Syntax is better viewed as the dynamics of a morphogenetic field on a semantic universe of “content” words. This may take widely different forms, making the acquisition of any language by an aspiring speaker an entirely new experience. The existence of an underlying “universal syntax” might be illusory.

A Hebbian model for speech generation opens a number of paths. A cross-linguistic scheme of functional relationships (inspired by Aristotle) dispenses with distraction by the “parts of speech” distinctions, while bridging the gap between “content” and “structure” words. A gradient model identifies emotional and rational dynamics and shows speech generation as a process where a speaker's dissatisfaction gets minimized.

Examining the implications of a localist model for linguistic performance, I show the strengths of the P-graph, a network of elementary units of meaning where utterance results from relaxation through the operation of a dynamics of affect values. A unit of meaning is stored in a synaptic connection that brings together two words. Such a model, consistent with the anatomy and physiology of the neural tissue, eschews a number of traditional pitfalls of “semantic networks”: (1) ambiguity ceases to be an (...) issue, as similar uses of a word are automatically clustered together; (2) faster retrieval of words acquired early is explained by the larger number of their instances. In addition the P-graph takes advantage of a plausible form of information storage: the local topology of the neural tissue. (shrink)

Responsable des crises économiques et environnementales catastrophiques qui l'affligent et menacent aujourd'hui de l'emporter, le genre humain est paradoxalement aussi un génie technologique dont les fruits de l'inventivité sont entrés dans une phase explosive faisant miroiter à la fois la promesse de l'immortalité individuelle et la déresponsabilisation par le transfert de la gestion des affaires à des machines. À quoi bon penser à l'heure où se profile à l'horizon la menace du remplacement de l'homme apprenti-sorcier par le robot, son héritier? (...) Paul Jorion a acquis sa réputation internationale en prévoyant la crise financière de 2008 et en étant conforté par les faits. Sa formation d'anthropologue et de sociologue, combinée à son goût pour les mathématiques et l'informatique, l'a conduit à jouer un rôle pionnier en anthropologie économique, en intelligence artificielle et en finance. Ses mises en garde sur le danger d'un effondrement ne relèvent en rien de la prophétie, elles s'appuient sur une expérience des processus culturels, économiques et technologiques, acquise sur le terrain. Elles mettent en accusation les choix politiques inconséquents débouchant sur un risque de collapse généralisé. Esprit libre et érudit, ignorant les approches disciplinaires "en silo-, Paul Jorion enrichit les outils de la pensée. Avec Franck Cormerais et Jacques Athanase Gilbert, il revient sur son parcours et sa démarche pour démontrer que seule une anthropologie radicale mobilisant la totalité du savoir que le genre humain a acquis sur son identité profonde est à même de prévenir son extinction."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Qui étions-nous? Pour répondre à cette question, Paul Jorion dresse l'inventaire de ce que nous, êtres humains, avons pu comprendre jusqu'ici de notre destin. Il convoque pour ce faire les phares de notre réflexion sur nous-mêmes, certains aux noms attendus : Confucius, Socrate, Aristote, Paul de Tarse, Hegel, Nietzsche et Freud, ou moins attendus, tels Machiavel, Shakespeare et Victor Hugo, voire inattendus, comme Mao Tse-toung et Jacob Taubes. Cette évaluation est réalisée en vue d'assurer notre salut, lequel (...) est sérieusement compromis aujourd'hui, dans un contexte de destruction accélérée de nos conditions de vie à la surface de la Terre. Le scénario le plus optimiste parmi les plus plausibles a cessé d'être celui de machines de plus en plus intelligentes à notre service, pour être celui de notre remplacement pur et simple par celles-ci. Si nous voulons survivre en tant qu'espèce, il nous faut sans plus tarder passer la vitesse supérieure. Il faut pour cela réunir l'équipe de ceux qui ne se résolvent pas à notre disparition, des femmes et des hommes qui soient précisément résolus, bâtissant sur les principaux acquis de l'humain, de la réciprocité au génie technologique. C'est l'appel lancé dans cette Défense et illustration du genre humain. (shrink)

Byrne & Russon's target article displays all the difficulties encountered when one fails to take a methodological behaviourist approach to imitation. Their conceptual apparatus is grounded in a mixture of introspection and folk psychology. Their distinction between action-level and program-level imitation falters on goal imputation for sequential acts. In an alternative gradient descent model, behaviour can be simulated as a frustration/satisfaction gradient descent in the animal's “potentiality space,” as defined by knowledge, inventiveness, and the surrounding environment.

