The book answers long-standing questions on scientific modeling and inference across multiple perspectives and disciplines, including logic, mathematics, physics and medicine. The different chapters cover a variety of issues, such as the role models play in scientific practice; the way science shapes our concept of models; ways of modeling the pursuit of scientific knowledge; the relationship between our concept of models and our concept of science. The book also discusses models and scientific explanations; models in the semantic view of theories; (...) the applicability of mathematical models to the real world and their effectiveness; the links between models and inferences; and models as a means for acquiring new knowledge. It analyzes different examples of models in physics, biology, mathematics and engineering. Written for researchers and graduate students, it provides a cross-disciplinary reference guide to the notion and the use of models and inferences in science. (shrink)

Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. These (...) tensions raise an important question, namely, what are the metaphysical implications of the phenomenologically intuitive claim that objects themselves are constituents of experience? To answer this question, I draw on a broad swath of thought on transcendental idealism and phenomenology. I argue that a modest metaphysics of appearance is warranted within the critical limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Through discussing and addressing the problems that typically plague transcendental arguments, I show that Husserlian phenomenology permits stronger claims about objects of experience than deflationary accounts allow but does not permit claims about intrinsic properties allowed by some forms of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

According to A-theories of time, the metaphysical ground of change and dynamicity is provided by a continuous shifting in which events are past, present and future (A-determinations). It is often claimed that these theories make better sense of our experience of dynamicity than their rival, the B-theories; according to the latter, dynamicity is grounded solely in the irreducible earlier-than relations (B-relations) which obtain between events or states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that the experience of time's dynamicity, on (...) the contrary, cannot be accounted for solely in terms of representations of irreducible A-determinations, because any representation which is adequate to ground these experiences must itself involve representation of irreducible B-relations, while it needs not involve representation of A-determinations. Even if, as a matter of contingent fact, our experiences of dynamicity consisted of representations of successions of A-determinations, what would account for them being experiences of dynamicity would be solely the B-theoretic relations of succession, rather than the irrelevant A-theoretic nature of the relata. (shrink)

Contingentism is the claim that the history of a particular field of science could have taken a different route from the actual one, and that the resulting imaginary science could have been both as successful as the real one and, in a non-trivial way, incompatible with it. Inevitabilism consists in the denial of this claim. In this paper, I try both to give a clear content to contingentism, especially in the field of physics, and to argue for its plausibility, while (...) acknowledging that it is extremely hard to give an argument that establishes its validity in a compelling way. By contrasting the history of science with that of geographic discoveries and the difficulties faced by any inevitabilist account of the former, I consider three different characterizations of the success of science, truth, adequacy to the phenomena, and robust fit, and analyze their consequences for the meaning and plausibility of contingentism. I retain the third characterization of scientific success and argue that the role played by creativity in scientific activities and the fact that there is a multiplicity of paths that researchers can legitimately follow in order to obtain a robust fit jointly support a qualified version of contingentism.Keywords: Inevitabilism; Contingentism; Success of science; Stability; Historical emergence; Robust fit. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl’s theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can (...) tacitly anticipate the possibility of other subjects. It is also this type that is enriched through interactions between actual subjects. (shrink)

The neuroscience of language studies the relationship between linguistic phenomena and the structure and functioning of the human brain. In this chapter, the authors focus on the neural basis supporting the remarkable human capacity to effortlessly assemble single words into more complex hierarchical structures, thus enabling the production and comprehension of unbounded arrays of different linguistic expressions. They begin with a brief discussion of language as a biological system that includes a historical sketch of the understanding of language in the (...) brain. The authors provide an overview of the early days of brain‐syntax research in neuropsychology, primarily on the basis of lesion studies. They end with a reflection on the impact that Noam Chomsky's ideas have had on the neuroscience of language. (shrink)

