Recent work on formal theories of truth has revived an approach, due originally to Tarski, on which syntax and truth theories are sharply distinguished—‘disentangled’—from mathematical base theories. In this paper, we defend a novel philosophical constraint on disentangled theories. We argue that these theories must be epistemically stable: they must possess an intrinsic motivation justifying no strictly stronger theory. In a disentangled setting, even if the base and the syntax theory are individually stable, they may be jointly unstable. We contend (...) that this flaw afflicts many proposals discussed in the literature; we defend a new, stable disentangled theory, double second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

I develop a novel argument against the claim that ordinals are sets. In contrast to Benacerraf’s antireductionist argument, I make no use of covert epistemic assumptions. Instead, my argument uses considerations of ontological dependence. I draw on the datum that sets depend immediately and asymmetrically on their elements and argue that this datum is incompatible with reductionism, given plausible assumptions about the dependence profile of ordinals. In addition, I show that a structurally similar argument can be made against the claim (...) that cardinals are sets. (shrink)

I extend theorems due to Roy Cook on third- and higher-order versions of abstraction principles and discuss the philosophical importance of results of this type. Cook demonstrated that the satisfiability of certain higher-order analogues of Hume's Principle is independent of ZFC. I show that similar analogues of Boolos's new v and Cook's own ordinal abstraction principle soap are not satisfiable at all. I argue, however, that these results do not tell significantly against the second-order versions of these principles.

Vann McGee has argued that, given certain background assumptions and an ought-implies-can thesis about norms of rationality, Bayesianism conflicts globally with computationalism due to the fact that Robinson arithmetic is essentially undecidable. I show how to sharpen McGee's result using an additional fact from recursion theory—the existence of a computable sequence of computable reals with an uncomputable limit. In conjunction with the countable additivity requirement on probabilities, such a sequence can be used to construct a specific proposition to which Bayesianism (...) requires an agent to assign uncomputable credence—yielding a local conflict with computationalism. (shrink)

This paper examines the logical and metaphysical consequences of denying Leibniz's Law, the principle that if t1= t2, then φ(t1) if and only if φ(t2). Recently, Caie, Goodman, and Lederman (2020) and Bacon and Russell (2019) have proposed sophisticated logical systems permitting violations of Leibniz's Law. We show that their systems conflict with widely held, attractive principles concerning the metaphysics of individuals. Only by adopting a highly revisionary picture, on which there is no finest-grained equivalence relation, can a well-motivated metaphysics (...) for rejecting Leibniz's Law be developed. We sketch one such picture—a metaphysics of stuff. Stuff ontologies can be initially motivated through ordinary language: stuff stands to mass nouns as objects stand to count nouns. The stuff ontology we propose takes stuff to be fundamental and views the world as composed of an infinite descending hierarchy of kinds and portions of stuff. We defend the coherence of this picture and offer a model theory demonstrating that it can be consistently formalized. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 3, Page 547-566, November 2021.

This note defends the reduction of ordinals to pure sets against an argument put forward by Beau Madison Mount. In the first part I will defend the claim that dependence simpliciter can be reduced to immediate dependence and define a notion of predecessor dependence. In the second part I will provide and defend a way to model the dependence profile of ordinals akin to Mount’s proposal in terms of immediate dependence and predecessor dependence. I furthermore show (...) that my alternative dependence profile allows us to single out the reduction of ordinals to von Neumann ordinals as the only viable set-theoretic reduction. (shrink)

In bioethics, discussions of justice have tended to focus on questions of fairness in access to health care: is there a right to medical treatment, and how should priorities be set when medical resources are scarce. But health care is only one of many factors that determine the extent to which people live healthy lives, and fairness is not the only consideration in determining whether a health policy is just. In this pathbreaking book, senior bioethicists Powers and Faden confront foundational (...) issues about health and justice. How much inequality in health can a just society tolerate. The audience for the book is scholars and students of bioethics and moral and political philosophy, as well as anyone interested in public health and health policy. (shrink)

Political liberalism has increasingly come under fire from both the right and the left, in politics as well as in philosophy. In this new study, G.B. Madison offers a systematic rebuttal to these contemporary critics, attempting to demonstrate that the basic principles of classical liberal philosophy are not only internally valid and coherent but also directly relevant to the problems faced by society in the post-industrial age. Building on the theory of Frank H. Knight and other liberal tinkers, (...) class='Hi'>Madison outlines the postmodern theory of reason that is presupposed within classical liberal theory and makes the case that as a political philosophy liberalism can be justified entirely within its own terms, without reference to arbitrary or absolute values. (shrink)

I Deliberation, Practical Syllogisms , and Intuition. Introduction Aristotle's views on moral reasoning are a difficult and much disputed subject. ...

