In an age of smartphones, Facebook and You Tube, privacy may seem to be a norm of the past. This book addresses ethical and legal questions that arise when media technologies are used to give individuals unwanted attention. Drawing from a broad range of cases within the US, UK, Australia, Europe, and elsewhere, I ask whether privacy interests can ever be weightier than society’s interest in free speech and access to information. Taking a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, and (...) drawing on the work of political theorist Jeremy Waldron concerning toleration, the book argues that we can still have a legitimate interest in controlling the extent to which information about us is disseminated. The book begins by exploring why privacy and free speech are valuable, before developing a framework for weighing these conflicting values. By taking up key cases in the US and Europe, and the debate about a ‘right to be forgotten’, I discuss the potential costs of limiting free speech, and point to legal remedies and other ways to develop new social attitudes to privacy in an age of instant information sharing. (shrink)

Technological advances are bringing new light to privacy issues and changing the reasons for why privacy is important. These advances have changed not only the kind of personal data that is available to be collected, but also how that personal data can be used by those who have access to it. We are particularly concerned with how information about personal attributes inferred from collected data (such as online behaviour), can be used to tailor messages and services to specific (...) individuals or groups. This kind of ‘personalised targeting’ has the potential to influence individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, and choices in unprecedented ways. In this paper, we argue that because it is becoming easier for companies to use collected data for influence, threats to privacy are increasingly also threats to personal autonomy—an individual’s ability to reflect on and decide freely about their values, actions, and behaviour, and to act on those choices.4 While increasing attention is directed to the ethics of how personal data is collected, we make the case that a new ethics of privacy needs to also think more rigorously about how personal data may be used, and its potential impact on personal autonomy. (shrink)

Privacy is often linked to freedom. Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is a hallmark of a free society, and pervasive state‐sponsored surveillance is generally considered to correlate closely with authoritarianism. One link between privacy and freedom is prominent in the library and information studies field and has recently been receiving attention in legal and philosophical scholarship. Specifically, scholars and professionals argue that privacy is an essential component of intellectual freedom. However, the nature of intellectual freedom and (...) its link to privacy are not entirely clear. My aim in this article is to offer an account of intellectual freedom as a type of positive freedom. I will argue that a full account of intellectual freedom must involve more than an absence of constraints. Rather, intellectual freedom is at least partly a function of the quality of persons’ agency with respect to intellectual endeavors. Such an account best explains the relation between intellectual freedom and privacy and avoids problems with conceptions of intellectual freedom based solely on constraints. (shrink)

While the balance between individual privacy and government monitoring or corporate surveillance has been a frequent topic across numerous disciplines, the issue of privacy within the family has been largely ignored in recent privacy debates. Yet privacy intrusions between parents and children or between adult partners or spouses can be just as profound as those found in the more “public spheres” of life. Popular access to increasingly sophisticated forms of electronic surveillance technologies has altered the dynamics (...) of family relationships. Monitoring, mediated and facilitated by practices of both covert and overt electronic surveillance, has changed the nature of privacy within the family. Parents are tracking children via GPS-enabled cell phone tracking software and are monitoring the Internet use of family members. Parents, siblings, and children are also posting information about their family members online, often without consent, and are creating social media profiles for others online. Prior scholarly work in philosophy and law has primarily addressed the privacy of children from third parties, usually commercial entities, and in the context of making medical decisions. Less attention has been directed at exploring a more general right of privacy of one family member against parents, siblings, children, or spouses. In this article, we do just that. We consider several moral rules that determine appropriate privacy boundaries within the family. More specifically, we will consider when overt or covert surveillance of a child, spouse, or partner by an adult family member is morally permitted. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make (...) sure that these are, genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

Recent advances in wireless technologies have led to the development of intelligent, in-vehicle safety applications designed to share information about the actions of nearby vehicles, potential road hazards, and ultimately predict dangerous scenarios or imminent collisions. These vehicle safety communication (VSC) technologies rely on the creation of autonomous, self-organizing, wireless communication networks connecting vehicles with roadside infrastructure and with each other. As the technical standards and communication protocols for VSC technologies are still being developed, certain ethical implications of these new (...) information technologies emerge: Coupled with the predicted safety benefits of VSC applications is a potential rise in the ability to surveil a driver engaging in her everyday activities on the public roads. This paper will explore how the introduction of VSC technologies might disrupt the “contextual integrity” of personal information flows in the context of highway travel and threaten one’s “privacy in public.” Since VSC technologies and their related protocols and standards are still in the developmental stage, the paper will conclude by revealing how close attention to the ethical implications of the remaining design decisions can inform and guide designers of VSC technologies to create innovate safety applications that increase public safety, but without compromising the value of one’s privacy in public. (shrink)

