This book advances Oruka's argument that the right to a human minimum is the most basic and necessary means to ensuring human dignity, a precondition to functioning as a moral agent. It also defends and promotes an understanding of justice as ensuring both egalitarian and ecological fairness at the global level.

Poverty in Africa has gained the attention of social activists, Non-Governmental Organizations, scholars from diverse fields, as well as governments. The contemporary reality of poverty, as revealed by various indices, shows that this problem has resisted the interventions so far. In view of the failures of earlier and current approaches to alleviating poverty in Africa, this paper explores the ethical and prudential approaches to setting anew, viable trajectory for poverty alleviation in twenty-first century Africa. It raises the fundamental question of (...) whether or not the affluent individuals in African societies on the one hand, and the wealthy Western nations on the other have any obligation towards the poor in Africa. On the basis of a critical consideration of some ethical theories in relation to the question of poverty, the paper contends that for the sake of stability and progress in the continent, it is necessary to develop programmes for the effectiveassistance of the poor on altruistic and prudential grounds. (shrink)

Human dignity, a normative category developed by the Colombian Constitutional Court, is seen from "humanist constitutionalism", due to its functionality for the configuration of the fundamental human right of access to the Internet that translates into a digital vital minimum of the human person, emphasizing in the inclusion of the poor and vulnerable affected by digital inequality. A complex fundamental hyperright that obliges the State to guarantee the human rights of their essential core and formulate (...) public policies for their effective satisfaction inherent in the realization of the valuable life project of the person and their effective functioning in society. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 7, Page 24-25, July 2011.

Animals are an important part of our social, economic and corporate world. Their wellbeing is significantly affected by the ways in which humans treat them. However, animals have long remained (and, indeed, continue to remain) effectively invisible in the business ethics and corporate responsibility discourse. This article argues in favor of the moral necessity of according animal welfare a higher priority in business. In line with most streams in both recent and traditional animal ethics, this article derives the avoidance of (...) unnecessary animal suffering as the moral minimum standard for responsible management in the livestock industry. Based on a broad range of different interpretations of what animal suffering may be necessary, the article discusses three distinct ways in which humans working in the animal industry could meet their moral responsibility to avoid unnecessary suffering, and, with this, increase animal welfare: by ameliorating circumstances for animals, by aiming at a two-pronged transformation, or by transforming into a “zero-suffering” business. Considering animal welfare as a legitimate ethical value in and of itself is a first step towards overcoming the anthropocentric bias in today's sustainability and corporate responsibility debate. (shrink)

What are the worst conditions under which someone can be virtuous and happy? In this paper, I argue that a minimum threshold of favorable circumstances is necessary for moral virtue and human flourishing or happiness. Stoic and Aristotelian traditions make different and important claims about the role of external circumstances in our moral lives. Retrieving the ancient dispute benefits contemporary ethics. For one, the relevance of external circumstances is an important question for the development of present-day virtue ethics. (...) For another, identifying the minimal ingredients for virtue and happiness is helpful for wider ethical concerns such as discussions of our moral obligations to future generations. After explaining the ancient dispute, I describe categories of circumstances that seem intuitively relevant to virtue and happiness. Then, I investigate which are necessary and examine commonsense examples. I conclude that a minimum threshold of favorable circumstances from the following categories is necessary: the necessities for biological life, cognitive ability, and moral education. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss the issue of the adequacy of the Minimum Intelligent Signal Test (MIST) as an alternative to the Turing Test. MIST has been proposed by Chris McKinstry as a better alternative to Turing’s original idea. Two of the main claims about MIST are that (1) MIST questions exploit commonsense knowledge and as a result are expected to be easy to answer for human beings and difficult for computer programs; and (...) that (2) the MIST design aims at eliminating the problem of the role of judges in the test. To discuss these design assumptions we will present Peter D. Turney’s PMI-IR algorithm which allows for MIST-type questions to be answered. We will also present and discuss the results of our own study aimed at the judge problem for MIST. (shrink)

This article analyzes how five leading Hungarian postdissident liberal thinkers conceptually constructed their view of liberalism in the early years of postcommunism. Studying Beszélő, the most signi cant liberal journal during the early years of representative democracy, it shows how they did so through references to political “threats” and the idea of a “liberal minimum” (János Kis), local liberal and democratic traditions and “progressive patriotism” (Miklós Szabó), the ongoing “liberal-conservative revolution” and the creation of a “new political community” (Gáspár (...) Miklós Tamás), antipolitics and “expertise” (György Konrád), and the “complete catalog of human rights” and the agenda of “modernization” (István Eörsi), respectively. Next to its conceptual analysis of heavily influential individual thinkers, the article discusses the ambition of postdissident Hungarian liberals to harmonize liberal and democratic tenets. Last but not least, it elaborates on the left-wing origins of many of their central concepts that, as suggested here, ultimately hindered liberalism's assumption of a central position in the new political system. (shrink)

Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong.

