All medieval philosophers agreed that emotions ought to be controlled by reason, but they gave different accounts of the control that is possible. Aquinas took emotions to be sensory states that are under immediate rational control because both sensory and rational states are produced by a single soul. By contrast, Ockham distinguished two souls and two types of emotions, namely sensory ones that inevitably arise, and rational ones that can be changed by the will. This chapter examines the mechanisms of (...) control in both cases, paying particular attention to the metaphysical framework the two authors chose. Moreover, it looks at the way they dealt with cases of internal emotional conflict. Whereas Aquinas ruled out permanent conflict in a well-functioning soul, Ockham conceded that some rational emotions could coexist with opposing sensory emotions, thus agreeing that true conflict is possible. (shrink)

Satz, Seele und Sachverhalt. Der propositionale Wahrheitsbegriff im Spätmittelalter.

Die Welt ist alles, was wir in unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien beschreiben können – so eine weit verbreitete Überzeugung, die seit den Tagen des Positivismus unser Weltbild bestimmt. Aber reicht das tatsächlich schon aus? Wer sich am Ideal der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis orientiert, neigt dazu, viele nicht-begriffliche Erfahrungsformen zu unterschlagen, die uns aus dem Alltag vertraut sind: Symbolsysteme wie Musik, Literatur oder Bilder, Instanzen der unmittelbaren Erfahrung wie Anschauung, Wahrnehmung oder Gefühl und den Bereich des praktischen Könnens. In der Regel sind wir (...) nicht in der Lage, den Gehalt dieser Phänomene vollständig begrifflich wiederzugeben. Dennoch ist das weite Feld des Nichtbegrifflichen eine unverzichtbare Voraussetzung unserer Sätze und Gedanken: Ohne Kunst, Wahrnehmung und Handeln gibt es kein Denken, keine Wissenschaft, keine Philosophie. Der Band geht der Vielfalt des Nicht-Begrifflichen in ästhetischen, symboltheoretischen und semantischen Untersuchungen nach. Aus ihnen ergibt sich ein umfassender systematischer Überblick über eines der spannendsten und offensten Problemfelder der aktuellen philosophischen Debatte. Mit Beiträgen von: Andreas Bartels, Uwe Baumann, Volker Beeh, Gottfried Boehm, Olaf Breidbach, Joachim Bromand, Gottfried Gabriel, Markus Gabriel, Ernest Wolf Gazo, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Jürgen Goldstein, Jens Halfwassen, Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Wolfgang Harms, Jochen Hörisch, Peter Janich, Guilherme F. R. Kisteumacher, Jakub Kloc-Konkolowicz, Imi Knoebel, Theo Kobusch, Klaus-M. Kodalle, Sibylle Krämer, Guido Kreis, Wolfgang Kubin, Sönke Lorenz, Antonio Cota Marçal, Aliasghar Mosleh, Theodoros Penolidis, Dominik Perler, Hans-Joachim Pieper, Andrzej Przylebski, Birgit Sandkaulen, Matthias Schmoeckel, Oswald Schwemmer, Josef Simon, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Dieter Teichert, Kai Vogeley, Gottfried Willems und Gereon Wolters. (shrink)

Could God Deceive Us? Skeptical Hypotheses in Late Medieval Epistemology.

How did the reception of Aristotelian logic in the Arabic and Latin Middle Ages shape the development of theology? And how did theological issues influence the debates about logic and theories of argumentation? The contributions in this volume examine these questions on the basis of key texts, thus shedding new light on the problematic relationship between logic and theology.

The contributions in this volume examine these questions on the basis of key texts, thus shedding new light on the problematic relationship between logic and theology.

Verstümmelte und verworrene Ideen: Sinneswahrnehmung und Erkenntnis bei Spinoza.

Does the soul have parts? What kind of parts? And how do all the parts make together a whole? Many ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers discussed these questions, thus providing a mereological analysis of the soul. The eleven chapters reconstruct and critically examine radically different theories. They make clear that the question of how a single soul can have an internal complexity was a crucial issue for many classical thinkers.

