Profielen van 59 denkers die filosofie en wetenschap van de twintigste eeuw beslissend beïnvloed hebben.

Introduces contemporary American philosophy of technology through six of its leading figures. The six American philosophers of technology whose work is profiled in this clear and concise introduction to the field—Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner—represent a new, empirical direction in the philosophical study of technology that has developed mainly in North America. In place of the grand philosophical schemes of the classical generation of European philosophers of technology, the contemporary American generation addresses (...) concrete technological practices and the co-evolution of technology and society in modern culture. Six Dutch philosophers associated with Twente University survey and critique the full scope and development of their American colleagues’ work, often illustrating shifts from earlier to more recent interests. Individual chapters focus on Borgmann’s engagement with technology and everyday life; Dreyfus’s work on the limits of artificial intelligence; Feenberg’s perspectives on the cultural and social possibilities opened by technologies; Haraway’s conception of the cyborg and its attendant blurring of boundaries; Ihde’s explorations of the place of technology in the lifeworld; and Winner’s fascination with the moral and political implications of modern technologies. American Philosophy of Technology offers an insightful and readable introduction to this new and distinctly American philosophical turn. Contributors are Hans Achterhuis, Philip Brey, René Munnik, Martijntje Smits, Pieter Tijmes, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. (shrink)

Het is bijna niet voor te stellen hoeveel Foucaults studie Surveiller et punir in het verleden betekend heeft voor mij en een belangrijk deel van mijn generatie. Vanwege mijn Franse achtergrond – ik promoveerde in Straatsburg op een proefschrift over Albert Camus – kende ik Foucault en zijn werk al goed. Je kon met name in de zomer van 1967 gewoon niet om hem heen. In alle parken en cafés rond de universiteit zaten toen in Straatsburg studenten zijn dikke boek (...) Les mots et les choses ostentatief te etaleren. Ze hadden het met de titelpagina naar boven naast of voor zich liggen, of hielden hun kostbare schat, met weer de titel goed zichtbaar in de hand. Het kwam zelden voor dat ze erin lazen. Als buitenlander begreep ik er niets van. Mijn Franse vrienden legden het mij uit. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues against a universal restriction on our pursuit of acceleration. Instead, he presents arguments for a selective slowdown in different areas of our life.

Kennismaking -- Verwantschap, vriendschap -- Antisemitisme, imperialisme -- Waarheid en politiek -- Slotbeschouwing.

Zoals bekend is de verhouding tussen filosofie en politiek problematisch. De veroordeling van Socrates door de polis maakte diepe indruk op zijn leerling Plato. Mede om dit soort misstappen te voorkomen ontwierp deze een ideale staat waarin filosofen koningen moesten worden. Vanuit dit idee probeerde hij ook Dionysus, de heerser van Syracus, tot een wijsgerig verantwoorde politiek te brengen. De mislukking van dit Siciliaans avontuur heeft velen na hem ervan overtuigd dat filosofen zich beter niet in kunnen laten met politieke (...) besluitvorming. Immers, Plato’s poging om Dionysus tot een wijsgerig verantwoorde politiek te brengen strandde jammerlijk. Maar, filosofen zijn natuurlijk hardleers en de aantrekkingskracht van het rijk der mensen en dingen op hen, die zich zo thuisvoelen in het rijk der ideeën valt niet altijd te loochenen. Hoewel voor Plato de politieke arena van alledag wezenlijk ongeschikt bleek te zijn voor filosofische uiteenzettingen, heeft toch zijn leerling en collega Aristoteles zich nog korte tijd met het onderwijs aan de jonge Alexander de Grote bemoeid – hoewel Aristoteles’ ambities al bescheidener waren dan van Plato. Het verhaal wil zelfs, dat Alexander op diens veldtochten een exemplaar van het werk van Homerus met aantekeningen van Aristoteles erin bij zich droeg. Na de dood van Alexander werd de anti-Macedonische atmosfeer in Athene voor Aristoteles zodanig bedreigend dat hij de stad verliet, om te voorkomen ‘dat de polis zich ten tweede male aan de filosofie bezondigde.’ Wie wel in het lot van Sokrates heeft moeten delen, is Thomas More, de auteur van het in 1516 verschenen ‘Utopia’. More weigerde Henry VIII als hoofd van de kerk te erkennen en moest dat met zijn dood bekopen. Dit vonnis vloeide dus niet direct voort uit het boek waarmee More zo bekend zou worden. Wellicht had More geleerd van de eerdere moeizame betrekkingen tussen filosofie en politiek en had hij daarom besloten om zich over ‘Ou-topia’ of ‘Nus-quama’ te buigen: over niet-plaats of nergens. Het in dialoogvorm opgetekende reisverhaal gaf op indirecte wijze kritiek op het Engeland van zijn tijd. Waarschijnlijk nog belangrijker dan het vermijden van risico’s door het schrijven over een niet reëel bestaande samenleving was het voordeel dat More op die manier een geheel ander beeld van een samenleving kon opstellen en beschrijven – ongehinderd door contingente omstandigheden, praktische bezwaren of politieke obstakels. More sloot de dialoog in ‘Utopia’ af met een korte overweging, waarin de auteur zegt zich nauwelijks te kunnen voorstellen dat deze samenleving ergens gerealiseerd zou kunnen worden. Vele lezers hebben deze overweging echter niet gezien of serieus genomen, zodat er al snel een ernstig meningsverschil over het genre van de utopie ontstond: vormde een utopie een blauwdruk voor een ideale samenleving die zonder meer ingevoerd zou moeten worden, of moest de utopie veeleer gelezen worden als een mengvorm van kritiek en ideaal – kritiek op de bestaande samenleving en richtinggevend ideaal voor nastrevenswaardige veranderingen van de huidige samenleving? (shrink)

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus.

