Buscamos aqui revisitar a leitura de Gyorgy Lukács em História e Consciência de Classe sobre a questão da ação humana. Tendo a história como ponto culminante onde se resolve a relação sujeito-objeto, Lukács propõe uma epistemologia dialética em que o sujeito interfere no conteúdo do real. A problemática central consiste em teorizar a gênese, a geração do novo. A gênese tem sua determinação concreta na contradição da luta de classes. Isso resultará num novo conceito de sujeito. O indivíduo, isoladamente, é (...) incapaz de realizar a gênese. O sujeito da práxis, destarte, não pode ser livre atuando sozinho, mas deve encontrar o fundamento da liberdade na classe social, real sujeito da gênese histórica. We seek here to revisit Gyorgy Lukács' reading in History and Class Conscousness about the question on the human action. Taking at hand history as the culminating point where the relation subject-object is resolved, Lukács proposes a dialectical epistemology in which the subject interferes in the content of reality. The central problematic consists in theorizing the genesis, the genesis of the new. This results in a new concept of subject. The individual isolated is incapable of achieving the genesis. The subject of praxis cannot therefore be free acting alone, but he must find the fundament of freedom in the social class, the real subject of historical genesis. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza si la versión de la justicia como equidad, presentada en El liberalismo político, es genuinamente una concepción política. Se examina el problema de la razonabilidad de las doctrinas comprehensivas, y se indaga luego si el argumento en dos etapas afecta la integridad estructural del liberalismo político. Se concluye que J. Rawls fracasa en su intento de justificar un liberalismo independiente de una doctrina comprehensiva de carácter liberal. ABSTRACT The article analyzes whether the conception of justice as fairness, (...) set forth by Rawls in Political Liberalism, is a genuine political conception. It first examines the issue of reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines and then goes on to inquire whether the two-step argument affects the structural integrity of political liberalism. The paper concludes that J. Rawls fails in his attempt to justify liberalism independently of a comprehensive liberal doctrine. (shrink)

This article takes up Diogenes again, investigating some of the reasons Diogenes has been unappreciated, and making a case for Diogenes' mind-based teleology as a significant philosophical contribution. The sophists, too, have suffered from the charge, which goes back to Plato, of not being “real” philosophers. Diogenes did not bother himself with, or was not interested in, showing in what sense the world is organized in the best possible manner; this looked to him as something that happened as a (...) matter of course. What did interest him, on the other hand, was to show what the thing that exercised intelligence is. From this point of view, the emphasis is definitely not on teleology, but rather on noetics. Here, primary textual evidence is available, for the fragments, as well as Simplicius's presentation of them, definitely support the view that the point of Diogenes' argumentation was to show that intelligence is air's. (shrink)

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further (...) to the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)

The two main arguments concern(1) the presence of an “enlightened complementarity” between philosophic (including scientific) and religious (not including mystic) thought, and(2) the necessity to postulate a “threefold relationship” whenever one is to gain knowledge of any kind. They are both inspired by physics (from Bohr's “strict complementarity”, resp. from Newton's fundamental postulate).God's perfection resides at least in Symmetry in a generalized (not restrictively spatial) sense. Yet, as the argument goes, Space does not “exist” as a thing. Consequently, the (...) Great Geometer (God) cannot dwell within a World He creates, and it is wrong to speak about His (God's) ‘existence’; for, existence is bound to the temporal, and Time is, together with the World, part of God's creation. Thus the only possible creation consists in God separating World and Time from Himself: This is the paradigm of Symmetry-breaking.Polytheistic mythologies all assume such and such imperfection of their deities; hence perfection is meaningful for monotheism only. A relationship of a threefold (‘trinitary’) nature must then obtain between God, World, and Time; this is analogous to Newton's postulate relating force, momentum and time. Just as the latter and its specific generalizations must be “found true” by verification, the said threefold relationship must also be found true: within philosophic thoughtmore geometrico (in a generalized sense), within religious thoughtmore “hymnometrico”. Yet the complementarity (called “enlightened”) arising between the two kinds of thought is of a higher nature than Bohr's “strict” complementarity. While it can be understood from the role assumed by language itself, it can however only be disposed of within mystic contemplation. (shrink)

