In the following paper, I discuss the adjectival uses of the English word ‘right’, in ethical and nonethical settings. I distinguish four distinct but related uses. In the central use, which includes the typical ethical applications, what is right is what conforms to a norm, or rule. The emphasis can be on the norm itself, or on the conforming to the norm. The view I offer is not original. It is to be found in the works of T.M. Scanlon, T.H. (...) Green, R.M. Hare and W.D. Ross.1. (shrink)

This is an M & M treat, a massive and magisterial commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Speaking of the historical influences that shaped Hegel’s thought according to his interpreters, our author writes, “Hegel must then have been reading night and day for more than a century”. But the same can be said of Peperzak himself, for the notes give a guided tour of a body of Hegel literature in German, French, Italian, and English so extensive as to suggest Hegel’s (...) bad infinite. Yet the voice in the text is distinctly Peperzak’s own. He tells us this work has been in the making for forty years and cites four of his earlier books as preparatory studies: Le jeune Hegel et la vision morale du monde, Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, and Hegels praktische Philosophie. It would seem that the spirit of thoroughness has not died out in Hegel studies. (shrink)

This is an M & M treat, a massive and magisterial commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Speaking of the historical influences that shaped Hegel’s thought according to his interpreters, our author writes, “Hegel must then have been reading night and day for more than a century”. But the same can be said of Peperzak himself, for the notes give a guided tour of a body of Hegel literature in German, French, Italian, and English so extensive as to suggest Hegel’s (...) bad infinite. Yet the voice in the text is distinctly Peperzak’s own. He tells us this work has been in the making for forty years and cites four of his earlier books as preparatory studies: Le jeune Hegel et la vision morale du monde, Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, and Hegels praktische Philosophie. It would seem that the spirit of thoroughness has not died out in Hegel studies. (shrink)

The influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein is just beginning to be appreciated. Hacker and Baker, Westphal, Monk, and Haller have all drawn attention to significant affinities between the two men's work, and the number of explicit citations of Goethe in Wittgenstein's texts supports the idea that we are not dealing simply with a matter of deeplying similarities of aim and method, but of direct and major influence. These scholarly developments are encouraging because they help to place Wittgenstein's work within (...) an important tradition of German letters which goes far beyond his contemporaries and immediate forebears in Vienna; and they show that Wittgenstein's profound interest in literature and music is ceasing to be merely a matter of biographical anecdote, and is being used to illuminate some of the most central areas of his work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript by Merold WestphalM. Jamie FerreiraMerold Westphal. Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript.” West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii + 261. Cloth, $32.95. Paper, $16.95.The Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy describes itself as attempting to provide insight into a philosopher by means of a focus on a (...) single major text. Such a focus is unusual for a series in the history of philosophy, and Westphal’s [End Page 144] accomplishment in this study is a fine example of how fruitfully this can be done. Commentary on over six hundred pages of Kierkegaard’s Postscript is presented in ten manageable chapters, which follow the order of the Postscript and deal with segments of it ranging from as few as twelve pages to as many as one hundred and seventy-five pages. The result is a commentary which can wonderfully guide students through the Postscript in its entirety, or through the assignment of individual chapters to accompany discrete reading selections. Westphal’s discussions are informed by an unusually wide-ranging knowledge of the history of philosophy—he considers the text not only in relation to Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Hegel, as others commentators have, but also brings to this work his clear strengths in phenomenological, existential, and postmodern thought (so we get useful comparisons with Gadamer, Derrida, Levinas, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, among others). Lying behind Westphal’s entire approach to the book is his desire to address the two most common major criticisms of Kierkegaard’s thought, namely, that it is individualist and irrationalist. Thus, the major perspective from which everything is approached is the tension between the fallible yet responsible self—more precisely, the tension between individual and society, and the tension between irrationalist (voluntarist, blind) and rationalist. Westphal does a superb job of laying out the diversity of protests Climacus is registering in the Postscript—against Platonic intellectualism, against systematic philosophical speculation, and against the rhetorical compromising embodied in the “priest-orator.” There are, of course (as one would expect), sensible, suggestive, illuminating, and detailed exegeses of passages concerning all the significant themes associated with Climacus (approximation, appropriation, leap, direct communication, second reflection, dialectic, etc). Westphal examines the Postscript in the light of the distinction between Socratic religion and the non-Socratic (Christian) alternative found in the earlier Philosophical Fragments, to which this Postscript is an admittedly peculiar postscript, and employs material from much of Kierkegaard’s other work, including journal entries. With respect to the (in)famous category of leap, Westphal incorporates contemporary discussions of volitionalism and presents a fine summary of ways in which willing (decision) can be viewed as indirect, yet allowing the relevance of an ethics of belief. In fact, regarding even the commentary on “Truth Is Subjectivity,” where one might feel nothing new could be said, he manages to be innovative, by identifying “four moments” in the presentation of a theory of subjectivity (a satire, a parable, a definition, and a portrait) which make the chapter much more manageable for teaching. After considering Climacus’s presentation of the relation between Religiousness A and Religiousness B, Westphal appends a discussion of his own creation, Religiousness C (Chapter XIV). But all of this discussion would be unhelpful to a reader who does not fully appreciate the role of pseudonymity and indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s works; so Westphal prefaces his entire discussion with a fine chapter on pseudonymity which can be used even in courses where the entire book is not required reading. This chapter, relating pseudonymity to twentieth-century discussions of themes such as the effacement of the author of a text and the forfeiture of the privilege of authorship, is part of a three-chapter introduction setting the Postscript in relation to Kierkegaard’s biography, pseudonymity, and the familiar theory of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages. This entire introduction is written in a remarkably [End Page 145] engaging style which will surely seduce readers new to Kierkegaard and his creation, Johannes Climacus. For example, Westphal announces that “the flow of Regina’s... (shrink)

