Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions (...) of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential. (shrink)

In this work I will analyze the debate between Pascal Engel and Richard Rorty about the relevance of the notion of truth to the characterization of assertion. I will point out the theoretic advantages of Rortian conversationalism’s refuse of the idea of truth as a norm of assertion. For that, first of all, I will make an analysis of Rortian deflationism. Then, I will make an reconstruction of Engel’s defense of the normativity of truth. Finally, I will establish that that (...) defense is overcome by conversationalism. During the discussion I will criticize some theoretical developments by Akeel Bilgrami, Harry Frankfurt and Huw Price which could be useful to Engel’s position. (shrink)

Una consecuencia de la crítica formulada por Richard Rorty a la epistemología tradicional es el rechazo al veroteleologismo, esto es, a la tesis según la cual la verdad es el fin o la meta de la investigación. A partir del enfrentamiento con una serie de críticas provenientes tanto desde perspectiva..

One of the consequences of Richard Rorty’s critique of traditional epistemology is the rejection of veroteleologism, that is, the thesis according to which truth is the end or goal of inquiry. This article aims at consolidating the anti-veroteleological position, on the basis of a critical examination of a series of critiques made from both “realist” and Peircean-style pragmatist perspectives. Consequently, the debate centers on some considerations formulated by Alvin Goldman and Akeel Bilgrami in favor of veroteleologism and against positions such (...) as Rorty’s. (shrink)

“Pragmatist Receptions of Martin Heidegger”. This paper studies theAmerican Pragmatist reception of Heidegger’s thought. The article briely presentsBrandom’s and Okrent’s readings of Heidegger, paying attention afterwards toRorty’s articulation of the Heideggerian legacy with the work of Wittgensteinand classical Pragmatists, especially Dewey. Rorty’s appropriation of Heideggerassumes a philosophical and metaphilosophical anti-essentialist commitment.This commitment requires some reading operations in relation to the lastHeidegger, who cannot be easily assimilated by the Pragmatist tradition. Thetension between irony and nostalgia will be crucial for Rorty’s appropriation (...) ofHeidegger’s thought. (shrink)

El comentario se concentra en la práctica del voto como mecanismo de decisión y en las estrategias de disolución de las fuerzas antidemocráticas. El que las prácticas efectivas en ambos casos no difieran parece redundar en un déficit para el deliberacionismo, el cual, a diferencia del agonismo, no puede justificar claramente dichas prácticas. A su vez, se detiene en las diferencias epistemológicas que ambas posiciones presentan. The discussion concentrates on two aspects: the practice of voting as a decision mechanism and (...) the strategies for the dissolution of the anti-democratic forces. The fact that effective practices in both cases do not differ leads to a deficit for deliberationism, which, unlike agonism, seems to not be able to clearly justify such practices from its theoretical position. The discussion also pays attention to the differences between the epistemological assumptions that sustain both positions. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo defiendo la concepción conversacionalista de la justificación epistémica en la caracterización que de la misma ha hecho y sigue haciendo Richard Rorty. Me detengo en un grupo de objeciones provenientes del campo pragmatista. Vertebro la exposición a partir de la crítica a Rorty sostenida por Susan Haack, incorporando luego las observaciones que Hilary Putnam y Jiirgen Habermas le han presentado al proyecto rortyano. La critica de dichas objeciones conduce a la asunción de una caracterización contextualista y (...) convencionalista de los criterios de corrección justificatoria. Un punto clave de mi defensa de la posición rortyana es desarticular las consecuencias antintuitivas que supuestamente se siguen de abandonar el veroteleologismo, esto es, la idea de que la verdad es la meta de la investigación. In this paper I defend the Rortyan conversationalist conception of epistemic justification against some objections which have been supported by some pragmatist philosophers. First, I propose a reconstruction ofthe argument that Susan Haack made against Rorty's conversationalism. Then, I point out Putnam's and Hahennas' criticisms to rortyan project. The objections that I present to all those critics lead me to as sume a contextualist and conventionalist characterization of the criteria for justificatory correction. Finally, dismantling the anti-intuitive consequences which supposedly follow from giving up veroteleologism is the main point ofmy defense ofthe Rortyan account. (shrink)