There is no agreed minimum standard with regard to what is considered safe, competent nursing care. Limited resources and organizational constraints make it challenging to develop a minimum standard. As part of their everyday practice, nurses have to ration nursing care and prioritize what care to postpone, leave out, and/or omit. In developed countries where public healthcare is tax-funded, a minimum level of healthcare is a patient right; however, what this entails in a given patient’s actual situation (...) is unclear. Thus, both patients and nurses would benefit from the development of a minimum standard of nursing care. Clarity on this matter is also of ethical and legal concern. In this article, we explore the case for developing a minimum standard to ensure safe and competent nursing care services. Any such standard must encompass knowledge of basic principles of clinical nursing and preservation of moral values, as well as managerial issues, such as manpower planning, skill-mix, and time to care. In order for such standards to aid in providing safe and competent nursing care, they should be in compliance with accepted evidence-based nursing knowledge, based on patients’ needs and legal rights to healthcare and on nurses’ codes of ethics. That is, a minimum standard must uphold a satisfactory level of quality in terms of both professionalism and ethics. Rather than being fixed, the minimum standard should be adjusted according to patients’ needs in different settings and may thus be different in different contexts and countries. (shrink)

A common presupposition in contemporary moral and political philosophy is that individuals should be provided with some basic threshold of goods, capabilities, or well-being. But if there is such a basic minimum, how should this be understood? Dale Dorsey offers an underexplored answer: that the basic minimum should be characterized not as the achievement of a set of capabilities, or as access to some specified bundle of resources, but as the maintenance of a minimal threshold of human (...) welfare. In addition, Dorsey argues that though political institutions should be committed to the promotion of this minimal threshold, we should reject approaches that seek to cast the basic minimum as a human right. His book will be important for all who are interested in theories of political morality. (shrink)

Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong.

Isaiah Berlin’s political thought consistently combines tragic value pluralism with moral priority for a minimum sphere of individual liberty which is defined and protected by a core set of basic human rights. His fundamental concept of a common moral minimum includes multiple components, including the idea that there is a common moral world of plural and conflicting incommensurable objective values and the idea that humans share a common nucleus of needs and interests centered on the overriding goal (...) of human survival. The basic human rights have priority over competing values because the rights are essential for human survival. They determine a common threshold of human decency: decent societies must respect the rights, which are in principle mutually harmonious under ordinary conditions, although emergencies can arise in which some of the rights must be sacrificed to respect others. Berlin’s focus is on decency, which he insists can be maintained without a commitment to political democracy. (shrink)

The human right to health, insofar as it is widely recognized, is typically thought to include the right to fair access to adequate healthcare, but the operating conception of healthcare in this context has been under-defined. This lack of conceptual clarity has often led in practice to largely Western cultural assumptions about what validly constitutes “healthcare” and “medicine.” Ethnocentric and parochial assumptions ought to be avoided, lest they give justification to the accusation that universal human rights are mere (...) tools for Western imperial agendas. At the same time, a right to healthcare that is not also explicitly the right to effective healthcare rapidly loses meaning. This paper strives to provide an account of medicine with the flexibility to accommodate cultural difference in forms of practice, while also aiding in the articulation of a minimum for medical systems to meet the standards set out in a human right. (shrink)

This article elaborates the conditions as well as four potential modes of the ecological problem: (1) The mode of the absolute minimization of the ecological problem: minimum population plus minimum Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is characterized by the quantity of destruction being less than the quantity of natural rehabilitation of an ecosystem. This mode is the poorest mode with minimum change. (2) The mode of the relative minimization of the ecological problem: minimum population plus maximization (...) of GDP, which is characterized by the quantity of destruction being less than the quantity of both natural rehabilitation and human rehabilitation of an ecosystem. This mode is the best mode with minimum change. (3) The mode of the relative maximization of the ecological problem: maximization of population plus minimum GDP, which is characterized by the quantity of destruction to the ecosystem not being offset by the quantity of human rehabilitation. An example of this mode is an underdeveloped district with vast population and limited farmland. (4) The mode of the absolute maximization of the ecological problem: maximization of population plus maximization of GDP. This is characterized by the continuous increase of the quantity of destruction beyond the quantity of both natural rehabilitation and human rehabilitation of the ecosystem. Its final outcome is the collapse of the ecosystem and a catastrophe to human beings. (shrink)

