Whenever justification of classroom punishment has been attempted it has usually been on grounds that punishment acts either appropriately pedagogically, teaching students how to behave morally, or is a necessary evil that enables the practical running of the school so that it may carry out its educational business. By itself the first justification leaves punishment in schools as only an extension of wider social attitudes about the virtue of punishing perceived moral wrongdoing, rather than providing any (...) distinct argument for punishment specific to the special circumstances of the school. By highlighting an entanglement between the moral and the conventional, and between discipline and punishment, within the context of the school, I shall argue that the essentially contested nature of education and its purpose, and the related question of the school’s suitability as a venue for it, means that the school’s most promising defence of its use of punishment—that punishment of students might somehow be necessary for enabling the important educative business of the school—becomes undone. Schooling and education are not necessarily synonymous, and as schools provide only one vision of education—and this vision is contestable—then upholding the business of any one school in order for it to achieve its particular unsettled and disputed purpose is not a morally sufficient reason to coerce a student’s compliance through regimes of ‘harm intended as harm’. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What I s Punishment? Purposes of Punishment An Alternative Theory of Punishment Responsibility References.

Our conversations about punishment have been constrained by the presumption that crimes ought to be punished. This presumption does not entail that crimes must be punished, but rather that punishment occurs as a natural response to wrongdoing instead of as a conventional creation. As a consequence, the challenges for punishment’s justification have been reduced to the problems of purpose, opportunity and form, leaving unaddressed the question of the authority of a certain polity to impose this form (...) of treatment on a given individual. In order to present and criticize this presumption, the article traces its origins by revisiting the debate about the nature of punishment that took place during the emergence of liberal political philosophy. After evaluating the main arguments of this debate the article concludes by arguing that liberal theories of punishment should give up this presumption. (shrink)

A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. I argue that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. I proceed in three steps in arguing for this claim. First, I define the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, I distinguish two theories of existence—the theory-commitments view and the truthmaker view—in both their eliminativist and their constructivist (...) variants. Third, I examine individual contributions to the dispute about the existence of group minds and actions to argue that these contributions have an implicit higher-order disagreement. This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a study to apply recent advances in meta-ontology. Second, it contributes to the debate on social ontology by illustrating how meta-ontology matters for social ontology. (shrink)

Retribution involves the presumption that acts of punishment are non-instrumentally good, right, fitting, or justified. On this view, punishment need not be organized in relation to some good outcome or purpose (separate from the act itself or its relationship to past wrongdoing) in order to have moral worth of some kind. Wiegman argues that this view has its roots in ancient psychological impulses like anger and vengefulness. He has argued elsewhere that the evolution of these impulses undercuts our (...) primary reason to believe that punishment is good in itself. Here, he extends those arguments to also undercut the claim that punishment is right in itself. (shrink)

All observers of our legal system recognize that criminal statutes can be complex and obscure. But statutory obscurity often takes a particular form that most observers have overlooked: uncertainty about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish. It is not uncommon for parties to disagree about the identity of the underlying wrong even as they agree on the statute's elements. Hidden in plain sight, these unexamined disagreements underlie or exacerbate an assortment of familiar disputes— (...) class='Hi'>about venue, vagueness, and mens rea; about DUI and statutory rape; about hate crimes, child pornography, and counterterrorism laws; about proportionality in punishment; and about the proper ambit of the criminal law. Each of these disputes may hinge on deeper disagreements about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish, and these deeper disagreements can be surprisingly hard to resolve, fueled as they are by the complex inner structure of our penal laws and the discretionary mechanisms of their administration. (shrink)

Among the many assaults upon widely held views in social and political philosophy to be found in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, is a novel criticism of the utilitarian deterrence theory of punishment. Nozick believes that this criticism is absolutely decisive, and, indeed, in his words, establishes the utilitarian deterrence theory's "non existence." The purpose of this paper is to show that Nozick's criticism rests upon a tacit crucial error about the nature of punishment. This error, (...) while an elementary one, is evidently easy to make since not only Nozick falls prey to it but also some prominent utilitarians themselves. Recognizing the error makes possible a more careful statement of the utilitarian deterrence theory that avoids Nozick's criticism. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers writing on punishment seek to show that much of the dispute between retributionists and utilitarians springs from a failure on the part of both parties to elucidate the concept of punishment. The writers are usually utilitarians who seek to show that what is true in the retributive theory is simply a point about the concept of punishment, and that for the rest, the morality of punishment is to be explained in terms of (...) the utilitarian theory. Those who attempt to destroy the retributive theory by reducing its element of truth to a mere conceptual point about the concept of punishment, seek to argue that the notion of being guilty of an offence is part of the concept of punishment. Against this kind of approach, I wish to consider whether a general theory of punishment is possible, and if so, what are its basic concepts—punishment, deserving of punishment, deserved, or justifiable punishment—and how they are to be elucidated. I shall be concerned to argue that much contemporary writing on punishment commits the Platonic fallacy of assuming that there is a single, core, paradigm use of ‘punishment’ which is to be found by elucidating the concept of legal punishment. (shrink)

Philosophers, legal scholars, criminologists, psychiatrists and psychologists have long asked important questions about punishment: What is its purpose? What theories helps us better understand its nature? Is punishment just? Are there effective alternatives to punishment? How can empirical data from the sciences help us better understand punishment? What are the relationships between punishment and our biology, psychology and social environment? How is punishment understood and administered differently in different societies? The Routledge Handbook of (...) the Philosophy and Science of Punishment is the first major reference work to address these and other important questions in detail, offering 31 chapters from an international and interdisciplinary team of experts, in a single, comprehensive volume. It covers the major theoretical approaches to punishment and its alternatives, emerging research from biology, psychology, and social neuroscience, and important special issues like the side-effects of punishment and solitary confinement, racism and stigmatization, the risk and protective factors for antisocial behavior, and victims' rights and needs. The Handbook is conveniently organized into four sections: I. Theories of Punishment and Contemporary Perspectives II. Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment III. Sciences, Prevention and Punishment IV. Alternatives to Current Punishment Practices A volume Introduction and a comprehensive index help make The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment essential reading for upper-undergraduate and postgraduate students in disciplines such as philosophy, law, criminology, psychology and forensic psychiatry, and highly relevant to a variety of other disciplines such as political and social sciences, behavioral and neurosciences, and global studies. It is also an ideal resource for anyone interested in current theories, research, and programs dealing with the problem of punishment. (shrink)

Legal philosophy is a general and systematic reflection about fundamental questions regarding law. The fact that despite the efforts of contemporary jurists terms like ‘legal philosophy’, ‘legal theory’ and ‘jurisprudence’ do not have established meanings is one of the reasons behind the dispute regarding the function and validity of legal philosophy; a second issue worth considering is the transformations of law due to diverse influences such as globalization or theories on human rights. This article intends to establish common ground (...) for the discussion surrounding this issue by revisiting some of the differences between the two main western traditions, the article then proceeds to describe the general perception and evolution of jurisprudence.Resumen:La filosofía del derecho es una reflexión general y sistemática sobre las cuestiones fundamentales del derecho. El hecho de que términos como “filosofía del derecho”, “teoría del derecho” y “jurisprudencia” no tengan significados delimitados e indisputables, a pesar de los esfuerzos de los juristas contemporáneos, es una de las razones que junto con las transformaciones del derecho en virtud de la globalización y las teorías sobre derechos humanos han dado lugar a diversas disputas sobre la función y validez de la filosofía del derecho. En este artículo se pretende establecer una base común para la discusión en torno a estos problemas mediante la revisión de algunas de las diferencias que las dos principales tradiciones occidentales para después describir la precepción general y evolución de la filosofía del derecho. (shrink)

(1994). Purposes of punishment under the Minnesota sentencing guidelines. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 11-20. doi: 10.1080/0731129X.1994.9991956.