Structural Injustice advances a theory of what structural injustice is and how it works. Powers and Faden present both a philosophically powerful, integrated theory about human rights violations and structural unfairness, alongside practical insights into how to improve them.

Whether Trinitarianism is coherent depends not only on whether some account of the Trinity is coherent, but on which accounts of the Trinity count as "Trinitarian." After all, Arianism and Modalism are both accounts of the Trinity, but neither counts as Trinitarian (which is why defenses of Arianism or Modalism don’t count as defenses of Trinitarianism). This raises the question, if not just any account of the Trinity counts as Trinitarian, which do? Dale Tuggy is one of very few philosophers (...) to give explicit definitions of Trinitarian (versus Unitarian) theology. But they are no mere formalities. They are essential to his central criticisms of both historical and contemporary forms of Trinitarianism. In this paper, I offer my own definitions of Trinitarian and Unitarian theology, contrast them with Tuggy’s, and argue for the superiority of my definitions to Tuggy’s. If Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are what Tuggy says they are, the outlook for Trinitarianism is bleak indeed. If they are what I say they are, Tuggy’s central objection to Trinitarianism fails. To show what is at stake in these pairs of definitions, I examine a doctrine much neglected in Analytic Theology, but central to Nicene Trinitarianism—the Monarchy of the Father. (shrink)

Interpreting God’s silence may prove as fruitful to communities of faith as a firm understanding of God’s words. Against the backdrop of Lamentations’ boisterous lament, God’s silence speaks volumes.

Analytic theology has sometimes been criticized as ahistorical. But what this means, and why it is problematic, have often been left unclear. This essay explicates and supports one way of making that charge while simultaneously showing this ahistoricity, although widespread within analytic theology, is not essential to it. Specifically, some analytic theologians treat problematic doctrines as metaphysical puzzles, constructing speculative accounts of phenomena such as the Trinity or Incarnation and taking the theoretical virtues of such accounts to be sufficient in (...) themselves to defend traditional doctrines with no need for additional, historical premises. But due to the different epistemic structures of metaphysical and theological puzzles, I argue that importing this methodology into philosophical theology results in invalid or question-begging arguments, and it is unclear how a virtue-centric methodology could be repaired without collapsing into a more historical methodology, which some of the best (but unfortunately not all) analytic theologians follow. (shrink)

Analytic theologians have proposed numerous “solutions” to the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT), mostly versions of Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI). Both types of solution are controversial, but many hold out hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may yield some as yet unimagined, and somehow importantly different, solution to the LPT. I first give a precise definition of the LPT and of what would count as a solution to it. I then show how, though there are infinitely (...) many possible solutions, all solutions can be grouped together into a finite, exhaustive taxonomy, based precisely on those features which make them either controversial, heretical, or inconsistent. The taxonomy reveals why ST and RI have been the major proposed solutions, and also proves that there can be no importantly different, new solutions to the LPT. (shrink)

Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has been a major challenge in vision science for at least the last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual domains, is the inherent ambiguity of (...) the real-world origins of any spectral stimulus. (shrink)

In this article, we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption (...) in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberty and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty. (shrink)

