Award-winning storyteller Barbara Diamond Goldin has collected and retold twenty-four stories about tzedakah in this inspiring volume. Some of these stories are based on oral tales, like "The Two Beggars," which is from Afghanistan, and "The Rabbi's Blessing," which is from Tunisia. Some stories, like "A Town of Baruchs" and "The Rabbi and the Rag Dealer" are Hasidic in origin, while others, like "Ox and Herbs" and "The Two Keys," are from much older sources. Some of the stories are based (...) on midrashic tales. The Hebrew word tzedakah is often translated as "charity," but it actually means "justice" or "righteousness." According to the Jewish Sages, tzedakah means we have an obligation to give to those in need, not only when we are feeling generous, but on a regular basis. Barbara Diamond Goldin has brought these stories of tzedakah together in the hope that they will inspire the young and the old, the rich and the poor, to give to those in need and to adopt a righteous sensibility and sensitivity akin to the commandment of performing acts of loving-kindness. By performing these mitzvoth, we all engage in tikkun olam, repair of the world, and, according to the Sages, each good deed we perform in the physical world creates an angel in the metaphysical world. This book should encourage readers to create their own angels and to recapture the significance of the mitzvah of tzedakah to the Jewish community, even to the world, today. (shrink)

Review text: "A specialist collection, but fascinating in its sociological insights."John Turnbull in: New Directions 3/2010.

: The purpose of this paper is to address from a normative perspective issues raised by John Mueller in Redeeming Economics: Rediscovering the Missing Element. Mueller criticizes economists, including Austrians, for failing to properly address unilateral transfers—in particular, charity, childcare, and crime—in economic thought. Mueller challenges economist Gary Becker’s position that giving increases the […] The post “Charity, Childcare, and Crime: From Objectivist Ethics to the Austrian School” appeared first on Libertarian Papers.

Charity is not only about giving to those in need, but in a broader sense about loving your neighbor and doing good things for other people without thought of reward. So wrote Swedish visionary Emanuel Swedenborg, who believed that charity, along with faiths, was part of the foundation of spiritual practice. This work combines two of Swedenborg's unpublished manuscripts to form a practical, inspirational handbook for appying the principle of doing good to daily life.

Many of us give to charities that are close to our hearts rather than those that would use our gifts to do more good, impartially considered. Is such partiality to charities acceptable? I argue that if partiality to particular people is justified, we can go SOME distance toward justifying partiality to particular charities. Even so, partiality to charities is justified in fewer cases than most people seem to believe.

Swedish visionary Emanuel Swedenborg considered charity -- in the sense of doing good for others with no thought of reward -- one of the foundations of religious practice. This short, practical guide gives the reader a handbook for compassionate living.

Contemporary republicans have adopted a less-than-charitable attitude toward private beneficence, especially when it is directed to the poor, worrying that rich patrons may be in a position to exercise arbitrary power over their impoverished clients. These concerns have led them to support impartial public provision by way of state welfare programs, including an unconditional basic income (UBI). In contrast to this administrative model of public welfare, I will propose a competitive model in which the state regulates and subsidizes a decentralized (...) and nonstatist provision of support for the poor. This model will fix the historically objectionable features of private provision by having the state prevent collusion among private charities, deliver information to recipients about alternative sources of assistance, and give substantial grants to charities as well as tax incentives and vouchers to donors. I will contend that such an approach would do a better job of minimizing domination of the poor than traditional welfare states and may prove more politically feasible than a UBI, at least in the near term in certain national contexts. (shrink)

Say that α is an n-strongly c. e. real if α is a sum of n many strongly c. e. reals, and that α is regular if α is n-strongly c. e. for some n. Let Sn be the set of all n-strongly c. e. reals, Reg be the set of regular reals and CE be the set of c. e. reals. Then we have: S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sn ⊂ · · · ⊂ (...) ⊂ Reg ⊂ CE. This gives a hierarchy of the c. e. reals. We also study the regularity of the d. c. e. reals. (shrink)

This chapter examines the relationship between laws and mechanisms as approaches to characterising generalizations and explanations in science. I give an overview of recent historical discussions where laws failed to satisfy stringent logical criteria, opening the way for mechanisms to be investigated as a way to explain regularities in nature. This followed by a critical discussion of contemporary debates about the role of laws versus mechanisms in describing versus explaining regularities. I conclude by offering new arguments for two roles for (...) laws that mechanisms cannot subsume, one epistemically optimistic and one pessimistic, both broadly Humean. Do note that this piece is not primarily Hume exegesis; it is more of a riff in the key of Hume. (shrink)