La poeta Gloria Dünkler nació en Pucón, Chile, en 1977. Sus padres se dedicaban a la artesanía, la pesca y la música en la región de la Araucanía. Ella estudió Pedagogía en la Universidad de la Frontera y Bibliotecología y Documentación en la Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana. Actualmente trabaja en la Biblioteca Central de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Universidad de Chile. Su obra editada está compuesta por Quillaco seducido (Edición de autor, 2003), Füchse von Llafenko (Ediciones Tácitas, 2009), Spandau (...) (Ediciones Tácitas, 2012), Yatagán (Ediciones Tácitas, 2015) y Castrato (Ediciones Tácitas, 2020). Además, poemas suyos fueron incluidos en las antologías Mujeres en la poesía chilena actual (Semejanza, 2000), Desde todo el silencio (Los puños de la paloma, 2008), Comer con la mirada (Desde la gente, 2008) y Doce en punto (UNAM, 2012). La obra de Dünkler ha alcanzado amplio reconocimiento en su país, donde obtuvo tres importantes premios: el de la Academia Chilena de Letras (2009), el Premio Municipal de Literatura de Santiago (2012) y el Premio Pablo Neruda de Poesía Joven (2015). Su obra ha sido traducida al alemán, al polaco y al catalán. (shrink)

Nel presente articolo tenteremo di mettere in luce in che modo la filosofia di Gilles Deleuze intrattenga un rapporto ineludibile con il tema delle pratiche, volendo mostrare il profondo interesse che il pensatore francese nutre nei confronti dei _πράγματα__. _Per seguire un tale itinerario, al contempo speculativo e pragmatico, ci soffermeremo su alcuni concetti chiave dell’opera deleuziana (creazione, invenzione, problematicismo, drammatizzazione e genesi), che crediamo possano contribuire a mettere in luce nel suo agire evenemenziale la dimensione “praticalista” del pensiero di (...) Deleuze. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay is an introduction to Time and Reality I, the first part of a special issue dedicated to the philosophy of time. Here I outline a number of new trends in philosophical theorizing about time, detailing how the various contributions fit into the picture. I argue that there has been a potentially misleading tendency to separate the debate over the passage of time from the debate over the reality of tense. This has obscured a number of interesting philosophical (...) questions. One of the aims of this volume is to bring these two issues together, where they belong. I argue that many contributions to it go in the right direction. The contributions to this volume also establish uncharted philosophical junctures between Metaphysics, Aesthetics, Morality, and the Philosophy of Mind. (shrink)

There are two no-change objections that can be raised against the B-theory of time. One stems from the observation that in a B-theoretic scenario changes of determinations can only be represented by propositions which have eternal truth values. The other derives from the principle that nothing can vary over a period of time if it doesn’t instantiate a state of change at all the instants of time which compose it. Here I argue that both objections apply to all comparative conceptions (...) of change, regardless of whether they take tense seriously or not. It follows that, contrary to what is widely believed, A-theoretic accounts of time are not immune to no-change objections, just in virtue of being realist about tense. A-theorists must either accept the conclusion that time, according to their account, does not flow, or put forward an account of flow that is not comparative. A number of difficulties with both of these options are discussed. (shrink)

A corpus made by online Canadian newspaper articles, coming from the archives of CBC News, Vice Canada and Huffington Post Canada, and related multimedia contents such us audio interviews, videos and especially links to images and comments shared on Twitter, allows us to reconstruct the debate on the seal hunt that involved Canadian media in 2014. In specific, we propose an interpretation of the pro-sealing discourse by Canadian Inuit and Newfoundlanders as an ironic and incisive answer to the serious United (...) States animal rights activists discourse, explaining how these two different points of view on animals come from a different experience of the environment and a different conception of nature. The image of the seal became the friction point between Western naturalism against Inuit animism: a multinaturalist clash in the North America post-colonial situation. A clash solved by people as Tanya Tagaq and other Inuit artists that belong to these two different semiospheres and thanks to their border placement can allow a dialog between Inuit and North American cultures traducing aesthetic forms, values and meanings. To study the structures of meaning at the base of this clash and iconoclash Iconoclash. Beyond the image-wars in science, religion and art, pp 14–37, ZKM and MIT Press, Boston, 2002) on the artic seal between opposite cultures, it has been necessary to use the socio-semiotic approach with the help of semiotics of culture tools (Lotman in Universe of the mind. A semiotic theory of culture. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990, Culture and explosion. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 2009]. (shrink)