This chapter discusses different views on religion and ethics from the viewpoint of Emmanuel Levinas and Søren Kierkegaard, and their insightful comparisons and contrasts to the viewpoints of Merold Westphal. It presents the qualifications that can be made for such comparison, first with Kierkegaard, then to Levinas. It argues that if Kierkegaard's view is that “God always stands between me and my neighbor”, it is then related to the view of Levinas, that is “the neighbor always stands between me (...) and God”. The only difference is that for Levinas, ethics comes first before religion. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to the emerging field of continental philosophy of religion by treating the thought of its most important representatives, including its appropriations by several thinkers in the United States. Part I provides context by examining religious aspects of the thought of Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. Christina Gschwandtner contends that, although the work of these thinkers is not apologetic in nature, it prepares the ground for the more religiously motivated work of more recent thinkers (...) by giving religious language and ideas some legitimacy in philosophical discussions. Part II devotes a chapter to each of the contemporary French thinkers who articulate a phenomenology of religious experience: Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-Yves Lacoste, and Emmanuel Falque. In it, the author argues that their respective philosophies can be read as an apologetics of sorts--namely, as arguments for the coherence of thought about God and the viability of religious experience--though each thinker does so in a different fashion and to a different degree. Part III considers the three major thinkers who have popularized and extended this phenomenology in the U.S. context: John D. Caputo, Merold Westphal, and Richard Kearney. The book thus both provides an introduction to important contemporary thinkers, many of whom have not yet received much treatment in English, and also argues that their philosophies can be read as providing an argument for Christian faith. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to the emerging field of Continental philosophy of religion by treating the philosophical thought of its most important representatives, including its appropriations by several thinkers in the US. Part I provides a context to the field by looking at the religious aspects of the thought of Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jacques Derrida. It contends that although the work of these thinkers is not apologetic in nature, it prepares the ground for the more religiously motivated (...) work of more recent thinkers by giving religious language and ideas some legitimacy in philosophical discussions. Part II devotes a chapter to each of the contemporary French thinkers who articulate a phenomenology of religious experience: Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-Yves Lacoste and Emmanuel Falque. This part argues that their respective philosophies can be read as an apologetics of sort, namely as making arguments for the coherence of thought about God and the viability of religious experience, though each does so in a different fashion and to a different degree. Part III considers the three major thinkers who have popularized and extended this phenomenology in the US context: Merold Westphal, John D. Caputo, and Richard Kearney. The book thus both provides an introduction to important contemporary thinkers many of whom have not yet received much treatment in English and also argues that their philosophies can be read as providing an argument for Christian faith. (shrink)

In support of the thesis that colours are examples of metaphysical simples, this article critiques arguments to the contrary. It is shown that facts about colour resemblance do not entail the complexity of colour, for such facts may explained by recourse to acts of seeing-as. The logic of colour and colour terms is adumbrated in support of this and used in a positive argument for the claim that colours are simple.

Review of Bykova, M., Westphal, K., et al.. The Palgrave Hegel handbook. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Serhii Shevchenko Merold Westphal’s existential theology as the development ideas of Soren Kierkegaard in age of Postmodern. The article reveals the problem of Merold Westphal’s understanding the specific of S. Kierkegaard’s religious existentialism. To analysed the basic statement of the books by M. Westphal «Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript. It was studied thoroughly the problem of explication of S. Kierkegaard’s ethical and religious ideas in the post-existential and postmodern context. To investigate the (...) phenomenon of «religiousness “C”», introduced by M. Westphal’s in the modern existential phenomenology of religion. (shrink)

Westphal wished to transpose lines 88–90 and 93–5 of the Supplices. This transposition has been supported recently by R. D. Dawe , by Holger Friis Johansen in C. & M. xxvii , 43–4 , and by Sir Denys Page . However, the transposition gains little support from a careful examination of the language and context of the passage, as I shall now proceed to demonstrate. I discussed the whole passage previously in my article ‘Aeschylus Supplices 86–95’, Classical Philology, 1 (...) , 21–5, and much of my argument can be found in that earlier article. (shrink)

Westphal wished to transpose lines 88–90 and 93–5 of the Supplices. This transposition has been supported recently by R. D. Dawe, by Holger Friis Johansen in C. & M. xxvii, 43–4, and by Sir Denys Page. However, the transposition gains little support from a careful examination of the language and context of the passage, as I shall now proceed to demonstrate. I discussed the whole passage previously in my article ‘Aeschylus Supplices 86–95’, Classical Philology, 1, 21–5, and much of (...) my argument can be found in that earlier article. (shrink)

The titles in this series present well-edited basic texts to be used in courses and seminars and for teachers looking for a succinct exposition of the results of recent research. Each volume in the series presents the fundamental ideas of a great philosopher by means of a very thorough and up-to-date commentary on one important text. The edition and explanation of the text give insight into the whole of the oeuvre, of which it is an integral part.

