Religion and culture play a central role in building harmonious relations between followers of different religions, both within the nuclear family and in the extended family. This study examines the revitalisation of religious moderation with a cultural approach in strengthening tolerance. Data was obtained qualitatively from in-depth interviews and observations of families of different religions, religious leaders, traditional leaders, and other relevant informants. The research findings show that the family institution is the most crucial place in carrying out moderate (...) religious culturalisation through the local wisdom values of kasiuluran [kinship], tengko situru [togetherness], and karapasan [tenacity]. Institutionally, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and clans in Tongkonan encourage peace in society, both in traditional and religious activities. Meanwhile, religious celebrations, traditional ceremonies, and community activities are occasions to socialise and interact by placing a firm tolerance for religious differences. CONTRIBUTION: This study contributes to the realisation of tolerance through the application of moderate religious values and local wisdom that the world needs today. Strengthening inter-religious relations is very important because the position of religion is complex and sensitive. This contribution is crucial in the midst of the rampant issue of radicalism in Indonesia lately. (shrink)

Religion and culture play a central role in building harmonious relations between followers of different religions, both within the nuclear family and in the extended family. This study examines the revitalisation of religious moderation with a cultural approach in strengthening tolerance. Data was obtained qualitatively from in-depth interviews and observations of families of different religions, religious leaders, traditional leaders, and other relevant informants. The research findings show that the family institution is the most crucial place in carrying out moderate (...) religious culturalisation through the local wisdom values of kasiuluran [kinship], tengko situru [togetherness], and karapasan [tenacity]. Institutionally, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and clans in Tongkonan encourage peace in society, both in traditional and religious activities. Meanwhile, religious celebrations, traditional ceremonies, and community activities are occasions to socialise and interact by placing a firm tolerance for religious differences. CONTRIBUTION: This study contributes to the realisation of tolerance through the application of moderate religious values and local wisdom that the world needs today. Strengthening inter-religious relations is very important because the position of religion is complex and sensitive. This contribution is crucial in the midst of the rampant issue of radicalism in Indonesia lately. (shrink)

Multiculturalism is not a flag that political philosophers seem eager to wave these days. Conservatives complain about the supposedly hazardous effects of the notion that non-Western societies have ideas and ways of life that are worthy enough to compete with those of Western societies for study and respect. Progressives worry that multiculturalism can be too uncritical of certain non-Western attitudes, especially about the nature and role of women. Perhaps this helps to explain why Hans Oberdiek is reluctant to associate his (...) views too closely with multiculturalism, despite endorsing an ideal of tolerance that is quite sympathetic to it. (shrink)

The strict-tolerant approach to paradox promises to erect theories of naïve truth and tolerant vagueness on the firm bedrock of classical logic. We assess the extent to which this claim is founded. Building on some results by Girard we show that the usual proof-theoretic formulation of propositional ST in terms of the classical sequent calculus without primitive Cut is incomplete with respect to ST-valid metainferences, and exhibit a complete calculus for the same class of metainferences. We also argue that the (...) latter calculus, far from coinciding with classical logic, is a close kin of Priest’s LP. (shrink)

Toleration and neutrality are not always distinguished. When they are, they are often offered as two complementary solutions for the problem of achieving political unity and a degree of mutual acceptance within a pluralist liberal polity. The essay shows the concepts to be fundamentally distinct, and then argues that instead of being mutually supporting, they are mutually exclusive. Neutralist liberals, it is argued, must give up toleration in favour of the virtue of neutrality on the part of citizens.