:Within the literature surrounding nonhuman animals on the one hand and cognitively disabled humans on the other, there is much discussion of where beings that do not satisfy the criteria for personhood fit in our moral deliberations. In the future, we may face a different but related problem: that we might create beings that not only satisfy but exceed these criteria. The question becomes whether these are minimal criteria, or hierarchical, such that those who fulfill them to greater degree should (...) be afforded greater consideration. This article questions the validity and necessity of drawing divisions among beings that satisfy the minimum requirements for personhood; considering how future beings—intelligent androids, synthezoids, even alternate-substrate sentiences—might fit alongside the “baseline” human. I ask whether these alternate beings ought to be considered different to us, and why this may or may not matter in terms of a notion of “human community.” The film Blade Runner, concerned in large part with humanity and its key synthezoid antagonist Roy Batty, forms a framing touchstone for my discussion. Batty is stronger, faster, more resilient, and more intelligent than Homo sapiens. His exploits, far beyond the capability of normal humans, are contrasted with his frailty and transient lifespan, his aesthetic appreciation of the sights he has seen, and his burgeoning empathy. Not for nothing does his creator within the mythos term him “more human than human.”. (shrink)

Until now, it has mostly been assumed that the kind of health the human right to health is concerned with is clearly understood and universal. Here, I question this assumption and offer an explicitly political and pluralistic account of health that is designed to help guide international and cross-cultural interventions on behalf of health. In order to be a useful mechanism of accountability, the human right to health needs an enforceable minimum standard of health by which to (...) judge situations and to determine if a violation of rights has occurred, but due to its international nature, it also needs to admit a large degree of cultural flexibility. With the account of health that I provide, I hope to clarify what makes up that minimum standard in a way that avoids unjustified parochial bias, while not being so permissive as to undermine the political force of a universal human right. (shrink)

This timely book by internationally regarded scholar of ethics and social/political philosophy, Michael Boylan, focuses on the history, application and significance of human rights in the West and China. Boylan engages the key current philosophical debates prevalent in human rights discourse today and draws them together to argue for the existence of natural, universal human rights. Arguing against the grain of mainstream philosophical beliefs, Boylan asserts that there is continuity between human rights and natural law and (...) that human beings require basic, essential goods for minimum action. These include food, clean water and sanitation, clothing, shelter and protection from bodily harm, including basic healthcare. The achievement of this goal, Boylan demonstrates, will require significant resource allocation and creative methods of implementation involving public and private institutions. Combining technical argument with four fictional narratives about human rights, the book invites readers to engage with the most important aspects of the discipline. (shrink)

The article explores the fundamental difference between two aspects of justice: international and global. It is then argued that for the sake of global justice, the difference can be overcome by taking a closer look at the basic human right of self-preservation in relation to moral agency, human well-being and social/distributive justice at both global and national levels. In an endeavour to attain global justice, the article defends an absolute moral right to a human minimum.

Encouraged by the financial incentives in the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009, electronic health record adoption is on the rise. According to a study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published in 2014, 78% of office-based physicians had adopted some type of EHR system, up from 18% in 2001. Implementation of EHRs able to support the Department of Health and Human Services “meaningful use” requirements has also significantly increased since 2010. Such (...) a growth in EHR adoption with the capacity to achieve “meaningful use” standards suggests that the goal of nationwide, interoperable health records is moving closer to a reality.While movement toward a system-wide, interoperable EHR promises benefits of such an electronic information management tool, the risks related to patients’ privacy of their health information remains a concern. (shrink)

The article explores the fundamental difference between two aspects of justice: international and global. It is then argued that for the sake of global justice, the difference can be overcome by taking a closer look at the basic human right of self-preservation in relation to moral agency, human well-being and social/distributive justice at both global and national levels. In an endeavour to attain global justice, the article defends an absolute moral right to a human minimum.

This volume engages with post-humanist and transhumanist approaches to present an original exploration of the question of how humankind will fare in the face of artificial intelligence. With emerging technologies now widely assumed to be calling into question assumptions about human beings and their place within the world, and computational innovations of machine learning leading some to claim we are coming ever closer to the long-sought artificial general intelligence, it defends humanity with the argument that technological 'advances' introduced artificially (...) into some humans do not annul their fundamental human qualities. Against the challenge presented by the possibility that advanced artificial intelligence will be fully capable of original thinking, creative self-development and moral judgement and therefore have claims to legal rights, the authors advance a form of 'essentialism' that justifies providing a 'decent minimum life' for all persons. As such, while the future of the human is in question, the authors show how dispensing with either the category itself or the underlying reality is a less plausible solution than is often assumed. (shrink)