Recent anthropological analyses of Chinese attitudes towards privacy fail to pay adequate attention to more ordinary, but more widely shared ideas of privacy – ideas that, moreover, have changed dramatically since the 1980s as China has become more and more open to Western countries, cultures, and their network and computing technologies. I begin by reviewing these changes, in part to show how contemporary notions of privacy in China constitute a dialectical synthesis of both traditional Chinese emphases on (...) the importance of the family and the state and more Western emphases on individual rights, including the right to privacy. This same synthesis can be seen in contemporary Chinese law and scholarship regarding privacy. A review of recent work in philosophical ethics demonstrates that information ethics in China is in its very early stages. In this work, privacy is justified as an instrumental good, rather than an intrinsic good. I argue by way of conclusion that privacy protections will continue to expand in China, in part under the pressures of globalization, increasing trade with and exposure to Western societies, and the increasing demands for Western-style individual privacy by young people. Even so, I argue that these emerging conceptions of privacy will remain distinctively Chinese – i.e., they will retain a basic consistency with traditional Chinese values and approaches. (shrink)

Purpose Privacy has been understood as about one’s own information, information that is not one’s own is not typically considered with regards to an individual’s privacy. This paper aims to draw attention to this issue for conceptualizing privacy when one’s privacy is breached by others’ information. Design/methodology/approach To illustrate the issue that others' information can breach one's own privacy, this paper uses real-world applications of forensic genealogy and recommender systems to motivate the discussion. Findings In (...) both forensic genealogy and recommender systems, the individual’s privacy is breached by information that is not one’s own. The information that breached one’s privacy, by its nature, is beyond the scope of an individual, which is a phenomenon that has already been captured by emerging discussions about group privacy. This paper further argues that the underlying issue reflected by the examples of forensic genealogy is an extreme case even under the consideration of group privacy. This is because, unlike recommender systems that rely on large amounts of data to make inferences about an individual, forensic genealogy exposes one’s identity by using only one other individual’s information. This paper echoes existing discussions that this peculiar situation where others’ information breaches one’s own privacy reveals the problematic nature of conceptualizing privacy relying only on individualistic assumptions. Moreover, this paper suggests a relational perspective as an alternative for theorizing privacy. Originality/value This situation that others’ information breached one’s own privacy calls for an updated understanding of not only privacy but also the relationship between the person and their information. Privacy scholars need to renew their ethical language and vocabularies to properly understand the issue, which recent privacy conceptualizations are already doing (e.g. group privacy). (shrink)

Self-sovereign identity solutions implemented on the basis of blockchain technology are seen as alternatives to existing digital identification systems, or even as a foundation of standards for the new global infrastructures for identity management systems. It is argued that ‘self-sovereignty' in this context can be understood as the concept of individual control over identity relevant private data, capacity to choose where such data is stored, and the ability to provide it to those who need to validate it. It is also (...) argued that while it might be appealing to operationalise the concept of ‘self-sovereignty’ in a narrow technical sense, depreciation of moral semantics obscures key challenges and long-term repercussions. Closer attention to the normative substance of the ‘sovereignty’ concept helps to highlight a range of ethical issues pertaining to the changing nature of human identity in the context of ubiquitous private data collection. (shrink)

In privacy self-management, people are expected to perform cost–benefit analysis on the use of their personal data, and only consent when their subjective benefits outweigh the costs. However, the ubiquitous collection of personal data and Big Data analytics present increasing challenges to successful privacy management. A number of services and research initiatives have proposed similar solutions to provide people with more control over their data by consolidating consent decisions under a single interface. We have named this the ‘consent (...) intermediary’ approach. In this paper, we first identify the eight obstacles to privacy self-management which make cost–benefit analysis conceptually and practically challenging. We then analyse to which extent consent intermediaries can help overcome the obstacles. We argue that simply bringing consent decisions under one interface offers limited help, but that the potential of this approach lies in leveraging the intermediary position to provide aides for privacy management. We find that with suitable tools, some of the more practical obstacles indeed can become solvable, while others remain fundamentally insuperable within the individuated privacy self-management model. Attention should also be paid to how the consent intermediaries may take advantage of the power vested in the intermediary positions between users and other services. (shrink)

This paper seeks to identify the distinctive moral wrong of stalking and argues that this wrong is serious enough to criminalize. We draw on psychological literature about stalking, distinguishing types of stalkers, their pathologies, and victims. The victimology is the basis for claims about what is wrong with stalking. Close attention to the experiences of victims often reveals an obsessive preoccupation with the stalker and what he will do next. The kind of harm this does is best understood in relation (...) to the value of privacy and conventionally protected zones of privacy. We compare anti-stalking laws in different jurisdictions, claiming that they all fail in some way to capture the distinctive privacy violation that stalking involves. Further reflection on the seriousness of the invasion of privacy it represents suggests that it is a deeply personal wrong. Indeed, it is usually more serious than obtrusive surveillance by states, precisely because it is more personal. Where state surveillance genuinely is as intrusive as stalking, it tends to adopt the tactics of the stalker, imposing its presence on the activist victim at every turn. Power dynamics —whether rooted in the power of the state or the violence of a stalker —may exacerbate violations of privacy, but the wrong is distinct from violence, threats of violence and other aggression. Nor is stalking a simple expression of a difference in power between stalker and victim, such as a difference due to gender. (shrink)