Out-of-court proceedings or alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a peaceful, voluntary alternative method for settling disputes without litigation in the court. ADR institutions usually use a third party to help the consumer and the trader reach a solution. The main purpose of this article is to share the main insights and experience about the out-of-court proceedings in various countries and present main trends of ADR development. First of all, in this article, ADR is presented and its main advantages (...) or disadvantages, main reasons of its origin are outlined. For example, ADR institutions are indeed a low-cost and quick alternative for consumers to settle disputes with businesses. These are the main reasons why ADR originated and developed so fast in the United States of America. Secondly, it is important to analyse various definitions used to describe ADR and its characteristics, because it is a very complicated and complex phenomenon. ADR and the principle of legal accessibility are also very closely related issues which are deeply analysed in this article. (shrink)

Out-of-court proceedings or alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a peaceful, voluntary alternative method for settling disputes without litigation in the court. ADR institutions usually use a third party to help the consumer and the trader to reach a solution. The main purpose of this article is to share the main insights and experience about the out-of-court proceedings in various countries and European Union Member States, to discuss the most important problems concerning ADR and propose possible solutions of these (...) problems. First of all, in this article, ADR is presented and its main advantages are outlined. For example, ADR institutions are indeed a low-cost and quick alternative for consumers for settling disputes with businesses. ADR mechanisms are highly diverse. There are public and private institutions as well as institutions established on the basis of cooperation between the public sector and the industry or consumer organizations and the industry. Although there is a high correlation between the nature of the institution and the funding, i.e. private institutions are usually financed by the industry and public institutions by public funds, ADR bodies established by public law can also be financed by the industry (especially in highly regulated markets). In the majority of the institutions, the participation of the industry in the ADR procedure is voluntary. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide a justification of punishment which can be endorsed by free will skeptics, and which can also be defended against the "using persons as mere means" objection. Free will skeptics must reject retributivism, that is, the view that punishment is just because criminals deserve to suffer based on their actions. Retributivists often claim that theirs is the only justification on which punishment is constrained by desert, and suppose that non-retributive justifications (...) must therefore endorse treating the people punished as mere means to social ends. Retributivists typically presuppose a monolithic conception of desert: they assume that action-based desert is the only kind of desert. But there are also personhood-based desert claims, that is, desert claims which depend not on facts about our actions, but instead on the more abstract fact that we are persons. Since personhood-based desert claims do not depend on facts about our actions, they do not depend on moral responsibility, so free will skeptics can appeal to them just as well as retributivists. What people deserve based on the mere fact of their personhood is to be treated as they would rationally consent to be treated if all they had in view was the mere fact of their personhood. We can work out the implications of this view for punishment by developing a hypothetical consent justification in which we select principles of punishment in the Rawlsian original position, so long as we are careful not to smuggle in the retributivist assumption that it is under our control whether we end up as criminals or as law-abiding citizens once we raise the veil of ignorance. (shrink)

While many possible goals could be achieved by punishing offenders, the reality of punishment in today's criminal justice system is that lawmakers have created the illusion of purpose in punishment when in fact the expectations are unrealistic and the options for punishment too few to expect the simultaneous accomplishment of all possible desirable goals. This lack of clear purpose has led to a punishment policy shaped largely by what some scholars refer to as “paranoid politicians,” who (...) have used public fear of crime as a fulcrum to launch “tough on crime” policies. Over a long period of time, this process has created a punishment system that many scholars argue has become too harsh and exceeds what a system of just deserts would allow for. This outcome has led some to propose that systematic mercy be implemented where appropriate, in order to offset the perceived harshness of the criminal justice system. While such a proposal is problematic, a re-evaluation of punishment policy seems appropriate. This paper suggests that any re-evaluation of punishment policy should include provisions for a broader consideration of victims' issues in sentencing as an integral part of the implementation of punishment in a truly just system. (shrink)

This paper proposes a philosophically informed decision-making methodology, inspired by Aristotle, that encourages constructive discussions amongst employers and employees; is directed towards shared higher-level goals; is consistent with planning frameworks already in place in many businesses; can be amended over time without disruptive disputes; and accounts for the particularities of each industry, enterprise, workplace, and job. It seeks to establish a more fundamental basis for discussions about remote vs. in-person office work: specifically, the purpose and nature of the (...) work of those affected. If these matters can be decided, then subsequent discussions might be focused more upon the shared outcomes to which stakeholders are committed and less upon individual preferences and ‘hunches.’. (shrink)

Self-harm among adolescents, mostly girls, has increased in the last years. Self-harm is associated with mental illness and the risk of suicide. This qualitative study aims to explore the lived experience of self-harm as it is related to everyday life and challenges among adolescents. Nineteen girls in a clinical population participated in personal interviews analyzed by Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to capture how they made meaning of self-harm and essential features of experiencing self-harm. Adult persons with the first-hand experience of self-harm (...) were included in the research analysis. Data-analysis resulted in three superordinate themes which all speak about ways to handle inner pain and vulnerability: 1. “I deserve pain,” 2. “I don't want to feel anything,” and 3. “I'm harmed, and no one cares.” Each superordinate theme included four main themes characterizing essential features of difficult experiences during self-harm, the purpose of the action, self-descriptions, and the role of others during self-harm. The three superordinate themes are discussed as emerging self-representations – “the punished self,” “the unknown self,” and “the harmed self” – during the transitional age of adolescence. This article argues that subjective personal data on self-harm related to adolescents' everyday lives may indicate diversity in the capacity to integrate difficult needs, feelings, and traumatic experiences as part of the self. This knowledge may bring a nuanced understanding of self-harm in adolescence, enhance self-understanding and treatment motivation, and inform clinical adjustment. (shrink)

We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds of treatment. (...) Instead, we argue detention on the grounds of self- defence, due to the severe and continuing threat posed by the psychopathic criminal. (shrink)