We set out a fundamental ontology of atomism in terms of matter points. While being most parsimonious, this ontology is able to match both classical and quantum mechanics, and it remains a viable option for any future theory of cosmology that goes beyond current quantum physics. The matter points are structurally individuated: all there is to them are the spatial relations in which they stand; neither a commitment to intrinsic properties nor to an absolute space is required. The spatial (...) relations change. All that is needed to capture change is a dynamical structure, namely dynamical relations as expressed in terms of the dynamical parameters of a physical theory. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between theory and praxis by contrasting three different models of intellectual endeavor: totalizing, particular and decolonial. Attending to the critique that Gayatri Spivak raised against Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze in Can the Subaltern Speak?, this article advocates a dramaturgical reading of texts as a model for political theory to address subaltern agency. It reads such agency in the smile that Pier Paolo Pasolini registers in his 1967 film version of Sophocles’ play, Oedipus Tyrannos. Dramaturgically (...) read, Oedipus reveals another text, the tragic history of a yet insufficiently explored democratic alternative that goes against the established democracy and its complicity with inequality in the continued naturalization of slavery despite its foundation in equality. This subtext demands understanding Oedipus as a political production from the speechless agency of dissident servants, a more subversive aspect of democratic politics. (shrink)

A bold and insightful departure from related texts, _Descartes_ goes beyond the categorical associations placed on the philosopher’s ideas, and explores the subtleties of his beliefs. An elegant, compelling and insightful introduction to Descartes' life and work. Discusses a broad range of his most scrutinized philosophical thought, including his contributions to logic, philosophy of the mind, epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion. Explores the subtleties of Descartes' seemingly contradictory beliefs. Addresses themes left unexamined in (...) other works on Descartes. (shrink)

A bold and insightful departure from related texts, _Descartes_ goes beyond the categorical associations placed on the philosopher’s ideas, and explores the subtleties of his beliefs. An elegant, compelling and insightful introduction to Descartes' life and work. Discusses a broad range of his most scrutinized philosophical thought, including his contributions to logic, philosophy of the mind, epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion. Explores the subtleties of Descartes' seemingly contradictory beliefs. Addresses themes left unexamined in (...) other works on Descartes. (shrink)

Depending on the dissemination of discursive forms through linguistic practices as well as a particular change in our contemporary doxa, the development language of collective social improvement has been based upon a particular mode of ontological naturalism. In a renewed version of the ontological mode that Descola termed “naturalism”, international development has set social expectations in terms of a progressive future framed by violent ruptures, crises, perils and a threat actual of human annihilation. This paper investigates how this developmental enterprise (...) and the consequent ideology of “developmentalism” have further expanded a bi-polar ontology. Since its inception, it articulates two radical sets of possibilities: one of infinite progress for humankind and one of its total annihilation according to the well-known metaphysics of possibilism. First, I will show how the institutionalization of development goes hand in hand with the emergence of a new form of naturalism that accentuates extreme possibilities as results of human action. My main claim here is that, after World War II, science and technology radicalized naturalism through the institutionalization of a new ideology. By presupposing a new transformational capability of science and technology, developmentalism furthers the naturalistic ontology. (shrink)