Fools rush in. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM (London, 1711). The full quotation is, “For Fools rush in where Angels fear to tread.” Id. at 66. She who hesitates is lost. Adaptation of the line, “The woman that deliberates is lost.” JOSEPH ADDISON, CATO: A TRAGEDY, AND SELECTED ESSAYS 30 (2004). See also OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, SR., THE AUTOCRAT AT THE BREAKFAST TABLE 29 (1858) (“The woman who ‘calculates’ is lost.”). American legal realism numbers among the most important theoretical (...) contributions of legal academia to date. Given the movement’s influence, as well as the common centrality of certain key figures, it is surprising that privacy scholarship in the United States has paid next to no attention to the movement. This inattention is unfortunate for several reasons, including that privacy law furnishes rich examples of the indeterminacy thesis — a key concept of American legal realism — and because the interdisciplinary efforts of privacy scholars to explore extra-legal influences on privacy law arguably further the plot of legal realism itself. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the interrelationship of regulation and private life in human rights. It argues three main points. Article 8 connects the question of protection of private lives and privacies with the question of their management. Thus, Article 8 orients regulatory practices to private lives and privacies. Article 8’s holders are autonomous to the extent that laws respect their private lives and privacies. They are not autonomous in a ‘pre-political’ sense, where we might expect legal rules to protect an (...) already autonomous private life or privacy. Article 8 does not simply prohibit or permit acts. In certain cases, it also ‘enables’ acts. Then, this essay introduces the idea of oikopolitics. This idea allows us to capture these three points in a useful manner. By this idea, this essay means the context where the interpretation of privacy reaches out to broader social practices and norms and where the status of rights-holders living their private lives makes them objects of attention. (shrink)

If one lives in a city and wants to be by oneself or have a private conversation with someone else, there are two ways to set about it: either one finds a place of solitude, such as one’s bedroom, or one finds a place crowded enough, public enough, that attention to each person dilutes so much so as to resemble a deserted refuge. Often, one can get more privacy in public places than in the most private of spaces. The (...) home is not always the ideal place to find privacy. Neighbours snoop, children ask questions, and family members judge. When the home suffocates privacy, the only escape is to go out, to the coffee shop, the public square. For centuries, city streets have been the true refuges of the solitaries, the overwhelmed, and the underprivileged. -/- Yet time and again we hear people arguing that we do not have any claim to privacy while on the streets because they are part of the so-called public sphere. The main objective of this chapter is to argue that privacy belongs as much in the streets as it does in the home. (shrink)

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, governments have turned their attention to digital contact tracing. In many countries, public debate has focused on the risks this technology poses to privacy, with advocates and experts sounding alarm bells about surveillance and mission creep reminiscent of the post 9/11 era. Yet, when Apple and Google launched their contact tracing API in April 2020, some of the world’s leading privacy experts applauded this initiative for its privacy-preserving technical specifications. In an interesting (...) twist, the tech giants came to be portrayed as greater champions of privacy than some democratic governments. This article proposes to view the Apple/Google API in terms of a broader phenomenon whereby tech corporations are encroaching into ever new spheres of social life. From this perspective, the advantage these actors have accrued in the sphere of the production of digital goods provides them with access to the spheres of health and medicine, and more worrisome, to the sphere of politics. These sphere transgressions raise numerous risks that are not captured by the focus on privacy harms. Namely, a crowding out of essential spherical expertise, new dependencies on corporate actors for the delivery of essential, public goods, the shaping of public policy by non-representative, private actors and ultimately, the accumulation of decision-making power across multiple spheres. While privacy is certainly an important value, its centrality in the debate on digital contact tracing may blind us to these broader societal harms and unwittingly pave the way for ever more sphere transgressions. (shrink)

Talking about privacy in the public prima facie seems to be a contradiction: why should privacy have to play a role within the public sphere? What could possibly be private in the public? However, quite a number of theories of privacy conceptualize privacy as a protective shield which we carry with us wherever we are: respect for privacy in public then means, for instance, not listening in on private conversations between friends on the street or (...) in a cafe. The most important form of privacy in public, however, which has gained a lot of attention during the last decade or so, is privacy as anonymity: the form of privacy in the public sphere, online as well as offline, which means invisibility, nontraceability, not being identifiable as an individual person. Theories of privacy differ as to the possibility as well as to the desirabilty of anonymity in public contexts, online as well as offline. In my paper, I investigate the complicated relations between privacy, anonymity, and the public sphere. I will, firstly, clarify the conceptual relation between privacy and anonymity, drawing on theories which define privacy in terms of conditions enabling individual freedom and autonomy. I will also review some normatively relevant differences between the online and the offline world. In the second part, I will discuss possible normative conflicts between a moral or legal right to privacy and anonymity, and considerations of security, accountability, or moral responsibility. One of the important questions will concern the ethical consequences of the technical possibilities of identification and de-anonymization in the online world. (shrink)