A punitive desert-claim should be understood as a claim about the intrinsic value of punishment, where this value is grounded in an act or feature of the person to be punished. The purpose of my project is to explore the structure and justification of such punitive desert-claims. ;I argue that a true punitive desert-claim takes the form and , and that belief in these principles is justified on the basis of our considered moral judgments. The Principle of Deserved (...) Punishment. A person who deserves punishment deserves it because, and only because, she has performed a culpable wrongdoing. The Principle of the Proportionality of Deserved Punishment. A person receives the punishments she deserves if and only if the punishment she receives is proportional to her culpable wrongdoing. ;My analysis proceeds as follows. In chapter two, I argue in favor of the claim that a culpable wrongdoing is the sole basis for deserved punishment. ;In chapter three, I put forth an account of the structure of a punitive desert-claim and argue that deserved punishment is not justified via the consequences that result from punishment. Having clarified the basis and structure of deserved punishment, I then set out to provide the justification for it. ;In chapter four, I argue that deserved punishment cannot be justified by an appeal to more general moral principles. My argument here rests on the criticism of different types of theory that attempt to justify deserved punishment on the grounds of more general principles. Here I criticize those theories that attempt to justify and on the grounds of: the culpable wrongdoer's choice, the culpable wrongdoer's hypothetical consent, the state's promise to punish, the demands of a justified institution, and distributive justice. ;In the last chapter I argue that and best account for our considered moral judgments about specific cases. From this, I conclude that our belief in both principles is justified. (shrink)

It is well documented that the effects of legal punishment tend to drift to the family members, friends, and larger communities of convicted offenders. Instead of conceiving of punishment drift as incidental to legal punishment, or as merely foreseen but not intended by state authorities and thus permissible, I argue that efforts ought to be undertaken to limit or ameliorate it. Failure to confine punishment drift comes perilously close to punishment of the innocent and is (...) at odds with other legal doctrines and broader penal practices that hold offenders, and offenders alone, responsible for their crimes. Numerous arguments urging tolerance of punishment drift, or more assertively defending it, are examined and found wanting. (shrink)

In Spare the Rod, historian Campbell F. Scribner and philosopher Bryan R. Warnick think deeply about punishment and discipline practices in American schooling. To delve into this controversial subject, the authors carefully consider two major issues. The first involves questions of meaning. How have concepts of discipline and punishment in schools changed overtime? What purposes are they supposed to serve? And what can they tell us about our assumptions about education? The second issue involves (...) the justification of punishment and discipline in schools. Are public school educators ever justified in punishing or disciplining students? Are these things important for moral education? Or, are they fundamentally opposed to education? If some form of punishment is justified in schools, what ethical guidelines should direct its administration? The authors argue that as schools have grown increasingly bureaucratic over the past century, formalizing disciplinary systems and shifting from physical punishments to forms of spatial or structural punishment (such as suspension), school discipline has not only come to resemble the operation of prisons or policing but has grown increasingly integrated with those institutions. These changes, they argue, disregard the unique status of schools as spaces of moral growth and community oversight, and are incompatible with the developmental ethos of education. What we need is a view of discipline and punishment that fits with the sort of moral community that schools should be. (shrink)

Skepticism about moral responsibility, or what is more commonly referred to as moral responsibility skepticism, refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings are never morally responsible for their actions in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is defined in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise. Some moral responsibility (...) skeptics wholly reject this notion of moral responsibility because they believe it to be incoherent or impossible. Others maintain that, though possible, our best philosophical and scientific theories about the world provide strong and compelling reasons for adopting skepticism about moral responsibility. What all varieties of moral responsibility skepticism share, however, is the belief that the justification needed to ground basic desert moral responsibility and the practices associated with it—such as backward-looking praise and blame, punishment and reward (including retributive punishment), and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation—is not met. Versions of moral responsibility skepticism have historically been defended by Spinoza, Voltaire, Diderot, d’Holbach, Priestley, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Clarence Darrow, B.F. Skinner, and Paul Edwards, and more recently by Galen Strawson, Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, Neil Levy, Tamler Sommers, and Gregg D. Caruso. -/- Critics of these views tend to focus both on the arguments for skepticism about moral responsibility and on the implications of such views. They worry that adopting such a view would have dire consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law. They fear, for instance, that relinquishing belief in moral responsibility would undermine morality, leave us unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior, increase anti-social conduct, and destroy meaning in life. Optimistic skeptics, however, respond by arguing that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe. These optimistic skeptics argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be threatened. They further maintain that morality and moral judgments would remain intact. And although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, they argue that the imposition of sanctions could serve purposes other than the punishment of the guilty—e.g., it can also be justified by its role in incapacitating, rehabilitating, and deterring offenders. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by extremely polarized debates. The polarization is particularly acute in the debate between naïve realist disjunctivists and their opponents, but divisions seem almost as stark in other areas of dispute (for example, the debate over whether we experience so-called ‘high-level’ properties, and the debate concerning individuation of the senses). The guiding hypothesis underlying this volume is that such polarization stems from insufficient attention to how we should go about settling these debates. In general, (...) there is widespread, largely implicit disagreement concerning what philosophical theories of perception are supposed to explain, the claims that we should hold fixed in the course of theorizing, and the methods that such theorizing should employ. The goal of this volume is to move such methodological questions from the background to the fore, in the hope of facilitating progress. The contributions constitute an initial effort to spur more explicit, systematic discussion of methodology in philosophy of perception. They cover a wide range of relevant topics, from the relation between scientific and philosophical theorizing about perception, to lessons we can learn from the history of philosophy of perception. (shrink)

A man, carrying a gun in his waistband, robs a food vendor. In making his escape, the gun discharges, critically injuring the robber. About such instances, it is common to think, “he got what he deserved.” This Article seeks to explore cases like that—cases of “natural punishment.” Natural punishment occurs when a wrongdoer faces serious harm that results from her wrongdoing and not from anyone seeking retribution against her. The Article proposes that U.S. courts follow their peers (...) and recognize natural punishment as genuine punishment for legal, specifically constitutional, purposes. Were U.S. courts to do so, they would need to reduce the amount of punishment they would otherwise bestow on wrongdoers upon conviction if a natural punishment has occurred or foreseeably will occur. A handful of foreign jurisdictions already accept something like this Article’s proposal, but natural punishment has no formal legal recognition in the United States. The goal of this Article is twofold: first, it offers a rigorous and defensible definition of natural punishment by distinguishing it from nearby notions and dispelling any association with supernatural ideas; second, it demonstrates that recognizing natural punishment as genuine punishment will not much disturb existing American legal institutions and understandings. -/- As an added bonus, the concept of natural punishment can be employed to solve a longstanding problem in criminal law theory, the Mystery of Credit for Time Served. The Mystery surrounds the common practice of giving prisoners credit toward their prison sentences for their time served in jail awaiting trial. The Mystery poses a dilemma about whether the detention time was punishment: If it was punishment, then the detainee was punished before trial in violation of Due Process; however, if the time was not punishment, there is no reason to discount the prison sentence. Seeing the time in detention as an instance of natural punishment resolves the Mystery. (shrink)

