: The Cartesians have often been read as if they denied spatial presence to incorporeal substances, reserving it for extended things alone. This article explores whether this common interpretation is accurate, examining the cases of both created minds and the divine substance of God Himself. Through scrutiny of the relevant texts of both Descartes himself and his followers, it demonstrates that, in the divine case, this common interpretation is incorrect, and that the Cartesians did believe that God’s own substance really (...) was omnipresent in a literal sense. In the case of created minds, by contrast, the article suggests that the standard reading is probably correct after all, and that these substances were indeed excluded from the spatial world: but it also suggests that, in the hands of at least some of the Cartesians, this position caused certain philosophical tensions and potential inconsistencies within their systems. (shrink)

: This paper charts the gradual development of a theory of real space, underlying the created world and constituted by the extension of God Himself, in the writings of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More. It identifies two impediments to More's embracing such a theory in the earlier part of his career, namely his initial commitment to the principles that (a) space was not real and (b) God was not extended, and it shows how he finally came to renounce these principles (...) in order to devise the theory so closely associated with him. (shrink)

Research using economic decision-making tasks has established that direct reciprocity plays a role in prosocial decision-making: people are more likely to help those who have helped them in the past. However, less is known about how considerations of mutual exchange influence decisions even when the other party’s actions are unknown and direct reciprocity is therefore not possible. Using a two-party economic task in which the other’s actions are unknown, study 1 shows that prosociality critically depends on the potential for mutual (...) exchange; when the other person has no opportunity to help the participant, prosocial behavior is drastically reduced. In study 2, we find that theories regarding the other person’s intentions influence the degree of prosociality that participants exhibit, even when no opportunity for direct reciprocity exists. Further, beliefs about the other’s intentions are closely related to one’s own motivations in the task. Together, the results support a model in which prosociality depends on both the social conditions for mutual exchange and a mental model of how others will behave within these conditions, which is closely related to knowledge of the self. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, four philosophers independently proposed immaterialist theories. Ontologies of this kind had been absent from the philosophical stage for several centuries, and their sudden and widespread revival suggests that there was something about the intellectual milieu at the turn of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century that made a move to immaterialism a natural step to take. This dissertation examines some of the factors which contributed to its revival. ;In this dissertation, immaterialist theories (...) are placed against the backdrop of a philosophical division between early modern versions of Platonism and Epicureanism, the former accentuating the priority of the infinite over the finite and the latter stressing instead the priority of the finite over the infinite. The twin revivals of these two ancient philosophical systems were instrumental in giving rise to importantly different versions of immaterialism. Part One of the dissertation serves as an introduction to the two subsequent Parts, by laying out some relevant historical and philosophical details regarding Platonism, Epicureanism and immaterialism. In Part Two, it is shown how Berkeley's early theory can be viewed as an Epicurean form of immaterialism. It is suggested that, while coherent as far as it went, the early theory left some crucially important things out---above all, a sound conception of God---and that, for Berkeley to be in a position to incorporate such components into his philosophy, he was compelled to make certain adjustments to it. These adjustments led to his moving quite far, from the Epicureanism of his youth to the Platonism of his old age. ;Part Three culminates with a discussion of the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards' own version of immaterialism, like Berkeley's later theory, had a strongly Platonist flavour. But, unlike Berkeley, Edwards drew on a sequence of seventeenth century theories concerning the relation between incorporeal extension and the divine substance. This enabled him to achieve a clearer conception of the divine ideas---the ones doing all the work in a Platonist immaterialist theory---than Berkeley ever managed. (shrink)

: This paper examines how Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) shifted from a broadly Newtonian conception of divine, absolute space to a more Berkeleian or Leibnizian theory of merely relative, ideal space. Setting Edwards' views within a context of contemporary European thought, it elucidates his early position, as expressed in the opening portion of his essay 'Of Being' (c. 1721), and then proceeds to chart the development of his more mature views, showing in particular how the development of his immaterialism during the (...) early 1720s drove him to change his mind on the issue of space and its relationship with God. (shrink)

Thomas Reid is now recognized as one of the towering figures of the Enlightenment. Best known for his published writings on epistemology and moral theory, he was also an accomplished mathematician and natural philosopher, as an earlier volume of his manuscripts edited by Paul Wood for the Edinburgh Reid Edition, Thomas Reid on the Animate Creation, has shown. The Correspondence of Thomas Reid collects all of the known letters to and from Reid in a fully annotated form. Letters already published (...) by Sir William Hamilton and others have been reedited, and roughly half of the letters included appear in print for the first time. Writing in 1802, Reid's disciple and biographer Dugald Stewart doubted that Reid's correspondence &"would be generally interesting.&" This collection proves otherwise, for the letters illuminate virtually every aspect of Reid's life and career and, in some instances, provide us with invaluable evidence about activities otherwise undocumented in his manuscripts or published works. Through his correspondence we can trace Reid's relations with contemporaries such as David Hume and his colleagues at both King's College, Aberdeen, and the University of Glasgow, as well as his engagement with the most controversial philosophical, scientific, and political issues of his day. If anything, the letters assembled here serve as the starting point for understanding Reid and his place in the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif these doctrines (...) are themselves motivated by ``platitudes'' then scepticism follows. Iaddress Williams's arguments for thinking scepticism must presuppose these doctrines,and argue that he overlooks a way that they can be seen as motivated by mere platitudes.Thus, I conclude that William's novel rejection of scepticism fails. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Background: Locke's Conception of Freedom For how can we think any one freer than to have the power to do what we will. — John Locke n his chapter on power ...