Are the sources of a combatant's knowledge in war morally relevant? This article argues that privacy is relevant to just war theory in that it draws attention to privacy harms associated with the conduct of war. Since we cannot assume that information is made available to combatants in a morally neutral manner, we must therefore interrogate the relationship between privacy harms and the acts that they enable in war. Here, I argue that there is ample evidence that (...) we cannot discount the analysis of privacy harms in war, and that analysis of such harms requires us to examine social goods. I develop this point to demonstrate the problems that this poses for aspects of revisionist just war theory; namely, reductivism and individualism. In order to evaluate the moral consequences of privacy harms in war, we must understand the unilateral and adversarial character of balancing privacy harms against social goods in the context of war, which, in turn, requires that we consider social goods and social institutions as objects of moral evaluation. Further, concepts drawn from privacy scholarship, such as Helen Nissenbaum's concept of contextual integrity, enable us to identify a range of moral problems associated with contemporary war that deserve further attention from just war theorists. (shrink)

I wonder why women philosophers, once recognized, too often seem to drop from the intellectual radar screen or, at least, to drop mainly to the land of footnotes and bibliographies. I consider one distinguished moral philosopher, Elizabeth Lane Beardsley, both to highlight her philosophical contributions and as a case study that suggests more widespread problems in recognizing t5he work of female philosophers and ensuring their rightful place in our professional dialogue. I consider sociological and professional factors which might partially explain (...) why work by women philosophers has not always received the attention in the professional dialogue it seems to deserve. I conclude with some modest suggestions about the efforts that we can make to address these problems, including the organization of readings for our own courses, the sources consulted for our own research and writing, and the preservation of rec rods of meetings and other public gatherings that recognize women philosophers. (shrink)

It has been debated whether the so-called attention economy, in which the attention of agents is measured and sold, jeopardizes something of value. One strand of this discussion has focused on so-called attention rights, asking: should attention be legally protected, either by introducing novel rights or by extending the scope of pre-existing rights? In this paper, however, in order to further this discussion, we ask: How is attention already protected legally? In what situations does a person have the right to (...) attention under current law? -/- Unlike (Chomanski, Neuroethics 16:1–11, 2023), who discusses an overall right to attention, or (Puri, Rutgers Law Record 48:206–221, 2021), who discusses an overall right to attentional privacy, in this paper we focus on two types of situations in which a person’s attention is already protected by legal regulation. Sustained attention-requiring tasks can be jeopardized by distractions whereas attentiveness to certain kind of stimuli can be jeopardized by immersive stimuli. That is why distractions are regulated in situations where an agent has what we call a concentration right and immersive stimuli are regulated in situations where an agent has what we call a duty to be attentive. The further analysis of these situations provides an understanding of the legal means by which attention is already regulated, which can be helpful when thinking about how it should be regulated in the future. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make (...) sure that these are, genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

As a key constituent of China's approach to fighting COVID-19, Health Code apps (HCAs) not only serve the pandemic control imperatives but also exercise the agency of digital surveillance. As such, HCAs pave a new avenue for ongoing discussions on contact tracing solutions and privacy amid the global pandemic. This article attends to the perceived privacy protection among HCA users via the lens of the contextual integrity theory. Drawing on an online survey of adult HCA users in Wuhan (...) and Hangzhou (N = 1551), we find users’ perceived convenience, attention towards privacy policy, trust in government, and acceptance of government purposes regarding HCA data management are significant contributors to users’ perceived privacy protection in using the apps. By contrast, users’ frequency of mobile privacy protection behaviors has limited influence, and their degrees of perceived protection do not vary by sociodemographic status. These findings shed new light on China's distinctive approach to pandemic control with respect to the state's expansion of big data-driven surveillance capacity. Also, the findings foreground the heuristic value of contextual integrity theory to examine controversial digital surveillance in non-Western contexts. Put tougher, our findings contribute to the thriving scholarly conversations around digital privacy and surveillance in China, as well as contact tracing solutions and privacy amid the global pandemic. (shrink)

Galleries, libraries, archives and museums are striving to retain audience attention to issues related to cultural heritage, by implementing various novel opportunities for audience engagement through technological means online. Although born-digital assets for cultural heritage may have inundated the Internet in some areas, most of the time they are stored in “digital warehouses,” and the questions of the digital ecosystem’s sustainability, meaningful public participation and creative reuse of data still remain. Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, are used to bring (...) born-digital archives to light, aiming to enhance the public’s engagement and participation. At the core of this debate lies both the openness of data and issues of privacy. How open to the public should born-digital archives be? Should everything be open and available online, and what does it take to achieve balance between openness and privacy, especially through AI initiatives? The study is qualitative and builds on the rationale of grounded theory. The role of AI development is critically investigated in relation to opening up born-digital archives online, by considering privacy and ethics issues. Grounded in the context of the author’s PhD research, the paper proposes a human-centred approach to AI development for democratising its development towards fairness and social inclusion, contrary to the stereotypical cliché of blackboxing, allowing space for the plurality of born-digital archives to flourish. (shrink)