It is said that Europe finds itself today in a post-christian situa-tion. Further, there are many who advocate abandoning monotheism in order to get back to prechristian polytheism in the hope that the plurality of gods would favour a democratic tolerance in a pluralistic world. In this article the author firstly asks if European Christians have not gone back to adoring idols and to attempting to distinguish between them in the new forms of devotion to possessiveness, to power and to (...) pleasure. He then goes on to ask about the possibilities of pro-claiming the God of Jesus Christ. The third and the fourth part of the article point out several forms of necessary witness to God in contemporary society, with special reference made to European society in the conclusion. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to situate our reading of the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades Major among both ancient and modern readings of the dialogue. Since the nineteenth century the issue of authenticity has preoccupied most modern commentators of the dialogue, but from all reasonable evidence, commentators from the ancient world had no such qualms about attributing the authorship of Alcibiades Major to Plato. Our reading of Alcibiades Major is in line with modern commentators who take both the dialogue's dramatic (...) features and educative value seriously, while not ignoring that in some quarters Alcibiades Major's authorship is still in dispute. ;Our treatment of Alcibiades Major differs from the attention given to it by past and present commentators, because it is our desire to see the ideas---expressed in the dialogue with such enthusiasm by Socrates and Alcibiades---entertained in a number of different contexts. For this reason we have titled the dissertation Socratic Encounters: Plato's Alcibiades, with each chapter designed to facilitate a kind of cross-fertilization of ideas from a variety of intellectual perspectives. Looking at the dialogue from various perspectives has allowed us to cast some new light on the dialogue from which other commentators may benefit. ;The objective of the dissertation to highlight Alcibiades Major's timeless insights and enduring relevance to contemporary issues, has led us on a course that revolves around pedagogy. The Platonic dialogues are gold-mines of insight, but knowing this to be the case does not answer the fundamental question: 'What did Plato intend to teach us by writing Alcibiades Major?' The dissertation goes to great lengths to provide answers to the question, and the answers it provides take unusual approaches. For example, Plato invites us to consider five issues in Alcibiades Major: appropriate listening, priorities, tradition, hypothetical questions, and women's role in male achievement. The dialogue is not limited to these five issues, but the dialogue cannot be seriously dealt with without considering them. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Seneca’s philosophy is a form of therapy and that one of its main concerns is the transformation of one’s life through time control. Aristotelian tradition lies in the idea that philosophy is, in its highest aspect, an abstract form of knowledge. Seneca, on the other hand, is an inheritor of a long tradition that takes philosophy as mind or soul therapy and bases its structure in a practical approach. Epicurus, for instance, goes as (...) far as to declare that “empty is the word of the philosopher by whom no human suffering is treated”. Even if Seneca doesn’t despise the theoretical principles that support the construction of a philosophical system, he builds, in his Letters to Lucilius, a strong therapeutic praxis whose purpose is to heal one’s mind and life. The upmost and fundamental step is providing the pupil with different ways of earning back time deprivation. Time seems to be, in a certain sense, the essential matter of Seneca’s philosophy. Time control, for him, is a kind of self-control that would make it possible to match a simple existence and a meaningful life. Therefore, Seneca’s opening letter to Lucile aims exclusively to identify how one loses time and why it’s essential to take control of it. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between theory and praxis by contrasting three different models of intellectual endeavor: totalizing, particular and decolonial. Attending to the critique that Gayatri Spivak raised against Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze in Can the Subaltern Speak?, this article advocates a dramaturgical reading of texts as a model for political theory to address subaltern agency. It reads such agency in the smile that Pier Paolo Pasolini registers in his 1967 film version of Sophocles’ play, Oedipus Tyrannos. Dramaturgically (...) read, Oedipus reveals another text, the tragic history of a yet insufficiently explored democratic alternative that goes against the established democracy and its complicity with inequality in the continued naturalization of slavery despite its foundation in equality. This subtext demands understanding Oedipus as a political production from the speechless agency of dissident servants, a more subversive aspect of democratic politics. (shrink)

En esta discusión abordo la hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot comparándola con la hermenéutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Argumento que Beuchot vuelve a la idea clásica de la hermenéutica como método de interpretación y no la juzga, como Gadamer, como una fenomenología de la comprensión. Sin embargo, Beuchot no atiende las razones de Gadamer en contra de concebir la hermenéutica como una metodología. Si se considera como metodología centrada en la analogía, la hermenéutica analógica deja de lado otros recursos interpretativos (...) importantes. Finalmente, Beuchot adopta una teoría correspondentista de la verdad contra la que argumenta Gadamer y que es incompatible con una hermenéutica filosófica. In this paper I analyze Mauricio Beuchot's analogical hermeneutics by contrasting it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Beuchot goes back to the classical idea of hermeneutics as a method of interpretation, and does not see it, as Gadamer does, as a phenomenology of understanding. However, Beuchot does not address Gadamer's arguments against using hermeneutics as a methodology. Considered as a methodology centered on analogy, analogical hermeneutics overlooks other important interpretation resources. Finally, Beuchot adopts a correspondence theory of truth, which Gadamer objects and is incompatible with philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