Resumen En esta conversación, María del Rosario Acosta y Jean-Luc Nancy reflexionan sobre los distintos registros de la palabra "murmullo" y la relación que puede establecerse entre cada uno de ellos y la pregunta por la crítica política y de lo político en el pensamiento de Nancy. El aspecto sonoro del murmullo permite acercarse, por un lado, a una reflexión sobre la circulación del sentido en términos de resonancia. Conduce también a la pregunta por la singularidad de la experiencia de (...) la escucha en la constitución de ser-en-común, y por el papel del testimonio -y la desaparición de espacios para su escucha- en medio de las múltiples violencias que afectan nuestro presente histórico. Nancy revisa algunas de sus posturas anteriores frente a estas preguntas, profundiza en otras, y trae a colación temas nuevos que no se encuentran desarrollados en otros de sus escritos. Como texto inédito, esta conversación es un homenaje a su voz en el contexto de su muerte reciente. Nos recuerda que el murmullo de su pensamiento seguirá circulando entre nosotres.In this conversation, María del Rosario Acosta and Jean-Luc Nancy reflect on the different registers of the word "murmur" and the relationship that can be established between each of them and the question of the political and political criticism in the thought of Nancy. The sound aspect of the murmur allows us to approach, on the one hand, a reflection on the circulation of meaning in terms of resonance. It also leads to the question of the uniqueness of the experience of listening in the constitution of being-in-common, and of the role of testimony -and the disappearance of spaces for listening to it- during the multiple violence that affects our historical present. Nancy reviews some of his previous positions on these questions, delves into others, and brings up new themes that are not developed in other of his writings. As a previously unpublished text, this conversation is a tribute to his voice in the context of his recent death. He reminds us that the murmur of his thoughts will continue to circulate. (shrink)

We propose a new interpretation of the equation E=mc² in special relativity by generalizing ideas of ontological emergence to fundamental physics. This allows us to propose that mass, as a property, can be considered to emerge from energy, using a well-known definition of weak ontological emergence. Einstein’s famous equation gains in this way a clearer philosophical interpretation, one that avoids the problems of previous attempts, and is fully consistent with the kinematic properties of special relativity, while yielding fresh insights concerning (...) the nature of mass. (shrink)

A restrictive view of self-control identifies exercises of self-control with synchronic intrapsychic processes, and pictures diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies not as proper instances of self-control, but as clever ways of avoiding the need to exercise that ability. In turn, defenders of an inclusive view of self-control typically argue that we should construe self-control as more than effortful inhibition, and that, on grounds of functional equivalence, all these diverse strategies might be properly described as instances of self-control. In this paper, I (...) take a fresh look at this debate by focusing on cases of addiction. I argue that addicted agents face a paradigmatic sort of self-control challenge, which makes addiction an important test case for theories of self-control. And I discuss evidence that highlights both the unreliability of synchronic intrapsychic strategies and the crucial role that is played by diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies in successful attempts at achieving abstinence by addicted individuals. Abstaining addicts are a paradigmatic case of agents who successfully exercise self-control, and they mostly do so by relying on diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies. This, I argue, lends further support to an inclusive view of self-control. (shrink)

Degrowth is the literal translation of 'decroissance', a French word meaning reduction. Launched by activists in 2001 as a challenge to growth, it became a missile word that sparks a contentious debate on the diagnosis and prognosis of our society. 'Degrowth' became an interpretative frame for a new (and old) social movement where numerous streams of critical ideas and political actions converge. It is an attempt to re-politicise debates about desired socio-environmental futures and an example of an activist-led science now (...) consolidating into a concept in academic literature. This article discusses the definition, origins, evolution, practices and construction of degrowth. The main objective is to explain degrowth's multiple sources and strategies in order to improve its basic definition and avoid reductionist criticisms and misconceptions. To this end, the article presents degrowth's main intellectual sources as well as its diverse strategies (oppositional activism, building of alternatives and political proposals) and actors (practitioners, activists and scientists). Finally, the article argues that the movement's diversity does not detract from the existence of a common path. (shrink)

According to Marshall et al. (2024), some of the patients who refuse to stay in observation after being resuscitated following an opioid overdose are likely not making an autonomous choice. While I do not intend to dispute this claim, it merits discussion what is the concept of autonomy at play in making this assessment. I contend that the concept at work is more substantive than Marshall et al. acknowledge—and more substantive, too, than the form of autonomy usually thought to underpin (...) the moral justification of the requirement of informed consent . (shrink)

Can addiction be credibly invoked as an excuse for moral harms secondary to particular decisions to use drugs? This question raises two distinct sets of issues. First, there is the question of whether addiction is the sort of consideration that could, given suitable assumptions about the details of the case, excuse or mitigate moral blameworthiness. Most discussions of addiction and moral responsibility have focused on this question, and many have argued that addiction excuses. Here I articulate what I take to (...) be the best argument for this view, based on the substantial difficulty that people with severe addiction experience in controlling drug-related behavior. This, I argue, may in some cases be sufficient to ground a mitigating excuse, given the way in which addiction undermines agents’ responsiveness to relevant moral reasons to do otherwise. Much less attention has been devoted to a second set of issues that critically affect the possibility of applying this mitigating excuse in particular cases, derived from the ambivalent nature of agential control in addiction. In order to find a fitting response to moral harm, the person with the right standing to blame must make a judgment about the extent to which the agent possessed certain morally relevant capacities at the time of the act. In practice, this will often prove tremendously difficult to assess. The ethical challenge for the person with the right standing to blame is fundamentally one of making a judgment about matters that seem underdetermined by the available evidence. (shrink)