The ethical problem of privacy lies at the core of computer ethics and cyber ethics discussions. The extensive use of personal data in digital networks poses a serious threat to the user’s right of privacy not only at the level of a user’s data integrity and security but also at the level of a user’s identity and freedom. In normative ethical theory the need for an informational self-deterministic approach of privacy is stressed with greater emphasis on the (...) control over personal data. However, scant attention has been paid on a virtue ethics approach of information privacy. Plotinus’ discussion of self-determination is related to ethical virtue, human freedom and intellectual autonomy. The Plotinian virtue ethics approach of self-determination is not primarily related to the sphere of moral action, but to the quality of the self prior to moral practice. In this paper, it is argued that the problem of information privacy should be reconsidered in the light of Plotinus’ virtue ethics and his notion of self-determination. (shrink)

Privacy issues are frequently discussed amongst researchers, practitioners and patients in healthcare. However, psychiatric patients’ privacy issues get less attention in information system development (ISD), whereby they are one of the most important stakeholders. This paper applies Carew and Stapleton’s ISD privacy framework to psychiatric monitoring systems to understand the issues that are related to monitoring psychiatric patients’ behaviour. By understanding the privacy issues amongst patients, the research will be able to provide guidance to system developers (...) to produce a privacy-sensitive system that can contribute to the system engineering for international stability. We will elaborate each factor in the framework (physical, social, psychological and informational) and then explain the relationship to the privacy of psychiatric patient. (shrink)

Luciano Floridi was not the first to discuss the idea of group privacy, but he was perhaps the first to discuss it in relation to the insights derived from big data analytics. He has argued that it is important to investigate the possibility that groups have rights to privacy that are not reducible to the privacy of individuals forming such groups. In this paper, we introduce a distinction between two concepts of group privacy. The first, the (...) “what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas” privacy (in the following: WHVSV privacy), deals with confidential information shared with the member of a group and inaccessible to (all or a specific group of) outsiders. The second, to which we shall refer as inferential privacy, deals with the inferences that can be made about a group of people defined by a feature, or combination thereof, shared by all individuals in the group. We show why we unreservedly agree with Floridi that groups can have a form of privacy that amounts to more than the mere fact of being sets of individuals each of whom has individual privacy; moreover, like Floridi, we find it plausible that at least some groups (those satisfying our definition of type-a groups) may have a right to a species of group privacy (that is, WHVSV privacy) as groups (and not just as individuals who belong to those groups). However, by turning our attention to the context of big data analytics, we show that the relevant, new notion of group privacy is one of inferential privacy. We argue that an absolute right (either of individuals or groups) to inferential privacy is implausible. We also show that many groups generated algorithmically (those satisfying our definition of type-b groups) cannot be right holders as groups (unless they become type-a groups). (shrink)

The 2010s were a golden age of information privacy research, but its policy accomplishments tell a mixed story. Despite significant progress on the development of privacy theory and compelling demonstrations of the need for privacy in practice, real achievements in privacy law and policy have been, at best, uneven. In this chapter, I outline three broad shifts in the way scholars (and, to some degree, advocates and policy makers) are approaching privacy and social media. First, (...) a change in emphasis from individual to structural approaches. Second, increasing attention to the political economy of privacy—especially the business models of information companies, such as social media platforms. And third, a deeper understanding of privacy’s role in a healthy digital public sphere. (shrink)

Background: For patients admitted to hospital both pastoral care and privacy or confidentiality are important. Rules related to each have come into conflict recently in the US. Federal laws and other rules protect confidentiality in ways that countermand hospitals’ methods for facilitating access to pastoral care. This leads to conflicts and poses an unusual type of dilemma—one of conflicting values and rights. As interests are elements necessary for establishing rights, it is important to explore patients’ interests in privacy (...) compared with their desire for attention from a cleric.Aim: To assess the willingness of patients to have their names and rooms included on a list by religion, having that information given to clergy without their consent, their sense of privacy violation if that were done and their views about patients’ privacy rights.Methods and participants: 179 patients, aged 18–92 years, admitted to hospital in an acute care setting, were interviewed and asked about their preferences for confidentiality and pastoral support.Results: Most patients did not want to be listed by religion; 58% did not think hospitals should give lists to clergy without their consent and 84% welcomed a visit by their own clergy even if triggered from a hospital list.Conclusions: Values related to confidentiality or privacy and pastoral care were found to be inconsistent and more complicated than expected. Balancing the right to privacy and the value of religious support continue to present a challenge for hospitals. Patients’ preferences support the importance of providing balance in a way that protects rights while offering comprehensive services. (shrink)

Two terms, student privacy and Massive Open Online Courses, have received a significant amount of attention recently. Both represent interesting sites of change in entrenched structures, one educational and one legal. MOOCs represent something college courses have never been able to provide: universal access. Universities not wanting to miss the MOOC wave have started to build MOOC courses and integrate them into the university system in various ways. However, the design and scale of university MOOCs create tension for (...) class='Hi'>privacy laws intended to regulate information practices exercised by educational institutions. Are MOOCs part of the educational institutions these laws and policies aim to regulate? Are MOOC users students whose data are protected by aforementioned laws and policies? Many university researchers and faculty members are asked to participate as designers and instructors in MOOCs but may not know how to approach the issues proposed. While recent scholarship has addressed the disruptive nature of MOOCs, student privacy generally, and data privacy in the K-12 system, we provide an in-depth description and analysis of the MOOC phenomenon and the privacy laws and policies that guide and regulate educational institutions today. We offer privacy case studies of three major MOOC providers active in the market today to reveal inconsistencies among MOOC platform and the level and type of legal uncertainty surrounding them. Finally, we provide a list of organizational questions to pose internally to navigate the uncertainty presented to university MOOC teams. (shrink)

