Carbon offsetting remains contentious within, at least, philosophy. By posing and then answering a general question about an aspect of the morality of carbon offsetting—Does carbon offsetting make luxury emissions morally permissible?—this essay helps to lessen some of the topic’s contentiousness. Its central question is answered by arguing and defending the view that carbon offsetting makes luxury emissions morally permissible by counteracting potential harm. This essay then shows how this argument links to and offers a common starting point for further (...) examination of offsetting across various disciplines and domains, such as policy and other branches of philosophy like the ethics of risk. (shrink)

Breastfeeding remains an understudied topic in research and theorizing about reproductive experience and women's bodies. This article reports on women's experiences of breastfeeding in public as revealed through in-depth interviews with 51 women. The current construction of the good maternal body requires women to carefully manage the performance of breastfeeding in specific ways and with particular attention to the dominant notion of a sexualized rather than nurturing breast. Women accommodate to, and resist, the perceived boundaries of the good maternal body (...) through their breastfeeding behaviors. (shrink)

Happiness in World History traces ideas and experiences of happiness from early stages in human history, to the maturation of agricultural societies and their religious and philosophical systems, to the changes and diversities in the approach to happiness in the modern societies that began to emerge in the 18th century. In this thorough overview, Peter N. Stearns explores the interaction between psychological and historical findings about happiness, the relationship between ideas and popular experience, and the opportunity to use historical (...) analysis to assess strengths and weaknesses of dominant contemporary notions of happiness. Starting with the advent of agriculture, the book assesses major transitions in history for patterns in happiness, including the impact of the great religions, the unprecedented Enlightenment interest in secular happiness and cheerfulness, and industrialization and imperialism. The final, contemporary section covers fascist and communist efforts to define alternatives to Western ideas of happiness, the increasing connections with consumerism, and growing global interests in defining and promoting well-being. Touching on the experiences in the major regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and North America, the text offers an expansive introduction to a new field of study. This book will be of interest to students of world history and the history of emotions. (shrink)

Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb. By Khaled el-Rouayheb. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xvi + 399. $99.99, £64.99.

Attempts to reclaim mindfulness from the commercial and corporate juggernaut it has become and to demonstrate its usefulness in spiritual (including Christian) life.

This article focuses on the rise of world history and the challenges it poses to curricula that emphasize history in service to national or civilizational identity. The nature and causes of the world history movement are juxtaposed to the continuing or renewed attachment to more nationalist history. Specific clashes around world history, particularly but not exclusively in the United States, have focused on opposing views about history and identity. Compromises continue to results, as well as clear delays in world history (...) interest in many regions and many programs. Yet world history continues to gain ground, fundamentally because, at its best, it provides many of the tools needed for responsible understanding of globalization past and present. (shrink)

This work shows that two problems—the reference class and the mental state of the agent—undermine the plausibility of the ‘blameworthiness tracks risk thesis’ (BTRT), which states, prima facie, an agent is more blameworthy for imposing a greater rather than smaller risk. The article first outlines core concepts. It then shows how the two problems undermine BTRT; namely, (1) no blame attribution based on risk imposition is unequivocal; (2) when the materialization of risk is subject to chance, an agent’s decision can (...) ground an equal degree of blameworthiness regardless of whether the risk is greater or lesser. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead called Isabel Scribner Stearns the most talented female philosopher in America. Drawing on Whitehead and her other teachers, Paul Weiss, C.I. Lewis, H.H. Price, and Grace de Laguna, as well as the traditions of ancient Greek philosophy, Continental Rationalism, German Idealism, and American Pragmatism, Stearns has created an epistemologically and logically sound systematic account of the ontology of individuation and the relational genesis and endurance of individual beings.

This paper involves a case study of physicians working in an urban Midwestern region. It raises questions surrounding how physicians adapted to, encouraged and resisted the increasing presence of managed care in their work lives. The patterning of physician accommodation to managed care and the failure of physicians to mount any effective organized resistance in Metro has some important implications for theories about professional dominance and decline.

On the basis of a distinction between suffering and punishment, I maintain that divine punishment is suffering understood against the backdrop of an ultimate or divine morality. Suffering can in some cases be a retributively just desert even where there is an obvious absence of distributive justice. After reconciliation with God the suffering may continue unabated, but the suffering loses its status as punishment. An innocent or forgiven person cannot be punished no matter how much s/he is made to suffer. (...) Divine punishment is an ultimate moral concept, an interpretation placed on suffering by a person of morally good will. (shrink)

The person is in process of becoming, and in this becoming it transforms itself as it reaches after new values. In its becoming, also, it is able to span the distance between the self it was and the self it is to become. Its transformation, then, can never become complete; it arises from a basis to which the person is always able in some measure to return.