Following the proposal of a new kind of selective structural realism that uses as a basis the distinction between framework and interaction theories, this work discusses relevant applications in fundamental physics. An ontology for the different entities and properties of well-known theories is thus consistently built. The case of classical field theories—including general relativity as a classical theory of gravitation—is examined in detail, as well as the implications of the classification scheme for issues of realism in quantum mechanics. These applications (...) also shed light on the different range of applicability of the ontic and epistemic versions of structural realism. (shrink)

In previous works, an ontology of properties for quantum mechanics has been proposed, according to which quantum systems are bundles of properties with no principle of individuality. The aim of the present article is to show that, since quasi-set theory is particularly suited for dealing with aggregates of items that do not belong to the traditional category of individual, it supplies an adequate meta-language to speak of the proposed ontology of properties and its structure.

It is often assumed that, except perhaps in a few rare cases, people with addiction can be aptly held responsible for having acquired the condition. In this chapter, I consider the argument that supports this view and draw attention to a number of challenges that can be raised against it. Assuming that early decisions to use drugs were made in possession of normal-range psychological capacities, I consider the key question of whether drug users who later became addicted should have known (...) that addiction was a likely outcome of their decisions to use drugs in a way that makes them blameworthy for their lack of foresight. I focus on three different points of contention surrounding this claim: how likely the outcome to be predicted was, how tolerable risk should be weighed against the expected value of decisions to use, and how reliable the relevant predictive abilities of the average person are. Once we consider in some detail what would have to be true in order for someone to be aptly held responsible for becoming addicted, the prospects for making a convincing case to that effect look, I argue, somewhat more uncertain than they might at first appear. (shrink)

While some form of loss of control is often assumed to be a common feature of the diverse manifestations of addiction, it is far from clear how loss of control should be understood. In this paper, I put forward a concept of decrease in control in addiction that aims to fill this gap and thus provide a general framework for thinking about addictive behavior. The development of this account involves two main steps. First, I present a view of degrees of (...) control as the degree to which an agent would be responsive to potential or counterfactual sufficient reasons to do otherwise. Second, I sketch an account of the relevant control-undermining factors in addiction that is consonant with my proposed view of degrees of control. Being a high-level functional property, reasons-responsiveness is particularly well suited to frame an account of control-undermining factors that is doubly pluralistic: it encompasses the contribution of factors both internal and external to the agent, and it is consistent with various proposals as to the precise nature of the anomaly taking place in the psychology of addiction. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming part of the everyday. During this transition, people’s intention to use AI technologies is still unclear and emotions such as fear are influencing it. In this paper, we focus on autonomous cars to first verify empirically the extent to which people fear AI and then examine the impact that fear has on their intention to use AI-driven vehicles. Our research is based on a systematic survey and it reveals that while individuals are largely afraid of (...) cars that are driven by AI, they are nonetheless willing to adopt this technology as soon as possible. To explain this tension, we extend our analysis beyond just fear and show that people also believe that AI-driven cars will generate many individual, urban and global benefits. Subsequently, we employ our empirical findings as the foundations of a theoretical framework meant to illustrate the main factors that people ponder when they consider the use of AI tech. In addition to offering a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of AI technology acceptance, this paper provides a nuanced understanding of the tension that exists between the fear and adoption of AI, capturing what exactly people fear and intend to do. (shrink)

Resumen: En el presente artículo se busca describir el rol fundamental que juega la experiencia estética en los procesos de significación de lo que se suele denominar “religión popular”. Para esta labor, tomamos como objeto de estudio la fiesta religiosa que, junto con hacer referencia a una determinada realidad empírica, nos provee de dos mediaciones conceptuales para el desarrollo de nuestro análisis: la fiesta y la imagen. De este modo, después de contextualizar nuestra reflexión en el marco de los estudios (...) culturales y la estética, procedemos a definir la lógica estético-sacramental de la fiesta religiosa a partir de los conceptos de “fiesta” e “imagen”, abordados desde el enfoque de la New Material Culture.: The aim of this article is to describe the fundamental role of the aesthetic experience in the processes of signification of what is usually called “popular religion”. In order to achieve this, we define as the object of our study the religious feast, which, apart from referring to a concrete empirical reality, provides us with two conceptual mediations for our analysis: feast and image. Thus, following a contextualization of our reflection on the field of cultural studies and aesthetics, we proceed to define the aesthetic-sacramental logic of the religious feast on the basis of the concepts “feast” and “image”, from the perspective of the New Material Culture approach. (shrink)