A growing body of literature argues that achieving radical change in the agri-food system requires a radical renegotiation of our relationship with the environment alongside a change in our thinking and approach to transformational food politics. This paper argues that relational approaches such as a more-than-human ethic of care (MTH EoC) can offer a different and constructive perspective to analyse agri-food system transformation because it emphasises social structures and relationships as the basis of environmental change. A MTH EoC has not (...) yet been applied to regenerative agriculture, yet other literature on regenerative agriculture suggests that care may be present in these spaces and calls for the need for social science analysis of the regenerative movement. This paper uses a MTH EoC lens to reveal a diverse array of ways in which power is and can be deployed for change in the regenerative agriculture movement in Aotearoa, New Zealand. Globally, regenerative agriculture tends to be analysed through positivist, scientific approaches that focus on biophysical markers of ecological improvement. Yet, a relational approach reveals how engagement in regenerative agriculture is creating significant shifts in mindset towards more holistic and relational understandings of biological and social ecosystems. A regenerative mindset framework is suggested as a method of understanding the connection between a regenerative form of thinking, being and doing for farmers. Interviews suggested that this shift in farmers’ socio-ecological relations is crucial to the transformational potential of regenerative agriculture. This paper argues that relational analyses such as the MTH EoC approach used to analyse regenerative agriculture in this research, refresh the way we analyse agri-food system change. They also are critical to guiding and supporting on-the-ground socio-ecological shifts that are necessary to see agricultural transformation. (shrink)

Beau Branson rounds out the previous two chapters, by exploring the doctrine of inseparable operations ad extra in the writings of St Gregory of Nyssa. This doctrine says that all the activities of the three hypostases of the Trinity, at least insofar as they relate to things outside of (“ad extra”) the Trinity, are not only qualitatively identical but numerically identical. Importantly, Branson focuses his attention on Gregory’s theory of action and the individuation of events that emerges from his (...) theological defense of the doctrine of inseparable operations ad extra. Through a heavy engagement with contemporary metaphysics, Branson shows that Gregory’s philosophy of action is not only coherent, anticipating current trends in the ontology of actions and events, but may provide novel solutions to longstanding problems in this field. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Trinity is central to mainstream Christianity. But insofar as it posits “three persons” (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), who are “one God,” it appears as inconsistent as the claim that 1+1+1=1. -/- Much of the literature on “The Logical Problem of the Trinity,” as this has been called, attacks or defends Trinitarianism with little regard to the fourth century theological controversies and the late Hellenistic and early Medieval philosophical background in which it took shape. I argue (...) that this methodol- ogy, which I call “the Puzzle Approach,” produces obviously invalid arguments, and it is unclear how to repair it without collapsing into my preferred method- ology, “the Historical Approach,” which sees history as essential to the debate. I also discuss “mysterianism,” arguing that, successful or not, it has a different goal from the other approaches. I further argue that any solution from the His- torical Approach satisfies the concerns of the Puzzle Approach and mysterianism anyway. -/- I then examine the solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity found in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s writings, both due to his place in the history of the doctrine, and his clarity in explicating what I call “the metaphysics of synergy.” I recast his solution in standard predicate logic and provide a formal proof of its consistency. I end by considering the possibilities for attacking the broader philosophical context of his defense and conclude that the prospects for doing so are dim. In any case, if there should turn out to be any problem with the doctrine of the Trinity at all, it will not be one of mere logical inconsistency in saying that “These Three are One.”. (shrink)

This paper investigates the adequacy of evidential relevance relations proposed by Glymour and others. These accounts incorporate, as a necessary condition, what I call the Positive Instance Condition (PIC): the evidence statement and auxiliary assumptions entail a "positive instance" of the hypothesis. I argue that any account which incorporates PIC as a necessary condition while allowing "bootstrap testing" is doomed to fail. A nonbootstrapping evidential relevance relation of similar form is proposed, and it is argued that, in addition to avoiding (...) published counter examples, this new relation meets two general requirements which, if not met, would undermine the ability of any account that incorporates PIC to accord with our intuitions of evidential relevance. (shrink)

Suppose that you have deeply personal information that you do not want to share. Further suppose that this information could help others, perhaps even saving their lives. Should you reveal the information or keep it secret? With the increasing prevalence of genetic testing, more and more people are finding themselves in this situation. Although a patient's genetic results are potentially relevant to all her biological family members, her first‐degree relatives—parents, children, and full siblings—are most likely to be affected. This is (...) especially true for genetic mutations—like those in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—that are associated with a dramatically increased risk of disease. Fortunately, people are usually willing to share results with their at‐risk relatives. Occasionally, however, a patient refuses to disclose her findings to anyone outside her clinical team. Ethicists have written little on patients’ moral duties to their at‐risk relatives. Moreover, the few accounts that have been advanced are problematic. Some unnecessarily expose patients’ genetic information to relatives who are unlikely to benefit from it, and others fail to ensure that patients’ most vulnerable relatives are informed of their genetic risks. Patients’ duty to warn can be defended in a way that avoids these problems. I argue that the duty to share one's genetic results is grounded in the principle of rescue—the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. When these two criteria are satisfied, a patient will most likely have a duty to warn. (shrink)