Early modern philosophers took the phenomena of causation and cognition to be closely related. United in their opposition to Aristotelian accounts of cognition, they developed a wide range of competing theories to explain which causal processes lead to cognitions. Somewhat surprisingly, some early modern authors also made cognition a requirement for causation, on the assumption that every cause needs to cognize its effect. This introductory chapter explores both directions of explanation—from causation to cognition and vice versa—and surveys the various early (...) modern approaches to causation and cognition. (shrink)

Was ist eine menschliche Person? Durch welche besonderen Eigenschaften zeichnet sie sich aus? Und wodurch unterscheidet sie sich von einem blossen Lebewesen? Mittelalterliche Autoren widmeten sich mit viel Scharfsinn diesen Fragen, indem sie sich auf drei Dimensionen einer Person konzentrierten. Sie setzten bei der metaphysischen Dimension an, indem sie eine Person als eine individuelle Substanz mit einer rationalen Natur bestimmten. Dies fuhrte sie dazu, diese Substanz genauer zu untersuchen: ihre wesentlichen Bestandteile, ihre Einheit und ihre Identitat uber die Zeit hinweg. (...) Sie beschaftigten sich aber auch mit der psychologischen Dimension, indem sie die Reflexionsfahigkeit als die entscheidende geistige Fahigkeit einer Person analysierten. Zudem berucksichtigten sie die handlungstheoretische Dimension, indem sie festhielten, dass eine Person im Gegensatz zu einem blossen Lebewesen Handlungen hervorbringen kann. Sie betonten sogar, dass sich eine Person frei fur Handlungen entscheiden kann und daher fur sie verantwortlich ist. Dieses Buch, das sich auf Theorien des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts konzentriert, rekonstruiert die Debatten zu allen drei Dimensionen im historischen Kontext, wertet sie systematisch aus und schlagt dabei auch einen Bogen zu fruhneuzeitlichen und gegenwartigen Diskussionen. Es verdeutlicht, dass im Mittelalter die Grundlagen fur eine philosophische Anthropologie gelegt wurden. (shrink)

Many late medieval Aristotelians assumed that a natural substance has several substantial forms in addition to matter as really distinct parts. This assumption gave rise to a unity problem: why is a substance more than a conglomeration of all these parts? This paper discusses Francisco Suárez’s answer. It first shows that he rejected the idea that there is a plurality of forms, emphasizing instead that each substance has a single form and hence a single structuring principle. It then examines his (...) account of the relationship between matter and form. While accepting the thesis that these two parts are really distinct entities, he claimed that there is a special “mode of union” that binds them together. With this account, he defended the essential unity of a natural substance, but he transformed the program of Aristotelian metaphysics: not substances, but entities and modes inside them, are now the basic building blocks of reality. (shrink)

Die Intentionalitätsproblematik steht nicht nur im Mittelpunkt der heutigen philosophischen und kognitionstheoretischen Debatten. Sie wurde bereits im Mittelalter scharfsinnig diskutiert, ja die scholastischen Autoren prägten als Erste die Fachausdrücke "Intentionalität" und "intentionale Existenz" und entwarfen verschiedene Modelle, um das Rätsel der kognitiven Bezugnahme zu lösen. Dieses Buch stellt fünf einflußreiche Intentionalitätsmodelle vor, die im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert entstanden sind. Dabei werden so unterschiedliche Autoren wie Thomas von Aquin, Petrus Johannes Olivi, Dietrich von Freiberg, Johannes Duns Scotus, Petrus Aureoli, Hervaeus (...) Natalis, Wilhelm von Ockham und Adam Wodeham berücksichtigt. -/- "Die anschauliche und präzise Art, in der Perler mit den Denkern des Mittelalters und der Gegenwart argumentierend spricht, lockert seine gestrenge Gedankenarbeit auf, ohne darüber hinwegzutäuschen, daß dieses Buch eine Reihe von Entdeckungen und Klärungen enthält, wie sie auf diesem schwierigen Feld selten vorkommen. Er bietet eine Meisterleistung an Konzentration und Darstellungskunst. Wenige Bücher zur Philosophie des Mittelalters vereinen so glücklich wie dieses geschichtlichen Takt und Problemsinn." Kurt Flasch -/- The problem of intentionality is not only at the centre of today's philosophical and cognitive theory debates. It was already discussed astutely in the Middle Ages; indeed the scholastic authors were the first to coin the technical terms "intentionality" and "intentional existence" and designed various models to solve the riddle of cognitive reference. This book presents five influential models of intentionality that emerged in the 13th and 14th centuries. It takes into account authors as different as Thomas Aquinas, Petrus Johannes Olivi, Dietrich von Freiberg, Johannes Duns Scotus, Petrus Aureoli, Hervaeus Natalis, Wilhelm von Ockham and Adam Wodeham. Upun reading this book, Kurt Flasch remarks that it "contains a wealth of discoveries and clarifications that are rare in this difficult field. [Perler] offers a masterly performance of concentration and art of representation [...]. Few books on medieval philosophy succeed so thoroughly in uniting historical and philosophical perspicacity such as this one". (shrink)