Music can answer questions that often confound more discursive modes of thought. Music takes concepts that are all too familiar, reframes these concepts, and returns them to us with incisive clarity and renewed vision. Unity is one of these "all too familiar concepts," thrown around by politicians, journalists, and pastors as if we all know what it means. By turning to music, especially musical space, the relational structure of unity becomes less abstract and more tangible within our philosophy. Arnold Schoenberg, (...) as an inherently musical thinker, is our guide in this study of unity. His reworking of musical structure, dissonance, and metaphysics transformed the tonal language and aesthetic landscape of twentieth century music. His philosophy of compositional unity helps us to deconstruct and reconceive how unity can be understood and worked with both aesthetically and theologically. This project also critiques Schoenberg's often monadic musical metaphysic by turning to Colin Gunton's conviction that the particularity and unity at the heart of God's triune being should guide all of our theological endeavors. Throughout, music accompanies our thinking, demonstrating not only how theology can benefit the philosophy of music but also how the philosophy of music can enrich and augment theological discourse. (shrink)

If one investigates a process that has several causes but assumes that it has only one cause, one risks ruling out important causal factors. Three mechanisms account for this mistake: either the significance of the single cause under test is masked by noise contributed by the unsuspected and uncontrolled factors, or the process appears only when two or more causes interact, or the process appears when there are present any of a number of sufficient causes which are not mutally exclusive. (...) In ecology and evolutionary biology, experiments usually test single factor hypotheses, and many scientists apparently believe that hypotheses incorporating several factors are so much more difficult to test that to do so would not be practical. We discuss several areas in ecology and evolutionary biology in which the presupposition of simple causation has apparently impeded progress. We also examine a more mature field, the study of atherosclerosis, in which single factor studies did significantly delay progress towards understanding what now appears to be a multifactor process. The problem has three solutions: either factorial experiments, dynamic models that make quantitative predictions, response-surface methods, or all three. In choosing a definition for ‘cause’, we make a presupposition that profoundly influences subsequent observations and experimental designs. Alternative definitions of causation should be considered as contributing to potential cures for research problems. (shrink)

Corporate ethical values (CEVs) can be viewed outside the realm of organizational training, standard operating procedures, reward and punishment systems, formal statements, and as more representative of the real nature of the organization (Organ, 1988). Past researchers have empirically demonstrated the direct influence of CEVs on job performance. This study argues that employees' perception of organizational fairness will create perceptual distortion of CEVs. The results of the study indicate that perceived fairness moderates the influence of CEVs on two seminal outcomes, (...) namely, job performance and commitment. The study offers prescriptive and descriptive insights to both academe and industry to understand the influence of CEVs and fairness on the performance outcomes of employees. (shrink)

This essay addresses moral aspects of using carbon offsets for counteracting individuals’ luxury emissions. After introducing and outlining the main topics and terms related to carbon offsetting, this essay answers three objections that have been levied against carbon offsetting: objections from the indulgences analogy, objections from the directness of the duty not to harm, and separateness objections. The essay argues that advocates for offsetting have resources to defend against these criticisms by pointing to particularities of individual emissions’ harmfulness, as well (...) as the preemptive nature of offsetting. The essay then shows that in spite of these defenses there is reason to regard not emitting as a better option because of a host of problems that plague offsetting in its current forms. The essay concludes that offsetting enhances individuals’ options for discharging their duty not to harm, but that standards of justice and efficacy need to be adopted. (shrink)

This paper is a response to "The Customer Is Not Always Right" published in the November, 1994 issue of this Journal (Sorell, 1994). The authors argue that "The Customer Is Not Always Right" ignores significant contributions from the literature of business and economics. This comment refutes Sorell's arguments on a case by case basis showing why in each situation the customer is, in reality, right or the situation is not a question of the customer being right or wrong. Existing knowledge (...) from economics and marketing is shown to provide richer, more parsimonious explanations and answers to the problems and dilemmas posed by Sorell. (shrink)

In this study, I surveyed students' evaluative perceptions of instructor behavior and their possible influence on academic dishonesty. Slightly over 20% of 1,369 student respondents admitted to academic dishonesty in at least 1 class during 1 term at college. Students who admitted to acts of academic dishonesty had lower overall evaluations of instructor behavior than students who reported not committing academic dishonesty. Implications for student learning and the enhancement of academic integrity in the classroom are discussed.