Las experiencias de justicia transicional en la antigüedad griega muestran hasta qué punto las emociones pueden jugar un papel específico en el restablecimiento social de la memoria, la justicia y la verdad. A partir de un estudio de fuentes clásicas provenientes de Atenas, Dicea y Nacone, el propósito del presente trabajo es identificar la ficción afectiva sobre la que reposan estos marcos institucionales: al proyectar el plano emocional desde los individuos hasta la colectividad, se produce una instalación política del páthos (...) que, mediante la planificación, procura superar los efectos traumáticos de la guerra civil y diseñar una comunidad emocional basada en las virtudes de la reconciliación. (shrink)

A theory of action is fundamental for legal theory, as the law is meant to direct behaviour: it influences the behaviour of agents who can understand the law’s prescriptions and act accordingly. A connection between law and action is assumed by the most diverse approaches to the law; when no reference is made to this connection it is since it appears to be an obvious truism. Let us list just a few examples where this connection appears most clearly.

El texto aborda la idea de poema en Walter Benjamin, aconsiderando tanto el contexto histórico como el literario que da pie a su particular concepción. La obra de arte en general y el poema en particular, suponen una instancia no representable, que permanece en un espacio indefinido, sin embargo, aprehensible mediante una dialéctica que tiene lugar en la propia obra.

We argue that the view that we misperceive time as passing is self-undermining.

The visuospatial system integrates inner and outer functional processes, organizing spatial, temporal, and social interactions between the brain, body, and environment. These processes involve sensorimotor networks like the eye–hand circuit, which is especially important to primates, given their reliance on vision and touch as primary sensory modalities and the use of the hands in social and environmental interactions. At the same time, visuospatial cognition is intimately connected with memory, self-awareness, and simulation capacity. In the present article, we review issues associated (...) with investigating visuospatial integration in extinct human groups through the use of anatomical and behavioral data gleaned from the paleontological and archaeological records. In modern humans, paleoneurological analyses have demonstrated noticeable and unique morphological changes in the parietal cortex, a region crucial to visuospatial management. Archaeological data provides information on hand–tool interaction, the spatial behavior of past populations, and their interaction with the environment. Visuospatial integration may represent a critical bridge between extended cognition, self-awareness, and social perception. As such, visuospatial functions are relevant to the hypothesis that human evolution is characterized by changes in brain–body–environment interactions and relations, which enhance integration between internal and external cognitive components through neural plasticity and the development of a specialized embodiment capacity. We therefore advocate the investigation of visuospatial functions in past populations through the paleoneurological study of anatomical elements and archaeological analysis of visuospatial behaviors. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Priest’s account of change and motion, contrasting it with its more orthodox rival, the Russellian account. The paper is divided in two parts. In first one we take a stance that is more sympathetic to the Russellian view, arguing that Priest’s arguments against it are inconclusive. In the second part, instead, we take a more sympathetic attitude towards Priest’s objections. We argue, however, that if these objections pose insurmountable difficulties to the Russellian account, then they (...) pose the same difficulties also to Priest’s favoured Hegelian account, and for the same reasons. (shrink)