This volume analyses ancient and medieval theories of intentionality in various contexts: perception, imagination, and intellectual thinking.

Thomas von Aquin reagierte im 13. Jahrhundert als erster europäischer Theologe auf den Occasionalismus, der sich im arabisch-islamischen Denken vom 8. bis zum 12. Jahrhundert entwickelte, und begann damit die bis in das 17. Jahrhundert fortdauernde Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Thema. Die Autoren stellen in chronologischer Reihenfolge die gesamte arabisch-islamische und europäische Diskussion vor.

What kind of entities are faculties? How are they related to the soul and to the entire living being? How can they be classified? And in what sense are they responsible for a large variety of activities? This chapter examines these questions, which were extensively discussed by scholastic authors, and focuses on the metaphysical models established by William of Auvergne, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and Francisco Suárez. It argues that there was no unified scholastic doctrine. While some authors (e.g. (...) Ockham) took the faculties to be mere ways of acting of the soul, others (e.g. Suárez) conceived of them as distinct entities with their own power. The latter theory gave rise to a new model of the soul—a model that presented it as a complex entity with many distinct causes. (shrink)

Zweifel und Gewissheit: Skeptische Debatten im Mittelalter (Philosophische Abhandlungen, Bd. 92).

Abstrakt zum Buch Welche Fragen haben die großen Denker beschäftigt? Wie haben sich die Fragestellungen weiterentwickelt? Und aus welchen Gründen sind diese klassischen Fragestellungen und Texte für uns heute noch interessant? Diesen Fragen geht der 2004 erstmals im Hardcover veröffentlichte Band nach. Die vollständig durchgesehene Neuausgabe in der Universal-Bibliothek wurde um Abschnitte zu Plotin (»Woher kommt das Böse?«), John Rawls (»Gerechtigkeit für eine pluralistische Gesellschaft«), Donald Davidson (»Bedeutung und Interpretation«) und Jacques Derrida (»Sinn, Schrift und Differenz«) erweitert. Nach oben .

Like many philosophers in the scholastic tradition, Suárez claims that we cannot cognize anything unless we use a cognitive device, a so-called intelligible species. But how can we produce such a device? And what kind of cognition does it make possible? This chapter examines these questions, paying particular attention to Suárez’s rejection of traditional theories that explained the production of intelligible species by referring to efficient causation. On his view, there can only be a relation of occasional causation: the existence (...) of sensory images is simply an occasion for the intellect to produce intelligible species. This chapter first analyzes this type of causation and then looks at the function of the species. It argues that species are inner representations that make particular things cognitively present. In presenting this view, Suárez breaks with a long tradition that took species to be the product of a process of assimilation of universal forms and paves the way for early modern theories of representation. (shrink)

It seems quite natural that we have cognitive access not only to things around us, but also to our own acts of perceiving and thinking. How is this access possible? How is it related to the access we have to external things? And how certain is it? This paper discusses these questions by focusing on Francisco Suárez’s theory, which gives an account of various forms of access to oneself and thereby presents an elaborate theory of consciousness. It argues that Suárez (...) clearly distinguishes between first-order sensory consciousness and second-order intellectual consciousness. Moreover, Suárez attempts to explain the unity of consciousness by referring to a single soul with hierarchically ordered faculties that is responsible both for first-order and for second-order consciousness. (shrink)