The inevitable global marketplace creates a need for freer movement of labor. The question is not whether this movement will occur but how it will be implemented. This paper discusses the idea of selling citizenship rights as an alternative approach for allocating immigration and permanent residency. First presented is the rationale for using the market approach to selling citizenship. Next the political, country image, economic, and ethical implementation issues of the proposal are discussed. And last, selling citizenship is discussed in (...) terms of ethical theory and frameworks. (shrink)

After a discussion of the evolution and criticisms of state run lotteries, this article examines the ethics of lottery advertising. A discussion of the appeals used by lottery advertisers is followed by evidence concerning the impact of expected value information on lottery purchase intentions. Findings point toward less emphasis on the lottery as a solution to financial and job problems and more emphasis on information about the actual value of a lottery bet. Using accepted standards from the marketing literature, lottery (...) advertising is found to be deceptive. (shrink)

It appears at least intuitively appropriate to claim that we owe it to victims to punish those who have wronged them. It also seems plausible to state that we owe it to society to punish those who have violated its norms. However, do we also owe punishment to perpetrators themselves? In other words, do those who commit crimes have a moral right to be punished? This work examines the sustainability of the right to be punished from the standpoint of the (...) two main theories of rights—the will and the interest conceptions. The right to be punished is shown to be largely indefensible on both accounts: on the will theory, the right to be punished conflicts with autonomy, and it can neither be claimed nor waived by a perpetrator; on the interest theory, a perpetrator’s interest in punishment, inasmuch as it exists, is not sufficient to ground a duty on the part of the state. (shrink)

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, (...) than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability. (shrink)

The concern people are now expressing about the human environment, ecology, pollution, and overpopulation, though admittedly legitimate from a moral point of view, has not attracted much attention from philosophers. This is notable particularly inasmuch as the United States civil rights struggle, the Vietnam War, and various responses of civil disobedience and violence to social problems have all aroused philosophers to careful thought on rights and obligations. I do not want to suggest that a social problem is interesting only if (...) it is philosophically interesting; nor do I want to make light of the way in which the problems of waste, noise, and overcrowding have captured the popular imagination. Yes, we must protect and use wisely the human environment and natural resources. But still, saying it seems banal, and philosophers do not feed on banalities. Here we have a modern moral commandment which speaks to an urgent and serious matter but which, like “Do not steal,” seems so obvious as to be trite. Yes, we must plan the world’s population in a rational way. Even that commandment, though disputed by some, seems trite. (shrink)

American parents greatly value children’s happiness, citing it well above other possible priorities. This commitment to happiness, shared with parents in other Western societies but not elsewhere, is an important feature of popular emotional culture. But the commitment is also the product of modern history, emerging clearly only in the 19th century. This article explains the contrast between more traditional and modern views, and explains the origins but also the evolution of the idea of a happy childhood. Early outcomes, for (...) example, included the novel practice of hosting parties for children’s birthdays, another mid-19th-century innovation that has expanded over time. Explaining the intensification of the happiness commitment also reveals some of the downsides of this aspect of popular emotional culture, for example in measurably complicating reactions to childish unhappiness. The basic goal of the essay is to use this important facet of modern emotional history to evaluate a commitment that many modern parents assume is simply natural. (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 92-93. A collection of Images produced by intentionally corrupting the circuitry of a Kodak DC280 2 MP digitalcamera. By rewiring the electronics of a digital camera, glitched images are produced in a manner that parallels chemically processing unexposed film or photographic paper to produce photographic images without exposure to light. The DCP Series of Digital Images are direct visualizations of data generated by a digital camera as it takes a picture. Electronic processes associated with the normal operations (...) of the camera, which are usually taken for granted, are revealed through an act of intervention. The camera is turned inside­out through complexes of short­circuits, selected by the artist, transforming the camera from a picture taking device to a data capturing device that renders raw data (electronic signals) as images. In essence, these images are snap­shots of electronic signals dancing through the camera's circuits, manually rerouted, written directly to the on­board memory device. Rather than seeing images of the world through a lens, we catch a glimpse of what the camera sees when it is forced to peer inside its own mind. With the digital photo, this light, from out of the night, no longer comes entirely from the day, it doesn't come from a past day that would simply have become night (like the photons emenating from Baudelaire's face.) It comes from Hades, from the realm of the dead, from underground: it is an electric light, set free by materials from deep within the belly of the earth. And electronic, that is to say, a decomposed light. Digitization breaks the chain, it introduces manipulation even into the spectrum, and by the same token, it makes phantoms and phantasms indistinct. Photons become pixels that are in turn reduced zeroes and ones on which discrete calculations can be performed. Essentially indubitable when it was analog (whatever its accidental manipulability), the this was has become essentially doubtful when it is digital (it is nonmanipulation that becomes accidental). —Bernard Steigler, The Discrete Image There are so many ways to take something apart. Deconstruction, differentiation, dissection, dissolution. A whole slew of concepts and processes towards atomization which aim, eventually, to evoke or locate an essence of some kind, in material science as in philosophy. In picking things apart, what is it we attempt to do? To simplify? To comprehend? To confront? To disprove? With Stearns’ DCP Series we see that destructive scrutiny can sometimes bring about new forms. To create this series of images, Stearns applies circuit bending techniques to modern photography—his fingers and stray wires cutting across the camera’s circuitry at the moment of registration. As with Moholy­Nagy’s vinyl records and Nam June Paik’s cathode ray TVs, Stearns deconstructs the technological inscription of his era. In so doing, the function of the digital camera is revealed, but its transduction inverted: A recorder becomes a synthesizer, the scientist an artist. In a single, simple gesture, these works example a media archeology of the present. We resist the urge to call these photographs. —Jamie Allen. (shrink)