Two longstanding questions about Hume's later moral theory have preoccupied scholars of his work: First, what does Hume mean by "humanity" in the second Enquiry, and what are we to make of its seeming replacement of "extensive sympathy" as the source of our moral sentiments? Second, what happened to the associationist account of sympathy emphasized so keenly in the Treatise? My primary task in this paper will be to answer the first of these two questions. To do this, I conduct (...) a careful analysis of Hume’s notion of humanity with heavy emphasis on the text of the second Enquiry. This is not to say I will skip over sympathy. On the contrary, if I am right that humanity is dependent on sympathy (or at a minimum, the process of sympathizing), then we must also take a close look at the Enquiry account of sympathy. -/- However, I do not directly discuss the mysterious disappearance of the associationist account of sympathy from the Enquiry in this paper. Instead, I address that part of the puzzle in a second, related article (published in the subsequent issue of BJHP in the same year). What we find in that related analysis, however, is that the associationist explanation of sympathy never really disappeared from the Enquiry . Taken together, then, the arguments of the two papers goes some distance towards confirming that there is no real inconsistency between Hume’s position in the Enquiry and the Treatise regarding humanity, sympathy, and the source of our moral sentiments. (shrink)

Many have thought that an important feature of any just society is the establishment and maintenance of a suitable basic minimum: some set of welfare achievements, resources, capabilities, and so on that are guaranteed to all. However, if a basic minimum is a plausible requirement of justice, we must have a theory — a theory of what, precisely, the state owes in terms of these basic needs or achievements and what, precisely, is the proper structure of the obligation (...) to provide them. In Section 1, I will critically examine one recent influential account of the basic minimum: Martha Nussbaum's `human capabilities approach'. I argue that Nussbaum's account has several structural features, few of which are independently plausible, and which create insuperable difficulties when viewed in combination. The failure of Nussbaum's account is instructive, however. It provides motivation for the positive account I sketch in Section 2. Key Words: Martha Nussbaum • welfare • capabilities • autonomy. (shrink)

Encouraged by the financial incentives in the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009, electronic health record adoption is on the rise. According to a study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published in 2014, 78% of office-based physicians had adopted some type of EHR system, up from 18% in 2001. Implementation of EHRs able to support the Department of Health and Human Services “meaningful use” requirements has also significantly increased since 2010. Such (...) a growth in EHR adoption with the capacity to achieve “meaningful use” standards suggests that the goal of nationwide, interoperable health records is moving closer to a reality.While movement toward a system-wide, interoperable EHR promises benefits of such an electronic information management tool, the risks related to patients’ privacy of their health information remains a concern. (shrink)

Every year approximately 18 million people die prematurely from treatable medical conditions including infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies. The deaths occur primarily amongst the poorest citizens of poor developing nations. Various groups and individuals have advanced plans for major international medical aid to avert many of these unnecessary deaths. For example, the World Health Organization's Commission on Macroeconomics and Health estimated that eight million premature deaths could be prevented annually by interventions costing roughly US$57 bn per year. This essay advances (...) an argument that human rights require high-income nations to provide such aid. The essay briefly examines John Rawls' obligations of justice and the reasons that their applicability to cases of international medical aid remains controversial. Regardless, the essay argues that purely humanitarian obligations bind the governments and citizens of high-income liberal democracies at a minimum to provide major medical aid to avert premature deaths in poor nations. In refusing to undertake such medical relief efforts, developed nations fail to adequately protect a fundamental human right to life. (shrink)

This article presents a model of the production of human behaviour, grounded in a pragmatist perspective. The model has two components: a small set of considered behaviours, and a set of motivators which I group into four subsets: material, reproductive, and two sets of attributional motivators. The model is based on a minimum principle. A person performs that considered behaviour which comes closest to ideal in light of the person's motivators. I show that both declining marginal utility and (...) satisfying follow as deductions from the model. In addition, especially with the inclusion of attributional motivators, the model accounts for a variety of findings in social science. I also show how it can generate theory and testable empirical predictions. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Basic Human Rights Public Reason Sovereignty and Self‐determination The DNSL Argument and the Minimum Respect‐for‐Justice Condition Adequate Justification Rights of Political Participation Post‐war Nation Building Promoting Political Reform Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes.

One of the most prevalent rationales for public healthcare policies is a human right to healthcare. Governments are the typical duty-bearers, but they differ vastly in their capacity to help those vulnerable to serious health problems and those with severe disabilities. A right to healthcare is out of the reach of many developing economies that struggle to provide the most basic services to their citizens. If human rights to provision of such goods exist, then governments would be violating (...) rights without doing anything wrong. I argue that such variable ability to provide healthcare depends not only on financial resources, but on institutional capacity, and that the latter represents a more fundamental challenge to the existence of a human right to healthcare than previously recognized. This challenge does not imply that government has no obligations to protect and improve the health of their citizens, but that it is best to think of such obligations as generated by conventional rights, namely rights arising from local legal and social conventions, which require governments to pursue health-related moral goals such as reducing suffering, closing opportunity gaps for the disadvantaged, and preventing the spread of contagious diseases. We need not think of such moral goals in terms of human rights. (shrink)