Living in the digital world, we have little choice but to share our personal data with big tech companies. These companies use our data to direct our attention so that they can make money from advertising. In a so-called surveillance society, we stand in an asymmetrical power relationship to these companies (and sometimes governments) and have little to no control over what happens to our data. Our dependence on these asymmetrical relationships is increasing as “big tech” uses the information it (...) gathers about us to cater to our personal habits and desires. (shrink)

The article undertakes to develop a theory of privacy considered as a fundamental moral right. The authors remind that the conception of the right to privacy is silent on the prospect of protecting informational privacy on consequentialist grounds. However, laws that prevent efficient marketing practices, speedy medical attention, equitable distribution of social resources, and criminal activity could all be justified by appeal to informational privacy as a fundamental right. Finally, the authors show that in the specter (...) of terrorism, privacy can be conceived as a fundamental moral right, one that is completely consistent with the willingness to submit for surveillance of private lives. (shrink)

This essay examines some ethical aspects of stalkingincidents in cyberspace. Particular attention is focused on the Amy Boyer/Liam Youens case of cyberstalking, which has raised a number of controversial ethical questions. We limit our analysis to three issues involving this particular case. First, we suggest that the privacy of stalking victims is threatened because of the unrestricted access to on-linepersonal information, including on-line public records, currently available to stalkers. Second, we consider issues involving moral responsibility and legal liability for (...) Internet service providers (ISPs) when stalking crimesoccur in their `space' on the Internet. Finally, we examine issues of moral responsibility for ordinary Internet users to determine whether they are obligated to inform persons whom they discover to be the targets of cyberstalkers. (shrink)

The concept of privacy is intimately related to epistemological concepts such as information and knowledge, yet for the longest time had received only scant attention from epistemologists. This has begun to change in recent years, and different philosophical accounts have been proposed. On the liberal model of privacy, what privacy aims at is the protection of individuals from interference in personal matters. On the (more narrowly epistemological) informational model, privacy is a matter of limiting access to (...) (or maintaining control over) certain types of information. Furthermore, it is sometimes claimed that privacy aims at preventing the formation of (potentially negative) judgments by others. This paper compares and contrasts the various approaches and identifies a number of shortcomings. It then outlines an alternative account, the disattendability/civil inattention model of privacy, according to which what constitutes a breach of privacy is neither the acquisition of new information per se, nor the formation of judgments by others, but the fact that undue attention is being paid to routinized (or otherwise unobtrusive) aspects of the target’s everyday life. This account, it is argued, is explanatorily superior to its competitors, in that it accounts both for the cultural contingency of privacy conventions and for the emergence of new threats to privacy (e.g. from electronic surveillance). The paper concludes by reflecting on remaining tensions within the proposed account of privacy and by commenting on its social ramifications. (shrink)

The accuracy principle is one of the key standards of informational privacy. It epitomises the obligation for those processing personal data to keep their records accurate and up-to-date, with the aim of protecting individuals from unfair decisions. Currently, however, different practices being put in place in order to enhance the protection of individuals appear to deliberately rely on the use of ‘inaccurate’ personal information. This article explores such practices and tries to assess their potential for privacy protection, giving (...) particular attention to their legal implications and to related ethical issues. Ultimately, it suggests that the use of ‘inaccurate’ data can potentially play a useful role to preserve the informational autonomy of the individual, and that any understandings of privacy or personal data protection that would tend to unduly limit such potential should be critically questioned. (shrink)

PurposeThis paper aims to (a) summarize the legal and ethical foundations of privacy with connections to workplace emails and text messages, (b) describe trends and challenges related to “Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD), and (c) propose legal and nonlegal questions these trends will raise in the foreseeable future.Design/methodology/approachBased on a review of legal cases and scholarship related to workplace privacy, implications for BYOD practices are proposed.FindingsPrimarily due to property rights, employers in the USA have heretofore been granted wide (...) latitude in monitoring employee communications. The BYOD trend has the potential to challenge this status quo.Originality valueBYOD programs present discernable threats to employee privacy. Attention is also directed toward contributing elements such as wearable technology, cloud computing and company cultures. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe concept of privacy has been astonishingly absent in the discussion about dementia care. In general, questions of privacy receive a lot of attention in nursing ethics; however, when it comes to dementia care, hardly any systematic ethical debate on the topic can be found. It almost seems as though people with dementia had lost any comprehensible interest in privacy and no longer had any private sphere that needed to be considered or protected. However, (...) this not only contradicts widespread moral intuitions but also ignores the views and needs of those affected.ArgumentsWe first outline the origins and dimensions of the concept of privacy and point out problems and limitations in the context of dementia. Especially the prevalent liberal conceptions’ dependence on the idea of autonomy poses significant challenges to an adequate conceptualization of the moral significance of privacy for people with dementia. Therefore, we subsequently explore alternative ways of conceptualizing the “value of privacy” in the context of dementia care.ConclusionAutonomy-based concepts of privacy may still be valid in the early stages of dementia. However, in the further course of the syndrome, the relevance of other normative aspects comes to the fore, especially respect for remaining personal preferences as well as objective criteria of dignity and well-being. Thus, we outline in a differentiated manner how and to what extent privacy can be of normative importance beyond the purview of autonomy and should consequently be taken into consideration in dementia care. (shrink)