Philosophical Commentary on the Words of the Gospel 'Compel Them to Come In', written by the Protestant philosopher Pierre Bayle in 1686-88, was a classic statement of the case for toleration at a time of extreme persecution. This collection of Kilcullen's writings on Bayle's work examines a wide range of 17th-century religious and philosophical issues, including Bayle's arguments, Arnauld's attack on Jesuit moral theories similar to Bayle's, the uses and limitations of "reciprocity" arguments, the "ethics of belief," and questions (...) of moral responsibility and free will. (shrink)

For the philosopher of Rotterdam, religious coercion has two essential sources of illegitimacy: the linking of religious and ecclesiastical belief and the use of politics for religious purposes. Bayle responds to it, with his doctrine of freedom of conscience, on one hand and by means of the essential distinction between voluntary religious affiliation and political obligation, on the other hand. From my perspective, his doctrine of tolerance does not involve an atheist state, nor does it mean the rejection of (...) the presence of religion in the public space or its displacement to the intimate sphere of the conscience. This paper proposes a reading of Baylean tolerance as a political doctrine that allows the articulation between freedom of conscience, minority confessions, and official religion. Thus, the Baylean theoretical model could be considered a proposal to provide a normative form to the practice of toleration present in the seventeenth -century Netherlands. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate (...) and importantly different conceptions of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

In this article we examine Kant’s understanding of toleration by including a study of all instances in which he directly uses the language of toleration and related concepts. We use this study to resolve several key areas of interpretative dispute concerning Kant’s views on toleration. We argue that Kant offers a nuanced and largely unappreciated approach to thinking about toleration, and related concepts, across three normative spheres: the political, the interpersonal and the personal. We examine shortcomings (...) in earlier interpretations and conclude by arguing that the theme of toleration in Kant’s work, while coherent and important, is neither as central nor as peripheral as suggested by previous interpretations. Further, while Kant is critical of the arrogance of toleration in the political sphere, he is more positive toward the role of toleration in the interpersonal and personal spheres since it promotes virtue. (shrink)

Increasingly, physicians are being asked to provide technical services that many believe are morally wrong or inconsistent with their beliefs about the meaning and purposes of medicine. This controversy has sparked persistent debate over whether practitioners should be permitted to decline participation in a variety of legal practices, most notably physician-assisted suicide and abortion. These debates have become heavily politicized, and some of the key words and phrases are being used without a clear understanding of their meaning. In this essay, (...) I endeavor, firstly, to clarify the meaning of some of these terms: conscience, conscientious action, professional judgment, conscientious objection, conscience clauses, civil disobedience, and tolerance. I argue that use of the term conscientious objection to describe these refusals by health care professionals is mistaken and confusing. Secondly, relying on a proper understanding of the moral and technical character of medical judgment, the optimal deference that the state and markets ought to have toward professions, and general principles of Lockean tolerance for a diversity of practices and persons in a flourishing, pluralistic, democratic society, I offer a defense of tolerance with respect to the deeply held convictions of physicians and other health care professionals who hold minority views on contested but legal medical practices. (shrink)

The "comprehensive liberalism" defended in this book offers an alternative to the narrower "political liberalism" associated with the writings of John Rawls. By arguing against making tolerance as fundamental a value as individual autonomy, and extending the reach of liberalism to global society, it opens the way for dealing more adequately with problems of human rights and economic inequality in a world of cultural pluralism.

The question of toleration matters more than ever. The politics of the twenty-first century is replete with both the successes and, all too often, the failures of toleration. Yet a growing number of thinkers and practitioners have argued against toleration. Some believe that liberal democracies are better served by different principles, such as respect of, or recognition for, people's ways of life. Others argue that because the liberal state should be entirely neutral or indifferent towards people's ways (...) of life, it can no longer be tolerant - it has no grounds on which it can object, and so there is nothing left to tolerate.Respecting Toleration provides a new, original, and provocative take on the question of toleration and its application to the politics of contemporary diversity. The volume demonstrates how toleration - despite its critics - is essential to any liberal political order. Peter Balint argues that from a conceptual viewpoint, toleration is entirely compatible with liberal politics; and from a normative viewpoint, it is utterly essential. The volume argues that if one cares about people living divergent lives, then it is liberal toleration that should be respected by legislators and policy makers, and not people's differences. It is a book that will shape the debate and demand a response from all who are interested in which political structures most fairly accommodate the competing ways of life that characterise contemporary diversity.Key Features:Develops a new framework of political tolerationProvides a clear demonstration and analysis of complex concepts and argumentsProvides extensive practical and theoretical examples. (shrink)

Toleration would seem to be the most rational response to deep conflicts. However, by examining the conditions under which trust can develop between warring parties, it becomes clear that a fundamental shift in values - a conversion - is required before toleration makes sense. This book argues that maintaining trust is the key to stable practices of toleration.