In her 2004 book Carol Gould addresses the fundamental issue of democratizing globalization, that is to say of finding ways to open transnational institutions and communities to democratic participation by those widely affected by their decisions. The book develops a framework for expanding participation in crossborder decisions, arguing for a broader understanding of human rights and introducing a new role for the ideas of care and solidarity at a distance. Reinterpreting the idea of universality to accommodate a multiplicity of (...) cultural perspectives, the author takes up a number of applied issues, including the persistence of racism, cultural rights, women's human rights, the democratic management of firms, the use of the Internet to enhance political participation, and the importance of empathy and genuine democracy in understanding terrorism and responding to it. Accessibly written with a minimum of technical jargon this is a major contribution to political philosophy. (shrink)

This essay discusses human rights from the standpoint of five outlooks dominant in our time by imaging five stylist ideal-typical countries. First, three countries in which the principle of defending human rights is unknown: Utilitaria, Communitaria and Proletaria. Each rejects human rights for a distinct set of reasons: the first because they conflict with utilitarian calculation, the second because they abstract from correct ways of living, the third because they soften hearts and are superfluous in a classless (...) world. Accepting human rights means departing from each of these standpoints in a given respect. First, we restrain the pursuit of social advantage, however enlightened or benevolent that pursuit. Second, we accept and protect the abstraction or distance of persons from specific, concrete ways of life. Third, we hold that the conditions of human life will never surmount scarcity, conflict of interests, moral divergences and limited rationality to render human rights superfluous. Next, two further countries are imagined in which human rights might be said to be respected: Libertaria and Egalitaria. The first represents a context of market freedoms, property rights, equal opportunity and civil rights but generates basic inequalities of condition and the sanctification of self-interest. The second is committed to rendering civil rights of equal worth to all and maintaining decent minimum standards for all, while striving for growth and improvement. But is Egalitaria feasible and viable? The incentives needed for growth give rise to inequalities, and the ideal of equal individual treatment conflicts with the communitarian goal of treating cultural identities as equal. These difficulties lead some away from Egalitaria back to Libertaria or Communitaria, but the essay concludes by suggesting that there is an »egalitarian plateau« that should not be abandoned for any of the other four possibilities. (shrink)

This article vindicates human rights, not as natural rights holding wherever human beings are, but as reducible to one historically constructed right to freedom of thought and its universal modes. Universal morality is elicited from international human rights law. To be moral is first to help engender everywhere either mere inner recognition of the validity of rights or mere outer compliance with their requirements; and to engender finally inner recognition expressed in a duty of outer observance. (...) class='Hi'>Human rights ethics replaces the rights consciousness common in the West with a duty consciousness. This universal rational morality supersedes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and other rational theories. Yet moralities making no rational claim on all (e.g., Christian, Buddhist) may flourish within human rights ethics as the universal ethical minimum. (shrink)

How should we measure medicines’ global health impact to set targets, monitor performance and improve health around the world? Can such a metric provide a philosophically well-grounded basis for an ethical consumption campaign that will create incentives for pharmaceutical companies and other agents to expand (equitable) access to essential medicines? And if such metrics exist, how should we think about our individual obligations to support ethical consumption campaigns on this basis? This paper reflects on these questions in light of Tim (...) Campbell’s, Yukiko Asada’s, and Andreas Albertsen’s worries about the answers I provide in Global Health Impact: Extending Access on Essential Medicines. I explain how reflecting on treatments consequences for individuals’ ability to live minimally well supports the creation of the Global Health Impact (GHI) index (https://global-health-impact.org/). I also consider how the index might be modified to better support efforts to promote everyone’s human rights. Finally, I argue that individuals should often promote positive change through GHI and other ethical consumption campaigns. (shrink)

Given its non-invasive nature, there is increasing interest in the use of transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation across basic, translational and clinical research. Contemporaneously, tVNS can be achieved by stimulating either the auricular branch or the cervical bundle of the vagus nerve, referred to as transcutaneous auricular vagus nerve stimulation and transcutaneous cervical VNS, respectively. In order to advance the field in a systematic manner, studies using these technologies need to adequately report sufficient methodological detail to enable comparison of results between (...) studies, replication of studies, as well as enhancing study participant safety. We systematically reviewed the existing tVNS literature to evaluate current reporting practices. Based on this review, and consensus among participating authors, we propose a set of minimal reporting items to guide future tVNS studies. The suggested items address specific technical aspects of the device and stimulation parameters. We also cover general recommendations including inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants, outcome parameters and the detailed reporting of side effects. Furthermore, we review strategies used to identify the optimal stimulation parameters for a given research setting and summarize ongoing developments in animal research with potential implications for the application of tVNS in humans. Finally, we discuss the potential of tVNS in future research as well as the associated challenges across several disciplines in research and clinical practice. (shrink)

