The study of spatial cognition has provided considerable insight into how animals (including humans) navigate on the horizontal plane. However, the real world is three-dimensional, having a complex topography including both horizontal and vertical features, which presents additional challenges for representation and navigation. The present article reviews the emerging behavioral and neurobiological literature on spatial cognition in non-horizontal environments. We suggest that three-dimensional spaces are represented in a quasi-planar fashion, with space in the plane of locomotion being computed separately and (...) represented differently from space in the orthogonal axis bicoded.” We argue that the mammalian spatial representation in surface-travelling animals comprises a mosaic of these locally planar fragments, rather than a fully integrated volumetric map. More generally, this may be true even for species that can move freely in all three dimensions, such as birds and fish. We outline the evidence supporting this view, together with the adaptive advantages of such a scheme. (shrink)

Of the four types of biological control, (1) natural, (2) conservation, (3) augmentation, and (4) importation), ethical concerns have been raised almost exclusively about only one type: importation. These concerns rest largely on fears of extinction of animal species. Importation biological control is a cost-effective alternative to chemical control for basic food crops of resource-poor farmers. Regarding the other types of biological control, natural biological control is not consciously manipulated by humans. Augmentation has some technical concerns, but is generally an (...) environmentally-sound, viable alternative to chemicals and offers local employment. Conservation can help empower farmers to preserve native species, while saving labor and money and reducing chemical insecticides. (shrink)

We explore psychological contracts as mechanisms by which individuals gain influence in organizations. Using two distinct research settings and longitudinal analysis, we demonstrate that ideological contracts endow individuals with increased centrality in the organization’s influence network. More generally, we propose that an important outcome of different psychological contract types may be how they affect the nature of influence in organizations.

Ascidians have evolved alternate modes of development in which the conventional tadpole larva is remodeled or eliminated. Adultation, the precocious development of adult features in the larval head, is caused by superimposing the larval and adult differentiation programs. Caudalization, the addition of muscle cells to the larval tail, is caused by enhancing muscle induction or increasing the number of muscle cell divisions before terminal differentiation. Adultation and caudalization are correlated with increased egg size, suggesting dependence on maternal processes. Anural development, (...) the elimination of the larval stage, is caused by maternal and zygotic events resulting in abbreviation and deletion of larval developmental programs. An example of a maternal change in anural species is the modification of the egg cytoskeleton during oogenesis, whereas a zygotic change may involve altered cell interactions during embryogenesis. Interspecific hybridization experiments suggest that some aspects of anural development may be caused by loss‐of‐function mutations. The dissociation of developmental programs is a key process in changing the mode of development in ascidians. (shrink)

We have argued that the neurocognitive representation of large-scale, navigable three-dimensional space is anisotropic, having different properties in vertical versus horizontal dimensions. Three broad categories organize the experimental and theoretical issues raised by the commentators: (1) frames of reference, (2) comparative cognition, and (3) the role of experience. These categories contain the core of a research program to show how three-dimensional space is represented and used by humans and other animals.

Shors & Matzel (1997) suggest replacing the question “Is LTP a mechanism of learning?” with “Is LTP a mechanism of arousal and attention?” However, the failure of experiments to verify the LTP-learning hypothesis may arise not because it is untrue, but because in its current guise, it is not properly testable. If so, then the LTP-attention hypothesis is untestable, as well.

In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal modeling. (...) When every ounce of your concentration is fixed upon blasting a winged pig out of the sky, you do not question its species' ontological status. James Morrow, City of Truth (1990). (shrink)

Health research increasingly relies on organized collections of health data and biological samples. There are many types of sample and data collections that are used for health research, though these are collected for many purposes, not all of which are health-related. These collections exist under different jurisdictional and regulatory arrangements and include: 1) Population biobanks, cohort studies, and genome databases 2) Clinical and public health data 3) Direct-to-consumer genetic testing 4) Social media 5) Fitness trackers, health apps, and biometric data (...) sensors Population biobanks, cohort studies, and genome databases Clinical and public health data Direct-to-consumer genetic testing Social media Fitness trackers, health apps, and biometric data sensors Ethical, legal, and social challenges of such collections are well recognized, but there has been limited attention to the broader societal implications of the existence of these collections. Although health research conducted using these collections is broadly recognized as beneficent, secondary uses of these data and samples may be controversial. We examine both documented and hypothetical scenarios of secondary uses of health data and samples. In particular, we focus on the use of health data for purposes of: Forensic investigations Civil lawsuits Identification of victims of mass casualty events Denial of entry for border security and immigration Making health resource rationing decisions Facilitating human rights abuses in autocratic regimes Forensic investigations Civil lawsuits Identification of victims of mass casualty events Denial of entry for border security and immigration Making health resource rationing decisions Facilitating human rights abuses in autocratic regimes Current safeguards relating to the use of health data and samples include research ethics oversight and privacy laws. These safeguards have a strong focus on informed consent and anonymization, which are aimed at the protection of the individual research subject. They are not intended to address broader societal implications of health data and sample collections. As such, existing arrangements are insufficient to protect against subversion of health databases for non-sanctioned secondary uses, or to provide guidance for reasonable but controversial secondary uses. We are concerned that existing debate in the scholarly literature and beyond has not sufficiently recognized the secondary data uses we outline in this paper. Our main purpose, therefore, is to raise awareness of the potential for unforeseen and unintended consequences, in particular negative consequences, of the increased availability and development of health data collections for research, by providing a comprehensive review of documented and hypothetical non-health research uses of such data. (shrink)