Radical interpretation is used by Davison in his linguistic theory not only as an interesting thought experiment but also a general pattern that is believed to be able to give an essential and general account of linguistic interpretation. If the principle of charity is absolutely necessary to radical interpretation, it becomes, in this sense, a general methodological principle. However, radical interpretation is a local pattern that is proper only for exploring certain interpretation in a specific case, and consequently the (...) principle of charity is an applicable principle in the limited scope. It is neither the case that every linguistic interpretation is in nature radical nor that the principle of charity is the primary and fundamental principle for all linguistic interpretation as Davidson believes. (shrink)

Theories such as effective altruism contend that people are morally obligated to give to charitable organizations that will efficiently do the most net good. The assumption is that aiding people who are most in need will create the most good; yet, it may be more inefficient to reach those most in need. In response, I outline my Inefficiency Principle in which efficiency has less moral weight when aiding those lacking in basic capabilities, and efficiency has more moral weight when aiding (...) those who are lacking in more complex capabilities. This principle acknowledges the obstacles in assisting those most in need while sustaining the moral importance of efficiency. (shrink)

In our globalized and interconnected world, companies are increasingly donating substantial amounts to good causes around the globe. Many companies choose to donate “at home” while others give to causes in faraway places where recipients are in dire need of support. Interestingly, past research on corporate donations has neglected the question of whether consumers differentially reward companies for geographically varying allocations of donation budgets. Through a mixed methods approach, this paper remedies this gap by developing and empirically testing a conceptual (...) framework of consumers’ preferences for geographically varying allocations of corporate donation budgets. In a first step, two preliminary field studies involving real donations explored customers’ preferences for donation allocations varying in geographical focus. A qualitative focus group study then investigated underlying rationales to inform the research and led to the development of hypotheses. Subsequently a large-scale between-subjects scenario experiment tested the predictions. Overall, results indicate that, in contrast with current managerial practice, customers prefer companies that split donations equally between domestic and foreign recipients or even donate only abroad. (shrink)

In this paper we present an equivalence between the category of commutative regular rings and the category of Boolean-valued fields, i.e., Boolean-valued sets for which the field axioms are true. The author used this equivalence in [12] to develop a Galois theory for commutative regular rings. Here we apply the equivalence to give an alternative construction of an algebraic closure for any commutative regular ring.Boolean-valued sets were developed in 1965 by Scott and Solovay [10] to simplify independence (...) proofs in set theory. They later were applied by Takeuti [13] to obtain results on Hilbert and Banach spaces. Ellentuck [3] and Weispfenning [14] considered Boolean-valued rings which consisted of rings and associated Boolean-valued relations. To the author's knowledge, the present work is the first to employ the Boolean-valued sets of Scott and Solovay to obtain results in algebra.The idea that commutative regular rings can be studied by examining the properties of related fields is not new. For several years algebraists and logicians have investigated commutative regular rings by representing a commutative regular ring as a subdirect product of fields or as the ring of global sections of a sheaf of fields over a Boolean space. These representations depend, as does the work presented here, on the fact that the set of central idempotents of any ring with identity forms a Boolean algebra. The advantage of the Boolean-valued set approach is that the axioms of classical logic and set theory are true in the Boolean universe. Therefore, if the axioms for a field are true for a Boolean-valued set, then other properties of the set can be deduced immediately from field theory. (shrink)

We often make a distinction between what we owe as a matter of repayment, and what we give or offer out of charity. But how shall we describe our obligations to fellow citizens when we are in a position to be charitable because of a past injustice on the part of the state? This essay examines the moral implications of past injustice by considering Immanuel Kant's remarks on this phenomenon in his lectures and writings. In particular, it discusses the (...) role of the state and the individual in addressing the problem. (shrink)