The goal of this paper is a comprehensive analysis of basic reasoning patterns that are characteristic of vague predicates. The analysis leads to rigorous reconstructions of the phenomena within formal systems. Two basic features are dealt with. One is tolerance: the insensitivity of predicates to small changes in the objects of predication (a one-increment of a walking distance is a walking distance). The other is the existence of borderline cases. The paper shows why these should be treated as different, (...) though related phenomena. Tolerance is formally reconstructed within a proposed framework of contextual logic, leading to a solution of the Sorites paradox. Borderline-vagueness is reconstructed using certain modality operators; the set-up provides an analysis of higher order vagueness and a derivation of scales of degrees for the property in question. (shrink)

Toleration matters to us all. It contributes both to individuals leading good lives and to societies that are simultaneously efficient and just. There are personal and social matters that would be improved by taking toleration to be a fundamental value. This book develops and defends a full account of toleration—what it is, why and when it matters, and how it should be manifested in a just society. Cohen defends a normative principle of toleration grounded in a (...) new conception of freedom as freedom from harm. He goes on to argue that the moral limits of toleration have been reached only when freedom from harm is impinged. These arguments provide support for extensive toleration of a wide range of individual, familial, religious, cultural, and market activities. _Toleration Matters_ will be of interest to political philosophers and theorists, legal scholars, and those interested in matters of social justice. (shrink)

Abstract:Arguments against physicians’ claims of a right to refuse to provide tests or treatments to patients based on conscientious objection often depend on two premises that are rarely made explicit. The first is that the protection of religious liberty (broadly construed) should be limited to freedom of worship, assembly, and belief. The second is that because professions are licensed by the state, any citizen who practices a licensed profession is required to provide all the goods and services determined by the (...) profession to fall within the scope of practice of that professional specialty and permitted by the state, regardless of any personal religious, philosophical, or moral objection. In this article, I argue that these premises ought to be rejected, and therefore the arguments that depend on them ought also to be rejected. The first premise is incompatible with Locke’s conception of tolerance, which recognizes that fundamental, self-identifying beliefs affect public as well as private acts and deserve a broad measure of tolerance. The second premise unduly (and unrealistically) narrows the discretionary space of professional practice to an extent that undermines the contributions professions ought to be permitted to make to the common good. Tolerance for conscientious objection in the public sphere of professional practice should not be unlimited, however, and the article proposes several commonsense, Lockean limits to tolerance for physician claims of conscientious objection. (shrink)

Toleration and respect are often thought of as compatible, and indeed complementary, liberal democratic ideals. However, it has sometimes been said that toleration is disrespectful, because it necessarily involves a negative evaluation of the object of toleration. This article shows how toleration and respect are compatible as long as ‘ respect ’ is taken to mean recognition respect, as opposed to appraisal respect. But it also argues that recognition respect itself rules out certain kinds of evaluation (...) of persons, and with these, certain bases for toleration : if recognition respect is really distinct from appraisal respect, and if the fundamental rights assigned to people on the basis of recognition respect are to be equal rights, then recognition respect must itself involve a refusal to evaluate certain basic agential capacities of persons when deliberating about how to treat them. Even where ‘ respect ’ means recognition respect, then, there is some truth both in the thesis that toleration and respect are compatible, and in the thesis that they are incompatible. The different truths in these two theses help to shed light on the nature of toleration considered specifically as a liberal democratic virtue. This point can be illustrated by showing how the foregoing analysis provides a plausible solution to the so-called ‘paradox of the tolerant racist’. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance states that there is no need to justify the adoption of a logic by philosophical means. Carnap uses the freedom provided by this principle in his philosophy of mathematics: he wants to capture the idea that mathematical truth is a matter of linguistic rules by relying on a strong metalanguage with infinitary inference rules. In this paper, I give a new interpretation of an argument by E. W. Beth, which shows that the principle of (...) tolerance does not suffice to remove all obstacles to the employment of infinitary rules. (shrink)