This article vindicates human rights, not as natural rights holding wherever human beings are, but as reducible to one historically constructed right to freedom of thought and its universal modes. Universal morality is elicited from international human rights law. To be moral is first to help engender everywhere either mere inner recognition of the validity of rights or mere outer compliance with their requirements; and to engender finally inner recognition expressed in a duty of outer observance. (...) class='Hi'>Human rights ethics replaces the rights consciousness common in the West with a duty consciousness. This universal rational morality supersedes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and other rational theories. Yet moralities making no rational claim on all (e.g., Christian, Buddhist) may flourish within human rights ethics as the universal ethical minimum. (shrink)

This article discusses the Daoist contribution to the idea of human dignity in the classical Chinese philosophy, particularly in aspects that had been ignored by the Confucians and the Moists. By criticizing the traditional morality and reviving the faith in a primitive, self-sufficient life, Laozi and Zhuangzi add an important dimension to the classical understanding of human dignity: individual freedom, particularly the freedom of living under minimum burden, direction, and oppression of the state. By comparing the Daoist (...) conception of human dignity with those of the Confucians and Moists, the article concludes that all three classical schools, if rationally construed, should support the view that the establishment of a liberal constitutional scheme is necessary to preserve and protect minimum/basic dignity in both physical and spiritual well-being of every human person who lives in a modern society. (shrink)

Given its non-invasive nature, there is increasing interest in the use of transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation across basic, translational and clinical research. Contemporaneously, tVNS can be achieved by stimulating either the auricular branch or the cervical bundle of the vagus nerve, referred to as transcutaneous auricular vagus nerve stimulation and transcutaneous cervical VNS, respectively. In order to advance the field in a systematic manner, studies using these technologies need to adequately report sufficient methodological detail to enable comparison of results between (...) studies, replication of studies, as well as enhancing study participant safety. We systematically reviewed the existing tVNS literature to evaluate current reporting practices. Based on this review, and consensus among participating authors, we propose a set of minimal reporting items to guide future tVNS studies. The suggested items address specific technical aspects of the device and stimulation parameters. We also cover general recommendations including inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants, outcome parameters and the detailed reporting of side effects. Furthermore, we review strategies used to identify the optimal stimulation parameters for a given research setting and summarize ongoing developments in animal research with potential implications for the application of tVNS in humans. Finally, we discuss the potential of tVNS in future research as well as the associated challenges across several disciplines in research and clinical practice. (shrink)

The weakening of mechanisms for international cooperation within the context of the right to minimum wage can be explained by the increasing power of new players, the transnational corporations on the one hand, and the waning of the power of the state, on the other hand. These processes of globalization produce various challenges to the modern welfare state, such as the ability to attain minimum wage. This right is vital particularly to weakened workers that would otherwise be remunerated (...) at a very low wage, which could likely lead to poverty. This right poses, however, numerous challenges, in particular the ability of international labor law to define it across borders. The article describes three models for defining this right: the existential deficiency model, the welfare model, and the comfort model and analyzes the various forms regulating the right to minimum wage in international regulations, state regulations, and codes of conduct of transnational corporations examining the ramifications of globalization within the context of labor rights. Moreover, the article suggests changes to international labor law, required to ensure that it functions as an effective instrument in protecting labor rights and proposes establishing regional parliaments—a supra-governmental body—composed of states and a broad array of interested private parties in its activities to establish fundamental principles relating to various areas of life, such as the basic rights of workers, taxation principles, and principles for protecting the environment. These regional bodies would decide which of the various models used for shaping the right to minimum wage should be adopted as a fundamental principle. (shrink)

Based on the communication ethics of Ptahhotep and other inclusivist communication value systems, including several additional non-Western (Confucian, Buddhist, Aborigine, Cree, San, Māori, Ubuntu, and Islamic) as well as Western ones (Stoic, Christian, Kantian, socialist, liberal, and journalistic), we propose seven principles as common ground for the future regulation of media communication on a global scale. All seven are formulated in a manner similar to Ptahhotep’s, providing a flexible range of norms allowing, for example, hate speech to be dealt with (...) by criminalization, or in civil law, or by means of ethics rules and self-regulation, depending on the severity of the involved threats to humanity, to human beings, or to other core values. We reject an often-paralyzing comparative intercultural juxtaposition of individualism versus collectivism, instead suggesting an inclusivist and interculturally principled common ground for the regulation of communication. (shrink)

