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Garrett Cullity [85]G. Cullity [15]G. M. Cullity [4]Garrett Michael Cullity [1]
  1. The Moral Demands of Affluence.Garrett Cullity - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press on Demand.
    Given that there is a forceful case for thinking that the affluent are morally required to devote a substantial proportion of what they have to helping the poor, Garrett Cullity examines, refines and defends an argument of this form. He then identifies its limits.
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  2. Offsetting and Risk Imposition.Christian Barry & Garrett Cullity - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):352-381.
    Suppose you perform two actions. The first imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive; but the second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form a set of actions that is risk-neutral, can you thereby make your overall course of conduct permissible? This question is theoretically interesting, because the answer is apparently: sometimes Yes, sometimes No. It is also practically important, because it bears on the moral (...)
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  3.  20
    The Moral Demands of Affluence.Garrett Cullity - 2005 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 67 (3):598-600.
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  4.  61
    Concern, Respect, and Cooperation.Garrett Cullity - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality – or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as three independently important foundations of (...)
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  5. Ethics and practical reason.Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.) - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. Issues covered include: the connection between reason and motivation; the source of moral reasons and their relation to reasons of self-interest; the relation of practical reason to value, to freedom, to responsibility, and (...)
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  6. weighing reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    What is involved in weighing normative reasons against each other? One attractive answer offers us the following Simple Picture: a fact is a reason for action when it bears to an action the normative relation of counting in its favour; this relation comes in different strengths or weights; the weights of the reasons for and against an action can be summed; the reasons for performing the action are sufficient when no other action is more strongly supported, overall; the reasons are (...)
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  7. Do We Impose Undue Risk When We Emit and Offset? A Reply to Stefansson.Christian Barry & Garrett Cullity - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):242-248.
    ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a way (...)
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  8. Moral Free Riding.Garrett Cullity - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1):3-34.
    This paper presents a moral philosophical account of free riding, specifying the conditions under which failing to pay for nonrival goods is unfair. These conditions do not include the voluntary acceptance of the goods: this controversial claim is supported on the strength of a characterization of the kind of unfairness displayed in paradigm cases of free riding. Thus a "Principle of Fairness" can potentially serve as a foundation for political obligations. The paper also discusses the relation between its moral philosophical (...)
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  9.  51
    Climate Harms.Garrett Cullity - 2019 - The Monist 102 (1):22-41.
    How should we think of the relationship between the climate harms that people will suffer in the future and our current emissions activity? Who does the harming, and what are the moral implications? One way to address these questions appeals to facts about the expected harm associated with one’s own individual energy-consuming activity, and argues that it is morally wrong not to offset one’s own personal carbon emissions. The first half of the article questions the strength of this argument. The (...)
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  10. Acts, Omissions, Emissions.Garrett Cullity - 2015 - In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 148-64.
    What requirements does morality impose on us in relation to climate change? This question can be asked of individuals, of the entire global population, and of groups of various sizes in between. Given the case for accepting that we all collectively ought to be causing less climate-affecting pollution than we do, what follows from that about the moral status of the actions of members of the larger group? I examine two main ways in which moral requirements on group members can (...)
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  11.  11
    Thinking How to Live.Garrett Cullity - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):308-311.
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  12. Neutral and relative value.Garrett Cullity - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 96-116.
    This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory...
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  13. Ethics and Practical Reason.Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):570-575.
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  14. Decisions, Reasons and Rationality.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):57-95.
    What difference do our decisions make to our reasons for action and the rationality of our actions? There are two questions here, and good grounds for answering them differently. However, it still makes sense to discuss them together. By thinking about the relationships that reasons and rationality bear to decisions, we may be able to cast light on the relationship that reasons and rationality bear to each other.
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  15. Public goods and fairness.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):1 – 21.
    To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that when free riding (...)
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  16.  25
    Ethics and Practical Reason.Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):537-539.
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  17. Pooled beneficence.Garrett Cullity - 2000 - In Mike Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits. Springer. pp. 9-42.
    There can be situations in which, if I contribute to a pool of resources for helping a large number of people, the difference that my contribution makes to any of the people helped from the pool will be imperceptible at best, and maybe even non-existent. And this can be the case where it is also true that giving the same amount directly to one of the intended beneficiaries of the pool would have made a very large difference to her. Can (...)
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  18. International aid and the scope of kindness.Garrett Cullity - 1994 - Ethics 105 (1):99-127.
    This paper argues that it is morally wrong for the affluent not to contribute money or time to famine relief. It begins by endorsing an important methodological line of objection against the most prominent philosophical advocate of this claim, Peter Singer. This objection attacks his strategy of invoking a principle the acceptability of which is apparently based upon its conformity with "intuitive" moral judgements in order to defend a strongly counterintuitive conclusion. However, what follows is an argument for that counterintuitive (...)