The biological basis of money lies in a three-term relationship between one subject and some others, with money acting as a mediator. The drive to acquire money is a special case of a desire for recognition. What is aimed at by subjects is their desire for the desire of some others: the former derive satisfaction from representing to themselves the admiration, or envy, of these others. This raises reproductive advantage. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Le genre humain se découvre, à sa très grande surprise, au bord de l’extinction. A cette menace, il ne réagit que mollement, en tentant de manière dérisoire de dégager un bénéfice commercial de toute tentative de réponse. Sommes-nous outillés pour empêcher notre propre extinction? Notre constitution psychique et notre histoire jusqu’ici suggèrent malheureusement que notre espèce n’est pas à la hauteur de la tâche : la découverte que chacun d’entre nous est mortel l’a plongée dans une stupeur profonde dont plusieurs (...) milliers d’années de rumination ne sont pas parvenues à la faire émerger. Le dernier qui s’en va éteint la lumière propose une description réaliste et véridique de notre espèce, de ses grandes forces et de ses immenses faiblesses. Nous comprendre nous-mêmes est la condition pour renverser la tendance qui nous conduit, si nous ne réagissons pas immédiatement avec la plus extrême vigueur, droit vers l’extinction. (shrink)

In their quality as acoustic or visual percepts, words are linked to the emotional values of the state-of-affairs they evoke. This allows them to engender meanings capable of operating nearly entirely detached from percepts. Such a laying flat of meanings permits deliberation to take place within the window of consciousness. In such a theatre of the imagination, linguistically triggered, resides the originality of the human psyche.

Descartes is widely portrayed as the arch proponent of “the epistemological transparency of thought” (or simply, “Transparency”). The most promising version of this view—Transparency-through-Introspection—says that introspecting (i.e., inwardly attending to) a thought guarantees certain knowledge of that thought. But Descartes rejects this view and provides numerous counterexamples to it. I argue that, instead, Descartes’s theory of self-knowledge is just an application of his general theory of knowledge. According to his general theory, certain knowledge is acquired only through clear and distinct (...) intellection. Thus, in his view, certain knowledge of one’s thoughts is acquired only through clear and distinct intellection of one’s thoughts. Introspection is a form of intellection and it can be clear and distinct. Ordinarily, however, introspection isn’t clear and distinct but is instead confused with dubitable perceptions of bodies. To make introspection clear and distinct, we need to “sharply separate” it from all perceptions of bodies by doubting all perceptions of bodies. Without such radical doubt, introspection remains confused and we lack certain knowledge not just of the specific features of our thoughts, but even of the minimal claim that a thought exists. Far from being the high priest of Transparency, Descartes is radically opposed to it. (shrink)

In _Matter and Consciousness_, Paul Churchland presents a concise and contemporary overview of the philosophical issues surrounding the mind and explains the main theories and philosophical positions that have been proposed to solve them. Making the case for the relevance of theoretical and experimental results in neuroscience, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence for the philosophy of mind, Churchland reviews current developments in the cognitive sciences and offers a clear and accessible account of the connections to philosophy of mind. For (...) this third edition, the text has been updated and revised throughout. The changes range from references to the iPhone's "Siri" to expanded discussions of the work of such contemporary philosophers as David Chalmers, John Searle, and Thomas Nagel. Churchland describes new research in evolution, genetics, and visual neuroscience, among other areas, arguing that the philosophical significance of these new findings lies in the support they tend to give to the reductive and eliminative versions of materialism. Matter and Consciousness, written by the most distinguished theorist and commentator in the field, offers an authoritative summary and sourcebook for issues in philosophy of mind. It is suitable for use as an introductory undergraduate text. (shrink)

The options in a decision problem generally have outcomes with common features. Putting aside the common features simplifies deliberations, but the simplification requires a philosophical justification that this book provides.

This book demonstrates how children's imagination makes a continuing contribution to their cognitive and emotional development.

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented 'crisis in the foundations of mathematics', featuring a world-famous paradox (Russell's Paradox), a challenge to 'classical' mathematics from a world-famous mathematician (the 'mathematical intuitionism' of Brouwer), a new foundational school (Hilbert's Formalism), and the profound incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel. In the same period, the cross-fertilization of mathematics and philosophy resulted in a new sort of 'mathematical philosophy', associated most notably (but in different ways) with Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, and Gödel himself, (...) and which remains at the focus of Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion. The present collection brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers. It is a substantially revised version of the edition first published in 1964 and includes a revised bibliography. The volume will be welcomed as a major work of reference at this level in the field. (shrink)

Zusammenfassungen der Referate in französischer Sprache.

An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of (...) an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement. (shrink)

Schelling und Hegel benutzen in ihren philosophischen Texten mathematische und naturwissenschaftliche Modelle wie Unendlichkeit oder Gleichgewicht. Die Strukturen dieser Begriffe liefern einen Massstab fur den Vergleich der Positionen Schellings und Hegels, der fur Schellings Identitatsphilosophie und Hegels erste Jenaer Schriften durchgefuhrt wird. Als wichtigstes Resultat kann eine grundlegende Differenz zwischen beiden Positionen bereits um 1801 nachgewiesen und gezeigt werden, dass diese auf einer unterschiedlichen Auffassung der Rolle des Absoluten beruht.