The past few years have seen a revival of interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy. His moral theory has been studied by D. D. Raphael (The Moral Sense) and his entire philosophical position by S. A. Grave (The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense). Prior to both, A. D. Woozley gave us the first modern reprint of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man - in fact the first edition of any work by Reid to appear in print since the Philosophical (...) Works was edited in the nineteenth century by Sir William Hamilton. But Reid's aesthetic philosophy has not received its due. Woozley, in abridging the Essays, omitted the whole final essay, "On Taste," which is the only extended work on aesthetic theory that Reid ever published. Raphael, being interested primarily in Reid's moral theory, understand ably, treated aesthetics only as it was related to morality. And Grave, although he did present a short and very cogent resume of Reid's aes thetic position, obviously found himself drawn to other elements of Reid's philosophy. There are, of course, some accounts of Reid's aes thetic theory to be found in the various studies of eighteenth-century British aesthetics and criticism. None, however, appears to me to do any kind of justice to the philosophical questions which Reid treats in his aesthetics and philosophy of art. (shrink)

For Thomas Reid, moral knowledge is a matter of having "good evidence" supplied by a sense-like moral faculty concerning moral reality, and the purpose of this work is to show that such a view can be both consistent and plausible. The first chapter attempts to characterize the state of moral epistemology and the assumptions that were considered uncontroversial when Reid wrote. The second chapter opens with a brief recounting of Reid's central claims about the moral sense and the progress of (...) moral knowledge, and then seeks to describe the various problems that confront those who would explain and defend his views. Three features in particular of his account turn out to be in need clarification: his reasons for using the moral sense analogy, his understanding of the object apprehended by the moral faculty, and his conception of evidence. ;Reid's expectations about moral ontology are handled somewhat briefly in chapter 2, and the rest of the work concentrates on the more purely epistemological issues of evidence and the process of moral belief-formation. Chapter 2 concludes with an explanation of the difficulty Reid's text poses for understanding his doctrine of evidence, and the third chapter lays the foundation for resolving those difficulties by detailing an epistemological conception of evidence which parallels the legal conception of evidence in use in the Scottish courts of Reid's day. Chapter 4 builds on this foundation, developing Reid's general epistemological strategy and showing that Reid's various claims about evidence and self-evidence are best understood in light of the legal model detailed in chapter 3. ;The fifth chapter returns to Reid's claims about moral knowledge, explaining his understanding of the primary task of the moral faculty--practical deliberation--and defending his invocation of the moral sense analogy. With these clarifications secured, chapter 6 characterizes and attempts to make plausible Reid's account of moral knowledge, both concerning individual actions and the truth of moral principles. The final chapter sketches brief responses to twentieth-century worries about "moral sense" constructions, and offers a final assessment of the success of Reid's project. (shrink)

David Hume’s critique of intelligent design is vastly overrated. Nevertheless, his critique, especially at the hands of his contemporary disciples, has been highly effective at shutting down discussion about design. I want here to review Hume’s critique, indicate how modern disciples have updated it, and then describe the response to Hume by his contemporary Thomas Reid. That response in my view is decisive. Would that more philosophers studied it. Hume did not demolish design. Reid demolished Hume.

During the 19th-century controversy over human freedom, a controversy involving such figures as Locke, Collins, Clarke, Leibniz, Price, and Reid, two different conceptions of freedom were at the center of the dispute. The first of these, of which John Locke is a major advocate, I will call Lockean freedom, the other conception, of which Thomas Reid is the leading advocate, I will call Reidian freedom. The history of this controversy is fundamentally a dispute over which of these two concepts of (...) freedom is more adequate to our common-sense beliefs about freedom and our general metaphysical and scientific principles. To evaluate the merits of each side in this dispute we must, as a start, have a clear understanding of these two conceptions of freedom. Lockean freedom is fairly well understood, Reidian freedom much less so, perhaps even misunderstood. My aim in this paper is to show that the standard account of Reidian freedom is incorrect, to provide a correct interpretation of Reid’s conception of freedom, and to show its importance to the question of the connection between moral responsibility and freedom. (shrink)

Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral (...) responsibility. In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist, agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Follows the career of a prominent nineteenth-century British music critic whose biased and eccentric views led him to denounce Chopin, Tchaikovsky, Verdi, Wagner, Berlioz, Schubert, Schumann, and Liszt.

Reid was a Newtonian and a Theist, but did he found his Theism on Newton’s physics? In opposition to commonplace assumptions about the role of Theism in Reid’s philosophy, my answer is no. Reid prefers to found his Theism on a priori reasons, rather than on physics. Reid’s understanding of physics as an empirical science stops it from contributing in any clear and efficient way to issues of natural theology. In addition, Reid is highly sceptical of our ability to discover (...) the efficient and final causes of natural phenomena, knowledge of which is essential for natural theology. To bring out Reid’s differences with classical Newtonian Theists Richard Bentley and William Whiston, I examine their use of the law and force of general gravitation, and reconstruct what would be Reidian objections.Keywords: Thomas Reid; William Whiston; Richard Bentley; Physics; Theism; Isaac Newton. (shrink)