Émile Durkheim remains one of the most controversial, and deeply misunderstood, classics of social theory. His work differs from the dominant version of sociology that has essentially accepted the modernist self-description of contemporary societies; and it contradicts the individualism that has come to dominate the social sciences. For everybody who is interested in constructing theoretical alternatives to this individualism, Durkheim's sociology can be a useful inspiration - not only because of the solutions it suggests, but already because of the questions (...) it asks. Making use of the theoretical possibilities offered by the Durkheimian tradition, however, requires going beyond the familiar appropriations. The Oxford Handbook of Émile Durkheim takes stock of the different recent debates on Durkheimian sociology, and makes them accessible to a wide audience spanning various disciplines; this includes crucial debates that, due to language barriers, are not easily accessible for an English-reading public. The handbook's chapters elucidate the controversial key concepts of Durkheimian sociology; situate them within the contemporary political and theoretical debates they were originally responding to; offer surveys of empirical research that uses Durkheimian concepts (on topics that were already central for Durkheim's own work as well as on topics that Durkheim hardly touched upon), thus demonstrating the possibilities of a Durkheimian sociology; bring out the divergent, and competing, ways in which Durkheim's ideas have been appropriated and reformulated within more recent theoretical developments in the social sciences. In doing so, this volume is an important resource for all scholars and students looking to understand Durkheimian sociology. (shrink)

In 1890 C. S. Peirce wrote a review of A. C. Fraser’s recent book on Locke, published to coincide with the bicentennial of Locke’s Essay. Peirce remarked that “Locke’s grand work was substantially this: Men must think for themselves, and genuine thought is an act of perception…. We cannot fail to acknowledge a superior element of truth in the practicality of Locke’s thought, which on the whole should place him nearly upon a level with Descartes.” This estimate of Locke was (...) not the common opinion in England during the nineteenth century. This opinion was reflected in Fraser’s book which, Peirce remarked, could not “be said to be a sympathetic account of [Locke]. The biographer seems to see no charm in his hero, and is perpetually speaking of his want of imagination; which only means he was not given to unpractical dreaming.” Locke had his knowledgeable critics and defenders—for instance Dugald Stewart and John Stuart Mill—but the common opinion ranged from extreme hostility and contempt to condescending criticism of isolated minor points. His style was deplored, his philosophy was called unoriginal and a mere unacknowledged plagiarism of Gassendi and Hobbes; he was said to have so thoroughly misunderstood Descartes that he had merely repeated him with new errors; he was said to owe his philosophical reputation entirely to his advocacy of the popular argument for political freedom or merely to the intellectual circumstances of his time; he was held accountable for Condillac’s rejection of reflection and reason; he was knocked down with a few bare sentences loosely drawn from Leibniz; he was said to have made the mind a puny, passive, mechanical thing. He was called a sensualist, a materialist, a sceptic, an atheist, and a utilitarian though at the same time—and not without contradiction—he was generally, especially by his critics, styled a “great lover of truth,” a plain and simple, well-meaning and religious man. To the nineteenth century Locke meant the Essay, and the history of the Essay was in large measure the history of modern thought, of the eighteenth century. Precisely for this reason there was something nearly sinister about him, in spite of his good personal character. “Locke, himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay, religious man,” said Carlyle, “had paved the way for banishing religion from the world.”. (shrink)

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus. Looking behind the self-consciousness of science, he discusses the tense relationship between truth and methodology. In examining the different experiences of truth, he aims to "present the hermeneutic phenomenon in its fullest extent.

This essay argues that Pufendorf conceived the principles of natural law against the rationalism and innatism of the 17th century, and that Condillac similarly formulated a conception of the human origin of language, both of them thus securing open and human foundations for the two primal institutions of law and language, and also making all citizens free agents in the ordering of communal living.

Reprinted 1999 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. LCCN 98-32334. ISBN 1-886363-74-9. Cloth. $95. * Reprint of the first edition.

Exploring all of the central themes of Wittgenstein's "oeuvre," this volume includes discussion of core topics such as meaning and use, rule following, the ...