As recorded in the Analects, Kongzi (Confucius) held that using punishment to influence ordinary citizens will do little to develop a sense of shame (chi 恥) in them. This term is usually taken to refer to a sense of shame described here as “ autonomous,” understood as a predisposition to feel ashamed when one does something wrong because it seems wrong to oneself, and not because others regard it as wrong or shameful. Historically, Confucian philosophers have thought a great (...) deal about the habits and character traits necessary for someone to have a sense of shame that is truly autonomous. The article looks at their views on this matter and shows how they help to articulate the hypothesis that coercive punishments undermine or work at cross-purposes with the cultivation of an autonomous sense of shame. It then uses this analysis to explicate the proposal that governing people by cultivating a sense of shame is to be preferred to governing by threat of punishment. It concludes by weighing its merits as a view about effective governance, observing that its strength and plausibility depends on whether we take the threat of punishment to be direct or indirect. (shrink)

Neuroexistentialism brings together some of the world's leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Against Definition. Eric Matthews. -/- Keywords: definition, mental illness, ideology -/- Varelius rightly says, in the very first sentence of his article, that 'The nature of mental disorder is a controversial issue.' But I do not think he recognizes just how deeply controversial it is. He hopes to be able to find a way of resolving the controversy by his chosen method, based on a consideration of 'the (...) goals that we have in classifying certain persons as mentally disordered.' However, not only does the adoption of that method presuppose that the controversy is resoluble, it is also somewhat circular. For to be able to set out the goals that we have in classifying some people as mentally disordered, we already have to know which persons we so classify, and so what is meant by calling them 'mentally disordered.' There are several appeals to alleged 'intuitions' and one to a 'paradigm case' in Varelius's article; but, if we had such intuitions, they would be all we needed to define the concept of mental disorder, and there would be no need for the further reference to our goals in demarcating this class of human conditions.I want to argue that any alleged 'intuitions' we might have in regard to mental disorder are philosophically useless, and that the controversy about the nature of mental disorder is intrinsically irresoluble. Any claimed intuition can always be met by a rival intuition that is irreconcilable with the first. It is this, indeed, that makes the dispute about mental disorder essentially philosophical, rather than scientific, in character. Philosophical positions have to be based on, and defended by, rational argument, but there necessarily comes a point in any philosophical dispute at which no rational argument can settle the matter one way or the other. Varelius derives his methodology of considering goals of demarcation from some work done using this method on the concept of science. But people have different goals for demarcating 'science' from 'non-science' or 'pseudo-science.' The demarcation is not made, as Varelius suggests, on the basis of such criteria as testability of hypotheses or clarity of concepts; or rather, the application of these criteria themselves is determined by the goals of demarcation. The debate about what is to count as a 'science' is irresoluble in part because what we classify as such has evaluative and practical consequences. To be a 'science,' in our culture, is to be a valued activity, to have a status to be aspired to. This makes arguments about what it is to be scientific what I would like to call 'ideological' in character. Similar considerations apply to the dispute about the nature of mental disorder. Human societies have always distinguished madness from reason, disturbed or disordered behavior, thoughts, and emotions from those that are not disordered. But the purpose of making the distinction, and thus the character of the distinction made, has varied from society to society and from one historical period to another. The historian Roy Porter, in his short work Madness: A Brief History (2002) describes some of the different images of madness which have prevailed at different times in Western culture—as a divine punishment for hubris, as [End Page 53] a source of poetic inspiration, as the inevitable result of moral excess, as diabolical possession, and so on. The modern idea of mental disorder as mental illness is only one possible way of classifying together certain sorts of deviations from normality. Varelius's method of arriving at a definition of mental illness involves 'considering the goals that we have in classifying certain persons as mentally disordered.' But we can ask who are the 'we' in question, and whether 'we' have only one set of goals in classifying people in this way. The history referred to in the preceding paragraph suggests that 'we' means those members of society who do not regard themselves as disordered—the 'normal' people whose behavior can be readily understood by other normal people. Classifying someone as mentally disordered is distinguishing them as 'not one of us,' and this can serve various purposes, for instance, treating them as objects of entertainment in a human zoo, as in Bedlam; or treating them as moral. (shrink)

The concept of causal specificity is drawing considerable attention from philosophers of biology. It became the rationale for rejecting (and occasionally, accepting) a thesis of causal parity of developmental factors. This literature assumes that attributing specificity to causal relations is at least in principle a straightforward (if not systematic) task. However, the parity debate in philosophy of biology seems to be stuck at a point where it is not the biological details that will help move forward. In this paper, I (...) take a step back to reexamine the very idea of causal specificity and its intended role in the parity dispute in philosophy of biology. I contend that the idea of causal specificity across variations as currently discussed in the literature is irreducibly twofold in nature: it is about two independent components that are not mutually entailed. I show this to be the source of prior complications with the notion of specificity itself that ultimately affect the purposes for which it is often invoked, notably to settle the parity dispute. (shrink)

This study focuses on the practice of punishment, as it is inflicted by the state. The author's first-hand experience with penal reform, combined with philosophical reflection, has led him to develop a theory of punishment that identifies the principles of sentencing and corrections on which modern correctional systems should be built. This new theory of punishment is built on the view that the central function of the law is to reduce the need to use force in the (...) resolution of disputes. Professor Cragg argues that the proper role of sentencing and sentence administration is to sustain public confidence in the capacity of the law to fulfil that function. Sentencing and corrections should therefore be guided by principles of restorative justice. He points out that, although punishment may be an inevitable concomitant of law enforcement in general and sentencing in particular, inflicting punishment is not a legitimate objective of criminal justice. The strength and appeal of this account is that it moves well beyond the boundaries of conventional discussions. It examines punishment within the framework of policing and adjudication, analyses the relationship between punishment and sentencing, and provides a basis for evaluating correctional practices and such developments as electronic monitoring. (shrink)