This book is challenging and sets itself up as “going against the stream”. But which stream? Perhaps there is a distinction between the stream in medical ethics and the stream in clinical practice. One impressive feature of the book is the detail of the references and footnotes. This gives me the impression that Jeffery is swimming in the stream of academic medical ethics. It is also true that he has first hand experience of clinical practice, but I suspect it (...) is the flow towards euthanasia in the literature that alarms him (page 10). Whereas in practice, however slow moving and stagnant in so many places, my perception is that the tide runs towards person centred care based on a compassionate commitment to meeting individual needs. In the National Health Service (NHS) nursing home for people with severe dementia with which I am involved, the talk is not of euthanasia, but of engendering the sort of holistic view and palliation found in hospices. One substantial argument put forward by Jeffery concerns the ethical basis for foregoing treatment. He argues that decisions, in order to be ethical and compassionate, must be based on the need to avoid disproportionate treatment. His concern is that using “substituted judgments” or criteria such as “best interests” and “quality of life” might not necessarily show respect for life and might be subjective. Instead, “disproportionate treatment” stresses the …. (shrink)

Long-term potentiation (LTP) is a long-lasting increase in synaptic efficacy that many consider the best candidate currently available for a neural mechanism of memory formation and/or storage in the mammalian brain. In our target article, LTP: What's learning got to do with it?, we concluded that there was insufficient data to warrant such a conclusion. In their commentaries, Jeffery and Zhadin raise a number of important issues that we did not raise, both for and against the hypothesis. Although we (...) agree with a number of these issues, we maintain that there remains insufficient evidence that LTP is a memory mechanism. (shrink)

Jeffery et al. suggest that three-dimensional environments are not represented according to their volumetric properties, but in a quasi-planar fashion. Here we take into consideration the role of visual experience and the use of technology for spatial learning to better understand the nature of the preference of horizontal over vertical spatial representation.

In a surface-dwelling animal like the rat, experimental strategies for investigating the hippocampal correlates of three-dimensional space appear inevitably complicated by the interplay of global versus local reference frames. We discuss the impact of the resulting confounds on present and future empirical analysis of the hypothesis by Jeffery and colleagues.

Recent research investigating the language–thought interface in the spatial domain points to representations of the horizontal and vertical dimensions that closely resemble those posited by Jeffery et al. However, the findings suggest that such representations, rather than being tied to navigation, may instead reflect more general properties of the perception of space.

How do thought and language manage to be 'about' aspects of the world? J. Robert G. Williams investigates how representation arises out of a fundamentally non-representational world, showing the explanatory relations between the representational properties of language, of thought, and of perception and intention.

In a widely cited paper, Jefferies et al.. Emotional valence and arousal interact in attentional control. Psychological Science, 19, 290–295. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02082.x[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]) report a study in which they manipulated participants’ mood and examined the effects of this manipulation on their performance on the Attentional Blink task. Their results revealed an interaction between emotional valence and arousal: attentional control of participants who experienced a negative mood with low arousal was best, whereas it was worst (...) for participants who experienced a negative mood with high arousal. Performance for participants who were in a positive mood, either with low arousal or high arousal had intermediate scores. In this study, I examined the replicability of this effect and performed additional analyses to investigate the extent to which this effect is due to perceptual or attentional processes and to examine the role of distraction on AB performance. Importantly, the results showed that the crucial interaction between emotional valence and arousal did not reach significance. This could be due a diversity of factors that are addressed in the discussion. (shrink)

A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...) affirming that p. An advantage of the proposal developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how group members must interact in order to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgment-focused collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016). (shrink)

Strange inversions occur when things work in ways that turn received wisdom upside down. Hume offered a strangely inverted story about causation, and Darwin, about apparent design. Dennett suggests that a strange inversion also occurs when we project our own reactive complexes outward, painting our world with elusive properties like cuteness, sweetness, blueness, sexiness, funniness, and more. Such properties strike us as experiential causes, but they are really effects—a kind of shorthand for whole sets of reactive dispositions rooted in the (...) nuts and bolts of human information processing. Understanding the nature and origins of that strange inversion, Dennett believes, is thus key to understanding the nature and origins of human experience itself. This paper examines this claim, paying special attention to recent formulations that link that strange inversion to the emerging vision of the brain as a Bayesian estimator, constantly seeking to predict the unfolding sensory barrage. (shrink)

The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).