In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...) explain how schemata function to subsume objects under concepts and to anticipate possible objects of experience before moving on to discuss the schema of substance. Next, I present a brief explanation of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, organizing my presentation around the idea of apperception. This paves the way for a demonstration of how the fundamental type is best understood as standing at the center of a cluster of concepts, including apperception, passive belief, natural bodies, and the one spatio-temporal horizon of experience. I argue that the fundamental type is central to Husserl’s attempt to ground logic in pre-predicative experience. Finally, I compare two specific types with schemata on the grounds cultivated in the previous sections. The first of these types, the fundamental type, functions to pre-predicatively anticipate objects of possible experience, just as schemata do. The second of these types, which is implied by but never discussed in Husserl’s work, serves to mediate between a formal system of rules and an intuitive grasp of the world, just as schemata do. (shrink)

In his In Contradiction (1987), Priest levelled three powerful arguments against the received Russellian view of change and motion. He argued that his preferred paraconsistent theory of change, the Hegelian account, is immune from these objections. Here I argue that these three arguments are sound, but that the Hegelian account falls pray to them too. I conclude, however, that the Hegelian account is in a better position to tackle these challenges.

We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.

Jusqu’à récemment, les deux textes écrits par Georges Canguilhem sur l’écologie restaient peu connus. Aujourd’hui, ils sont réunis dans le tome V des Œuvres complètes. Chez Can-guilhem, le sujet de l’écologie est intrinsèquement lié aux concepts de technique et de milieu, dont la généalogie théorique remonte à ses premiers ouvrages des années 1930. Ce qui éclaire ces questions : l’être humain doit-il renoncer aux techniques pour restaurer un équilibre supposé avec la nature, ne serait-il pas plutôt nécessaire de rendre à (...) ses besoins leur priorité sur les intérêts économiques? (shrink)

La pensée de Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) connaît un regain d'intérêt dans les lieux académiques et de recherche. Ainsi, eut lieu à l'Université Paris-1 un colloque international intitulé «Un nouveau Canguilhem? » pour la parution des Oeuvres complètes jetant une nouvelle lumière sur des écrits de jeunesses peu connus. Mais que peut-on apprendre de ces manuscrits privés? Ces écrits inédits confirment-ils l'opinion vague qui lie le philosophe aux sciences naturelles? Ce livre privilégie un autre angle: Canguilhem en philosophe de l'action.

We develop a conceptual and formal clarification of notion of surprise as a belief-based phenomenon by exploring a rich typology. Each kind of surprise is associated with a particular phase of cognitive processing and involves particular kinds of epistemic representations (representations and expectations under scrutiny, implicit beliefs, presuppositions). We define two main kinds of surprise: mismatch-based surprise and astonishment. In the central part of the paper we suggest how a formal model of surprise can be integrated with a formal model (...) of belief change. We investigate the role of surprise in triggering the process of belief reconsideration. There are a number of models of surprise developed in the psychology of emotion. We provide several comparisons of our approach with those models. (shrink)

An Archaeology of Educational Evaluation: Epistemological Spaces and Political Paradoxes outlines the epistemology of the theories and models that are currently employed to evaluate educational systems, education policy, educational professionals and students learning. It discusses how those theories and models find their epistemological conditions of possibility in a specific set of conceptual transferences from mathematics and statistics, political economy, biology and the study of language. The book critically engages with the epistemic dimension of contemporary educational evaluation and is of theoretical (...) and methodological interest. It uses Foucauldian archaeology as a problematizing method of inquiry within the wider framework of governmentality studies. It goes beyond a mere critique of the contemporary obsession for evaluation and attempts to replace it with the opening of a free space where the search for a mode of being, acting and thinking in education is not over-determined by the tyranny of improvement. This book will appeal to academics, researchers and post-graduate students in the fields of educational philosophy, education policy and social science. (shrink)

Las valoraciones estéticas de György Lukács sobre Franz Kafka han generado tanto un interés genuino por su análisis como circunstanciales polémicas. En este sentido, el presente artículo indaga fundamentalmente las lecturas del filósofo húngaro y las del teórico brasileño Carlos Nelson Coutinho sobre la obra del artista praguense. A partir del análisis detallado de las apreciaciones estéticas de ambos teóricos, el trabajo se propone disipar las aparentes controversias y hallar puntos de encuentro teóricos en la ponderación artística del literato.