The subject of general utterances (al-lafdh al-āmm) being certain or presumptive in their usage as an indication to all their members is controversial amongst the methodists. Ḥanafī methodists suggest that the indication of general utterances to all of their members as certain and unless they are specified with a certain evidence, they can’t be specified with a presumptive evidence. Like the ḥanafī methodists, the ẓāhirī methodists also suggest that the general utterance is certain indicant for all of its members and (...) can be specified only with another evidence in the same rank. The main difference between the two groups focuses on whether al-khabar al-wāhid (single prophetic narration) is a certain or a presumptive evidence in terms of certitude. According to ḥanafīs, al-khabar al-wāhid is a presumptive evidence and unless the general utterances in Qur’ān are specified initially with another certain evidence, they can’t be specified with al-khabar al-wāhid. However, al-khabar al-wāhid is a certain evidence according to ẓāhirīs and it can specify general utterances in Qur’ān. In this study, the comparison of the views of the methodists of two schools regarding the indication of general utterances in Quran and their specification (takhsīs) with al-akhbar al-wāhid is made and their influence on Islamic Law regulations is studied afterwards. In this study, the two sect’s approaches are compared over the provision of reading al-Fatehah during prayer, the number of milk sucking to establish the kinship, the rights of women divorced with bain talaq and the execution of the death penalty in the Harem region.Summary: The purpose of this study is to try to demonstrate that an assertion in the Ph.D. thesis, The History and Doctrine of Ẓāhirī Madhhab, completed by Amr Osman in 2010 is incorrect. It can be summarized that in his study, Amr Osman claims that the affiliation of the schools to ahl-al-hadith and ahl-al-ra’y in conventional classification is wrong. According to him, contrary to what is known, the School of Ẓāhiriyya is closer to School of Ḥanafiyya rather than schools coming out of ahl-al-hadith. In this study, one of the arguments that he relied on to support his claim is studied in order to prove that his claim was inaccurate. Osman claims that ẓāhirīs are closer to ḥanifīs, based on the view that in both schools the general utterances embrace all of their members in their usage and they are a certain indicant to all of their members. At this stage, although the views of both schools are common, the ḥanifīs don’t accept the idea that the general statements of Qur’ān can be established with al-khabar-al-wāhid, those which they acknowledge as presumptive as of certitude. However, according to the ẓāhirīs, the certitude of al-khabar al-wāhid is as precise as the narrated report, so it can specify the general statements of Qur’ān which are in equal power. The related dispute between the schools has been reflected on many Islamic law regulations. Some of them are:1. Ḥanafīs state that the correct Quranic prayer may be performed by reading any or a few verses of the Qur’ān in prayer, which is a practice based on the verse “Read what you can read from the Qur’ān now”. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs have established the related order based on the report “There is no prayer without reading Umm Al-Quran (Surah al-Fatehah)” and it is obligatory (fardh) to read Surah al-Fatehah in prayers.2. Because that the terms milk-mother and milk sister are in general form in the verse “It is forbidden to you to marry these people...Your milk-mothers who nursed you, your milk-sisters who nursed you” the ḥanafīs clarify that it is sufficient for a child to breastfeed only one time in order to form a milk-kinship. They do not act in accordance with the solitary report (al-khabar-al-wāhids) which indicate that the milk kinship specifying the verse shall only be formed with at least three or five breastfeeding. However, one of the ẓāhirīs, Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, has specified the verse with the report indicating that the kinship shall not be formed with less than three breastfeeding by the child, and Ibn Ḥazm has specified it with Salim hadith which indicates that the kinship shall be formed with five breastfeeding.3. According to ḥanafīs, there is an alimony and inhabiting right of the widow woman to be procured by the husband within the period of delay who divorced her either with irreversible divorce (talāq al-bāin) or reversible divorce (talāq al-ric‘ī) according to the generalization of the verse “Give shelter to them (the women you have divorced) in some part of your household within your capacity.” They did not act with the report of Fātima binti Qays, who specified the generalization of the verse. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs recognize the abovementioned rights only for the women who got divorced with irreversible divorce or the ones who are pregnant, specifying the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet does not grant alimony and inhabiting to the woman who was divorced with reversible divorce.4. According to ḥanafīs, the criminal who committed a crime that would require a death penalty and took refuge in the Harem region could not be executed while in Ḥarem, according to the common statement of the verse, “Whoever enters there, will be safe.” Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, one of the ẓāhirīs has specified the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet has authorized the execution of the sentence to Ibn Khattal in Ḥarem on the day of the conquering of Mecca and he states that the death sentence can be executed wherever the criminal is caught, even if it is inside the Harem. Ibn Ḥazm shares the same view with ḥanafīs regarding the provision of this issue. However, the reason for his opinion stems from the fact that the report about Ibn Khattal was an event specific to that day. As it is seen, even though the ḥanefīs and ẓāhirīs share the same opinion about the general utterances being a certain indicant to all their members, they have disagreements upon the argument about the general utterances of Quran being specified by al-khabar al-wāhid and many Islamic Law regulations have been issued by these schools based on such disagreements. According to us, in the final analysis, Amr Osman’s claim must be met with caution. (shrink)

The matter of ḥusn (goodness) and qubḥ (evil), which is the result of the disagreements on the source of moral value in human actions, is one of the main disputes between the Sunnī schools and the Muʿtazilī school of theology. This study examines the reasons why Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, the Ash‘arī scholar, argues that the values of the ḥusn- qubḥ in actions are relative (i‘tibārī) against to the Mu‘tazilī school that considers these values to be inherent in actions. According (...) to the Ash‘arīs, and specifically al-Āmidī, if the actions make people worth of either praise in this world and reward (thawāb) in afterlife or blame in this world and punishment in afterlife, those actions are named as ḥasan (good) or qabīḥ (bad). Therefore, if the action of a person provides him/her praise in this world and reward in afterlife, the action is called ḥasan. If an action necessitates condemnation in this world and punishment in the afterlife, the action is called qabīḥ. The moral values in actions can only be determined by the Sharī‘a. In other words, human reason cannot know which actions are included in the category of ḥasan and qabīḥ. In addition to their contentious meanings in the doctrine, ḥasan and qabīḥ have two more meanings. The first one is the suitability and contrariety to the purpose or disposition while the second one is the agent’s right of doing any given action. However, there is no debate about these two meanings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Adoro Te Devote of St. Thomas AquinasSr. Lucia Marie of the Visitation Langford O.P.The Adoro te devote is perhaps the most well-beloved Eucharistic hymn of our time, popularly attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas, the medieval Dominican friar known for his theological treatises as well as his Eucharistic hymnography. Unlike most of Aquinas's work, the poem reveals the intensely personal side of his faith. Rich in theological content and (...) inspiring deep Eucharistic devotion, this poem amply repays a closer investigation. We will look first at the questions of authorship, background, and structure before moving on to a discussion of the text itself.The "Disputed Question" of AuthorshipWhile the Adoro te has traditionally been attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas, the Thomistic authorship of the text was contested in the twentieth century, with two main objections being raised. The first claims that the content of the poem contradicts Thomas's own teachings and cannot have flowed from the same pen. The second objection is historical, claiming that a lack of evidence makes Thomistic authorship improbable.The first objection, claiming that the content of the poem is irreconcilable with Thomistic authorship, takes objection to a line in the poem which seems to claim that sense perception is unreliable and inaccurate, at least with regard to the Eucharist. The text of the Adoro te uses the word fallitur (deceived) with reference to the senses: "Visus, tactus, gustus in te fallitur"—"Sight, touch, taste in you are deceived." Some scholars have claimed that this line contradicts the teaching of Aquinas that the senses are [End Page 365] infallible in regard to their proper sensibles.1 Robert Wielockx addresses this charge in his study of the Adoro te, arguing that "the text does not contradict the continuous teaching of Thomas according to which the senses are not wrong when they judge their proper object, which as far as the Eucharist is concerned, is only the sacramental species."2 The substantial presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a mystery which is not knowable by the senses, and as Paul Murray, O.P., observes: "That's surely the point St. Thomas is making."3 However, the Thomistic insistence that all knowledge comes through our senses is not missing even here. While sight, touch, and taste fall short of comprehending the truth before them, the Adoro te itself proclaims that it is another sense—hearing—which reveals the mystery: "sed auditu solo tute creditur"—"but by hearing alone it is safely believed."4Thus there is no solid objection to Thomistic authorship based on the poem's content. But what about the historical evidence? Dom André Wilmart published a comprehensive study of the manuscript tradition in 1929. Noting that there were no extant copies of the text dating to Aquinas's lifetime and that the biography of Aquinas written by his own Dominican confrere and contemporary, William of Tocco, made no mention of the Adoro te, he considered it most probable that the poem was authored at a later date and ascribed to Aquinas.5However, Dom Wilmart did not know that he was not working with William of Tocco's final version of his work. The publication of a critical edition of William of Tocco's Ystoria Sancti Thome de Aquino in 1996 demonstrated that Tocco published his work in four successive redactions. The fourth and final version of his text (unknown to Dom Wilmart) was finished just before his death in 1323, and in this final version, Tocco includes the text of the Adoro te, attributing its authorship to St. Thomas.6 [End Page 366] Furthermore, Wielockx published a study of the Adoro te in 1998; his investigation of the manuscript tradition found that, of fifty-one sources, forty-four explicitly cite St. Thomas as their author. The remaining sources simply lacked any attribution. We may thus conclude with Wielockx: "External evidence, which must be given priority in sound criticism, wholly favors Thomas Aquinas's authorship of the poem."7BackgroundWith the attribution of the poem to St. Thomas Aquinas on secure footing, we now move to the background of the poem. Unlike Aquinas's Eucharistic hymns such as... (shrink)