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This paper argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism and naturalism. This (...) crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The paper examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies. (shrink)

All medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition agreed that the human intellect is not only able to know other things, but also itself. But how should that be possible? Which cognitive mechanisms are required for self-knowledge? This chapter examines three models that attempted to answer this fundamental question: (i) Thomas Aquinas referred to higher-order acts that make first-order acts and eventually also the intellect itself cognitively present, (ii) Matthew of Aquasparta appealed to introspection, (iii) Dietrich of Freiberg claimed that no (...) special cognitive process is necessary because the intellect is by nature always fully present to itself. An analysis of these three models shows that scholastic philosophers intended to provide an epistemological foundation for the explanation of Socratic self-knowledge. (shrink)

It has often been said that we should enter into a dialogue with thinkers of the past because they discussed they same problems we still have today and presented sophisticated solutions to them. I argue that this “dialogue model” ignores the specific context in which many problems were created and defined. A closer look at various contexts enables us to see that philosophical problems are not as natural as they might seem. When we contextualize them, we experience a healthy alienation (...) effect: we realise that problems discussed in the past depend on assumptions that are far from being self-evident. When we then compare these assumptions to our own, we reflect on our own theoretical framework that is not self-evident either. This leads to a denaturalisation of philosophical problems – in the past as well as in the present. I argue for this thesis by examining late medieval discussions on mental language. (shrink)

The journal publishes exceptional articles in all areas of Western philosophy from antiquity up to contemporary philosophy. The Archiv articles are distinguished by precise argumentation and lucid prose.

Perler, D. Essentialism and Direct Realism: Some Late Medieval Perspectives. Topoi 19, 111–122 (2000).

This paper examines Elisabeth of Bohemia’s critique of Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness. According to this conception, we can all become happy because we can all make full use of our rational faculties and constantly follow our best judgments. Happiness is nothing but an “internal satisfaction” that arises when we act in accordance with these judgments. Elisabeth challenges this conception by pointing out that it is far too optimistic and that it neglects what is external to our own mind. Quite (...) often, we cannot make full use of our rational faculties because we are in the grip of passions and diseases or because we are under time pressure and can neither make the best decisions nor foresee their consequences. The paper focuses on these two objections, arguing that Elisabeth replaces Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness with a more complex conception that takes both internal and external factors into account. On her view, not only the right use of our rational faculties but also the right conditions for using them are required for obtaining happiness. In defending this view, Elisabeth presents an alternative to Descartes’ position and should therefore be seen as an original thinker engaging in a philosophical debate. (shrink)

The aim of the series Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind is to foster historical research into the nature of thinking and the workings of the mind. The volumes address topics of intellectual history that would nowadays fall into different disciplines like philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, etc. The monographs and collections of articles in the series are historically reliable as well as congenial to the contemporary reader. They provide original insights into central contemporary (...) problems by looking at them in historical contexts, addressing issues like consciousness, representation and intentionality, mind and body, the self and the emotions. In this way, the books open up new perspectives for research on these topics. (shrink)

What am I thinking about? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on intentional objects.

It seems quite natural to explain the activities of human and non-human animals by referring to their special faculties. Thus, we say that dogs can smell things in their environment because they have perceptual faculties, or that human beings can think because they have rational faculties. But what are faculties? In what sense are they responsible for a wide range of activities? How can they be individuated? How are they interrelated? And why are different types of faculties assigned to different (...) types of living beings? The six chapters in this book discuss these questions, covering a wide period from Plato up to contemporary debates about faculties as modules of the mind. They show that faculties were referred to in different theoretical contexts, but analyzed in radically different ways. Some philosophers, especially Aristotelians, made them the cornerstone of their biological and psychological theories, taking them to be basic powers of living beings. Others took them to be inner causes that literally produce activities, while still others provided a purely functional explanation. The chapters focus on various models, taking into account Greek, Arabic, Latin, French, German and Anglo-American debates. They analyze the role assigned to faculties in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and epistemology, but also the attack that was often launched against the assumption that faculties are hidden yet real features of living beings. The short "Reflections" inserted between the chapters make clear that faculties were also widely discussed in literature, science and medicine. (shrink)