Large-scale data brokers collect massive amounts of highly personal consumer information to be sold to whoever will pay their price, even at the expense of sacrificing individual privacy and autonomy in the process. In this Article, I will show how a proper understanding and justification for a right to privacy, in context to both protecting private acts and safeguarding information and states of affairs for the performance of such acts, provides a necessary background framework for imposing legal restrictions (...) on such collections. This problem, which has already gained some attention in literature, now becomes even more worrisome, as government itself becomes a consumer of this information to fight off a domestic instantiation of the global Covid-19 pandemic. This Article proposes some definite ways in which the courts and Congress might limit both the private sector and the government’s use of such data to ensure individual autonomy will not be sacrificed. (shrink)

While the accumulation and increased circulation of genomic data have captured much attention over the past decade, privacy risks raised by the diversification and integration of omics have been la...

In the last few years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the effects that the achievements of the Human Genome Project will have on the confidentiality of medical information. The Genetic Privacy Act is an attempt to address the privacy, confidentiality, and property rights relating to obtaining, requesting, using, storing, and disposing of genetic material. The GPA grew out of concerns over the vast amount of genetic information that is a product of the Human Genome (...) Project. The central goals of the GPA are twofold: to define an individual's right to control access to their genetic material and the privilege to control the information derived therefrom; and to prevent potential and actual abuse of genetic information by third parties, such as insurance companies, employers, and government. The GPA is one of a group of proposals that seek to control the flow of medical information from the individual to health care professionals and to other persons. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people’s freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make (...) sure that these are, genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

Digital communication now pervades all spheres of life, creating new possibilities for commodification: personal data and communication are the new resources of surplus value. This in turn brings about a totally new category of threats to privacy. With recourse to the culture industry critique of early critical theory, this article seeks to challenge basic theoretical assumptions held within a liberal account of privacy. It draws the attention to the entanglement of technical and socio-economic transformations and aims at elaborating (...) an alternative framing which takes into account that privacy is not in the first place a pre-political space for individual freedom but a constituted sphere in which social power relations are reproduced in a particularly deceitful way. With recourse to positions of critical theory, this article revisits the conceptual ambiguity of liberation and oppression and looks to draft prospects for a socio-theoretical justification and critique of privacy, updated for the digital age. Following the tradition of critical theory, the argument focuses on (new) forms of domination in and by privacy. It aims to prepare the ground for a critique of the social’s increasing commodification as well as an idea of privacy understood as reflexive participation in social practices. (shrink)

H.L.A. Hart objects to John Rawls’s liberty principle by drawing attention to how our legal system accepts the restriction of liberty to protect against other harms than liberty-deprivation, such as by laws against slander, libel, and publications which grossly infringe privacy. What is the solution for John Rawls, faced with this criticism? One solution is, by the reflective equilibrium method, to justify abandoning the judgment that these actions are immoral.

In discussions about direct-to-consumer availability of genetic testing, much attention has been given to identifying the various risks and benefits that individuals might incur. For example, upon...

Most studies on the ethics of privacy focus on what others ought to do to accommodate our interest in privacy. I focus on a related but distinct question that has attracted less attention in the literature: When, if ever, does morality require us to safeguard our own privacy? While we often have prudential reasons for safeguarding our privacy, we are also, at least sometimes, morally required to do so. I argue that we, sometimes, ought to safeguard (...) our privacy for the sake of the possible wrongdoer, in order to prevent the possible wrongdoer from committing a morally defiling act that renders them worse off. I illustrate the variety of cases in which this duty binds us and contrast my view to some other claims in the literature which also purport to show that we sometimes have a duty to safeguard our own privacy. (shrink)

Self-disclosures on online social networks have received increased attention in the last two decades. Researchers from different disciplines investigated manifold influencing variables, and studies applied different theories to explain why many users share very sensitive and personal information despite potential risks and negative consequences, whereas others do not. Oftentimes, it is argued that self-disclosure decisions result from a kind of rational “calculus” of risks and benefits. However, such an assumption of rationality can and has been criticized. Nevertheless, fundamental cognitive and (...) affective mechanisms that underlie self-disclosure decision making on social networks are still under-explored. By building upon previous self-disclosure theories and models, dual-and tripartite-system perspectives of decision making, and former empirical findings, we propose a Tripartite Self-Disclosure Decision model that conceptualizes inner processes of online self-disclosure decision making. Central to this model is the proposed interaction of three neural and cognitive/affective systems: a reflective, an impulsive, and an interoceptive system. We further highlight individual and environmental features, which can impact individuals’ online self-disclosure decisions by influencing the proposed inner decision-making processes targeting the aforementioned three systems. Possible short- and long-term consequences are also discussed, which in turn can affect certain model components in subsequent self-disclosure decision situations. By taking such a neurocognitive perspective, we expand current research and models, which helps to better understand potentially risky information sharing on online social networks and can support attempts to prevent users from incautious self-disclosures. (shrink)