Some jurisdictions acknowledge, as a matter of positive law, the relevance of evil to capital punishment. At one point, the state of Florida counted that the fact that a murderer’s crime was “especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel” as an aggravating factor for purposes of capital sentencing. I submit that Florida may be onto something. I consider a thesis about capital punishment that strikes me as plausible on its face: if capital punishment is ever morally (...) permissible, it is permissible as a response to evil. Call this the Punishment as a Response to Evil thesis, or PRE. If capital punishment is not morally permissible as a response to evil, then, according to PRE, it is not morally permissible, period. PRE admits of at least two different readings: on the first, if capital punishment is ever morally justified it is justified as a punishment for evil crimes; on the second, if capital punishment is ever morally justified it is justified as a punishment for evil people. While this first version of PRE has found advocates in both philosophy and forensic psychiatry, I argue against this first reading of PRE and for the second. To secure this conclusion I appeal to an account of evil and evil personhood that I have developed elsewhere. (shrink)

“There’s no disputing about taste.” That’s got a nice ring to it, but it’s not quite the ring of truth. While there’s definitely something right about the aphorism – there’s a reason why it is, after all, an aphorism, and why its utterance tends to produce so much nodding of heads and muttering of “just so” and “yes, quite” – it’s surprisingly difficult to put one’s finger on just what the truth in the neighborhood is, exactly. One thing (...) that’s pretty clear is that what’s right about the aphorism, that there’s no disputing about taste, isn’t that there’s no disputing about taste. There’s heaps of disputing about taste. People engage in disputes about which movies, music, paintings, literature, meals, furniture, architectural styles, etc. are good, beautiful, tasty, fun, elegant, ugly, disgusting, etc. all the time. This is obvious to anyone who has watched dueling-movie-critics shows, read theater reviews, or negotiated with a group or partner about which movie or restaurant to go to, or which sofa or painting to put in the living room. It takes great care and good aim to fling a brick without hitting somebody who’s engaged in a dispute about taste. (shrink)

There is a vast literature on the meanings of legal penalties. However, we lack a theory that explains them according to the formation of the modern state. Oakeshott's theory can help explain this phenomenon, leading to an attempt of the individual to take over as many powers of the state as possible. Thus, Kant's and Smith's retributivism is the most consistent of all those theories. Nevertheless, the preventive and resocializing theory of Bentham succeeded eventually. But is this a liberal theory? (...) We contrast the explanations of H.L.A. Hart and Frederick Rosen in order to lay the groundwork for a liberal theory of the meaning of legal sanctions. (shrink)

THIS PAPER CONCERNS A CONTROVERSY about priorities between J. D. Forbes, Professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and the noted Swiss scientist Louis Agassiz, later to be a distinguished teacher at Harvard. Its origins lie in the visit which Forbes made at Agassiz' invitation to the Unteraar glacier in Switzerland, in the summer of 1841, during which a major topic of interest was their observations of the bandes bleues, markings in the ice previously little discussed. Both (...) men, in independent later publications, were to establish the importance of the bandes in the theory of glacial ice and its movement. The question of credit for the discovery, and priority in its publication, was unclear at the time and has remained so despite bitter debate. Examination of surviving papers in Great Britain and in Switzerland suggests that previous discussions have not closed the question,' and our purpose is to review the evidence and if possible to clarify the issue. (shrink)

