The third contribution concerns the evaluation of different ways of addressing criminal activities by AI systems in a regulatory perspective. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta las relaciones entre la filosofía y la tecnología en la obra de Philip E. Agre, quien propuso una práctica técnica crítica que incorporase a la investigación tecnológica un examen de las construcciones discursivas que subyacen al proyecto de la inteligencia artificial (IA). Se ofrece una exposición de las ideas heideggerianas que Agre pretende hacer valer en la programación de la acción inteligente de agentes artificiales, si bien ulteriormente se criticará el propósito de programar el comportamiento práctico en (...) el mundo circundante, dado que esto no es otra cosa que lo que Heidegger denominó la construcción técnica moderna del ser humano como máquina. Palabras clave: Filosofía de la ciencia cognitiva - inteligencia artificial - Heidegger - Agre. (shrink)