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  19.  69
    The Context-Undermining of Practical Reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):8-34.
    Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen.
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  20. Demandingness and Arguments from Presupposition.Garrett Cullity - 2009 - In Timothy Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 8-34.
  21. Introduction.Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27.
  22. Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2017 - In Noell Birondo & S. Stewart Braun (eds.), Virtue’s Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons. New York: Routledge. pp. 11-31.
    Moral discourse contains judgements of two prominent kinds. It contains deontic judgements about rightness and wrongness, obligation and duty, and what a person ought to do. As I understand them, these deontic judgements are normative: they express conclusions about the bearing of normative reasons on the actions and other responses that are available to us. And it contains evaluative judgements about goodness and badness. Prominent among these are the judgements that evaluate the quality of our responsiveness to morally relevant reasons. (...)
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  23. Particularism and moral theory: Particularism and presumptive reasons: Garrett Cullity.Garrett Cullity - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):169–190.
    Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a (...)
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  24. Asking Too Much.Garrett Cullity - 2003 - The Monist 86 (3):402 - 418.
    Most of us think that it can be wrong not to help someone in chronic need — someone whose life you could easily save, say. And many of us find it hard to see how the remoteness of needy people, either physical, social or psychological, should make a difference to this. Maybe it makes a difference to how wrong it is not to help, but it is hard to see how it can make a difference to whether not helping is (...)
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  25. Discriminate Virtue.Garrett Cullity - 2022 - Australasian Philosophical Review 6 (2):180-188.
    ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove’s ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’ maintains that sometimes virtue is fundamental in the order of value, and that we should reject the general thesis that the value of our responses depends on their proportionality to the value of the objects toward which they are directed. He argues that this view is needed to account for the moral phenomena surrounding love, forgiveness and ambition. I object that his view is unable to explain the forms of discrimination that distinguish (...)
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  26.  21
    Free riding.G. M. Cullity - 2022 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. pp. 2220-227.
    “Free riding,” used as a descriptive term, refers to taking a jointly produced benefit without contributing towards its production. Used as a term of criticism, it refers to the wrongful failure to contribute towards the joint production of benefits that one receives. On either usage, the central interest of moral philosophy in free riding is the same: to specify the conditions under which not contributing towards the joint production of benefits that one receives is wrong, and to explain why.
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  27.  7
    Introduction.Garrett Cullity - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):289-292.
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  28. Weighing Reasons.G. Cullity - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
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  29.  10
    Practical Theory.Garrett Cullity - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 101--24.
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  30.  84
    Moral Character and the Iteration Problem.Garrett Cullity - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (2):289.
    Moral evaluation is concerned with the attribution of values whose distinction into two broad groups has become familiar. On the one hand, there are the most general moral values of lightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, and what ought to be or to be done. On the other, there is a great diversity of more specific moral values which these objects can have: of being a theft, for instance, or a thief; of honesty, reliability or callousness. Within the recent body of work (...)
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  31.  45
    Another Shake of the Bag: Stefansson and Willners on Offsetting and Risk Imposition.Christian Barry & Garrett Cullity - forthcoming - Ethics, Policy and Environment.
    There is a difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to who is harmed, and worsening someone’s prospect. This difference is relevant to debates about the ethics of offsetting, since it means that showing that emitting-and-offsetting has the first feature is not a way of showing that it has the second feature. In an earlier paper, we illustrate this difference with an example of a lottery in which you shake the bag from which a ball will be (...)
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  32.  38
    Describing rationality.Garrett Cullity - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3399-3411.
    This critical study of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning raises some questions about the various requirements of rationality Broome formulates, pointing out some apparent gaps and counterexamples; proposes a general description of rationality that is broadly consistent with Broome’s requirements while providing them with a unifying justification, filling the gaps, and removing the counterexamples; and presents two objections to the book’s broader argument concerning the nature and importance of reasoning.
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  33. Participatory Moral Reasons: Their Scope and Strength.Garrett Cullity - forthcoming - Journal of Practical Ethics.
    A familiar part of ordinary moral thought is this idea: when other people are doing something worthwhile together, there is a reason for you to join in on the same terms as them. Morality does not tell you that you must always do this; but it exerts some pressure on you to join in. Suppose we take this idea seriously: just how should it be developed and applied? More particularly, just which groups and which actions are the ones with respect (...)
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  34. Beneficence.Garrett Cullity - 2007 - In Angus Dawson Richard Ashcroft & John McMillan Heather Draper (eds.), Principles of Health Care Ethics. Wiley. pp. 19-26.