Are philosophical arguments as effective as narratives in influencing charitable giving and attitudes toward it? In four experiments, we exposed online research participants to either philosophical arguments in favor of charitable giving, a narrative about a child whose life was improved by charitable donations, both the narrative and the argument, or a control text (a passage from a middle school physics text or a description of charitable organizations). Participants then expressed their attitudes toward charitable giving and were (...) either asked how much they would hypothetically donate if given $10 (Experiment 1) or told they had a 10% chance of winning $10 and given the opportunity to donate from their potential winnings (Experiments 2–4). Across the four experiments, participants in all of the narrative conditions and in some of the argument conditions tended to express more positive attitudes toward charitable giving and donated about $1 more on average than did participants in the control conditions. These effects appear to have been mediated by the “narrative transportation” scale, which suggests that appeals to donate can be effective if they engage participants’ emotions, imagery, and interest. (shrink)

By using multilevel mediation involving 322,589 posts made by 384 musicians over 104 weeks, we simultaneously analyze the short-term and long-term effects of charity-related signaling on sales, with social media engagement as the mediator. Specifically, we compare the effects of charity-related signals with those of two other types of signals: mission-related (i.e., promoting music and commercial products) and non-mission-related (i.e., other posts that do not relate to the other two categories). In the short term, the indirect effect of (...) using charity signaling on sales (through engagement) is positive, though smaller than the effects of mission-related and non-mission related signals. However, in the long term, the indirect effect of regularly using charity-related signaling on sales (through long-term engagement) is greater than for the effects involving the other types of signals. We derive from these findings three main implications for the business ethics literature. First, in the long term, the mutual economic benefits of charity signaling should encourage both entities (i.e., musicians and charities) to go beyond short-term, transactional philanthropy. Second, because it is profitable for musicians to partner with charities in the long-term, our research argues that charities have extensive bargaining power in such co-branding decisions. Third, our research highlights the importance of studying the longitudinal aspects of co-branding decisions involving non-profit organizations; the financial outlook of such decisions could greatly vary depending on the timeframe (i.e., short vs. long). (shrink)

The troubling ethics and politics of philanthropy Is philanthropy, by its very nature, a threat to today’s democracy? Though we may laud wealthy individuals who give away their money for society’s benefit, Just Giving shows how such generosity not only isn’t the unassailable good we think it to be but might also undermine democratic values and set back aspirations of justice. Big philanthropy is often an exercise of power, the conversion of private assets into public influence. And it is (...) a form of power that is largely unaccountable, often perpetual, and lavishly tax-advantaged. The affluent—and their foundations—reap vast benefits even as they influence policy without accountability. And small philanthropy, or ordinary charitable giving, can be problematic as well. Charity, it turns out, does surprisingly little to provide for those in need and sometimes worsens inequality. These outcomes are shaped by the policies that define and structure philanthropy. When, how much, and to whom people give is influenced by laws governing everything from the creation of foundations and nonprofits to generous tax exemptions for donations of money and property. Rob Reich asks: What attitude and what policies should democracies have concerning individuals who give money away for public purposes? Philanthropy currently fails democracy in many ways, but Reich argues that it can be redeemed. Differentiating between individual philanthropy and private foundations, the aims of mass giving should be the decentralization of power in the production of public goods, such as the arts, education, and science. For foundations, the goal should be what Reich terms “discovery,” or long-time-horizon innovations that enhance democratic experimentalism. Philanthropy, when properly structured, can play a crucial role in supporting a strong liberal democracy. Just Giving investigates the ethical and political dimensions of philanthropy and considers how giving might better support democratic values and promote justice. (shrink)

In GIVING WELL: THE ETHICS OF PHILANTHROPY, an accomplished trio of editors bring together an international group of distinguished philosophers, social scientists, lawyers and practitioners to identify and address the most urgent moral questions arising today in the practice of philanthropy.

Giovanni Sambin has recently introduced the notion of an overlap algebra in order to give a constructive counterpart to a complete Boolean algebra. We propose a new notion of regular open subset within the framework of intuitionistic, predicative topology and we use it to give a representation theorem for overlap algebras. In particular we show that there exists a duality between the category of set-based overlap algebras and a particular category of topologies in which all open subsets are (...) class='Hi'>regular. (shrink)

Celebrity studies is an expansive and expanding field in European and American scholarship. Unfortunately, Africanist scholars have paid limited attention to this significant branch of scholarship. Drawing from varied secondary sources, including audio-visual materials, newspaper articles and journals, and books in the fields of celebrities and development, I examine Nigerian celebrity philanthropy in the age of internet technology. I argue that Nigerian celebrity philanthropy, given its mediatised nature and impact on its recipient, is a palliative measure to systemic and structural (...) crises of poverty. I show that this individualistic effort only gives temporary respite for some of its recipients while others are left even worse off after their encounters with celebrities helping. My research sits at the crossroads of multiple fields in the humanities and the social sciences and offers a new direction for celebrity studies in the global South. Future research may examine individual Nigerian celebrity philanthropy while centring on gender, class, education, ethnicity, religion, and location in celebrity humanitarians in the global South, particularly in Nigeria. (shrink)