In the past decade, new, independent thinking in psychology has merged into an international movement that rejects the traditional "scientific" psychology and the reliance on experimental methodology. The movement is underpinned by the principle that human life is best understood through discourse. This "discursive" psychology has found adherents across all psychological disciplines and has ushered in a comprehensively revised understanding of the subject matter. Discursive Psychology in Practice puts these theoretical insights to work as it investigates concrete problems from decision (...) making, memory, and attribution to emotions, learning, and the self in a discursive light, thus mapping out a vision of a new psychology. Discursive Psychology in Practice will be invaluable to students and academics in all areas of psychology who have an interest in applying a discursive perspective. (shrink)

This volume bridges contemporary philosophical conceptions of risk and responsibility and offers an extensive examination of the topic. It shows that risk and responsibility combine in ways that give rise to new philosophical questions and problems. Philosophical interest in the relationship between risk and responsibility continues to rise, due in no small part due to environmental crises, emerging technologies, legal developments, and new medical advances. Despite such interest, scholars are just now working out how to conceive of the links between (...) risk and responsibility, the implications that risks may have to conceptions of responsibility (and vice versa), as well as how such theorizing might play out in applied cases. With contributions from leading scholars, this volume brings together new work examining the interplay between risk and responsibility, exploring its varied philosophical aspects and applications to contemporary issues in law, bioethics, technology, and environmental ethics. Risk and Responsibility in Context will be of interest to philosophers working in ethics, bioethics, philosophy of law, and philosophy of technology, as well as scholars and practitioners in law, health and science management, public policy, and environmental studies. (shrink)

This article uses historical analysis of shame to argue for a more active connection between emotions history and the other disciplines that deal with emotion. It assesses the current state of historical work on shame, including the argument for a 19th-century decline; it juxtaposes current social psychological and anthropological work with this argument. Additional data allow more precise consideration of changing patterns of shame, reasons for change, and probable impacts including increasing complexity in individual and social reactions alike. Evaluation includes (...) the unexpected increase in shame discussions in recent decades; the possibility that shame and “modernity” are ultimately incompatible; and some larger problems attached to the decline of shame. (shrink)

Since 1960 the prevailing interpretation of Anselm’s Proslogion has been that it contains not one but at least two ontological arguments for the existence of God. The first argument, appearing in Proslogion II, assumes that existence is a perfection and shows that God, the being more perfect than which no being can be conceived, exists. The crucial difficulty with this proof, as Kant pointed out and many contemporary philosophers agree, is that ‘existence’ is not a predicate, and therefore can not (...) signify any property, and hence can not signify a perfection. However, the prevailing interpretation claims, there is an additional argument in Proslogion III which at least is not subject to the difficulty Kant exposed. There the premiss is not that existence is a perfection but rather that necessary existence is a perfection. To this premiss the objection that ‘existence’ is not a predicate is irrelevant. Claiming that something necessarily exists does contribute to our concept of the entity in question. It tells us that the entity can not be brought into existence, is compatible with all conceivable states of affairs, and hence can not be destroyed. Since necessary existence is a consistently conceivable perfection which God can have, God, the being more perfect than which nothing can be conceived, must have it. Furthermore, some recent interpreters of the Proslogion maintain that the conclusion of the second argument is stronger than the conclusion of the first. Proslogion II, even if valid, yields nothing more than God’s existence, whereas Proslogion III yields God’s necessary existence. From the conclusion of Proslogion III the conclusion of Proslogion II is entailed, but not vice versa. The purpose of my paper is to show that the current interpretation of Anselm on these points is incorrect. (shrink)

In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir revealed that it is just this freedom of withdrawal from self that woman cannot gain because of the constant effort of establishing and guarding her identity against an enforced background of passivity, ornamentality and self-enclosure. Even as a small child, woman is taught how to.