Some people (e.g., Drs. Paul and Susan Lim) and, with them, organizations (e.g., the National Embryo Donation Center) believe that, morally speaking, the death of a frozen human embryo is a very bad thing. With such people and organizations in mind, the question to be addressed here is as follows: if one believes that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, ought, morally speaking, one prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo (...) adoption? By way of a three‐premise argument, one of which is a moral principle first introduced by Peter Singer, my answer to this question is: at least some of those who believe this ought to. (Just who the “some” are is identified in the paper.) If this is correct, then, for said people, preventing the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is not a morally neutral matter; it is, instead, a morally laden one. Specifically, their intentional refusal to prevent the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is, at a minimum, morally criticizable and, arguably, morally forbidden. Either way, it is, to one extent or another, a moral failing. (shrink)

This paper considers the relationship between corporations and global human rights. This relationship lies at the heart of the 2010 conference theme “Business and the Sustainable Commons.” A human or natural right is one that is inherent, and thus universal, in being human. It is typical to distinguish between civil and political rights as a category (thus supposing constitutional democracy in some form); and economic, social, and cultural rights (thus implying minimum conditions such as food, work, (...) education, culture, and so forth). A right for one person implies a duty (not necessarily binding) for some other person or entity. The paper assesses the duty on corporations imposed by definition of global human rights. Such rights also involve considerations of enforcement and funding (or compensation). (shrink)

This paper defends a modest conception of human nature and argues that any adequate moral theory must incorporate this conception. Against the extreme historicist view it is argued that there are morally important necessary characteristics all human beings possess, and that many moral theories can be justified and criticized on the basis of these characteristics. Against the extreme naturalist view it is argued that the morally important and necessary characteristics give only a minimum content to moral theories (...) and an adequate theory must both include and go beyond this minimum. In conclusion, it is claimed that it follows that purely formal, some relativistic, some élitist, and some natural law moral theories are mistaken. (shrink)

Are ethical principles that guide human behavior suitable for the array of complex new environmental problems? Justice, nonmaleficence, noninterference, and fidelity seem by extension to apply. Conflicts between the principles of humanistic ethics and environmental ethics may perhaps be resolved, as Paul W. Taylor indicates, through the application of such “priority principles” as “self-defense,” “proportionality,” “minimum wrong,” and “restitutive justice.” Taylor suggests that these principles would forbid moral agents from perpetrating harm through direct killing, habitat destruction, environmental contamination, (...) and pollution. (shrink)

Abstract. Recent developments, both in the cognitive sciences and in world events, bring special emphasis to the study of morality. The cognitive sci- ences, spanning neurology, psychology, and computational intelligence, offer substantial advances in understanding the origins and purposes of morality. Meanwhile, world events urge the timely synthesis of these insights with tra- ditional accounts that can be easily assimilated and practically employed to augment moral judgment, both to solve current problems and to direct future action. The object of the (...) following paper is to present such a synthesis in the form of a model of moral cognition, the ACTWith model of conscience. The purpose of the model is twofold. One, the ACTWith model is intended to shed light on personal moral dispositions, and to provide a tool for actual human moral agents in the refinement of their moral lives. As such, it re- lies on the power of personal introspection, bolstered by the careful study of moral exemplars available to all persons in all cultures in the form of literary or religious figures, if not in the form of contemporary peers and especially leadership. Two, the ACTWith model is intended as a minimum architec- ture for fully functional artificial morality. As such, it is essentially amodal, implementation non-specific and is developed in the form of an information processing control system. There are given as few hard points in this sys- tem as necessary for moral function, and these are themselves taken from review of actual human cognitive processes, thereby intentionally capturing as closely as possible what is expected of moral action and reaction by hu- man beings. Only in satisfying these untutored intuitions should an artificial agent ever be properly regarded as moral, at least in the general population of existing moral agents. Thus, the ACTWith model is intended as a guide both for individual moral development and for the development of artificial moral agents as future technology permits. (shrink)

The luxury-versus-necessity controversy is primarily concerned with the importance of civil and political rights vis-à-vis economic and social rights. The viewpoint of political leaders of many developing and newly industrialized countries, especially China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia is that civil and political rights are luxuries that only rich nations can afford. The United Nations, transnational civil society and the Western advanced countries oppose this viewpoint on normative and empirical grounds. While this controversy is far from over, new challenges (...) of “evidence” and “marketization” are emerging. The first calls for a narrative on the history of civil and political rights in the West in the comparative context of the Industrial Revolution and the East Asian Miracle and China’s economic growth. The effects of the recent financial crisis and insulation of China from the Arab Spring further deepen this challenge. The marketization challenge looks at this controversy from the social exclusion angle. It argues that the basic needs covered by the minimum human rights agenda are becoming luxuries in a real sense for those who do not have the power to purchase these needs from the market. (shrink)