Techne and Truth. The problem of techne in the dispute between Gorgias and Plato -/- The source of the problem matter of the book is the Plato’s dialogue „Gorgias”. One of the main subjects of the discussion carried out in this multi-aspect work is the issue of the art of rhetoric. In the dialogue the contemporary form of the art of rhetoric, represented by Gorgias, Polos and Callicles, is confronted with Plato’s proposal of rhetoric and concept of art (techne). The (...) ingenuous and dramatic structure of the dialogue composed of three acts, in each of which Socrates’ consecutive interlocutors emerge, is difficult to interpret. It seems, however, that even though the first conversation between Socrates and Gorgias constitutes a small part of the dialogue, it forms the foundations for the discussion. This part, dealing with such important issues as the subject of art, knowledge, power and relation between art and good, is the starting point for the conversations which follow. What do the differences between the Gorgias’ and Plato’s concepts of art consist in? Any attempt to answer the question requires presentation of the background for the discussion taking place in Plato’s work as well as the reconstruction of Gorgias’ vision of the art of rhetoric and art in general, defining the relation between art and knowledge. The latter may be undertaken on the basis of two paraphrases of the treatise “On Non-existence”, two epideictic speeches entitled “Helen” and “Palamedes” and some smaller fragments which have been preserved from Gorgias’ creative output. The treatise “On Non–existence”, very paradoxical in its philosophical meaning, testifies to new, sophistic thinking represented by Gorgias of Leontinoi. The treatise is the polemic and attack on Eleatism based on certain principles and methods elaborated by the Eleatics themselves. It also shows that Gorgias – using traditional Eleatic schemes – is opposed to this tradition. Even though the treatise does not discuss the problem of art directly, it anticipates the considerations from epideictic speeches. “Helen” and “Palamedes” constitute further stages in the development of Gorgias’ thought and concept of art combining typically epideictic elements with some philosophical convictions. Gorgias refers to the Eleatic theme considering the issues of truth, knowledge and belief, yet defining them in the empirical spirit. Solutions in the cognitive sphere determine the horizon of Gorgias’ rhetoric. The word is separated from the existence. Human cognition is limited and therefore the word and visual images affect the belief. This promotes the great importance of rhetoric, painting and sculpture, i.e. the areas which influence in a specific way – creating the “delusion” (ἀπάτη). Through idealization art provides pleasure, which is its objective. Therefore the task of art is to create delusion. The rhetor of Leontinoi discusses the issue of “how?” to use the word ‘rhetoric’. Gorgias is aware that rhetoric may be used to talk about what is unknown and that technical correctness of a rhetoric statement is not identical with the truthfulness of the proclaimed message. Mentioning it, Gorgias shows his respect to the truth as a value which should be respected in speech on the one hand, and on the other emphasizes that the truth in itself has no persuasive power. For this reason it is not enough to proclaim the truth, but, to convince the listeners, the orator should possess the skill of speaking. What is then the relation between truth and art emerging from epideictic speeches? Gorgias undoubtedly emphasizes the formal aspect of speech, as rhetoric is art, thus an ability based on certain principles. According to Gorgias, the truth is the value which should be respected in speeches. Rhetoric is able to create a fictive world, as a great range of reality remains outside direct human experience. Rhetoric does not oppose the truth but discussing not only what is directly given concerns the area outside the sphere of direct experience. This concept of rhetoric is the basis of the discussion about art carried out in the dialogue “Gorgias”. Even though the first of the discussions in the dialogue – the conversation between Socrates and Gorgias – is directly concerned with rhetoric itself, numerous remarks testify to its much wider character. This is best exemplified by the way of carrying out the conversation by Socrates, who, asking questions about rhetoric practised by Gorgias, throughout the whole conversation compares it with other skills. Additionally, the manner and the structure of the conversation prove that Plato considers the issue of rhetoric from a wider perspective determined by the issue of art. The specific feature of the conversation is ordering it around main issues – such notions as πρᾶγμα, ἐπιστήμη, δύναμις, each of which has its own meaning in Plato. In the first part of Gorgias Plato presents the principles previously occurring in other dialogues in a certain order, thus constructing the structure of the conversation with Gorgias. The notions are not novum in Plato but the fact that he clearly wants to systematise them and present a certain concept of art is a new and significant aspect. This tendency is of paramount importance for the discussion because Gorgias’ answers are evaluated by Plato from the perspective of this clearly set concept consisting of not only established notions but also certain principles. The discussion between Socrates and Gorgias introduces a theme which is crucial for the dialogue: the relation between art and good, i.e. the technical and ethical spheres. The issue is introduced by Gorgias, who mentions that rhetoric may be used for evil purposes. On this basis Socrates proves that if rhetoricians can use rhetoric for evil purposes, they have no knowledge concerning the subject of their art – justice, because one who knows what is just, always acts justly. Thus the relation between the technical and ethical spheres transpires to be the main point of contention. The question is whether a technician following the principles of the art he practices may act against good. This paradoxical statement based on the well-known Socrates’ principle "nemo sua sponte peccat" acquires philosophical foundations in the dialogue. In its remaining two parts Plato presents a justification, placing the principle within the framework of a certain concept of art, as a result of which not only rhetoric but also many other skills are criticised. The notions on which the conversation with Gorgias focuses are more precisely defined in the subsequent parts of the dialogue. Additionally, Plato presents twice the conditions which art should fulfill. They oblige the “technicians” to know the nature and purpose of the art and to know the causes of undertaken activities and to be able to justify them. These conditions determine the relation between the two spheres – technical and ethical. According to Plato, art may not act against good because it should be the objective of its activities. Certain concepts of good and knowledge outlined in the dialogue are the guarantees of “technicality”. Good, which should be respected by every art, is understood objectively and is contrasted with subjective pleasure. Knowledge, which should be the basis of art, opposes experience, which uses observation and recollection. Additionally, the definition of knowledge, significance of order in the world assuming the form of “geometrical equality”, significance of mathematics becoming the ideal of exactness indicate that Plato’s concept of knowledge is formed in Gorgias. These conclusions render it impossible that the results of any activity deserving the name of art should oppose good. And this is Plato’s main reproach of Gorgias’ concept, who wrote about false speeches possessing the power of conviction because they were written according to the principles proof of art or who defined tragedy as “a deceit, where he who cheats is more just than he who does not and the cheated is wiser than he who was not cheated”. Such determination of the relation between the technical and ethical sphere resulted from Gorgias’ concept of the world and fundamental philosophical principles. The whole concept of art described by Plato in the dialogue opposes the view presented by Gorgias. According to Plato, every technical activity has a defined object (ἔργον), is based on knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and is always aimed at the good of human soul or body. The danger revealed and presented in the dialogue by Plato exists in the very concept of art presented by Gorgias, i.e. in its empirical foundations and the resulting understanding of the relation between art and good. Gorgias’ concept of art based on empirical cognition, which concerns the world of phenomena and rejects the possibility of perfect knowledge, leads, according to Plato, to a dangerous falsification of the relation between art and good. Plato proves that this weakness of Gorgias’ concept is revealed when confronted with these representatives of “the magnificent art” who are not protected against radicalism by the adherence to the moral tradition. The comparison of two, completely contrasting concepts of art based on different philosophical understanding of knowledge and good is decisive for the criticism of rhetoric in Gorgias. The concept presented by Plato criticises contemporary rhetoric and sophistry but determines the direction of research of the real art of rhetoric. (shrink)

This article identifies two mistakes commonly made about the concept of punishment. First, confusion exists about when an analysis of punishment counts as retributive, and when as justificatorily n...

This article descriptively discusses the divine purpose in the creation of the world and especially the human being, and the value analysis of the concepts, expressing this purpose in the light of the views of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024), who was from the Basra School, and systemized the five doctrinal principles of the Mu'tazila. Accordingly, it answers the question why God created the human on the basis of the purpose/aim in divine actions and examines the qualitative value of the (...) non-compulsory cause (dā’ī) that motivates God to create. In addition, the article shows that 'beneficence', the central concept in the purpose of the creation, is formulized as ‘tafaḍḍul’ (disinterested or gratuitous beneficence) with the title of wisdom before the creation and as ‘thawāb’ (reward) and ‘iwaḍ (compensation) with the title of wājib (necessary or obligatory) in the resurrection. It also emphasizes that ‘iqāb (punishment) is not a value for the beginning of creation, and therefore it is 'legal good' required by the resurrection. It also touches on that the concepts, expressing all this purposefulness are based on the values of 'benefit and good' (maṣlaḥa and ḥusn). This article concludes that while the main purpose of the beginning of creation is beneficence and its actual value is tafaḍḍul; the main purpose of re-creation is benefit and good, and the actual value is wājib. (shrink)

Drawing upon empirical studies of racial discrimination dating back to the 1940’s, the Movement for Black Lives platform calls for the abolition of capital punishment. Our purpose here is to defend the Movement’s call for death penalty abolition in terms congruent with its claim that the death penalty in the U.S. is a “racist practice” that “devalues Black lives.” We first sketch the jurisprudential history of race and capital punishment in the U.S., wherein courts have occasionally expressed worries (...) about racial injustice but have usually taken such evidence to warrant reform but not outright abolition. We argue that the racial discrimination at issue flows in significant part from implicit biases concerning race, criminality, and violence, which do not fit comfortably within the picture of racial bias advanced by the courts. The case for abolition, we contend, rests on Black Americans as a class (not merely those who interact with the criminal justice system as capital defendants or as murder victims) being subject to such bias and thereby not being accorded equal status under the law. (shrink)