The articles in the present issue are the result of a study day on William Desmond’s recent book, Ethics and the Between, held at the K.U.Leuven's Institute of Philosophy. This important book certainly deserves a thorough discussion and for many reasons. It is the manifestation of an ambition that reminds us of past periods in the history of philosophy. These days not so many philosophers venture to set up a body of work — three volumes — in the tradition of (...) the great philosophical systems that once tried to cover and understand the whole of reality. When reading Ethics and the Between, Hegel’s system comes to mind not only because we know that William Desmond is a Hegel scholar but also because of its ambition to give everything a place within an encompassing system.Of course Desmond takes care to explain where the difference lies between his metaxological approach and an insufficiently open and pluralist dialectics. His is an attempt to rethink the notion of system so that it is more hospitable to otherness as other, to the rich inexhaustibility of being. He wants to be true to the equivocities of our being and not to give in to the seduction of mediated univocity, as some forms of dialectics do. What is at stake in his work is not forgetting the surplus, the excess, the otherness of the good which suggests a transcendence of each dialectical completion in terms of self-determination.Desmond’s oeuvre is not only unusual today because of its systematic ambition. A second characteristic marks off more specifically his book on ethics: the attempt to write an ethics dominated by the idea of the good, raising the question of the relation between metaphysics and ethics, between being and being good. Desmond seems to tell us that something has been forgotten: the good which continues to be there incognito, present even in philosophies that forget it. This seems to be Desmond’s way of situating himself in an age characterized by the subtle ethos of valuelessness, the perplexity about the inherent value of being, of being as good; an age oscillating between foundationalist unity and postmodern plurality.If it were my task to give an introduction to Desmond’s thought I would have to pay attention to the richness of the concept of metaxu, the between, the way it seems to encompass the whole and keep it together, while at the same time being excessive. I would have to speak about the fourfold meaning of being and the way it shapes different ways of being ethical that dwell more and more intensively with what is at play in the ethos, that is to say in the metaxu.But it is not my task to do this; others have made the attempt more extensively in the papers reproduced here. I doubt whether they will be sufficient to bring to light all the rich dimensions of this book that is written at the same tempo as William speaks when discussing and, I suppose, when he goes running in the morning. (shrink)

Cismando com o dualismo cartesiano e seus desdobramentos em práticas e estruturas escolares contemporâneas nas margens do capitalismo Resumo: Esse texto relaciona conceitos que, advindos de áreas do conhecimento diferentes, fundamentam estruturas de subordinação e controle, próprios de muitas práticas e hábitos da vida de diversos povos que habitam as margens do capitalismo moderno e colonialista. Ao articular os desdobramentos trazidos por cada um desses personagens conceituais, nota-se o quanto eles se interseccionam ao fundamentar muito da forma de viver da (...) modernidade, sobretudo em contextos da periferia do capitalismo. Essa articulação se dá por meio de uma investigação bibliográfica sem deixar de refletir sobre as práticas da vida. Para tanto, inicia-se com uma descrição dos fundamentos dualistas cartesianos da ciência e da sociedade ocidental moderna. A seguir, busca-se descrever como esses conceitos se enredam em uma teia que institucionaliza hábitos típicos da estrutura de escola que vigora no país. Por fim, encaminham-se possibilidades de alternativas conceituais que refletem e sustentam práticas educacionais em direção à emancipação e superação das condições impostas pela modernidade/ colonialidade/capitalismo. Encerra-se o artigo com dois apontamentos resultantes do curso da pesquisa: conhecimento é criação, cultivo, cuidado; emancipar-se envolve, necessariamente, a ação de narrar a própria história. Palavras-chave: Educação; Emancipação; Modernidade/colonialidade/capitalismo. Doubting about cartesian dualism and its consequences in contemporary school practices and structures on the margins of capitalism Abstract: This text relates concepts that, coming from different areas of knowledge, underlie structures of subordination and control, typical of many practices and habits of life of different peoples who inhabit the margins of modern and colonialist capitalism. By articulating the developments brought about by each of these conceptual characters, it is possible to notice how much they intersect in grounding much of the way of living of modernity, especially in contexts on the periphery of capitalism. This articulation goes through a bibliographic investigation, without ceasing to reflect on the practices of life. To do so, it begins with a description of the Cartesian dualist foundations of science and modern Western society. Next, we seek to describe how these concepts are entangled in a web that institutionalizes typical habits of the school structure in force in the country. Finally, possibilities of conceptual alternatives that reflect and sustain educational practices towards emancipation and overcoming the conditions imposed by modernity/coloniality/capitalism are presented. The article ends by pointing out two paths resulting from the course of the research so far, that knowledge is creation, cultivation, care, and that emancipating oneself necessarily involves the action of narrating one's own history. Key-words: Education; Emancipation; Modernity/coloniality/capitalism. Dudando del dualismo cartesiano y sus consecuencias en las prácticas y estructuras escolares contemporáneas al margen del capitalismo Resumen: Este texto relaciona conceptos que, provenientes de diferentes áreas del conocimiento, subyacen en estructuras de subordinación y control, propias de muchas prácticas y hábitos de vida de diferentes pueblos que habitan los márgenes del capitalismo moderno y colonialista. Al articular los desarrollos provocados por cada uno de estos personajes conceptuales, es posible notar cuánto se cruzan al fundamentar gran parte de la forma de vida de la modernidad, especialmente en contextos en la periferia del capitalismo. Esta articulación se produce a través de una investigación bibliográfica, sin dejar de reflexionar sobre las prácticas de la vida. Para hacerlo, comienza con una descripción de los fundamentos dualistas cartesianos de la ciencia y la sociedad occidental moderna. A continuación, buscamos describir cómo estos conceptos se enredan en la red que institucionaliza hábitos típicos de la estructura escolar vigente en el país. Finalmente, se presentan posibilidades de alternativas conceptuales que reflejan y sustentan las prácticas educativas hacia la emancipación y la superación de las condiciones impuestas por la modernidad/colonialidade/capitalismo. El artículo finaliza señalando dos caminos resultantes del curso de la investigación hasta el momento, que el conocimiento es creación, cultivo, cuidado, y que emanciparse implica necesariamente la acción de narrar la propia historia. Palabras-clave: Educación; Emancipación; Modernidad/colonialidade/capitalismo. Data de registro: 18/08/2021 Data de aceite: 20/10/2021. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the idea of tragedy in Marx. A comparison between Capital and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1884 is proposed, in order to assert that what happens to the human being goes through the understanding of his tragic condition in the bosom of capitalist production. It maintains that tragedy is the conflict in whose development the human being sacrifices his essential forces with the intention of producing new contents of life for him.

