The book comprises an enquiry into what quantum theory shows us about the world. Its aim is to sort out which metaphysical speculations are tenable and which are not. After an initial discussion of realism, the author provides a non-technical exposition of quantum theory and a criticism of the proposal that quantum theory should make us revise our beliefs about logic. He then discusses the various problems and puzzles which make quantum theory both interesting and perplexing. The text defends three (...) markedly different speculations. The first of them, the "determinate particle speculation", is shown to involve both a view which proposes determinate locations and velocities for particles and the opposite. With the "wave speculation" particles are seen as different again: here the professor proposes a radically original view of particles as polywaves. In the final chapter, he compares the competing particle theories and shows that two ostensibly opposing views are in fact compatible. He goes on to discuss the implications of quantum theory for our understanding of persons. The work assumes no prior knowledge of quantum theory and confines the necessary mathematical details to end-notes. (shrink)

Introduction -- Overview -- Theism, simplicity, and properly anthropocentric metaphysics -- Materialism and dualism -- The power, knowledge, and motives of the primordial God -- The existence of the primordial God -- God changes -- Understanding evil -- The Trinity -- The Incarnation -- Concluding remarks.

In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason (...) to accept and their opponents have reason to reject. So, neutralism is not neutral on the topic of whether properties are universals. Nor is Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation as naturalistic as he claims. I argue that although compatible with Ontological Naturalism, his theory provides a precedent for the non-naturalistic emergence of mental properties. Finally, I argue that because his theory requires a simple physics it presupposes a more rationalist epistemology than that of Methodological Naturalism. (shrink)

Mereotopology is that branch of the theory of regions concerned with topological properties such as connectedness. It is usually developed by considering the parthood relation that characterizes the, perhaps non-classical, mereology of Space (or Spacetime, or a substance filling Space or Spacetime) and then considering an extra primitive relation. My preferred choice of mereotopological primitive is interior parthood . This choice will have the advantage that filters may be defined with respect to it, constructing “points”, as Peter Roeper has done (...) (“Region-based topology”, Journal of Philosophical Logic , 26 (1997), 25–309). This paper generalizes Roeper’s result, relying only on mereotopological axioms, not requiring an underlying classical mereology, and not assuming the Axiom of Choice. I call the resulting mathematical system an approximate lattice , because although meets and joins are not assumed they are approximated. Theorems are proven establishing the existence and uniqueness of representations of approximate lattices, in which their members, the regions, are represented by sets of “points” in a topological “space”. (shrink)

In this paper I have had two aims. One was to describe a number of pantheist or near pantheist religious attitudes, including the influence of many worlds theories. The other was to indicate some of the ways we might arrive at Pantheism.One final remark: when assessing religious positions the intellectual grounds for accepting or rejecting them should, I suggest, be whether they make sense of things, that is, enable us to understand. The ways to Pantheism, or to near Pantheism, should (...) therefore be interpreted as part of a comparison between ways of understanding. (shrink)

My enquiry will be within the scope of two suppositions. The first is that Space is continuous, not discrete. The second is that we are to adopt realism about either points or regions or both. That does not, however, preclude a choice of categories—substance or property—for these entities. Thus we could think of either regions or points as properties of the things in those regions or at those points. Alternatively, we could think of regions or points as substances which themselves (...) have properties. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Realism about Possible Worlds by showing how it leads to a counter-intuitive scepticism about the rationality of Occam’s razor. This can be thought of as a transcendental argument from Logic to Metaphysics. It should be contrasted with a straightforward application of Logic to Metaphysics, as when we apply Occam’s razor to reject a category of entities which we judge to be redundant.

In this chapter I assume that we accept, perhaps reluctantly, general facts, that is states of affairs corresponding to universal generalizations. I then argue that, without any addition, this ontology provides us with physical necessities, and moreover with various grades of physical necessity, including the strongest grade, which I call absolute physical necessity. In addition there are consequences for our understanding of time. For this account, which I call the Mortmain Theory, provides a defence of No Futurism against an otherwise (...) serious objection due to David Armstrong. In addition the Mortmain theory enables me to argue against the ‘‘Parmenidean’’ or Block Universe position that future and past are both real. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBy the Many Categories problem, I mean the prima facie violation of Ockham’s Razor by realists about universals: there is, it might seem, just too much variety. Thus, David Armstrong posits both properties and relations. He also theorises about determinates of determinables. Another influential realist, E. J. Lowe distinguishes non-substantial from substantial universals. Yet again, both Armstrong and Lowe include in their ontology abstract particulars in addition to universals. My aim in this paper is to offer a unification of these (...) categories using an operator-theory. First, I show how operators provide a theory of abstract particulars of relations and of impure relational properties. Then, using impure relational properties I derive the Fregeanion Principle. After some metaphysics of mathematics, I provide a theory of determinables. Finally, I consider kinds and substances. (shrink)