  35. Virtue ethics, theory, and warrant.Garrett Cullity - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
    Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from (...)
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  36. Stupid Goodness.Garrett Cullity - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press.
    In Paradise Lost, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, I argue that this is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The essay examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is – between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able (...)
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  37. The moral, the personal and the political.Garrett Cullity - 2007 - In Igor Primoratz (ed.), Politics and morality. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  38.  71
    Exceptions in Nonderivative Value.Garrett Cullity - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):26-49.
    According to most substantive axiological theories – theories telling us which things are good and bad – pleasure is nonderivatively good. This seems to imply that it is always good, even when directed towards a bad object, such as another person’s suffering. This implication is accepted by the Mainstream View about misdirected pleasures: it holds that when someone takes pleasure in another person’s suffering, his being pleased is good, although his being pleased by suffering is bad. This view gains some (...)
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  39.  78
    The Life-Saving Analogy.G. Cullity - unknown
    Many writers have followed Peter Singer in drawing an analogy between assisting needy people at a distance and saving someone’s life directly. Arguments based on this analogy can take either a subsumptive or a non-subsumptive form. Such arguments face a serious methodological challenge.
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  40.  53
    As you were? Moral philosophy and the aetiology of moral experience.Garrett Cullity - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):117 – 132.
    What is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral epistemology. On this (...)
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  41.  20
    Conflicts of interest in divisions of general practice.N. Palmer, A. Braunack-Mayer, W. Rogers, C. Provis & G. Cullity - 2006 - Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (12):715-717.
    Community-based healthcare organisations manage competing, and often conflicting, priorities. These conflicts can arise from the multiple roles these organisations take up, and from the diverse range of stakeholders to whom they must be responsive. Often such conflicts may be titled conflicts of interest; however, what precisely constitutes such conflicts and what should be done about them is not always clear. Clarity about the duties owed by organisations and the roles they assume can help identify and manage some of these conflicts. (...)
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  42. the Iteration Problem'.G. Cullity & Moral Character - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (2).
     
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  43. Bernard Williams.Garrett Cullity - 2005 - In Brown Stuart (ed.), Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers, Vol. 2. Thoemmes Continuum. pp. 1132-8.
  44. compromised humanitarianism.Garrett Cullity - 2010 - In Keith Horton & Chris Roche (eds.), Ethical Questions and International NGOs: An Exchange between Philosophers and NGOs. Springer. pp. 157-73.
    The circumstances that create the need for humanitarian action are rarely morally neutral. The extremes of deprivation and want that demand a humanitarian response are often themselves directly caused by acts of war, persecution or misgovernment. And even when the direct causes lie elsewhere—when suffering and loss are caused by natural disaster, endemic disease or poverty of natural resources—the explanations of why some people are afflicted, and not others, are not morally neutral. It is those without economic or political power (...)
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  45. Neutral and Relative Value.Garrett Cullity - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    This chapter examines the distinction that is sometimes drawn between neutral and relative attributions of value. It asks whether a plausible interpretation can be found for claims about relative value, whether an interpretation can be found for claims about neutral value which best captures the thoughts that people express by using this distinction, whether the distinction can be used to produce a satisfactory way of formulating a relative-value consequentialist theory, and whether a theory of that kind is plausible. A positive (...)
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  46.  71
    Neutral and Relative Value.Garrett Cullity - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 96-116.
    This chapter examines the distinction that is sometimes drawn between neutral and relative attributions of value. It asks whether a plausible interpretation can be found for claims about relative value; whether an interpretation can be found for claims about neutral value which best captures the thoughts that people express by using this distinction; whether the distinction can be used to produce a satisfactory way of formulating a relative-value consequentialist theory; and whether a theory of that kind is plausible. A positive (...)
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  47.  42
    Agency and policy.Garrett Cullity & Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):315–325.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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  48. Beneficence, rights and citizenship.Garrett Cullity - 2006 - Australian Journal of Human Rights 9:85-105.
    What are we morally required to do for strangers? To answer this question – a question about the scope of requirements to aid strangers – we must first answer a question about justification: why are we required to aid them (when we are)? The main paper focuses largely on answering the question about justification, but does so in order to arrive at an answer to the question about scope. Three main issues are discussed. First, to what extent should requirements of (...)
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  49.  50
    Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency.Garrett Cullity - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, and why? This paper (...)
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  50.  33
    Foundations, Derivations, Applications: Replies to Bykvist, Arpaly, Steele, and Tenenbaum.Garrett Cullity - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):519-533.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 2, Page 519-533, March 2022.
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