This paper critiques Adorno’s interpretation of Paul Celan’s poetry, as well as some of the philosophical ideas that motivate it. For Adorno, Celan’s poetry is “hermetic”—it refuses aesthetic representation; and, by virtue of this hermeticism, it expresses the horror of the Holocaust—a horror whose content is that it refuses aesthetic representation. I give a reading of Celan’s “Tenebrae,” from his 1959 collection Sprachgitter, and show that it uses aesthetic representation; that this use expresses the horror of the Holocaust; and that, (...) in comparison to this, Adorno’s concept of hermeticism is a way of concealing this horror. (shrink)

This paper critiques Adorno’s interpretation of Paul Celan’s poetry, as well as some of the philosophical ideas that motivate it. For Adorno, Celan’s poetry is “hermetic”—it refuses aesthetic representation; and, by virtue of this hermeticism, it expresses the horror of the Holocaust—a horror whose content is that it refuses aesthetic representation. I give a reading of Celan’s “Tenebrae,” from his 1959 collection Sprachgitter, and show that it uses aesthetic representation; that this use expresses the horror of the Holocaust; and that, (...) in comparison to this, Adorno’s concept of hermeticism is a way of concealing this horror. (shrink)

Since their emergence in the 1980s, environmental virtue ethics (EVEs) have aimed to provide an alternative to deontological and consequentialist approaches for guiding ecological actions in the context of the global environmental crisis. The deterioration of the ecological situation and the challenges in addressing collective action problems caused by global changes have heightened interest in these ethics. They offer a framework for meaningful individual actions independently of the commitment of other actors. However, by shifting the focus onto individuals, EVEs appear (...) to grapple with the tension between anthropocentrism and respect for nature, as well as between self-flourishing and concern for other living beings. This article argues that this difficulty is rooted in the neglect within EVEs of the communitarian aspect of ancient virtue ethics. Drawing from Baird Callicott’s ecocentric approach and Val Plumwood’s works, this paper explores the possibility of conceiving ecological communities as collective frameworks in which both public and private virtues are defined and practiced. (shrink)

In the 225 years since the United States Constitution was first drafted, no single book has addressed the key questions of what constitutions are designed to do, how they are structured, and why they matter. In From Words to Worlds, constitutional scholar Beau Breslin corrects this glaring oversight, singling out the essential functions that a modern, written constitution must incorporate in order to serve as a nation's fundamental law. Breslin lays out and explains the basic functions of a modern (...) constitution -- including creating a new citizenry, structuring the institutions of government, regulating conflict between layers and branches of government, and limiting the power of the sovereign. He also moves into the esoteric, discussing the theoretical concepts behind the fundamentals of written constitutions and examining in-depth some of the most important constitutional charters from around the world. In assaying how states put the structural ideas into practice, Breslin asks probing questions about why -- and if -- constitutions matter. His answer is a resounding yes. Solidly argued and engagingly written, this comparative study in constitutional thought demonstrates clearly the key components that a state's foundational document must address. In doing so, Breslin draws a critically important distinction between constitutional texts and constitutional practice. (shrink)

Technological advances in genetic testing have enabled prospective parents to learn about their risk of passing a genetic condition to their future children. One option for those who want to ensure that their biological children do not inherit a genetic condition is to create embryos through in vitro fertilisation and use a technique called preimplantation genetic testing to screen embryos for genetic abnormalities before implantation. Unfortunately, due to its high cost, IVF-with-PGT is out of reach for the vast majority of (...) Americans. This article addresses an issue that has been underexplored in the medical ethics literature: the lack of insurance coverage for IVF-with-PGT.Within the US system, a key concept in insurance is that of medically necessary care, which broadly consists of diagnostic services and treatment services. In this article, I argue that IVF-with-PGT could be classified as either a diagnostic service or as a treatment service. To make this case, I show that IVF-with-PGT is similar to other types of services that are often covered by US insurance providers. In light of these similarities, I argue that the current system is inconsistent with respect to what is—and is not—covered by insurance. To promote consistency and fairness in coverage, like cases should be treated alike—starting with greater coverage for IVF-with-PGT. (shrink)