Ockham affirms that a human being consists of three really distinct forms that exist in matter, thus defending a «pluralist» position in the debate about the soul. However, he takes a «unitarist» position with regard to the rational soul, claiming that intellect and will are not really distinct. Why does he not admit a plurality of forms in the rational soul as well? And why does he think that the rational soul as a whole is really distinct from the sensory (...) soul? This paper examines these questions, thus analyzing Ockham’s metaphysics of the soul. It pays close attention to his arguments both for a plurality of forms and for the unity of the rational soul. It argues that Ockham carefully distinguishes between forms that are metaphysical parts of a human being, and faculties that are ways of acting of a specific form. This distinction enables him to reject both a radical unitarism that accepts one single form in a human being, and an excessive pluralism that posits as many forms as there are faculties. (shrink)

Ockham developed two theories to explain the intentionality of memory: one theory that takes previously perceived things to be the objects of memory, and another that takes one’s own earlier acts of perceiving to be the objects of memory. This paper examines both theories, paying particular attention to the reasons that motivated Ockham to give up the first theory in favor of the second. It argues that the second theory is to be understood as a theory of double intentionality. At (...) the core of this theory is the thesis that one directly remembers one’s own acts, and indirectly also the objects of these acts. The paper analyzes the cognitive mechanism that makes this double intentionality possible and examines the causal account that Ockham gave for explaining the emergence of acts of remembering. It emphasizes that he accepted nothing more than a causal chain of acts and habits, thereby offering an ontologically parsimonious theory of memory. (shrink)

Leibniz holds that we cannot give an account of the synchronic and diachronic identity of a person without appealing to a substance. This paper analyses his reasons for this anti-Lockean thesis. It first looks at his theory of substance, paying particular attention to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason: the existence of a well-ordered series of mental states cannot be sufficiently explained without reference to a substance. The paper then examines the distinction Leibniz draws between the substance as (...) the “real person” and the “appearing person” that comes into existence through reflexive consciousness. It argues that there can be no appearing person without a real person and looks at the relationship between these two types of person. Leibniz’s distinction is still relevant because it shows that questions concerning the metaphysical constitution of a person need to be carefully distinguished from questions concerning the psychological construction of a personality. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 3.

Does the soul have parts? What kind of parts? And how do all the parts make together a whole? Many ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers discussed these questions, thus providing a mereological analysis of the soul. The eleven chapters reconstruct and critically examine radically different theories. They make clear that the question of how a single soul can have an internal complexity was a crucial issue for many classical thinkers.

Sind die Gegenstände farbig? Zum Problem der Sinneseigenschaften bei Descartes.

A comprehensive study of medieval and modern debates surrounding the nature of emotions, this book presents not just a single theory or tradition, but examines Aristotelian, dualist, monist, and even skeptical approaches to emotions. It discusses various cognitive therapies that help us to change or even overcome some emotions.

Satztheorien. Texte zur Sprachphilosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie im 14. Jahrhundert.

It seems to be self-evident that through perception we gain access to the material world. That visual perception takes an important role seems self-evident as well. But what exactly do we see? The objects themselves or just their perceptible properties? How do we manage to see something at all? Are we capable of seeing solely through optical and physiological processes or does viewing something asks for presupposed terms in order to help us to see something as something? These questions, currently (...) discussed at great length within the framework of cognitive and epistemological theory, were already cause for intensive debate in the early modern times. In many aspects, those discussions in the 17th and 18th century laid the groundwork for today’s theories: on one hand, they identified the problems with great clarity and on the other, they provided strategies for possible solutions which are still of value today. This volume will provide new access to those debates (from Descartes to Reid) and will present these debates to an audience interested in philosophical questions. The book shows that the early modern times is not just a respectable museum in the history of philosophy, but on the contrary, a very productive and stimulating philosophical epoch which invites further discussion. (shrink)

