The teaching of the ethical implications of scientific advances in science courses for undergraduates has significant advantages for both science and non-science majors. The article describes three courses taught by the author as examples of the concept, and examines the disadvantages as well as the advantages. A significant advantage of this approach is that many students take the courses primarily because of the ethical component who would not otherwise take science. A disadvantage is less time in the course for the (...) science; arguably, this is outweighed by the greater retention of the science when it is put into context. (shrink)

Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible ...

Life's Values offers new analyses of the nature of pleasure, happiness, well-being, and meaning in life. Recognizing how individuals have different priorities, Goldman explains what is of ultimate value in our lives and argues that making our desires rational - relevantly informed of what it's like to satisfy them - maximizes well-being.

To say that an object is beautiful or ugly is seemingly to refer to a property of the object. But it is also to express a positive or negative response to it, a set of aesthetic values, and to suggest that others ought to respond in the same way. Such judg- ments are descriptive, expressive, and normative or prescriptive at once. These multiple features are captured well by Humean accounts that analyze the judgments as ascribing relational properties. To say that (...) an object is beautiful is to say, in part, that it is such as to elicit a response expressing pleasure in certain observers. The observers in question must not be ignorant, biased, insensitive, or of poor taste, and they must not base their evaluations on aesthetically irrelevant properties of the objects they judge. The reference to the object's "being such . . ." captures the objective side of the relation; refer- ence to the pleasurable response captures the expressive function of these judgments; and the ideal properties of the observers suggest that others ought to judge in the same way. (shrink)

When physicist Alan Sokal recently submitted an article to the postmodernist journal Social Text, the periodical's editors were happy to publish it--for here was a respected scientist offering support for the journal's view that science is a subjective, socially constructed discipline. But as Sokal himself soon revealed in Lingua Franca magazine, the essay was a spectacular hoax--filled with scientific gibberish anyone with a basic knowledge of physics should have caught--and the academic world suddenly awoke to the vast gap that (...) has opened between the scientific community and their mould-be critics. But the truth is that not only postmodern critics but Americans in general have a weak grasp on scientific principles and facts. In Connected Knowledge, physicist Alan Cromer offers a way to bridge the chasm, with a lively, lucid account of scientific thinking and a provocative new agenda for American education. Science, Cromer argues, is anything but common sense: It requires a particular habit of mind that does not come naturally. For example, something as simple as buoyancy can only be explained through Archimedes' principle--that a body in a fluid is subject to an upward force equal to the weight of fluid it displaces--yet few scientists could arrive at this ancient concept by trial and error. School children, however, are often given a ball and a tank of water, and asked to explain buoyancy any way they can. Today's de emphasis on teaching pupils necessary facts and principles, he argues, "far from empowering them, makes them slaves of their own subjective opinions." This movement in education, known as Constructivism, has close ties to postmodern critics (such as the editors of Social Text) who question the objectivity of science, and with it the existence of an objective reality. Cromer offers a ringing defense of the knowability of the world, both as an objective reality and as a finite landscape of discovery. The advance of scientific knowledge, he argues, is not unlike the mapping of the continents; at this point, we have found them all. He shows how the advent of quantum mechanics, rather than making knowledge less certain, actually offers a more precise understanding of the behavior of atoms and electrons. Turning from philosophy to education, he argues that instead of allowing students to flounder, however creatively, schools should follow a progressive curriculum that returns theoretical knowledge to the classroom. Connected Knowledge, however, goes much farther. As a discipline that insists upon connecting theory with measurable reality, physical science offers a new direction for reforming the social sciences. Cromer also shows how some of the hottest issues in public policy--including the debates over special education and group variations in I.Q., can be resolved through clear, hard headed thinking. For example, he argues for use of the G.E.D. as a national educational standard, with a new "politics of intelligence" to guide the distribution of school resources. Always forthright and articulate, Alan Cromer offers a startling new vision for integrating science, philosophy, and education. (shrink)

In this concise survey, intended for advanced undergraduate students of aesthetics, Alan Goldman focuses on the question of aesthetic value, using many practical examples from painting, music, and literature to make his case. Although he treats a wide variety of views, he argues for a nonrealist view of aesthetic value, showing that the personal element can never be factored out of evaluative aesthetic judgments and explaining why this is so.

It is consistent with ¬CH that every universal theory of relational structures with the joint embedding property and amalgamation for P --diagrams has a universal model of cardinality ℵ 1. For classes with amalgamation for P --diagrams it is consistent that $2^{\aleph_0} > \aleph_2$ and there is a universal model of cardinality ℵ 2.