Se busca aportar elementos conceptuales para una filosofía del consentimiento, al interrogar el privilegio que otorga Paul Ricoeur a la afirmación con respecto a las múltiples formas de negatividad inscritas en el ser humano y en sus acciones. Para ello, se propone un análisis del consentimiento próximo a Le volontaire et l'involontaire, en el que se tiene siempre en la mira la hermenéutica del sí-mismo y del homo capax, desarrolladas por Ricoeur desde 1990. Se defiende que el consentimiento va siempre (...) acompañado de la paciencia, y que ambos pueden y deben ser pensados como elementos estructurales que constituyen al sí-mismo. By inquiring into the privilege granted by Paul Ricoeur to affirmation with respect to the multiple forms of negativity inscribed in human beings and their actions, the article seeks to contribute conceptual elements for a philosophy of consent. To this effect, it proposes an analysis of consent along the lines of Le volontaire et l'involontaire, bearing in mind the hermeneutics of self and of homo capax, developed by Ricoeur since 1990. The paper argues that consent goes hand in hand with patience, and that both can and should be thought as structural elements that constitute the oneself. Neste artigo, procura-se contribuir elementos conceituais para uma filosofia do consentimento, ao interrogar o privilégio que outorga Paul Ricoeur à afirmação a respeito das múltiplas formas de negatividade inscritas no ser humano e em suas ações. Para isso, propõe-se uma análise do consentimento próximo a Le volontaire et l'involontaire, no qual se tem sempre no alvo a hermenêutica do si-mesmo e do homo capax, desenvolvidas por Ricoeur desde 1990. Defende-se que o consentimento vai sempre acompanhado da paciência e que ambos podem e devem ser pensados como elementos estruturais que constituem o si-mesmo. (shrink)

This article examines a neglected dimension of Bazin's work, namely his writings for the daily newspaper Le Parisien libéré. Four key points emerge from this corpus. First, Bazin goes beyond the film-reviewing norms of the day to analyse the intentions and achievements of the film-makers. Second, Bazin foregrounds the capacity of cinema to address the concerns of contemporary society. Third, as a result, he ascribes a particular value to films that actively engage with the new social realities of post-war (...) France. Four, Bazin remains blind to the misogynistic dimension of post-war French cinema, with its tendency to culpabilize women for the national disgrace of the Occupation. Ultimately, Bazin's newspaper reviewing represents a more socially aware vision of cinema than that promoted by more specialized cinema journals, yet his criticism remains caught within the gender ideology of his time. (shrink)

This review essay critically discusses Andre Kukla's Methods of theoretical psychology. It is argued that Kukla mistakenly tries to build his case for theorizing in psychology as a separate discipline on a dubious distinction between theory and observation. He then argues that the demise of empiricism implies a return of some form of rationalism, which entails an autonomous role for theorizing in psychology. Having shown how this theory-observation dichotomy goes back to traditional and largely abandoned ideas in epistemology, (...) an alternative is presented in the guise of the pragmatist or functionalist tradition, where the interdependence of theory, observation and action is emphasized and the positivist dichotomy of pure observations and pure theory is rejected. Furthermore, we show how recent work on "active" perception supports the functionalist approach. Although the authors agree with Kukla that theory has a legitimate place in psychology, it is suggested that he needlessly limits its scope to autonomous domain-neutral theorizing, and that broadening its perspective to analyzing the presuppositions and implications of empirical work is a more fruitful approach. In fact, the attempt to find the epistemological and philosophical implications of empirical work in perception that is sketched in this review essay is, in the authors' view, a case of theorizing in psychology. (shrink)