RESUMEN Durante buena parte del siglo XX, uno de los grandes debates en el ámbito de los estudios sobre la doctrina del conocimiento según Tomás de Aquino fue aquel que rodeó la cuestión del proceso abstractivo. Particularmente la atención se volcó sobre el rol de este último como causa de la determinación de los objetos de ciencia especulativa. Dejando de lado las particularidades de esta discusión, este trabajo pretende enfocarse en el análisis particular de un texto en el que la (...) abstracción -aun figurando como el fundamento de la distinción de los objetos que estudia la matemática- no parece designar un tipo de operación intelectual; por el contrario, la abstracción figura como una propiedad de las propias esencias o formas matemáticas. En lo sucesivo se esbozará una interpretación de dicho texto y se enumerarán algunas objeciones contra dicha interpretación a las cuales se intentará dar respuesta. Las consecuencias de este hallazgo podrían conllevar la revisión de algunas ideas que se han vuelto comunes en la epistemología tomista. ABSTRACT During the 20th century, one of the most debated issues regarding Aquinas's theory of knowledge was the process of abstraction. Attention was mainly focused on the role of abstraction in the definition of objects of speculative sciences. Leaving aside the particular features of this debate, this paper aims to focus on the analysis of a very peculiar text in which abstraction -still considered as the cause of the distinction of mathematical objects- does not seem to designate some sort of intellectual operation. On the contrary, abstraction there appears as a property of the very mathematical essences or forms. The consequences of this could lead to the revision of some established ideas in Thomistic Epistemology. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to formulate a clear definition of the concept of crisis of Western sciences introduced by Husserl in his last work. The attempt will be based on a reading of the Krisis, which will stress its underlying continuity with Husserl’s life-long concerns about the theoretical insufficiency of positive sciences, and downplay the novelty of the idea of crisis itself within Husserl’s work. After insisting on the fact that, according to Husserl, only an account of the shortcomings (...) of the scientificity of Western sciences can justify the claim that they are undergoing a crisis, it will be argued that the common definition of the crisis of the sciences as the loss of their significance for life rests on a misunderstanding. The crisis of Western sciences will be characterized, instead, as the repercussion of the crisis of the scientificity of philosophy on the scientificity of positive sciences. The loss of significance of scientific knowledge for our existence will in turn appear as a further, inevitable consequence of the uprooting of the sciences from the soil of a universal philosophy culminating in metaphysics, and thus, as a phenomenon deeply intertwined with the crisis of Western sciences, but not identical to it. (shrink)

The view from inside maintains that not only to study and understand, but also to profit from financial markets, it is necessary to get as much knowledge as possible about their internal ‘structure’ and machinery. This view maintains that in order to solve the problems posed by finance, or at least a large part of them, we need first of all a qualitative analysis. Rules, laws, institutions, regulators, the behavior and the psychology of traders and investors are the key elements (...) to the understanding of finance, and stock markets in particular. Accordingly, data and their mathematical analysis are not the crucial elements, since data are the output of a certain underlying structure of markets and their actors. The underlying structure is the ultimate object of the inquiry. This chapter examines how the view from inside raises, and deals with, critical issues such as markets failure, information disclosure, and regulation, the notion of data, performativity, and the study of micro-structures. (shrink)

The arena of the philosophy of time has been largely concerned with deciding whether tense distinctions reflect absolute metaphysical distinctions or not. After bringing the debate over the metaphysical status of instantaneous velocity to bear on the debate over the nature of temporal passage, I argue that we should further investigate whether aspectual distinctions reflect objective and absolute metaphysical distinctions too. I conclude that those who think that being realist about tense uniquely makes room for the idea that time passes (...) should be realist about the progressive too. (shrink)

I present a variant of with time, called, interpreted in standard Kripke semantics. On the syntactic level, is nothing but the extension of atemporal individual by: the future tense and past tense operators, and the operator of group agency for the grand coalition. A sound and complete axiomatisation for is given. Moreover, it is shown that supports reasoning about interesting normative concepts such as the concepts of achievement obligation and commitment.