According to a shared functionalist view in philosophy of mind, a cognitive system, and cognitive function thereof, is based on the components of the organism it is realized by which, indeed, play a causal role in regulating our cognitive processes. This led philosophers to suggest also that, thus, cognition could be seen as an extended process, whose vehicle can extend not only outside the brain but also beyond bodily boundaries, on different kinds of devices. This is what we call the (...) ‘Externally Extended Cognition Thesis.’ This notion has generated a lively debate. Here, we offer a novel notion of extended cognition, according to which cognition can be seen as being realized outside the brain, but still inside the body. This is what we call the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis’. Not only our thesis but also our approach while defending it is innovative. The argument we offer is supported by recent empirical findings in the life sciences and biomedicine, which suggest that the gut microbiota’s activity has a functional role in regulating our cognitive processes and behaviors. In doing so, we embrace the holobiont-perspective, according to which it is possible to claim that what we call biological individuals are not autonomous entities with clear boundaries, but should rather be seen as networks of multiple interactions among species. Thus, by analyzing different sets of evidence in light of the holobiont-perspective, we argue that the gut microbiota could be seen as a component of our organism. On the basis of the philosophical interpretation of this evidence, however, we also suggest that there are no impediments standing the way of considering the gut microbiota also as a functional extension of our cognitive system. If so, this amounts to extending cognition out of ‘our skull’, though still confining it within ‘our body’: to ‘our gut’. This is an instance of the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis,’ whose benefits for an original theory of extended cognition are discussed. (shrink)

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at (...) a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind. (shrink)

En este trabajo reconstruyo la estructura argumentativa del asociacionismo coercionista defendido por Michael Blake, que consta de dos premisas, una normativa y otra empírica. Sostengo que ambas premisas pueden ser rechazadas, de manera indirecta (en el caso de la premisa empírica) o directa (en el caso de la premisa normativa). La conclusión es que el asociacionismo coercionista no prueba la existencia de una discontinuidad normativa entre el plano doméstico y el plano global.

In this paper I will evaluate the normative assumptions of Nozick's experience machine. I try to show that the intrinsic value that experiment gives to objectivity should be rejected from utilitarianism and that subjectivity counts as a necessary and sufficient condition for moral evaluation. I also conclude that satisfaction preferences utilitarianism to stay within the boundaries of utilitarianism should be considered as broad mental states consequentialism.

RESUMEN Las redes sociales han tenido un papel importante en el desarrollo de reclamos cívicos recientes. Internet presenta rasgos favorables para un libre intercambio de razones entre ciudadanos y ofrece un espacio nuevo para la circulación de información. En el presente trabajo me propongo indagar sobre el alcance de los recursos electrónicos y su vinculación con las concepciones deliberativas de la democracia.PALABRAS CLAVE DEMOCRACIA DELIBERATIVA – REDES SOCIALES - RECURSOS ELECTRÓNICOS - LEGITIMIDADABSTRACT Social networks have played an important role in (...) the development of recent civic complaints. Internet has favorable features for a free exchange of reasons between citizens and provides a new space for the circulation of information. This paper investigates the scope of electronic resources and its relationship to deliberative conceptions of democracy.KEYWORDS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY - SOCIAL NETWORKS – ELECTRONIC RESOURCES - LEGITIMACY. (shrink)

In a very short article, James Sterba argues that there is a moral duty to sacrifice one’s life to save the lives of others. Sterba justifies this duty by drawing an analogy with a series of cases in which some degree of sacrifice would be commonly accepted for the benefit of third parties. In this paper, I argue that Sterba’s argument reaches the correct conclusion, but is invalid. In addition, I point out two different arguments to support the existence of (...) a duty to sacrifice one’s life to save the lives of others. (shrink)

We discuss the mathematical structures that underlie quantum probabilities. More specifically, we explore possible connections between logic, geometry and probability theory. We propose an interpretation that generalizes the method developed by R. T. Cox to the quantum logical approach to physical theories. We stress the relevance of developing a geometrical interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, (...) their status as beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the attempt to reorient the discussion (...) about moral expertise. (shrink)

It is usually stated that quantum mechanics presents problems with the identity of particles, the most radical position—supported by E. Schrödinger—asserting that elementary particles are not individuals. But the subject goes deeper, and it is even possible to obtain states with an undefined particle number. In this work we present a set theoretical framework for the description of undefined particle number states in quantum mechanics which provides a precise logical meaning for this notion. This construction goes in the line of (...) solving a problem posed by Y. Manin, namely, to incorporate quantum mechanical notions at the foundations of mathematics. We also show that our system is capable of representing quantum superpositions. (shrink)