This book examines the origins of communal and institutional almsgiving in rabbinic Judaism. It undertakes a close reading of foundational rabbinic texts and places their discourses on organized giving in their second to third century CE contexts. Gregg E. Gardner finds that Tannaim promoted giving through the soup kitchen and charity fund, which enabled anonymous and collective support for the poor. This protected the dignity of the poor and provided an alternative to begging, which benefited the community (...) as a whole - poor and non-poor alike. By contrast, later Jewish and Christian writings would see organized charity as a means to promote their own religious authority. This book contributes to the study of Jews and Judaism, history of religions, biblical studies, and ethics. (shrink)

In giving to charity, should we strive to do the greatest good or promote a lesser good? This is a unique collection of new papers on philanthropy from a range of philosophical perspectives, including intuitionism, virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, theories of justice, and ideals of personal integrity.

Radical interpretation is used by Davison in his linguistic theory not only as an interesting thought experiment but also a general pattern that is believed to be able to give an essential and general account of linguistic interpretation. If the principle of charity is absolutely necessary to radical interpretation, it becomes, in this sense, a general methodological principle. However, radical interpretation is a local pattern that is proper only for exploring certain interpretation in a specific case, and consequently the (...) principle of charity is an applicable principle in the limited scope. It is neither the case that every linguistic interpretation is in nature radical nor that the principle of charity is the primary and fundamental principle for all linguistic interpretation as Davidson believes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bodhicitta and Charity:A ComparisonLuke PereraThe object of this paper is to present a comparison of bodhicitta and charity. These concepts are central to their respective traditions (Mahāyāna Buddhism, Christianity), and for the sake of keeping the comparison within reasonable limits I will focus on two sets of texts: the writings of the Indian Buddhist monk Śāntideva (late seventh and eighth centuries ce) and those of the French (...) Catholic nun Thérèse of Lisieux (1873–1897). My intention is that this comparison will help to clarify the similarities and the differences between the two concepts and provide thoughtful comment for Christians and Buddhists involved in interfaith dialogue and interested in comparative or interreligious theology.preliminary definitionsBodhicittaBodhicitta is a Sanskrit term, a compound of bodhi and citta, which appears regularly in the sūtras and śāstras composed by Mahāyāna Buddhist monks in India. Citta can mean mind, intelligence, thought, intention, or will, and bodhi (lit. awakening) refers to the state of all-embracing knowledge and freedom from cognitive and emotional limitations possessed by the buddhas. Bodhicitta, then, is the mind or thought that takes the supreme bodhi of the buddhas as its aim. Synonyms include cittotpāda (arising of the thought) and bodhicittotpāda (arising of the thought of bodhi). These three terms have always been associated with the resolve to become a buddha or a bodhisattva.1The resolve to become a buddha appears first in retellings of the story of the buddha Śākyamuni. Many lifetimes ago, the buddha-to-be was a pious young ascetic who had the fortune to encounter a buddha, and in his presence he vowed to become a buddha in the future.2 Thenceforth he was a bodhisattva, a being (sattva) devoted to the goal of complete enlightenment, the bodhi of the buddhas.3 In the Mahāyāna sūtras, the Buddha is shown teaching that the bodhisattva path is the supreme spiritual path. For a monk or layperson to begin the spiritual career of bodhisattva, they must generate the thought (cittotpāda), which takes bodhi as its aim (bodhicittotpāda): They must generate bodhicitta.The Abhisamayālaṃkāra, an Indian scholastic text attributed to the bodhisattva Maitreya, provides a classic definition: “to generate the resolve [to become a buddha] [End Page 121] is to desire perfect complete awakening for the sake of other [sentient beings].”4 Bodhicitta has two aspects: It is a resolve to attain the state of the buddhas and to work for the welfare of sentient beings. These two aspects combine in one career because the best way to help beings is to become an awakened buddha, capable of teaching them the way to deliverance. As another important text, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, relates:Furthermore, the bodhisattva, when fixing his thought on awakening, collects [his] thoughts and articulates [his] words thus: “Oh, may I be perfectly awakened unto the highest, perfect awakening, may I be the benefactor of all sentient beings and may I establish [them] in the absolutely perfect (or firm) extinction [i.e. Nirvāṇa] and in the insight of the Tathagata!” In this way, one generates the resolve [to become a buddha] when striving for one’s awakening and for the welfare of sentient beings.5The generation of bodhicitta requires preparatory actions such as confession of sins, solicitation of buddhas and bodhisattvas, and prolonged meditation on the benefits of bodhicitta and the sufferings of sentient beings. When the candidate is ready, he will vocalize his intention in the form of a vow in a ritual context, modeled on the monastic prātimokṣa vow.6 He will henceforth be bound by special bodhisattva precepts, which forbid harming sentient beings and creating difficulties for fellow Buddhist practitioners. Tibetan Buddhists identify two ritual traditions for the taking of the bodhicitta vow, each with their respective preparatory meditations, which they trace back to India. They associate Śāntideva with a lineage derived from the mythic bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, which includes the great monastic teacher and philosopher Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva (second and third centuries ce).The causes required for generating bodhicitta and its exact subdivisions have been... (shrink)