Dass wir durch Wahrnehmung einen Zugang zur materiellen Welt haben, scheint selbstverständlich zu sein. Und dass die visuelle Wahrnehmung dabei einen prominenten Platz einnimmt, scheint ebenfalls selbstverständlich zu sein. Doch was genau sehen wir: die Gegenstände selbst oder bloß ihre wahrnehmbaren Eigenschaften? Wie gelingt es uns überhaupt, etwas zu sehen? Können wir allein aufgrund von optischen und physiologischen Vorgängen etwas sehen, oder setzt das Sehen bereits Begriffe voraus, mithilfe derer wir etwas als etwas sehen können? -/- Diese Fragen, die in (...) der gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungs- und Erkenntnistheorie ausgiebig erörtert werden, waren bereits in der Frühen Neuzeit Gegenstand intensiver Debatten. In vielfacher Hinsicht legten die Diskussionen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert sogar die Grundlage für heutige Theorien, da sie zum einen die Probleme in aller Schärfe benannten, zum anderen aber auch Lösungsstrategien vorlegten, die auch heute noch von Bedeutung sind. -/- Der Band soll diese Debatten (von Descartes bis Reid) neu erschließen und einem breiten philosophisch interessierten Publikum zugänglich machen. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass die Frühe Neuzeit kein ehrwürdiges Museum der Philosophiegeschichte ist, sondern eine äußerst produktive und anregende philosophische Epoche, die zu einem Dialog einlädt. (shrink)

Dass wir durch Wahrnehmung einen Zugang zur materiellen Welt haben, scheint selbstverständlich zu sein. Und dass die visuelle Wahrnehmung dabei einen prominenten Platz einnimmt, scheint ebenfalls selbstverständlich zu sein. Doch was genau sehen wir: die Gegenstände selbst oder bloß ihre wahrnehmbaren Eigenschaften? Wie gelingt es uns überhaupt, etwas zu sehen? Können wir allein aufgrund von optischen und physiologischen Vorgängen etwas sehen, oder setzt das Sehen bereits Begriffe voraus, mithilfe derer wir etwas als etwas sehen können? -/- Diese Fragen, die in (...) der gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungs- und Erkenntnistheorie ausgiebig erörtert werden, waren bereits in der Frühen Neuzeit Gegenstand intensiver Debatten. In vielfacher Hinsicht legten die Diskussionen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert sogar die Grundlage für heutige Theorien, da sie zum einen die Probleme in aller Schärfe benannten, zum anderen aber auch Lösungsstrategien vorlegten, die auch heute noch von Bedeutung sind. -/- Der Band soll diese Debatten (von Descartes bis Reid) neu erschließen und einem breiten philosophisch interessierten Publikum zugänglich machen. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass die Frühe Neuzeit kein ehrwürdiges Museum der Philosophiegeschichte ist, sondern eine äußerst produktive und anregende philosophische Epoche, die zu einem Dialog einlädt. (shrink)

Abstract of the book This volume has three aims. First, historians of philosophy have typically focused on the discussions of the moral relevance of emotions, and with the exception of scholars of ancient philosophy, neglected the place of emotions in cognitive life. This collection of articles refocuses the discussion of emotion in the medieval and early modern periods to their role in cognition. Second, though many have aimed to clarify relationship between the later thinkers and their predecessors with regard to (...) issues in metaphysics and epistemology, there has been very little effort at tracing similar lines of thought about emotion. As a whole, the contributions to this volume serve to begin a discussion about the continuities between medieval and early modern thinking about the emotions. In this regard, there is also a discussion of the emotions of cognitive life of the Renaissance. Though we get only a snapshot of a period of philosophical work often passed over, even this snapshot invites questions about how to weave an intellectual history about accounts of our emotions in our cognitive lives. Finally, attention to the concerns that engage philosophers of the medieval, renaissance and early modern periods can inform the contemporary debate regarding the relationship between emotions, cognition, and reason. The thirteen contributions explore this from the point of view of four key themes: the situation of emotions within the human mind; the intentionality of emotions and their role in cognition; emotions and action; the role of emotion in self-understanding and the social situation of individuals. (shrink)