The concept ‘silence’ has diametrically opposed meanings; it connotes peace and contemplation as well as death and oblivion. Silence can also be considered a practice. There is keeping the rule of silence to still the mind and find inner truth, as well as forcibly silencing in the sense of subjugating another to one's own purposes. The concept of teaching runs the gamut between these extremes, from respectfully leading students to search and discover, to relentlessly bending them to one's own will. (...) This article examines contradictory connotations and practices of silence and teachers’ ambivalent perceptions of it in order to conceptualize a positive practice of silence for teacher education. (shrink)

Conceivability is, I say, prima facie evidence for possibility. Hence, we may count the cost of theories about possibility by listing the ways in which, according to the theory in question, something conceivable is said nonetheless to be impossible. More succinctly we may state a principle, Hume's razor to put alongside Ockham's. Hume's razor says that necessities are not to be multiplied more than necessary. In this paper I count the cost of David Lewis's modal realism, showing that many of (...) the objections are replied to by Lewis only at the cost of multiplying necessities. (shrink)

Consider the things that exist—the entities—and let us suppose they are mereologically structured, that is, some are parts of others. The project of ontology within the bounds of bare mereology use this structure to say which of these entities belong to various ontological kinds, such as properties and particulars. My purpose in this paper is to defend the most radical section of the project, the mereological theory of the exemplification of universals. Along the way I help myself to several hypotheses: (...) the existence of merely possible worlds; that particulars have thisnesses; and that mereology is far from classical. Moreover, the way I characterize instantiation might be judged too complicated to be plausible. At the end of the paper, I reply to these objections based on complexity. (shrink)

© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] intellectual virtue an obstacle to religious faith? The papers in this fine collection answer this question either directly or indirectly.1 The editors, Laura Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, are to be congratulated on requesting, and receiving, from the authors accessible papers that cover many of the relevant issues. In addition they have provided a clear introduction and useful summaries....In (...) this review, I first consider the way the editors explicate the question. Then I examine the authors' answers. Finally I draw some conclusions from the various papers.In their Introduction the editors remind us of the complexity of faith, which typically involves: various intellectual propensities, notably tenacity of belief; a world-view; a moral orientation and an ‘affective stance’. This last may well be the... (shrink)

This paper presents a case for the thesis that quantum mechanics is compatible with common sense. I make this case by exhibiting a Wignerian formulation of quantum mechanics and a neo-Dirackian interpretation of quantum mechanics thus formulated. Together these reconcile quantum mechanics with some common-sense theses, which might seem to be violated by quantum mechanics.

In Chapter II of Appearance and Reality, Bradley writes.

In this paper I propose an indubitability analysis of knowledge. The motivation for this analysis is a conviction I have that the Cartesian analysis of knowledge as indubitability is not completely mistaken, although it requires considerable weakening if it is to be satisfactory. My analysis may be contrasted to those which treat knowledge as a species of the genus justified true belief. For although on my analysis, ‘S knows that p’ entails ‘S has a justified true belief that p’, I (...) am not proposing indubitability as a differentia distinguishing knowledge from other members of the genus justified true belief. The situation here is analogous to that of the conceptual relation between vermillion and red: ‘X is vermillion’ entails ‘X is red’, but there is no straightforward differentia which would entitle us to think of vermillion as a species of the genus red. Another point of contrast is that species-of-justified-true-belief analyses start with an analysis which is too weak and strengthen it. My starting point is an analysis which is too strong which I then weaken. (shrink)

In his admirable commentary, Jeffrey Henderson notes the significance of posture and of physical setting. He does not remark that the statue of Leaina near to which Lysistrata and Kalonike are standing on the Akropolis was intimately tied to the obscure story of the later years in the Athenian tyranny. With minor variations of detail or colour the story was that Leaina, a hetaira beloved of Harmodios or Aristogeiton, had been tortured by Hippias after the murder of Hipparchos but, brave (...) girl, had preferred to die than say yes, or indeed say anything. She bit out her tongue. The Athenians set up a bronze lioness, the work of Amphikrates, to commemorate her martyrdom. (shrink)

Book Information Warranted Christian Belief. By Alvin Plantinga. Oxford University Press. New York. 2000. Pp. xx + 508.

In this paper I defend the Direct Actualisation of Conditional Situations as a way of explaining how God answers prayers without assuming that God acts on the world after the prayer is made. My hypothesis states that God, in creating, brings about conditionals without either preventing the antecedent or bringing about the consequent. I compare this hypothesis with some rivals, notably the appeals to foreknowledge and to middle knowledge.

This article provides a biographical sketch of the Russian composer and educator D. B. Kabalevsky, a discussion of his philosophy of music and education, and an overview of his music for children. Kabalevsky's philosophy of education and music encompassed a wide range of ideas that were developed over his life-time. Central to his philosophy is the belief that music and the arts should be accessible to all children and, in turn, to all people.