The ‘agents’ of toleration can be divided into three categories: public institutions, groups and individuals. If it is mostly accepted that both public institutions and individuals are capable of toleration, it is not clear that such a capacity can be attributed to groups, although in daily discourse we seem ready to say that a certain social group is (in)tolerant. This article aims to address this issue by investigating the relationship between collective agency and social groups. Formal groups (e.g. (...) corporations) have internal rules and collectively recognized decision-making procedures that constitute a collective behaviour. However, it is not clear if and in what sense such a capacity is also upheld by informal groups. This article discusses some competing criteria to define informal groups and proposes the shared convictions criterion. In conclusion, this criterion is applied to toleration-related issues, so as to reconcile our ordinary understanding of groups’ toleration with a more technical analysis. (shrink)

In defending toleration against its many critics, Respecting Toleration has both conceptual and normative aims. Conceptually, I defend and explain the coherence of political toleration. This involves, in part, highlighting a distinction between two forms of toleration; one of which always involves objection, and one which does not. Normatively, I defend a particular understanding of toleration as the best way of accommodating contemporary diversity. In brief, the state should be guided by an active ideal of (...) neutrality, and citizens must at minimum engage in forbearance tolerance with each others’ differences. In this paper, I respond to four main lines of criticism. The first is that my understanding of toleration – in which objection is not always necessary – is too broad, and that my non-moralised understanding of forbearance tolerance requires additional context. Second, my discussion of neutrality runs together the distinction between an active/passive state with a large/small state; wrongly fails to distinguish between mere preferences and deeply held beliefs; and is really a concern about equality. Third, my freedom-based justification for toleration is too limited; and may, in fact, enable recognition rather than resist it. Fourth, my rejection of inter-citizen respect for difference is too quick. (shrink)

The canonists’ determination of the sphere of sanction provides an insight into the foundations of ecclesiastical tolerance. There is indeed an ecclesiastical tolerance that leads the magisterium to limit the scope of penal normativity for theological and pastoral reasons. The distinction between sin and crime, well known to canonists, is justified less by recourse to decretals or decisions of councils than by a return to the discourses of the Church Fathers. The definition of the notion of crime in (...) canon law and beyond owes a debt to Augustine’s meditation on the Donatist quarrel: according to this approach, it is a question of tolerating the tares. (shrink)

The paper explores challenges for the interpretation of the ideal toleration that arise in educational contexts involving children. It offers an account of how a respect-based conception of toleration can help to resolve controversies about the accommodation and response to diversity that arise in schools.

This book traces the growth of philosophical justifications of toleration. The contributors discuss the grounds on which we may be required to be tolerant and the proper limits of toleration. They consider the historical and conceptual relation between toleration and scepticism and ask whether toleration is justified by considerations of autonomy or of prudence. The papers cover a range of perspectives on the subject, including Marxist and Socialist as well as liberal views. The editor's introduction prepares (...) the ground by discussing the essential features of the subject and offers a lucid survey of the theories and arguments put forward in the book. The collection arises out of the Morrell Toleration Project at the University of York and all the papers were written as contributions to that project. The discussion will be of interest to specialists in philosophy, in political and social theory and in intellectual history. (shrink)

Since 1989 there has been an ongoing controversy about the limits of public discussion of bioethical issues in the German-speaking world. While a number of scholars have been involved, Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse have been the principal targets of those seeking to limit bioethical debates. Those who have supported silencing discussion of certain issues have argued that such public discussion leads to a loss of freedom. In the article we argue that toleration is not based on subjectivism but (...) rather on reason. Furthermore, the efforts to suppress debate are often based on a failure to understand our position. Such efforts at suppression also rest on an elitist view of society that must assume that the general public cannot debate such topics. (shrink)

In this paper, starting from Condorcet's discussion on progress, the author analyzes the relationship between the decline of religions, the end of State paternalism and tolerance. The author underlines how history shows a different course with respect to illuminist previsions.