The property of being the implementation of a computational structure has been argued to be vacuously instantiated. This claim provides the basis for most antirealist arguments in the field of the philosophy of computation. Standard manoeuvres for combating these antirealist arguments treat the problem as endogenous to computational theories. The contrastive analysis of computational and other mathematical representations put forward here reveals that the problem should instead be treated within the more general framework of the Newman problem in structuralist accounts (...) of mathematical representation. It is argued that purely structuralist and purely functionalist accounts of implementation are inadequate to tackle the problem. An extensive evaluation of semantic accounts is provided, arguing that semantic properties are, unlike structural and functional ones, suitable to restrict the intended domain of implementation of computational properties in such a way as to block the Newman problem. The semantic hypothesis is defended from a number of recent objections. (shrink)

A recent idea of “ecosystem health” was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to draws attention to the fact that ecosystems can become ill because of a reduction of properties such as primary productivity, functions and diversity of interactions among system components. Starting from the 1990s, this idea has been deeply criticized by authors who argued that, insofar as ecosystems show many differences with respect to organismic features, these two kinds of systems cannot share a typical organismic property such as (...) health. In recent years, an organisational approach in philosophy of biology and ecology argued that both organisms and ecosystems may share a fundamental characteristic despite their differences, namely, organisational closure. Based on this kind of closure, scholars have also discussed health and malfunctional states in organisms. In this paper, we examine the possibility of expanding such an organisational approach to health and malfunctions to the ecological domain. Firstly, we will see that a malfunction is related to a lower effectiveness in the functional behaviour of some biotic components with respect to other systemic components. We will then show how some introduced species do not satisfactorily interact in an organisational closure with other ecosystem components, thus posing a threat to the self-maintenance of the ecosystem in which they are found. Accordingly, we will argue that an ecosystem can be said to be healthy when it is a vital environment organisationally grounded on its intrinsic capacity to ensure, under favourable conditions, appropriate functional behaviours for ecosystem components and ecosystem self-maintenance. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s account of passive synthesis can be developed into a phenomenology of peripheral experience. Peripheral experiences are not defined by their location in visual space but by their phenomenal and intentional character, by what these experiences are like and how they present things in the world. Further, I argue that peripheral experience is of a piece with our most basic background convictions about the world. As such, the periphery is epistemically neutral, but not therefore empty of meaning. (...) It is meaningful as holding open the possibility of further activity, both practical and intellectual. I explore these ideas by focusing on peripheral color experience. Husserl’s discussions of associative synthesis, affection, and doxic and nondoxic forms of attention prove key to detailing peripheral color experience. I end by arguing that at the periphery, intentional content and phenomenal content come apart. (shrink)

Many historical studies tend to underline two central Kantian themes frequently emerging in Georges Canguilhem’s works: (1) a conception of activity, primarily stemming from the Critique of Pure Reason, as a mental and abstract synthesis of judgment; and (2) a notion of organism, inspired by the Critique of Judgment, as an integral totality of parts. Canguilhem was particularly faithful to the first theme from the 1920s to the first half of the 1930s, whereas the second theme became important in the (...) early 1940s. With this article, I will attempt to show that a third important theme of technique arose in the second half of the 30s also in the wake of Kant’s philosophy, especially Sect. 43 of the Critique of Judgment. This section, which states that technical ability is distinguished from a theoretical faculty, led Canguilhem to a more concrete and practical conception of activity. I will then suggest that it was by considering technique that the concept of normativity, which characterizes Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy of life, also took shape. (shrink)