According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...) even viable, is not our focus here. Rather, our issue is with Hume, particularly: How could Hume have responded? In this paper, I show that in Book I of the Treatise, Hume did—however implicitly—appeal to a “pre-theoretical” notion of belief, which meets Husserl’s demands for a pre-theoretical grounding, i.e. a justificatory grounding. And so, his method is, at least in this respect, justified. But this belief is by no means “prenaturalistic.” Rather, it is a function of empirical data. In particular, it is a product of the “constant and coherent” impressions that seem to naturally obtain of experience. As a result, Hume’s method, which, in agreement with Husserl, we may characterize as psychology, does admit of a certain degree of regularity, but an empirical regularity. And according to Hume, contra Husserl’s complaints, this is the best that we can hope for; regularity will have to suffice, not certainty. However, it must be noted up front that this justification is implicit—Hume is not nearly as forthright as he could have been. Thus, making his position more explicit is the task of this paper. I am not presenting my own position, where I offer my own arguments. Instead, I present textual evidence, contextualized with ample explication. It is my hope that by doing so, Hume may more effectively make his case. (shrink)

This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.

What does global justice or charity requires us to give to other people? There is a large theoretical literature on this question. There is much less experimental work in political philosophy relevant to answering it. Perhaps for this reason, this literature has yet to have any major impact on theoretical discussions of global justice or charity. There is, however, some experimental research in behavioral economics that has helped to shape the field and a few relevant studies by political (...) philosophers. This paper reviews this research. Moreover, it argues that the little work that has been done can offer some methodological lessons to empirically engaged philosophers of many kinds. Finally, it suggests that there is reason for those interested in global ethics and charitable giving to consider doing new kinds of experimental and other empirical work in addition to traditional experimental philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Paul Russell's ‘Nozick, need and charity’, published in Vol. 4, No. 2 of the Journal of Applied Philosophy develops an attack on Nozick's thesis that “the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others’’in order “to contribute to our positive understanding of the nature of distributive justice”. Against Russell the present paper argues: first, that although these kinds of use of the coercive apparatus of the state are indeed justified—even (...) if not necessarily for the reasons which he gives—such justified uses are nevertheless not mandated by any sort of justice; and, secondly, that by collapsing the distinction between justice and the less fundamental virtue of charity Russell detracts from the credit due to the charitable. (shrink)

This paper investigates why some companies give to charity and others do not. The study uncovers a strong relationship between the personal attitudes of the charitable decision maker and the firm's giving behavior. This relationship indicates that the human element of personal attitudes may interact and play a very important role in a firm's decision to become involved with philanthropic activities. The study also shows that firms who have a history of giving to charity cite altruistic (...) motives for their behavior. On the other hand, firms that do not give to charity tend to use business reasons to explain their non-involvement. (shrink)