I propose a T‐cell receptor (TcR)‐based mechanism by which immunity mediates both “genetic self” and “microbial self” thereby, connecting microbiome disease with autoimmunity. The hypothesis is based on simple principles. First, TcR are selected to avoid strong cross‐reactivity with “self,” resulting in selection for a TcR repertoire mimicking “genetic self.” Second, evolution has selected for a “microbial self” that mimics “genetic self” so as to share tolerance. In consequence, our TcR repertoire also mimics microbiome antigenicity, providing a novel mechanism (...) for modulating tolerance to it. Also, the microbiome mimics the TcR repertoire, acting as a secondary immune system. I call this TcR‐microbiome mimicry “holoimmunity” to denote immune tolerance to the “holobiont self.” Logically, microbiome‐host mimicry means that autoimmunity directed at host antigens will also attack components of the microbiome, and conversely, an immunological attack on the microbiome may cross‐react with host antigens producing “holoautoimmunity.”. (shrink)

In a previous paper (see ‘Tolerant, Classical, Strict’, henceforth TCS) we investigated a semantic framework to deal with the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, namely that small changes do not affect the applicability of a vague predicate even if large changes do. Our approach there rests on two main ideas. First, given a classical extension of a predicate, we can define a strict and a tolerant extension depending on an indifference relation associated to that predicate. Second, we can use (...) these notions of satisfaction to define mixed consequence relations that capture non-transitive tolerant reasoning. Although we gave some empirical motivation for the use of strict and tolerant extensions, making use of them commits us to the view that sentences of the form ‘ p∨¬p ’ and ‘ p∧¬p ’ are not automatically valid or unsatisfiable, respectively. Some philosophers might take this commitment as a negative outcome of our previous proposal. We think, however, that the general ideas underlying our previous approach to vagueness can be implemented in a variety of ways. This paper explores the possibility of defining mixed notions of consequence in the more classical super/sub-valuationist setting and examines to what extent any of these notions captures non-transitive tolerant reasoning. (shrink)

The concept of toleration plays a central role in pluralistic societies. It designates a stance which permits conflicts over beliefs and practices to persist while at the same time defusing them, because it is based on reasons for coexistence in conflict - that is, in continuing dissension. A critical examination of the concept makes clear, however, that its content and evaluation are profoundly contested matters and thus that the concept itself stands in conflict. For some, toleration was and (...) is an expression of mutual respect in spite of far-reaching differences, for others, a condescending, potentially repressive attitude and practice. Rainer Forst analyses these conflicts by reconstructing the philosophical and political discourse of toleration since antiquity. He demonstrates the diversity of the justifications and practices of toleration from the Stoics and early Christians to the present day and develops a systematic theory which he tests in discussions of contemporary conflicts over toleration. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate (...) and importantly different conceptions of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

Toleration is one possible response to diversity, and it is a defining feature of contemporary liberal democracies. Still, why we should tolerate and what we should tolerate are persistent political questions. This dissertation explores the reasons why citizens should sometimes refrain from embodying in law moral beliefs that they hold to be true. It claims that a neglected aspect of John Locke's writings on religious toleration, the formal relationship between moral principles and law, can instruct political deliberation. Since (...) this portion of Locke's thought is deeply influenced by Christian natural law, the approach is analogical. Locke confronted some political problems analogous to our own and there are alternative secular justifications available for the intermediate principles he employed. These intermediate principles can provide meaningful guidance in contemporary disputes about law and morality. ;Chapter Two explores Locke's most important insight into the formal relationship between law and morality, concerns about the use of "non-neutral principles" in political argument. A non-neutral principle is one that contains the very term under dispute between two contending parties. Neglected arguments in Locke's Third Letter Concerning Toleration provide formal tests for differentiating between non-neutral principles that do and do not justify coercive law. The Lockean criteria assume a "juridical equality" between persons such that at the persons who disagree are moral equals under a common set of public, general, and reasonable rules that determine when they may and may not use force. ;This Lockean insight has broad implications both for political theory and Locke scholarship. Chapter Three explores the relationship between natural law, consent, and the public good and argues that Lockean criteria can help modern readers choose between competing conceptions of the public good. Chapter Four explores the tensions between the Lockean formal criteria and Locke's specific views about which groups the government should tolerate. Chapter Five shows how a Lockean theory can account for institutional reasons for toleration, instances where a person refrains from putting a stop to an action for lack of jurisdiction. Chapter Six shows how both substantive and institutional forms of toleration should guide interpreters of the United States Constitution. (shrink)