What is justice? -- The idea of justice in the Holy Scriptures -- Platonic justice -- Aristotle's doctrine of justice -- The natural-law doctrine before the tribunal of science -- A "dynamic" theory of natural law -- Absolutism and relativism in philosophy and politics -- Value judgments in the science of law -- The law as a specific social technique -- Why should the law be obeyed? -- The pure theory of the law and analytical jurisprudence -- Law, state, and (...) justice in the pure theory of law -- Causality and retribution -- Causality and imputation -- Science and politics. (shrink)

In seinem 1960 erschienenen Hauptwerk "Wahrheit und Methode" nimmt Gadamer die bis in die Antike zuruckreichende hermeneutische Tradition auf, um vor allem im Anschluss an Hegel und Heidegger eine philosophische Hermeneutik zu begrunden. Das Buch brachte seinem Autor internationalen Ruhm, und die philosophische Hermeneutik ist eine der massgeblichen Konzeptionen der neueren Philosophie geworden. Nach wie vor bildet "Wahrheit und Methode" den Ausgangspunkt fur eine philosophische Klarung des Verstehens und seiner von Gadamer behandelten Auspragungen in Kunst, Geschichte und Sprache. Der vorliegende (...) Band rekonstruiert und diskutiert in Form eines kooperativen Kommentars, der Gliederung des Werkes folgend, Gadamers Gedankengang, zeigt aber auch die Perspektiven einer Philosophie auf, die sich gegenuber ihrem eigenen hermeneutischen Charakter nicht verschliesst.". (shrink)

Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science have asked, "what kind of thing is a scientific theory?" The logical positivists answered: a scientific theory is a mathematical theory, plus an empirical interpretation of that theory. Moreover, they assumed that a mathematical theory is specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. Later 20th century philosophers questioned this account, arguing instead that a scientific theory need not include a mathematical component; or that the mathematical component need (...) not be specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. We survey various accounts of scientific theories entertained in the 20th century -- removing some misconceptions, and clearing a path for future research. (shrink)

In this book, Hans Joas interweaves Mead's political and intellectual biography with the development of his theories.

This book both consummates and demonstrates the basic thrust of Jonas's thought: the inseparability of ethics and metaphysics, the reality of values at the ...

Dass Edmund Husserl am Problem der Intersubjektivität gescheitert ist, gilt als ausgemacht - und ebenso, welche Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen sind. Entgegen dem allenthalben pauschal erklärten `Abschied vom Subjekt' spricht aber vieles dafür, dass es in der gegenwärtigen Sozialtheorie eher um eine Reformulierung transzendentaler Subjektivität geht. Diese Interpretationsthese wirft ein neues Licht auf den sozialtheoretischen Diskurs, der im deutschen Sprachraum in den vergangenen dreissig Jahren vom Gegensatz von Jürgen Habermas' und Niklas Luhmanns Theorien bestimmt war: `Diskurs' und `System' erscheinen als (...) gegensätzliche Versuche, `Subjektivität' und `Interität' in ein theoretisch befriedigendes Verhältnis zu setzen. Wenn aber - so die kritische These dieses Buches - weder die Reformulierung von Subjektivität als `Interität' noch die Reformulierung von Subjektivität ohne `Interität' das Problem der Intersubjektivität überzeugend löst, ist dies ein Grund, neuerlich in eine direkte Auseinandersetzung mit Husserls Theorie transzendentaler Subjektivität einzutreten. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass Husserls vielkritisierter und -skandalisierter Versuch, den Sinn `Anderer' im `Eigenen' zu fundieren, in der transzendentalphänomenologischen Subjekttheorie durch ein umgekehrtes Begründungsverhältnis konterkariert wird. Bei aller Problematik dieser Theorieanlage - welche nur in Gegenwendung zu den Gewohnheiten der Husserl-Interpretation, vor allem aber auch zu Husserls Selbstinterpretation in den Blick kommt - zeigt sich, dass der phänomenologische Begriff des transzendentalen Subjekts seinen Reformulierungen als Diskurs und als System in mancher Hinsicht überlegen ist. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the idea of collective epistemic commonality suggested by Charles Taylor's example, and contrasts it with a distributive notion of epistemic commonality. It describes a number of accounts of collective epistemic commonality, and then argues that, contrary to what Taylor suggests, conversation is not constitutive of collective epistemic commonality as such, but rather presupposes basic forms of collective epistemic commonality. Taylor's remarks indicate that understanding the consensus is insufficient as whatever proposition people rationally and openly accept in conversation. (...) It is suggested that joint attitudes are irreducible, relational, and pre-reflective, and that such attitudes are joint, in the respect that the participants are aware of themselves as a ‘we’. Highly inferential beliefs need some form of communication, and are probably really some form of joint commitment. (shrink)

Albert approaches critical rationalism as an alternative to other philosophical standpoints dominant in Germany: the conceptions of the Frankfurt School, hermeneutical thinking as represented by Gadamer, analytic philosophy, and logical empiricism. The author's purpose is to find a way out of the foundationalism of classical philosophy without falling back on the skeptical views so prevalent in today's philosophical thinking. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the (...) distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

According to the premises of the fine-tuning argument, most nomologically possible universes lack intelligent life; and the fact that ours has intelligent life is best explained by supposing it was created. However, if our universe was created, then the creator chose the laws of nature, and hence chose in favor of lifeless universes. In other words, the fine-tuning argument shows that God prefers universes without intelligent life; and the fact that our universe has intelligent life provides no new evidence for (...) God's existence. (shrink)