Residence of unauthorized immigrants is a stable feature of the Global North’s liberal democracies. This article asks how liberal-democratic policymakers should respond to this phenomenon, assuming both that states have incontrovertible rights and interests to assert control over immigration and that unauthorized residence is nevertheless an entrenched fact. It argues that a set of liberal-democratic commitments gives policymakers strong reason to implement both so-called ‘firewall’ and ‘regularization’ policies, thereby protecting unauthorized immigrants’ basic needs and interests and officially incorporating many of (...) them in society. It then explains that the background imperative of immigration control creates a dilemmatic tension between these policies, as regularization is envisaged alongside the removal of the ineligible, which is in turn hindered by the implementation of firewalls. This creates a dilemma between the pursuit of two policy goals that are both underwritten by the same value commitments. Though it cannot be entirely dissolved, I argue that the best way to mitigate this dilemma is to design regularization policy in a way that leaves only a small number of unauthorized immigrants subject to removal. (shrink)

Relativism has usually been presented as linked to the limits of translation and understanding. The Principle of Charity was developed to decide the reference of words or the best translation of a sentence. However, the principle has been defined in, at least, two different ways: a naturalistic one, as a pragmatic maxim that guides the interpreter generally; or a transcendental one, as an a priori, necessary condition for someone to be understood. In this paper I will focus on the (...) latter approach, taking Donald Davidson's arguments and his transcendental interpretation of the Principle of Charity as a representative case. Although different versions of the principle can be found in Davidson's writings, and some of them would seem flexible enough to give an account of how interpreter and speaker have different beliefs, all of these versions put understanding and intelligibility at risk. The reason is that the Principle of Charity has a wide scope: to conceive a person as rational, as having beliefs and desires, or as saying something, we have to interpret his/her utterances as revealing a set of beliefs consistent and true, and that maxim is applied to the whole system of sentences. So charity is necessary, we cannot choose it and if we spell out the Principle of Charity in sociological or psychological terms, that is, in empirical terms, we are changing the subject. The transcendental character of the principle has received criticism from various authors who understand it in a naturalistic way. I will conclude that an empirical description of how we use the Principle of Charity when we interpret a speaker's utterance would show the psychological and sociological relevance of relativism. (shrink)

Whilst there is a growing volume of literature exploring the ethical implications of organisational change for HRM and the ethical aspects of certain HRM activities, there have been few published U.K. studies of how HR managers actually behave when faced with ethical dilemmas in their work. This paper seeks to enhance the foundations of such knowledge through an examination of the influence of organisational values on the ethical behaviour of Human Resource Managers within a sample of charities in the U.K. (...) and the Republic of Ireland. A qualitative research design is adopted utilising semi-structured interviews. Findings highlight ethical inconsistency in people management in the charity sector arising from the clear application of strong and explicit organisational values to external client groups but their limited influence on people management strategies and practices within the organisation. Many of the ethical issues faced by HRM professionals in both countries arise from this inconsistency. In their handling of ethical dilemmas, the HRM professionals exhibit a combination of a care ethic and a concern for justice but it is also clear that in situations of management intransigence, a desire to be conscience driven often gives way to a contingent approach. Whilst respondents considered it inappropriate for the HRM function to be the conscience of the organisation, it is seen to have a key role in providing management with advice on ethical action. However, the ability of HRM to influence ethical behaviour is highly dependent on the status of the function within the organisation. (shrink)

In this paper I examine some presuppositions of toleration and pluralism. I explore two models, viz. a deontological and a consequentialist model, respectively, which could support the view that rational agents should act in a tolerant way. Against the background which is offered by the first model I give two arguments in favor of the view that people are better off and more rational if they act in a tolerant way. The first argument draws upon a principle of charity (...) which one usually makes use of in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language but which could work equally well with regard to this foundational issue in ethics and philosophyof action. The second argument is built upon the epistemic principle of fallibilism and it is meant to show that from this vantage point acting in a tolerant way is the rational thing to do. (shrink)

The square of a language L is the set of all words pp where p ∈ L. The square of a regular language may be regular too or context-free or none of both. We give characterizations for each of these cases and show that it is decidable whether a regular language has one of these properties.