In 1900, art historians André Jolles and Aby Warburg constructed an experimental dialogue in which Jolles supposed he had fallen in love with the figure of a young woman in a painting: “A fantastic figure—shall I call her a servant girl, or rather a classical nymph?…what is the meaning of it all?…Who is the nymph? Where does she come from?” Warburg’s response: “in essence she is an elemental spirit, a pagan goddess in exile,” serves as the touchstone for this wide-ranging (...) and theoretical exploration of female representation in iconography. In _Nymphs_, the newest translation of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s work, the author notes that academic research has lingered on the “pagan goddess,” while the concept of “elemental spirit,” ignored by scholars, is vital to the history of iconography. Tracing the genealogy of this idea, Agamben goes on to examine subjects as diverse as the aesthetic theories of choreographer Domineco da Piacenza, Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s essay on the “symbol,” Walter Benjamin’s concept of the dialectic image, and the bizarre discoveries of photographer Nathan Lerner in 1972. From these investigations, there emerges a startlingly original exploration of the ideas of time and the image. Agamben is the rare writer whose ideas and works have a broad appeal across many fields, and _Nymphs_ will engage not only the author’s devoted fans in philosophy, legal theory, sociology, and literary criticism, but his growing audience among art theorists and historians as well. (shrink)

In my article "berkeley's master argument" I attempt to show that an argument berkeley uses in the 'dialogues' and 'principles' to support his contention that whatever is perceivable is perceived can be seen as an illuminating attempt to relate conceptualizing, Imaging and perceiving. In consequence it cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary fallacy, But reflects on the conditions for the self ascription of experience.

The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...) introduces and asseses the philosophical puzzles posed by things persisting through time. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem it explores the following key topics and debates: mereology and identity, including 'Leibniz's Law' the constitution view of identity the 'relative identity' argument concerning identity temporary identity four-dimensionalism, counterpart and mulitiple counterpart theory supervenience the problem of temporary intrinsics the necessity of identity presentism ontological and epistemological criteria for persistence and the difference between them. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessement of the metaphysics of identity. (shrink)

In _The Immaterial_,_ _French social philosopher André Gorz argues, in his finely-tuned and polemical style, that the economic boom that accelerated in the 1990s and crashed so spectacularly in 2008 was based largely on an immaterial consumption of symbols and ideas, as capitalism tried to overcome the crisis of the formally industrial regime by throwing itself into a new, so-called knowledge economy. In this, the last full-length theoretical work Gorz completed before his death, he argues instead for the creation of (...) a true knowledge economy. This economy would be based on zero-cost exchange and pooled resources, and knowledge would be treated as humanity’s common property. Currently, in order to exploit knowledge and turn it into capital, the capitalist enterprise privatizes specialized knowledge and claims ownership through private licenses and copyright. But as Gorz shows, the traditional foundations of such capitalist economics have begun to crumble because of the immaterial nature of this new form of product, which makes it almost impossible to measure in monetary terms. The knowledge economy, Gorz declares, _is_ the crisis of capitalism. Thought-provoking and divisive, _The Immaterial _is the perfect book for our time, as we begin to reimagine the structures of our economic system in order to rebuild and move forward. “It is to Gorz... that readers should turn for a compelling combination of sharp analysis, well-wrought polemic, and suggestions for the future.”—_Red Pepper_ “A great figure of the intellectual Left.”—Nicolas Sarkozy “Gorz’s intelligence strikes you at the very first glance: it is one of the nimblest, acutest intelligences I know.”—Jean-Paul Sartre. (shrink)

Trata-se de capítulo de um livro sobre a noção de "substância" na história da filosofia e contém uma discussão sobre a noção ordinária de "corpo" do ponto de vista da filosofia analítica.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a (...) classical or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

The objective of this article is to try to elucidate Wittgenstein’s ex-travagant thesis that each and every mathematical advancement involves some “semantical mutation”, i.e., some alteration of the very meanings of the terms involved. To do that we will argue in favor of the idea of a “modal incompati-bility” between the concepts involved, as they were prior to the advancement, and what they become after the new result was obtained. We will also argue that the adoption of this thesis profoundly (...) alters the traditional way of con-struing the idea of “progress” in mathematics. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, mais (...) insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Labour and employment law no longer has a monopoly on regulating labour relations and is facing a crisis as its effectiveness is questioned. Codes of conduct adopted by companies to recognise their social responsibility for the global supply chain are instruments that can usefully complement labour and employment law. The aim of this paper is to analyse in depth the legal nature of codes of conduct and their impact on labour and employment law. Will the use of codes of conduct (...) reinforce the crisis of labour and employment law in the era of globalisation or will these codes be part of a solution to this crisis? Do we have to consider codes of conduct as competitors to labour and employment law or as an opportunity for rethinking the way that labour and employment law norms should be produced and applied? (shrink)