The second season of True Detective portrays the relationship between law and justice cynically; law and its enforcement seem to be divorced from any conception of justice. Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen jurisprudence explicitly refers to official norms, such as legal order imposed by the state. True Detective, deals largely with unofficial legal norms, such as those of a corrupt city and of criminal organizations. A central conflict in True Detective's second season is the tension between the impulse for revenge (...) and the impulse for the more noble retributive justice. The series' presentation of law and justice and the conflict between a retrograde system of justice that is the norm and a newer virtue ethic driven by moral reasoning is what brings about the inevitable tragedies of the finale— the violent deaths of Velcoro and Semyon, and the exile of Bezzerides. True Detective is, particularly in its finale, a good illustration of Hegel's vision of tragedy. (shrink)

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...) Evil Genius thought experiment is at best incomplete. As presented, therefore, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains. (shrink)

Articles by Lyn Horn and Alison Thompson highlight several points crucial to understanding how our theory figures in wider debates about social justice as well as the particular relevance of our theory for assessing the overall practice of public health (Horn, 2013; Thompson, 2013). We begin with these two articles, first to respond to and concur with many of their central points, and second to set the stage for dealing more efficiently with some points raised in the other articles.

When new drugs are approved by the Food and Drug Administration, the default assumption is that they will be available by prescription only, safe for use exclusively under clinical supervision. The paternalism underlying this default must be interrogated in order to ensure appropriate respect for patient autonomy. Upon closer inspection, prescription requirements are justified when nonprescription status would risk harm to third parties and when a large segment of the population would struggle to exercise their autonomy in using a drug (...) safely and effectively on their own. Although these justifications can support prescription status for many drugs, we propose that reversing the FDA's current default to instead begin with a presumption in favor of over‐the‐counter status is the best way to avoid interference with valid claims of patient autonomy. Under this approach, a range of drug products could be considered for an OTC switch, including oral contraceptives, statins, and HIV‐prevention drugs. (shrink)

: The increasing reliance upon, and perhaps the growing public and professional skepticism about, the special expertise of bioethicists suggests the need to consider the limits of moral expertise. For all the talk about method in bioethics, we, bioethicists, are still rather far off the mark in understanding what we are doing, even when we may be going about what we are doing fairly well. Quite often, what is most fundamentally at stake, but equally often insufficiently acknowledged, are inherently political, (...) essentially contested visions of the most compelling and attractive forms of life for individuals and social organization. The current situation in bioethics parallels similar debates in eighteenth-century jurisprudence, especially Jeremy Bentham's withering critique of the prevalent forms of judicial argument and his own, equally unsuccessful, attempt to develop a decision-making procedure in ethics that would operate on a plane above politics. The risk, both then and now, is that we will fail to appreciate the wide range of reasonable disagreement that will remain past the point of extended reflection and discussion. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

According to Leo Strauss, one of the primary purposes of the esotericism practiced by philosophers is the defense against persecution. This defense entails communicating the truth only to philosophers and concealing it from non-philosophers. For many commentators, this conception of esotericism has inegalitarian implications—for example, that the philosophers, who constitute a minority of people, are naturally capable of being told the truth, while the non-philosophers, who constitute a majority, are not. In this article, I argue that Strauss gives another account (...) of esotericism that does not have inegalitarian implications. He gives this account in his discussion of Farabi’s esotericism in the “Introduction” to Persecution and the Art of Writing. I also argue that Strauss presents this account esoterically. The “Introduction” reproduces text from an earlier article by Strauss, “Farabi’s Plato,” and Strauss makes certain changes, which point towards this other account. Finally, I explain why Strauss presents this other account esoterically. (shrink)