We analyze the rather unusual properties of some exact solutions in 2D dilaton gravity for which infinite quantum stresses on the Killing horizon can be compatible with regularity of the geometry. In particular, the Boulware state can support a regular horizon. We show that such solutions are contained in some well-known exactly solvable models (for example, RST). Formally, they appear to account for an additional coefficient B in the solutions (for the same Lagrangian which contains also “traditional” solutions) that (...) gives rise to the deviation of temperature T from its Hawking value T H . The Lorentzian geometry, which is a self-consistent solution of the semiclassical field equations, in such models, is smooth even at B≠0 and there is no need to put B=0 (T=T H ) to smooth it out. We show how the presence of B≠0 affects the structure of spacetime. In contrast to “usual” black holes, full fledged thermodynamic interpretation, including definite value of entropy, can be ascribed (for a rather wide class of models) to extremal horizons, not to nonextreme ones. We find also new exact solutions for “usual” black holes (with T=T H ). The properties under discussion arise in the weak-coupling regime of the effective constant of dilaton-gravity interaction. Extension of features, traced in 2D models, to 4D dilaton gravity leads, for some special models, to exceptional nonextreme black holes having no own thermal properties. (shrink)

Bayesians since Savage (1972) have appealed to asymptotic results to counter charges of excessive subjectivity. Their claim is that objectionable differences in prior probability judgments will vanish as agents learn from evidence, and individual agents will converge to the truth. Glymour (1980), Earman (1992) and others have voiced the complaint that the theorems used to support these claims tell us, not how probabilities updated on evidence will actually}behave in the limit, but merely how Bayesian agents believe they will behave, suggesting (...) that the theorems are too weak to underwrite notions of scientific objectivity and intersubjective agreement. I investigate, in a very general framework, the conditions under which updated probabilities actually converge to a settled opinion and the conditions under which the updated probabilities of two agents actually converge to the same settled opinion. I call this mode of convergence deterministic, and derive results that extend those found in Huttegger (2015b). The results here lead to a simple characterization of deterministic convergence for Bayesian learners and give rise to an interesting argument for what I call strong regularity, the view that probabilities of non-empty events should be bounded away from zero. (shrink)

This book offers a new reading of Aquinas' views on faith. The author argues that the theological nature of faith is crucial to Aquinas' thought, and that it gives rise to a peculiar and otherwise incomprehensible relationship with reason. The first part of the book examines various modern and contemporary accounts of the relationship between faith and reason in Aquinas' thought. The author shows that these accounts are unconvincing because they exhibit what he calls a Lockean view of faith and (...) reason, which maintains that the relationship in question should only be treated by way of evidence. In other words, this view ignores the specific nature of the Christian faith and the equally specific way it needs to relate to reason. The second part offers a comprehensive account of Aquinas' view of faith. It focuses on the way the divine grace and charity shape the relationship between evidence and human will. The final part of the book ties these ideas together to show how Christian faith, with its specifically theological nature, is perfectly compatible with rational debates. It also argues that employing the specificity of faith may constitute the best way to promote autonomous and successful rational investigations. Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Aquinas, philosophy of religion, Christian theology, and medieval philosophy. (shrink)

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, (...) contributing to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. (shrink)

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, (...) contributing to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. (shrink)

Effective altruists recommend that we give large sums to charity, but by far their more central message is that we give effectively, i.e., to whatever charities would do the most good per dollar donated. In this paper, I’ll assume that it’s not wrong not to give bigger, but will explore to what extent it may well nonetheless be wrong not to give better. The main claim I’ll argue for here is that in many cases it would be wrong of (...) you to give a sum of money to charities that do less good than others you could have given to instead, even if it would not have been wrong of you not to give the money to any charity at all. I assume that all the charities under discussion here do positive good overall, do not cause harm, do not infringe rights, etc. What makes my main claim here particularly interesting is that it is inconsistent with what appears to be a fairly common assumption in the ethics of giving, according to which if it is not wrong of you to keep some sum of money for yourself, then it is likewise not wrong of you to donate it to any particular charity you choose. Roughly: if it’s up to you whether to donate the money, it’s also up to you where to donate the money. I challenge this common assumption. (shrink)

Two cultures are at play in the field of social entrepreneurship: an age-old culture of charity, and a more contemporary culture of entrepreneurial problem solving. These cultures permeate activities from resource providers to front line operations. Both have roots in our psychological responses to the needs of others and are reinforced by social norms. They can work hand-in-hand or they can be at odds. Some of the icons of the social entrepreneurship movement have spoken harshly about charity, yet (...) most of them rely to some degree, at least early in their development process, on resources that are given out of a charitable impulse. The success of social entrepreneurship requires an integration of values from each of these cultures, in which the satisfactions of giving are correlated with social benefits of rigorous problem solving. (shrink)