Like Plato, Protagoras held that young children learn virtue from fine examples in poetry. Unlike Plato, Protagoras taught adults by correcting the diction of poets. In this paper I ask what his standard of correctness might be, and what benefit he intended his students to take from exercises in correction. If his standard of correctness is truth, then he may intend his students to learn by questioning the content of poems; that would be suggestive of Plato’s program in Republic III. (...) But his standard is more likely to be the accurate use of language; in that case he would intend his students to learn to express their thoughts clearly enough that their audience would understand what they were saying. That standard would be independent of the truth of what they are saying; and that would be a precursor to modern techniques by which we try to teach speaking and writing. Truth is not so easy to escape, however, and we shall see that Protagoras’ exercise must assume that the poet is trying to tell the truth. (shrink)

Die MISCELLANEA MEDIAEVALIA präsentieren seit ihrer Gründung durch Paul Wilpert im Jahre 1962 Arbeiten des Thomas-Instituts der Universität zu Köln. Das Kernstück der Publikationsreihe bilden die Akten der im zweijährigen Rhythmus stattfindenden Kölner Mediaevistentagungen, die vor über 50 Jahren von Josef Koch, dem Gründungsdirektor des Instituts, ins Leben gerufen wurden. Der interdisziplinäre Charakter dieser Kongresse prägt auch die Tagungsakten: Die MISCELLANEA MEDIAEVALIA versammeln Beiträge aus allen mediävistischen Disziplinen - die mittelalterliche Geschichte, die Philosophie, die Theologie sowie die Kunst- und (...) Literaturwissenschaften sind Teile einer Gesamtbetrachtung des Mittelalters. (shrink)

I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.

According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers (...) hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems. (shrink)

Extends the ideas of social constructivism to the philosophy of mathematics, developing a powerful critique of traditional absolutist conceptions of mathematics, and proposing a reconceptualization of the philosophy of mathematics.

The first book-length study of a leading tenth-century Ismaili theoretician Abu Ya'qub al-Sijistani.

The centrality of death rituals has in anthropologically informed studies of Buddhism been little documented. The current volume brings together a range of perspectives on Buddhist death rituals including ethnographic, textual, historical and theoretically informed accounts, and presents the diversity of the Buddhist funeral cultures of mainland Southeast Asia and China. It arises out of the University of Bristol's Centre for Buddhist Studies research project Buddhist Death Rituals in Southeast Asia and China, funded by the United Kingdom's Arts and Humanities (...) Research Council. This project involved extensive new research in Thailand, Laos and China. Other items from that project included several public exhibitions, extensive stills photographs, and several video films. The project-team produced two 30 minutes films on the ghost festival in Laos and China, one on urban funerals in Chiang Mai (Thailand) and several shorter clips dealing with funeral cultures in Laos, Thailand and China. Most of this material (and an extensive bibliography on the topic) is available free of charge from the project website located at the webpage of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies (Centre for Buddhist Studies) at the University of Bristol. (shrink)

This article contends that the evolution toward interdisciplinary collaboration that we are witnessing in the sciences must also occur in the humanities to ensure their very survival. That is, humanists must be open to working with scientists and social scientists interested in similar research questions and vice versa. Digital humanities is a positive first step. Complexity science should be the next step. Even though much of the ground-breaking work in complexity science has been done in the natural sciences and mathematics, (...) it can, if critically adapted, provide the needed metaphor for a broad integration of disciplines, humanistic and otherwise. Given its almost a-disciplinary nature, a complexity approach to the research problems in the humanities necessarily breaks down silos. Moreover, it can restore and reframe the seamless intellectual fabric sought by researchers before the atomization of the various disciplines in the nineteenthcentury academy. (shrink)

I hope to show that supervenience and determination, as I have here intuitively characterized them, are really different expressions of the same core idea which one may make more precise in a great number of different ways, depending on the interpretation one puts on the catchall parameters “cases”, “truth of kind P”and “truth of kind S”.

Bernard Williams identifies Hume as “in some ways an archetypal reconciler” who, nevertheless, displays “a striking resistance to some of the central tenets of what [Williams calls] ‘morality’”. This assessment, it is argued, is generally correct. There are, however, some significant points of difference in their views concerning moral responsibility. This includes Williams’s view that a naturalistic project of the kind that Hume pursues is of limited value when it comes to making sense of “morality’s” illusions about responsibility and blame. (...) It is, Williams maintains, only when we consider moral responsibility in genealogical terms, which gives attention to the importance of culture and history, that we can find a way of exposing the various prejudices and illusions of “the morality system”. Nevertheless, despite these differences, what Hume and Williams share is a fundamental commitment to provide a more “truthful” and “realistic” understanding of moral responsibility and our human ethical predicament. (shrink)

This paper presents the view that tropes can change, and so are not individuated by their determinate qualitative characters. On the view I have in mind, a trope is at any given time fully determinate, but can change qualitatively within the bounds set by a determinable essence. A charge trope, for example, must at any time have some exact intensity, but can survive changes in intensity. My argument, roughly, is this: Objects can change, and tropes are the parts of objects (...) that change (in a special sense of ‘part’), so tropes can change too. After some preliminaries, I present the argument carefully and discuss the operant notions. I then discuss each premise in turn. I respond to the charge that the view isn't realist, and to objections based on identity‐conditions for tropes. I describe both substratum‐ and bundle‐theoretic versions of the view, and finally, show what the view buys us. (shrink)