Admirers of Robert Bresson often remark on the commitments he shares with the philosopher and activist Simone Weil. Both stubbornly idiosyncratic, they subscribe to what modernists call “a poetics of impersonality”: a deep desire to shed the ego and find some space empty of will, intention and even consciousness. Bresson pursued this ideal through his anti-theatrical practice, his resistance to expression and interpretation, and his war against “acting.” In Weil's religious thinking, the possibility of achieving a state of automatism in (...) the soul, and thus leaving room for God to occupy all, was central. “Decreation,” her term for this principle, sounds like a will to suicide (a recurring theme in Bresson) but she explains it as motivated by love. Bresson's writerly films – the Bernanos adaptations (especially Diary of a Country Priest) – and Au hasard Balthazar – take as their theme the problem of grace. As in Weil, the path to grace goes through an acceptance of brutal necessity and incomprehensible accident. This is also the conclusion of Rossellini's Europa ’51. While André Bazin is a thinker with a keen sensitivity to grace and spiritual accident – his interest in depth of field is motivated by a desire to keep the free exercise of chance in play – his notion of love is more compassionate than anything we meet in Weil, Bresson or Rossellini. As Truffaut remarked, Bazin is a Christian from the days before the Fall. (shrink)

The "Director" controls Ms. B’s life. He flatters her, beguiles her, derides her. His instructions pervade each aspect of her life, including her analytic sessions, during which he suggests promiscuous and dangerous things for Ms. B to say and do, when he suspects that her isolated state is being changed by the therapy. The "Director" is a diabolical foreign body installed in the mind who purports to protect but who keeps Ms. B feeling profoundly ill and alone. The story of (...) Ms. B’s analysis is one of many vivid illustrations presented in this collection of papers by Paul Williams, who shares his lifetime of experience working with severely disturbed patients. As the title suggests, the unifying thread of these papers is the investigation of serious mental disturbance, often characterized by the presence of intrusive and invasive thoughts and fantasies that originate in a traumatic past but which can colonize and destroy the rational mind. The diverse papers are grouped into two related sections. Part one is comprised of papers with a clinical orientation, including a summary of the analysis of Ms. B as well as a speculative paper on the psychosis and recovery of John Nash. In part two, applied psychoanalytic thinking is integrated with Williams’ other professional passion, anthropology, in a paper that exemplifies generative thought through art, poetry, and tribal masks. Other papers in this section include a short essay that takes Freud-bashers to task, a reappraisal of the Rat Man, and a lively discussion of André Green’s "central phobic position" in borderline thinking. Whether engaging in the coconstructed therapeutic relationship or the implications for "madness in society" at large, Williams’ diverse influences – psychoanalytic and otherwise – repeatedly come to the fore in an intellectually stimulating and clinically enriching way. It goes without saying that work with patients whose thinking is psychotic is a challenge, as these papers clearly demonstrate, but Williams reminds us that it is a challenge that psychoanalysis can not only engage but also treat with enduring and impressive therapeutic results. (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation for Wittgenstein`s treatment of mathematical identities. As it is widely known, Wittgenstein`s mature philosophy of mathematics includes a general rejection of abstract objects. On the other hand, the traditional interpretation of mathematical identities involves precisely the idea of a single abstract object – usually a number –named by both sides of an equation.

Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called constitutive luck. (...) In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:370 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Leibniz. By Edmondo Clone. (Napoli : Libreria scientifica editrice. Pp. 540. L.4.000.) L'ouvrage d'E. Cione est une presentation d'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Leibniz. L'auteur situe d'abord Leibniz dans son milieu culturel et dans son ambiance historique. Puis il aborde les probl~mes relatifs ~ la monade et ~ l'univers. Une troisi~me partie traite du choix divin, du real et des possibles. La quatri~me s'attache au difficile (...) probl~me de la liberte~ en Dieu et dans l'homme. Enfin, Clone precise queles sont et doivent ~tre les activite~s de l'homme dans los domaines de la logique, de la morale, de l'esth~tique, de la religion. Par consequent, ne serait-que par l'ampleur des mati~res ~tudi~es, on dispose ici d'une vaste fresque qui met en place l'ensemble des preoccupations philosophiques de Leibniz, et qui d~ploie son ~ventail en un certain sens, disons celui de la Monadologie, toute entree dans la philosophie de Leibniz ~tant bonne, pourvu, si j'ose dire, qu'on en sorte. Or, on en sort, car l'au~eur appuie ses connaissanc~s sur une pratique quotidienne des ~extes de Leibniz, sur une documentation de premiere main qui lui fair honneur, sur une somme de lectures [eibniziennes qui l'aident s orienter son dessein. Cet ouvrage repose sur l'humus fertile d'un vaste savoir technique et livresque concernant la philosophic de Leibniz. I1 est donc, de ce point de vue, document~ avec pr4cision, et il atteint le fond des probl~mes abord4s. Enfin, rauteur ne perd pas ses propres droits dans cette ~tude, et pr4cise d'un oeil vigilant quelles sont es d4fectuositds de cette pens4e, qui n'a sa pleine signification que si on ne la coupe pas de sos racines th4ologiques. I1 semble que lh, le destin de Leibniz diff~re de celui de Clone, puisque, pour ce dernier, le philosophe d'Hanovre ne parvient pas ~ p4n~trer le sens profond de la r~alit(~ spirituelle, c'est-h-dire de la libert4 de l'homme. ANDRE ROBINET Orldans, France David Hume: Prophet o] the Counter-Revolution. By Laurence L. Bongie. (Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvii + 182.35s.) This excellent work uncovers and analyzes the amazing influence of Hume's historical and political views on the world of late 18th-century France. First Professor Bongie admirably recounts the immense impact of Hume's History o] England in France when it originally appeared. The work was wildly praised by French royalty, by the philosophes, by Catholic intellectuals, by almost everyone except the Huguenot exiles. Hume's alleged impartiality and philosophical approach made him for France of the time, the finest historian of the age, the new Tacitus. Everyone found great profundity in the History, and each group managed to overlook those aspects of Hume's views that conflicted with their own outlook, and stressed those aspects that fitted in with their own predilections. it was Turgot who apparently first realized that Hume was not the zeal hero of those who were to transform France, and that Hume's political philosophy and his picture of human nature "glean'd" through the study of history were hardly in accord with the theories of the reformers and the future revolutionists. In their correspondence, Hume and Turgot revealed the enormous gulf that separated them, the latter believing in the endless perfectibility of mankind, the former, much more sceptical and much readier to accept man in his historical condition. For Hume, there was always a struggle between order and liberty, and dangers on both sides with no ideal solution in sight, while for the optimistic Turgot a new and better world was just around the corner. What Turgot saw as their differences became clearer a few years later to moderates like Mirabeau, Mably and Brissot. Hume, for them, did not really see the importance of liberty, the fundamental rights of man, the real lessons of History. The moderates began boosting, translating and commenting on an antidote to Hume's History, the liberal Whig version of English history by Catherine Macaulay-Graham, a work finally published in French under Mirabeau... (shrink)

A. Selbstverortung: Der hermssche Blick auf andere Religionen -- b. Öffnung zu Anderen: Das Problem geschlossener Rationalitätsformen -- ii. Einheit in der Vielfalt. Die interpretative Vernunft -- III. 3.C. Schlussfolgerungen. Bildung der Weltanschauungen -- IV. Ergebnisse und Ausblicke -- IV. 1. Perspektiven des Theorievergleichs -- IV. 1.A. Eine 'Topik der Verständigung' - als Struktur der Forschungsfragen -- IV. 1.B. Vernunft und Religion als komplementäre Konkurrenz -- IV. 2. Möglichkeiten interkultureller Koexistenz -- IV. 2.A. Evangelischer Glaube im Horizont des globalen Wandels (...) -- IV. 2.B. Diskurskultur und Diskurs der Kulturen -- IV. 2.C. Konstitutionalisierung der Wirkungsgemeinschaft der Menschheit -- Bibliografie -- Literatur von Jürgen Habermas -- Literatur von Eilert Herms -- Weitere Literatur -- Personenregister -- Sachregister. (shrink)

nombreux textes inédits André Robinet. 2. LE SECOND MEMBRE DE LA DISJONCTION ARCHITECTONIQUE (D2): LES AUTOMATES SYSTÉMIQUES ( 1686-1716) Le discours leibnizien dans (v>4) emprunte la voie d'une communication qui ...