This article offers a new account of Leo Strauss’s interpretation of Maimonides’ esoteric teaching in the Guide for the Perplexed, which Strauss offers in his seminal essay ‘The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed.’ According to the generally-accepted view, for Strauss, Maimonides’ esoteric teaching is the identity of the secrets of the Torah with Aristotelian philosophy, and—since that philosophy contradicts the foundational beliefs of the Torah—that the Torah has the merely instrumental function of bringing about political well-being. By (...) contrast, I argue that, for Strauss, Maimonides’ esoteric teaching is the necessity of breaking the laws of the Torah for the sake of restoring Israel’s sovereignty. Additionally, I claim that Strauss’s interpretation depends on Carl Schmitt’s ‘decisionism.’. (shrink)

Paul Celan’s “Tenebrae” is a scandalous poem: it describes how “unity with the dying Jesus” is achieved by means of the Jewish experience of the concentration camps. In this paper, I provide a new interpretation of “Tenebrae” that breaks from the two traditional ways in which the poem has been viewed—on the one hand, as a Christian poem that suggests that Jesus, insofar as he suffers just like Jewish concentration camp victims do, can provide “hope and redemption for the faithful”, (...) and, on the other hand, as an ironic criticism of this Christian idea. Rather, I suggest that “Tenebrae” is a modification of Christianity: preserving Christian belief about Jesus’s death, it destroys that belief, and does so for the sake of the defense against Christian persecution. Finally, I suggest that this view reveals the peculiar poetic form of “Tenebrae”—what I call “political form.”. (shrink)

This paper is an elaboration of Paul de Man’s critique, in “Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin,” of Martin Heidegger’s commentary on Friedrich Hölderlin’s poem, “As when on a holiday…” I show that de Man’s critique can be expanded into a critique of a type of testimony that Heidegger ascribes to Hölderlin’s poem. Heidegger ascribes to Hölderlin’s poem what I call “infinite testimony,” but, thereby, suppresses in the poem another type of testimony—what I call “finite testimony. This suppression is most in evidence (...) in Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s reference to the myth of Semele, as well as in Heidegger’s excision, in the version of the poem that he printed in the commentary, of the concluding lines of the poem. Additionally, I discuss the political implications of Heidegger’s suppression of the finite testimony depicted in “As when on a holiday...”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA primary theme in Leo Strauss’s early work is how medieval Jewish and Islamic political philosophy, while influenced by Plato, differs from him in crucial ways. This theme is central to Strauss’s 1935 book Philosophy and Law. Philosophy and Law concerns the medieval ‘philosophic foundation of the law,’ which provides a rational justification of revelation. For Strauss, the foundation provides this justification by virtue of some difference it has from Plato. In this paper, I offer a new interpretation of Strauss’s (...) view of this difference. I suggest that, for Strauss, whereas Plato conceived of the legislator and his legislation, the foundation conceives of the sovereign and his sovereign laws. On this basis, I also suggest a solution to a perennial mystery of Philosophy and Law: Strauss claims that the medieval foundation reveals ‘ultra-modern thoughts,’ yet does not explicitly state the identity of these thoughts. I suggest that their author is Carl Schmitt. (shrink)

Yarkoni's argument risks skepticism about the very possibility of social science: If social phenomena are too causally complex, normal scientific methods could not possibly untangle them. We argue that the problem of causal complexity is best approached at the level of scientific communities and institutions, not the modeling practices of individual scientists.

Each target article contributes important proto-musical building blocks that constrain music as-we-know-it. However, neither the credible signaling nor social bonding accounts elucidate the central mystery of why music sounds the way it does. Getting there requires working out how proto-musical building blocks combine and interact to create the complex, rich, and affecting music humans create and enjoy.

The wilderness debate that has raged in American environmentalism since the 1990s has led to the valuation of less spectacular forms of nature than wilderness. This increasing interest in ordinary nature brings American environmental thought to an environmental ground more familiar to French ecologists. Although the wilderness idea that has focused on untrammeled places was difficult to integrate into the French philosophical landscape, reaching common ground could foster exchanges between American environmental ethics and French political ecology. More precisely, the renewal (...) of naturalism that emerged from the wilderness debate could inform French political ecology, which sometimes tends to reduce environmental problems to social issues. (shrink)