This paper defends strong internalism about reasons, the view that reasons must relate to pre-existing motivational states, from several kinds of counterexamples, supposed desire independent reasons, that have been proposed. A central distinction drawn is that between there being a reason and an agent's having a reason. For an agent to have an F reason, she must be F-minded. Reasons, as what motivate us, are states of affairs and not themselves desires or motivational states, but they must connect to existing (...) motivational states. It has been claimed that rationality itself requires us to recognize certain reasons independent of our desires, that we acquire new desires by learning what is valuable, by acquiring desire-independent reasons to pursue certain values. It is claimed also that prudential and moral reasons are desire independent. By offering an account of rationality as coherence, by appealing to broader concerns as opposed to specific desires, and by appealing to the distinction noted above, the paper exposes weaknesses in recent arguments for desire independent reasons by Millgram, Smith, Korsgaard, and Searle. the reasons they propose can be interpreted as internal (not desire independent) or dismissed as nonexistent. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the account of desire defended by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder in their recent book, In Praise of Desire. It contrasts their account with one that I favor, a cluster analysis listing various criteria that are together sufficient for having paradigm desires, but none of which is necessary or sufficient for desiring. I argue that their account fails to state necessary or sufficient conditions, that it is explanatorily weaker than the cluster account, that it fails to provide (...) a neat reduction of desires to neurophysical terms, and that in any case such a reduction is not required for the preservation of the concept of desire in mature psychology. Implications are drawn for the broader debate between reductionists, eliminativists, and defenders of folk psychological concepts. (shrink)

This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects (...) that framework entirely. Topics treated include the Gettier problem, the nature of explanation and inductive inference, the justification of foundations for knowledge in terms of inference to the best explanation, the possibility of realist interpretations of contemporary science, reference, and the relations between empirical psychology and epistemology. Professor Goldman defends the need for a foundational theory of justification and presents a version that refutes standard criticisms of that doctrine. His defense of realism takes into account contemporary advances in semantics and philosophy of science. It attempts to clarify the kinds of skeptical argument the philosopher must take seriously, without succumbing to them. While recent epistemology has tended to dismiss the traditional foundational approach, it has not provided a suitable alternative. Goldman breaks new ground by adapting that approach within his explanationist, inductive theory. (shrink)

This books examines the fundamental values and principles of conduct in the professions, focusing specifically on four areas: law, politics, medicine and business. One central question unifies its inquiry into the different professions: should the principles for judging the actions of professionals be the same as those used to judge private individuals, or do these professions require special moral principles to guide their conduct. The author considers arguments deriving from the underlying institutional goals of each profession in turn.

Originally published in 1988, this book discusses if moral knowledge exists, and if so, if it is similar to other forms of knowledge. This book approaches the issues from both historical and contemporary perspectives and in order to determine whether there is a real property of rightness, looks to the ethical theories of Hobbes, Hume and Kant. This historical analysis leads to a systematic comparison of three theories of the nature of ethics: realism, emotivism and coherentism. The nature of coherence (...) is explained using legal reasoning as a model. Moral reasoning is compared and contrasted with reasoning both in science and law, showing how ethics differs from science and empirical disciplines. (shrink)

Editors’ Note: As a matter of policy, the editors believe that publishing several reviews of selected texts is a valuable exercise which will enable a cross-section of views to be aired.Copies of this report can be obtained from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 28 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3EG, U.K. . The report publishes the recommendation of a Working Party set up in January 1995. Following a wide public consultation, the Working Party prepared its report on xenotransplantation which has been (...) endorsed by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. (shrink)

Robert Nozick argued that we would not plug into his machine that could give us any experiences we chose. More recently Richard Kraut has argued that it would be prudentially rational to plug into the machine, since only experiences count for personal welfare. I argue that both are wrong, that either choice can be rational or not, depending on the central desires of the subjects choosing. This claim is supported by the empirical evidence, which shows an almost even split between (...) those who would enter and those who would not. If we interpret those on both sides as making rational choices to maximize their personal well-being, and if such rational choice tends to enhance well-being, then the experience machine thought experiment supports neither experientialism nor its denial, but instead a rational desire satisfaction account of personal well-being. Unlike objective list and perfectionist accounts, the desire satisfaction account of well-being easily accommodates rational choices on both sides, depending on the motivational sets of the choosers. (shrink)

The idea that a just political system must ignore or nullify socially caused initial advantages in competing for positions and other social benefits is as old as political philosophy itself. Plato called for social mobility among his classes so that all could gravitate toward the classes for which their temperaments naturally suited them. The idea that the system must take positive steps to correct for these differences among individuals is likewise as old as the concept of public education, the supposed (...) great equalizer. But the claim that society must correct also for natural differences among individuals – differences in intelligence, talents, beauty, and physical prowess – is far more recent, having been articulated most forcefully by Rawls. The reasoning underlying this further step toward a more radical notion of equal opportunity appeals to the fact that natural differences are equally arbitrary from a moral point of view as a basis for differential rewards as are socially caused differences. A person no more deserves to be born smart than rich. Why then should the former but not the latter be allowed to influence future benefits and rewards? A negative answer, however, creates a tension within a liberal theory of justice between the demand to nullify natural differences, or to use them to the benefit of those least well endowed, and the demand to respect distinct individuals that supposedly grounds such a theory. (shrink)

Part I. Philosophy of novels. 1. Introduction: philosophical content and literary value -- 2. Interpreting novels -- 3. The sun also rises: incompatible interpretations -- 4. The appeal of the mystery -- Part II. Philosophy in novels. 5. Moral development in Pride and prejudice -- 6. Huckleberry Finn and moral motivation -- 7. What we learn about rules from The cider house rules -- 8. Nostromo and the fragility of the self.