It is commonly said that patients have no right to demand that treatment must be continued when medical carers believe it is “futile” to continue it. There are certainly many judicial statements to this effect, some of which are quoted in this paper. However, there are various ways that courts can intervene, even if they do not order directly that treatment must be provided or continued. First, patients or their representatives may argue the process of decision making was unfair or (...) that they were unfairly discriminated against when treatment has been refused. To date, these arguments have met with limited success so far as enabling patients to have treatment provided or continued against medical advice. More recently, however, some patients have challenged the lawfulness of a proposed treatment regime by advancing human rights arguments, based in turn on a broader aspect of patients’ “best interests” than best medical interests. (shrink)

It is commonly said that patients have no right to demand that treatment must be continued when medical carers believe it is “futile” to continue it. There are certainly many judicial statements to this effect, some of which are quoted in this paper. However, there are various ways that courts can intervene, even if they do not order directly that treatment must be provided or continued. First, patients or their representatives may argue the process of decision making was unfair or (...) that they were unfairly discriminated against when treatment has been refused. To date, these arguments have met with limited success so far as enabling patients to have treatment provided or continued against medical advice. More recently, however, some patients have challenged the lawfulness of a proposed treatment regime by advancing human rights arguments, based in turn on a broader aspect of patients’ “best interests” than best medical interests. (shrink)

The social sciences playa variety of multifaceted roles in the policymaking process. So varied are these roles, indeed, that it is futile to talk in the singular about the use of social science in policymaking, as if there were one constant relationship between two fixed and stable entities. Instead, to address this issue sensibly one must talk in the plural about uses of dif ferent modes of social scientific inquiry for different kinds of policies under various circumstances. In (...) some cases, the influence of social scientific research is direct and tangible, and the connection between the find ings and the policy is easy to see. In other cases, perhaps most, its influence is indirect-one small piece in a larger mosaic of politics, bargaining, and compromise. Occasionally the findings of social scientific studies are explicitly drawn upon by policymakers in the formation, implementation, or evaluation of particular policies. More often, the categories and theoretical models of social science provide a general background orientation within which policymakers concep tualize problems and frame policy options. At times, the in fluence of social scientific work is cognitive and informational in nature; in other instances, policymakers use social science primarily for symbolic and political purposes in order to le gitimate preestablished goals and strategies. Nonetheless, amid this diversity and variety, troubling general questions persistently arise. (shrink)

The Idea of a Moral Economy is the first modern edition and English translation of three questions disputed at the University of Paris in 1330 by the theologian Gerard of Siena. The questions represent the most influential late medieval formulation of the natural law argument against usury and the illicit acquisition of property. Together they offer a particularly clear example of scholastic ideas about the nature and purpose of economic activity and the medieval concept of a moral economy. In (...) his introduction, editor Lawrin Armstrong discusses Gerard's arguments and considers their significance both within the context of scholastic philosophy and law and as a critique of contemporary mainstream economics. His analysis demonstrates how Gerard's work is not only a valuable source for understanding economic thought in pre-modern Europe, but also a fertile resource for scholars of law, economics, and philosophy in medieval Europe and beyond. (shrink)

My aim is to highlight four philosophical presuppositional issues that underliethe questions associated with God-arguments precisely as such.Apresuppositional issue is some matter that systematically precedes a question onwhich one is focusing, and one‟s stance on the presuppositional issue provides afundamental component of one‟s stance on that focalquestion. Moreover, differences between stances on presuppositional issuesfrequently constitute a basic part of disputes overstances on focal questions. Finally, philosophical presuppositional issues areespecially crucial, since they regard one‟s fundamental horizon – one‟s basiccategories of (...) meaning and criteria of verification. For example, yourdisagreement with your friend about whether capital punishment could ever bemorally good may well arise at least partly from an underlying disagreement between the two of you about just what “moralgoodness” means and how its presence in a concrete situation can be confirmedor disconfirmed.The first of the philosophical presuppositional issues I have in mind isepistemological: Do I ever genuinely know anything at all? The remaining issuesare metaphysical. One is general: What are the characteristics of reality preciselyas such? And two are particular: Is utter badness real? Is direct divine selfdisclosurereal?In the first of my paper‟s three parts, I will recount four common stanceson these issues that short-circuit the enterprise of attempting to arguephilosophically in favor of God before it even gets started. To maintain any ofthem is to maintain a philosophical presupposition that excludes in advance thepotential rational success of any particular argument for God, thus leaving everysuch argument as at most the symbolic expression of individual or collectivefeelings, experiences, memories, hopes, expectations, and so forth, or perhaps asjust a matter of historical interest. In the second part of my paper, I will review two other common stancesthat serve to undercut the potential religious relevance of any philosophical Godargument,evenifithappenstoberationallysuccessful.Thesestancesconstitutephilosophicalpresuppositio nsthatexclude in advance the possibility that what aphilosophical argument might establish has any connection at all with what thereligious believer means by “God.”Finally, in my paper‟s third part I will spell out a further set ofphilosophical presuppositions, all of which, in my view, must be in place if anyparticular argument in favor of God is to have hope of being rationally successfuland religiously relevant. Although maintaining these latter presuppositions doesnot guarantee the success and relevance of any particular God-argument, it leavessuch matters open to being determined argument by argument, rather than havingtheir very possibility dismissed before any particular argument has actually beenstudied.I must add three important prefatory notes. First, in this paper what Inormally mean by “God” is what is meant by that word in the philosophicaltradition typified by the views of Augustine and Aquinas. More exactly, forpresent purposes let me say that by “God” I mean at least this: a reality that isessentially spiritual, world-transcending, all-knowing, all-powerful, and allloving.Second, my primary purpose in this paper is elucidation, not evaluation.While you will not be surprised to learn that I think the presuppositions discussedin the third part are notably more defensible than those discussed in parts one andtwo, I am mainly concerned not to justify any specific set of presuppositions butrather to illuminate the role that presuppositions play, whether explicitly or justimplicitly, and therefore the importance of taking them into account in order toproperly situate particular arguments for God.Third, my interest in this topic grows out of my own experience in theclassroom. An important part of my pedagogical responsibility is to help studentsunderstand and assess some of the traditional philosophical arguments for God –cosmological, ontological, moral, and so forth. The propensity of many studentsto remain unmoved by those arguments stems not from their study of specificfeatures of the arguments themselves but rather from their antecedentassumptions about knowing and reality. That is to say, for many students thecrucial philosophical factor in their rejection of this or that particular Godargumentis their stance, whether patent or just latent, on some issue that isproper not to philosophy of religion but rather to general epistemology ormetaphysics.2. (shrink)