In the discussion of moral diversity the most influential approaches have been relativism, monism and minimum universalism. In this paper I argue, however, that this kind of general distinction is not as such very helpful. It does not show what is really decisive in those approaches and what is the crucial distinguishing feature among them. The most important issue, I think, is the relationship between rules that guide human beings in their pursuit of the good life and rules (...) that specify what people can do in relation to one another. Generally speaking, moral doctrines, or theories, can be divided into two categories on the basis of their answer to this question. Some doctrines—which may be called comprehensive—begin with a definite account of the highest good and determine the rights and duties of human beings on the basis of this account. Other theories, non-comprehensive, treat these two as separate issues that should not be mixed. Although such a distinction is seldom explicitly made, its significance is evident, for instance in the current discussion of human rights. Various religiously and culturally motivated reinterpretations of human rights quite distinctively stand for the former view. Moreover, even though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly represents the latter approach, it has been claimed that it nevertheless puts forward a specifically Western life ideal. In order to make sense of the human rights discourse at all, it is of fundamental importance to distinguish between comprehensive and non-comprehensive approaches. Without such a distinction it is difficult to determine how to deal with competing claims about the origin, range and content of human rights (or common moral standards), not to speak of deciding between these claims. (shrink)

As the third volume of a trilogy which also comprises The Insect Societies and Sociobiology, On Human Nature sets out to identify and to solve certain contemporary spiritual "dilemmas." According to Wilson, we have now clearly recognized that the intersection of the causality of natural selection with that of environmental necessity explains human nature. This awareness, he suggests, has brought us today to experience these three dilemmas: first, that the human species "lacks any goal external to its (...) own biological nature"; second, that "morality evolved as instinct"; and finally, that we will soon be able to control our own evolution through molecular engineering and cloning. For Wilson, human life has no transcendent source of meaning, of moral values, or of guidance for its own future evolution. Having offered this diagnosis of the human condition, Wilson prescribes replacing the old humanistic, religious, and Marxist mythologies with wholehearted assent to "the mythology of scientific materialism." Wilson's sociobiological version of scientific materialism has, he claims, the added power of being able to explain the old mythologies themselves as products of natural selection and cultural determinism. The minimum claims of the "evolutionary epic" are these. (shrink)

Recent developments, both in the cognitive sciences and in world events, bring special emphasis to the study of morality. The cognitive sciences, spanning neurology, psychology, and computational intelligence, offer substantial ad- vances in understanding the origins and purposes of morality. Meanwhile, world events urge the timely synthesis of these insights with traditional ac- counts that can be easily assimilated and practically employed to augment moral judgment, both to solve current problems and to direct future action. The object of the following (...) paper is to present such a synthesis in the form of a model of moral cognition, the ACTWith model of conscience. The purpose of the model is twofold. One, the ACTWith model is intended to shed light on personal moral dispositions, and to provide a tool for actual human moral agents in the refinement of their moral lives. As such, it relies on the power of personal introspection, bolstered by the careful study of moral exemplars available to all persons in all cultures in the form of literary or religious fig- ures, if not in the form of contemporary peers and especially leadership. Two, the ACTWith model is intended as a minimum architecture for fully func- tional artificial morality. As such, it is essentially amodal, implementation non-specific and is developed in the form of an information processing control system. There are given as few hard points in this system as necessary for moral function, and these are themselves taken from review of actual human cognitive processes, thereby intentionally capturing as closely as possible what is expected of moral action and reaction by human beings. Only in satisfying these untutored intuitions should an artificial agent ever be properly regarded as moral, at least in the general population of existing moral agents. Thus, the ACTWith model is intended as a guide both for individual moral develop- ment and for the development of artificial moral agents as future technology permits. (shrink)

The European Convention of Human Rights system was originally created to sound the alarm if democracy was threatened in the member states. Yet, it eventually developed into a very different system with a focus on providing individual justice in an ever growing number of member states. This transformation has raised fundamental questions as to the level of difference and diversity allowed within the common European human rights space. Was the system to rest on minimum standards with room (...) for domestic differences, or was it to create uniform standards? These questions have come up as increasingly contentious issues over the past years and have triggered a number of reforms seeking to introduce more subsidiarity in the system, striking a different balance between the European and national oversight of human rights. The article analyses this turn to subsidiarity by exploring whether the reform process has introduced new forms of difference and diversity within the common space of European human rights. Covering the period from 2000 to the end of 2019 and using a dataset of all judgments of the period, the article provides a structural analysis of developments in reference to the margin of appreciation which is the European Court of Human Rights’ long-standing tool for balancing the common standards, yet leaving space for individual member states to find local solutions to implementing those standards. It concludes that recent developments have contributed to a more federal-style construction of European human rights with more space for differences within the common general standards. (shrink)