Where did the right to privacy come from and what does it mean? Grappling with the critical issues involving women and gays that relate to the current Supreme Court appointment, Vincent J. Samar develops a definition of legal privacy, discusses the reasons why and the degree to which privacy should be protected, and shows the relationship between privacy and personal autonomy. He answers former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork's questions about scope, content, and legal justification for (...) a general right to privacy and pays particular attention to issues involving gays and lesbians. (shrink)

In the last few years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the effects that the achievements of the Human Genome Project will have on the confidentiality of medical information. The Genetic Privacy Act is an attempt to address the privacy, confidentiality, and property rights relating to obtaining, requesting, using, storing, and disposing of genetic material. The GPA grew out of concerns over the vast amount of genetic information that is a product of the Human Genome (...) Project. The central goals of the GPA are twofold: to define an individual's right to control access to their genetic material and the privilege to control the information derived therefrom; and to prevent potential and actual abuse of genetic information by third parties, such as insurance companies, employers, and government. The GPA is one of a group of proposals that seek to control the flow of medical information from the individual to health care professionals and to other persons. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide new insights to debates on group privacy, which can be seen as part of a social turn in privacy scholarship. Research is increasingly showing that the classic individualistic understanding of privacy is insufficient to capture new problems in algorithmic and online contexts. An understanding of privacy as an “interpersonal boundary-control process” (Altman, The environment and social behavior, Brooks and Cole, Monterey, 1975) framing privacy as a social practice necessary to sustain (...) intimate relationships is gaining ground. In this debate, my research is focused on what I refer to as “self-determined groups” which can be defined as groups whose members consciously and willingly perceive themselves as being part of a communicative network. While much attention is given to new forms of algorithmically generated groups, current research on group privacy fails to account for the ways in which self-determined groups are affected by changes brought about by new information technologies. In an explorative case study on self-organized therapy groups, I show how these groups have developed their own approach to privacy protection, functioning on the basis of social practices followed by all participants. This informal approach was effective in pre-digital times, but online, privacy threats have reached a new level extending beyond the scope of a group’s influence. I therefore argue that self-determined sensitive topic groups are left facing what I present as a dilemma: a tension between the seemingly irreconcilable need for connectivity and a low threshold, on the one hand, and the need for privacy and trust, on the other. In light of this dilemma, I argue that we need new sorts of political solutions. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought the long-standing public health practice of contact tracing into the public spotlight. While contact tracing and case investigation have been carefully designed to protect privacy, the huge volume of tracing which is being carried out as part of the pandemic response in the United States is highlighting potential concerns around privacy, legality, and equity. Contact tracing during the pandemic has gained particular attention for the new use of digital technologies—both on the consumer side (...) in the form of Exposure Notification applications, and for public health agencies as digital case management software systems enable massive scaling of operations. While the consumer application side of digital innovation has dominated the news and academic discourse around privacy, people are likely to interact more intensively with public health agencies and their use of digital case management systems. Effective use of digital case management for contact tracing requires revisiting the existing legal frameworks, privacy protections, and security practices for management of sensitive health data. The scale of these tools and demands of an unprecedented pandemic response are introducing new risks through the collection of huge volumes of data, and expanding requirements for more adept data sharing among jurisdictions. Public health agencies must strengthen their best practices for data collection and protection even in the absence of comprehensive or clear guidance. This requires navigating a difficult balance between rigorous data protection and remaining highly adaptive and agile. (shrink)

The power exercised by technology companies is attracting the attention of policymakers, regulatory bodies and the general public. This power can be categorized in several ways, ranging from the “soft power” of technology companies to influence public policy agendas to the “market power” they may wield to exclude equally efficient competitors from the marketplace. This Article is concerned with the “data power” exercised by technology companies occupying strategic positions in the digital ecosystem. This data power is a multifaceted power that (...) may overlap with economic (market) power but primarily entails the power to profile and the power to influence opinion formation. While the current legal framework for data protection and privacy in the EU imposes constraints on personal data processing by technology companies, it ostensibly does so without regard to whether or not they have “data power.” This Article probes this assumption. It argues that although this legal framework does not explicitly impose additional legal responsibilities on entities with “data power,” it provides a clear normative indication to do so. The volume and variety of data and the reach of data-processing operations seem to be relevant when assessing both the extent of obligations on technology companies and the impact of data processing on individual rights. The Article suggests that this finding provides the normative foundation for the imposition of a “special responsibility” on such firms, analogous to the “special responsibility” imposed by competition law on dominant companies with market power. What such a “special responsibility” might entail in practice will be briefly outlined and relevant questions for future research will be identified. (shrink)