Let p be an odd prime. A method is described which given a structure M of finite similarity type produces a nilpotent group of class 2 and exponent p which is in the same stability class as M. Theorem. There are nilpotent groups of class 2 and exponent p in all stability classes. Theorem. The problem of characterizing a stability class is equivalent to characterizing the (nilpotent, class 2, exponent p) groups in that class.

It is consistent that for many cardinals λ there is a family of at least λ + unbounded subsets of λ which have uniformization properties. In particular if it is consistent that a supercompact cardinal exists, then it is consistent that ℵ ω has such a family. We have applications to point set topology, Whitehead groups and reconstructing separable abelian p-groups from their socles.

In a well known collection of essays, Martha Nussbaum has argued that novels are indispensable in teaching and learning ethics in the right way.1 A large part of such learning consists in developing the capacity to perceive and respond to complex, nuanced situations having numerous morally relevant features deriving from particular relationships and past commitments that combine these context sensitive features in unique and unpredictable ways. Careful attention to detailed, intricate stories with finely sketched characters develops such capacity far better (...) than does reading analytical philosophy papers. Only such narratives capture the particularity and complexity of morally charged contexts with their myriad of .. (shrink)

c.c.c. posets are characterised in terms of N-generic conditions. This characterisation can be applied to get simple proofs of many facts about c.c.c. forcing including $\operatorname{Con}(MA + \neg CH)$.

Our information about the Athenian politician Syrakosios is entirely derived from Ar. Birds 1297 and the scholia thereon. Syrakosios here figures among a long list of Athenians who are said to be nicknamed after various birds:δοκε δ κα ψήισμα τεθεικέναι μ κωμδεσθαι νομαστί τινα, ς Φρύνιχος ν Μονοτρόπ ησί [fr. 26 Kock]· “ψρ' χοι Συρακόσιον. πιανς γρ ατ κα μέγα τύχοι. είλετο γρ κωμδεν ος πεθύμουν.” διπικρότερον ατ προσέρονται, ς λάλ δ τν “ κίτταν” παρέθηκεν.

Originally published in 1988, this book discusses if moral knowledge exists, and if so, if it is similar to other forms of knowledge. This book approaches the issues from both historical and contemporary perspectives and in order to determine whether there is a real property of rightness, looks to the ethical theories of Hobbes, Hume and Kant. This historical analysis leads to a systematic comparison of three theories of the nature of ethics: realism, emotivism and coherentism. The nature of coherence (...) is explained using legal reasoning as a model. Moral reasoning is compared and contrasted with reasoning both in science and law, showing how ethics differs from science and empirical disciplines. (shrink)

These lines come from the passage describing the mourning of the natural world following the death of Orpheus. A. D. Melville translates as follows:[‘ … ] and naiads wore,and Dryads too, their mourning robes of blackAnd hair dishevelled.’.

Mark Twain, the "Father of American Literature," and renowned humorist, satirist, and commentator on humanity and American life, is best known for his classic, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Twain's body of work, however, is expansive; from Adventures of Tom Sawyer and A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court to the travelogue The Innocents Abroad and essays on human nature, religion, science, and literature, no aspect of life is left untouched by Twain. His portrayal of American life, ripe with the contradictions (...) of America's ideals and its actual practices, as well as his characters, at once fantastical and completely human, provide a window onto humanity and social life. As the third book in the Great Authors and Philosophy series, Mark Twain and Philosophy reveals deeper issues raised by Twain's work and speaks to his continued relevance as a social commentator interrogating issues fundamental to our lives. From slavery, freedom, and human rights, to science, parapsychology, and religion, this book exposes how Twain's body of work touches every corner of human experience. (shrink)

IntroductionClassifying the ethical issues in clinical ethics consultations is important to clinical practice and scholarship. We conducted a systematic review to characterize the typologies used to analyze clinical ethics consultations.MethodsWe identified empirical studies of clinical ethics consultation that reported types of ethical issues using PubMed. We screened these articles based on their titles and abstracts, and then by a review of their full text. We extracted study characteristics and typologies and coded the typologies.ResultsWe reviewed 428 articles; 30 of the articles (...) fulfilled our inclusion criteria. We identified 27 unique typologies. Each typology contained five to 47 categories (mean = 18). The most common categories were do-not-attempt-resuscitation orders (19 typologies, 70 percent), capacity (18 typologies, 67 percent), withholding (18 typologies, 67 percent), withdrawing (17 typologies, 63 percent), and surrogate or proxy (16 typologies, 59 percent). Only seven (26 percent) of the typologies contained all five of the most common categories. The typologies we used to characterize clinical ethics consultations exhibit significant heterogeneity and several conceptual limitations. A common typology is needed whose development may require multi-institutional collaboration and could be facilitated by professional organizations. (shrink)