In Erwiderung auf Kohlbergs Theorie moralischer Entwicklung betont Gilligan (1982, 2. Aufl.: 1993, S. 18 – 9), dass seine Theorie völlig von ihrem postulierten Ziel abhänge, nämlich einer prinzipien-geleiteten Urteilskraft. Hier wird nun analysiert, inwiefern Gilligans Diagnose nur die Spitze eines moralischen sowie theoretischen Eisbergs dadurch beleuchtet, dass ihre Untersuchungen der Klärung dienen, inwiefern Kohlbergs Etappen „Fünf“ und „Sechs“ eine spezifische Theorie des „moralischen Standpunkts“ voraussetzen, bei der Fragen der Gerechtigkeit und zu viel von dem, was wir einander und auch (...) uns selbst schulden, vernachlässigt werden. Um dies zu zeigen, untersuche ich zunächst, wie klassische Gerechtigkeitsfragen für teleologische Ethiktheorien nicht nur einmal, sondern zweimal verloren gegangen sind (§ 2). Ein wichtiges Beispiel dafür ist die radikale Kehre in der „ethischen Theorie“ zu Beginn des anglophonen 20. Jahrhunderts (C.E.), repräsentiert durch die Kehre von Moore, Prichard und Ross hin zu Partikularismus und Intuitionismus und deren prinzipielle Missachtung des tatsächlichen Verhaltens im tatsächlichen Kontext eines jeglichen Agenten (§ 3). Ein zweiter wichtiger Fall betrifft die liberal-individualistische Grundlage von Untersuchungen zu „der“ moralischen Sichtweise aus der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts (C.E.) und Vorstellungen von „Unparteilichkeit“, die Kant oft, aber fälschlicherweise zugeschrieben werden (§§ 4 – 7). Diese Überlegungen ermöglichen es, einige zentrale methodologische Verwirrungen zu identifizieren (§ 8), die unvermeidlich auch einige schwerwiegende moralische Verwirrungen erzeugen – Verwirrungen, die Kohlbergs Theorie der moralischen Entwicklung zugrunde liegen, von denen einige durch Gilligans Einwände gegen seine Theorie identifiziert werden (§ 9). Diese kritischen Überlegungen erlauben es mir dann, wesentliche Züge von Kants kritischem Ansatz zur Moralphilosophie zu charakterisieren (§ 10). Kants scharfsinnige Theorie moralischer Urteile und moralischer Rechtfertigung erfordert keine Berufung auf den einzigen inkommensurablen Wert der „Würde“; auch ist seine Darstellung nicht individualistisch: Die „Universalität“, die erforderlich ist, um Prinzipien, Handlungen und unsere moralischen Verpflichtungen, Erlaubnisse oder Verbote zu identifizieren und zu bewerten, ist im Prinzip und in der Praxis kosmopolitisch. Kants ‚konstruktiver‘ Ansatz zu diesen Fragen ist nicht der von Rawls; er wird vielmehr von Onora O’Neill korrekt identifiziert. Kants Explikation des rationalen Urteils und der rationalen Rechtfertigung kann das Pyrrhonsche Kriteriumsdilemma auflösen; alternative Methoden, die in der Moralphilosophie bevorzugt worden sind, können dies nicht. (shrink)

"The selections are well chosen... the Introduction and headnotes are extremely clear and well written... appropriately pegged for a very introductory audience." --Steven Gerrard, Williams College.

The young Hegel was entranced by the notion of intellectual intuition, and this notion continues to entrance many of Hegel’ commentators. I argue that Kant provided three distinct conceptions of an intuitive intellect, that none of these involve aconceptual intuitionism, and that they differ markedly from Fichte’s and Schelling’s conceptions of intellectual intuition. I further argue that by 1804 Hegel recognized that appealing to an aconceptual model, or to Schelling’s model, or to his own early model of intellectual intuition generates (...) inevitable and insoluble problems of question-begging. By incorporating several important points from Kant’s Transcendental Ideal into his reinterpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Refutation of Idealism, Hegel’s mature discursive and conceptual account of ‘absolute knowing’ performs some of the functions Kant assigned to the intuitive intellect, though without invoking any such intuitive intellect. I discuss several of these functions. (shrink)

_Grounds of Pragmatic Realism_ shows Hegel is a major epistemologist, who disentangled Kant’s critique of judgment, across the Critical corpus, from transcendental idealism, and augmented its enormous evaluative and justificatory significance for commonsense knowledge, the natural sciences and freedom of action.