This chapter explores Rainer Forst’s justification-centric view of nondomination toleration. This view places an idea of equal respect and a corresponding requirement of reciprocal and general justification at the core of non-domination toleration. After reconstructing this view, this chapter addresses two issues. First, even if this idea of equal respect requires the limits of non-domination toleration to be drawn in a manner that is equally justifiable to all affected people, equal justifiability should not be understood in terms (...) of Forst’s requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability. Second, for the equal justifiability of relevant constraints to ensure non-domination outcomes, discursive equality must be understood in substantive, purchase-sensitive terms. This means that a justification-centric view of non-domination toleration stands or falls with the participation value of what it regards as the standards of justification. This places reasonably contested matters of value at the heart of such views. (shrink)

In the so-called modern age, a transition can be observed in Western thought regarding this issue of tolerance. A perceptible shift can be seen in the understanding of tolerance as mere endurance to attempts to conceive of tolerance as a kind of well-grounded acceptance. It is regrettable, however, that this change in thinking has often remained hypothetical rather than heuristic. This certainly has to do with the fact that most of the time only large-scale theological, philosophical, or (...) political projects were negotiated. In this case, as is often happens, the directly concerned individual, the concrete person in the course of the demonstration efforts, was lost. We want to counter this loss with our study. In our investigation, which is based on a phenomenological reflection, we want to examine tolerance and respect as an existential problem couched within an individual. We wish to consider a person who desires to be tolerant and respectful; a person who accepts tolerance and respect as an existential task. (shrink)

Tolerance—though seen to be necessary on a world divided by deep differences—often strikes us as grudgingly given and resentfully received. Conceived more widely, however, tolerance can be seen to occupy the difficult, and contested, terrain between merely putting up with and accepting others.

This chapter examines some central features to liberal conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience. The first section briefly examines conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience in the traditions of Locke, Rawls, and Mill. The second section considers contemporary controversies surrounding toleration and liberty of conscience with a focus on neutrality and equality. The third section examines several challenges, including whether non-religious values should be afforded the same degree of accommodation as religious values, whether liberty of (...) conscience requires a secular state, and how bias impedes understandings of toleration and liberty of conscience. The chapter concludes with brief comments on future directions for research on toleration and liberty of conscience. One is exploring toleration and liberty of conscience in non-Western contexts; another is exploring ways that varieties of religious and political identity impact conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience. (shrink)

This paper reviews arguments concerning the relation between relativism and tolerance, both whether tolerance entails relativism, and whether relativism entails tolerance. Two new arguments are offered to support the contention that there is no necessary relation between relativism and tolerance. In particular, building on the classic argument by Geoffrey Harrison, this paper argues that even if there is no strict dichotomy between facts and values, as Harrison had assumed, relativism still does not entail tolerance for (...) every relativized perspective. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Fault Lines of Toleration in the Context of Education Toleration and Mutual Respect Toleration and an Autonomy Facilitating Education Appreciation Instead of Non‐Bigoted Acceptance Restrained Manifestation Limited Associational Liberty Implications Conclusion Notes References.

Thomas Hobbes argued for absolute sovereignty, and claimed that in Christian countries the sovereign was fully empowered to govern the church as well as the state. There are grounds for seeing Hobbes as a staunch opponent of religious toleration, and a number of scholars support some variation of this position. This chapter examines the case for and against the idea of the tolerant Hobbes, beginning with his views on the clergy, and the historical context of those views, especially in (...) the debates on church–state relations that preoccupied his English contemporaries. Hobbes noted that clerics were commonly funded by tithes, which were a tenth of the incomes of the laity to whom they catered. Many English Protestant supporters of toleration drew the line at tolerating Roman Catholicism. Hobbes contended that “there is Publique, and Private Worship”. The precept that states should establish the uniform, public worship of God stemmed, in his opinion, from reason and nature. (shrink)

This is an anthology of literary, religious, and philosophical texts from the entire Middle Ages and the early modern age that address already quite explicitly religious toleration and even tolerance.

The removal of life-sustaining treatment often brings physicians into conflict with patients. Because of their moral beliefs physicians often respond slowly to the request of patients or their families. People in bioethics have been quick to recommend that in cases of conflict the physician should simply sign off the case and “step aside”. This is not easily done psychologically or morally. Such a resolution also masks a number of more subtle, quite trouble some problems that conflict with the commitment to (...) toleration and moral diversity that it is intended to support. These conflicts are detailed and evaluated. (shrink)

The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Toleration, Recognition and Respect Toleration and Recognition in Tension Aspects of Recognition and Toleration Acts of Toleration Acts of Recognition (In)compatibility Revisited Conclusion References.

The rise of populism and nationalism in the West have raised concerns about the fragility of liberal political values, chief among them tolerance. But what alternative social resources exist for cultivating the interpersonal relationships and mutual goodwill necessary for sustainable peace? And how might the lived practices of religious communities carry potential to reinterpret or re-circuit these interpersonal tensions and transform the relationship with the cultural "other" (Fremde) from "foe" (Feind) to "friend" (Freund)? This volume contributes a unique analysis (...) of this shifting discourse by viewing the contemporary socio-political upheaval through the lens of Friedrich Schleiermacher's theology, with a focus on the themes of friendship, interpersonal subjectivity, and sociability as a path beyond mere tolerance. Each of the essays of the volume is written by an internationally recognized scholar in the field, and the volume examines Schleiermacher's novel reflections across multiple social contexts, including North America, Great Britain, western Europe, and South Africa. As these essays demonstrate, the implications of this conversation continue to resound in contemporary religious communities and political discourse. (shrink)

One of the pressing challenges we face today—in a post-Westphalian order and post-Bretton Woods world —is how to design the right kind of MAS that can take full advantage of the socio-economic and political progress made so far, while dealing successfully with the new global challenges that are undermining the best legacy of that very progress. This is the topic of the article. In it, I argue that in order to design the right kind of MAS, we need to design (...) the right kind of norms that constitute them; in order to design the right kind of constitutive norms, we need to identify and adopt the right kind of principles of normative design; toleration is one of those principles; unfortunately, its role as a foundation for the design of norms has been undermined by the “paradox of toleration”; however, the paradox can be solved; so toleration can be re-instated as the right kind of foundational principle for the design of the right kind of norms that can constitute the right kind of MAS that can operate across cultures, societies and states, to help us to tackle the new global challenges facing us. (shrink)

Political liberty is at the centre of liberal conceptions of toleration. Liberal political philosophers disagree about the limits of toleration, whether equality is central to liberal toleration, and the toleration of illiberal religious and cultural practices, among other topics. Some non-liberal states adopt a model of toleration, despite significant limitations on liberty. Moreover, some recent work in comparative philosophy emphasizes pluralism across traditions of political morality. This chapter will consider a variety of positions on liberal (...) toleration as well as the challenge to liberal toleration posed by ethical pluralism. (shrink)

In this book, René González de la Vega argues that tolerance under the structure of modern deontological liberalism becomes a "suicidal ideal" or an irrational attitude, mainly because its claims are contradictory to the core normative elements of this account of the liberal thought.

Contemporary philosophical debates surrounding toleration have revolved around three issues: What is toleration? Should we tolerate and, if so, why? What should be tolerated? These questions are of central importance to social and political thought.

Multicultural societies are far more likely than others to include minorities committed to the pursuit of practices that offend the majority, and treating the cultural commitments of all citizens fairly will require some set of guiding principles to distinguish tolerable ‘cultural controversies’ from intolerable ones. This paper does not directly address the moral question at stake here (i.e. demarcating the limits of toleration) but rather seeks to provide a politically justifiable normative argument to explain when tolerant restraint is necessary, (...) permissible or prohibited. This argument emerges from a concern to treat the cultural commitments of all citizens fairly. In turn, the argument indicates a potential reconciliation of the ‘politics of toleration’ with the ‘politics of respect’. (shrink)