The paper explores the potential and limitations of big data for researching racism on social media. Informed by critical data studies and critical race studies, the paper discusses challenges of doing big data research and the problems of the so called ‘white method’. The paper introduces the following three types of approach, each with a different epistemological basis for researching racism in digital context: 1) using big data analytics to point out the dominant power relations and the dynamics of racist (...) discourse, 2) complementing big data with qualitative research and 3) revealing new logics of racism in datafied context. The paper contributes to critical data and critical race studies by enhancing the understanding of the possibilities and limitations of big data research. This study also highlights the importance of contextualisation and mixed methods for achieving a more nuanced comprehension of racism and discrimination on social media and in large datasets. (shrink)

The democratic system in the U.S. is in disarray. Daily reports of hostile confrontation, fake news, alternative facts, ad hominem attacks, and increasing tribalism are distressing. But those divisions also indicate something good about our democratic system. We can, as yet, still voice our dissent, take collective public action, and engender grassroots activism without legitimate reprisal for those activities in themselves. But the public discourse is increasingly polarizing and unproductive. Is there a common ground upon which we can build discourse (...) and seek a common public good? To what can we appeal for common ground? Do we appeal to truth or power? Philosophers have traditionally sought truth to legitimate power and parsed education as a search for truth. But, as Alasdair MacIntyre asked, "Whose truth? Which rationality?" In this talk, Dr. Kaarina Beam explores the nature of truth, the nature of truth-seeking education, and the nature of the philosophy underlying an educational search for truth in a pluralistic world. (shrink)

Lying is an important moral phenomenon that most people are affected by on a daily basis—be it in personal relationships, in political debates, or in the form of fake news. Nevertheless, surprisingly little is known about what actually constitutes a lie. According to the traditional definition of lying, a person lies if they explicitly express something they believe to be false. Consequently, it is often assumed that people cannot lie by more indirectly communicating believed‐false claims, for instance by merely conversationally (...) implicating them. In this paper, we subject this claim to an empirical test. In a preregistered study of 300 participants, we investigate how people judge cases of implicit deceptions that would usually be excluded by the traditional definition of lying (i.e., conversational implicatures, presuppositions, and nonverbal actions). Our results show that people do in fact consider it possible to lie by indirect means, suggesting that people have a broader concept of lying than is usually assumed. Moreover, our findings indicate that lie judgments are closely tied to the extent to which agents are perceived as having committed themselves to the believed‐false claims they have communicated. We discuss the implications of our results for the traditional definition of lying and propose a new commitment‐based definition of lying that can account for the findings of our experiment. (shrink)

Co-éditions avec la Maison descartes d'Amsterdam Les 29 et 30 novembre 1979 s'est tenu à la Maison Descartes (Institut Français d'Amsterdam) un colloque franco-néerlandais sur le thème de "L'Enfermement", sous la présidence de Charles Grivel du côté néerlandais et de Michel Deguy du côté français.Les intervenants venaient d'horizons divers. Poètes, comme Maurice Roche pour la France et Rein Bloem pour les Pyas-Bas. Psychanalyste: Anton Mooij. Sociologues: le néerlandais Pieter Nijhoff et le français Jean Duvignaud. Historiens: Robert Muchembled. Professeurs de (...) littérature française (Roger Kempf) et de linguistique (Teun van Dijk).Cette diversité dans la formation, cette convergence des points de vue, voilà peut-être ce qui a permis de cerner le difficile concept d'enfermement. S'agit-il bien d'ailleurs d'un concept? N'est-ce pas là un mythe à la mode? Toutes les civilisations, toutes les sociétés définissent et suscitent, chaque fois d'une manière différente et pour elles-même, une certaine expérience de l'enfermememnt. Pour la mort ou la sexualité sans doute, mais aussi pour l'art et le savoir: les idéologies ou les doctrines ne sont-elles pas aussi des formes de l'enfermement? Il s'agit alors de se demander pourquoi notre époque, et plus particulièrement une certaine situation de la société intellectuelle, valorise, non sans complaisance, cet "enfermement". (shrink)

Dans cet article, on suggère qu’un rôle central peut être assigné à la philosophie de la chimie dans la philosophie des sciences post-kuhnienne en général, et dans l’analyse du débat opposant le réalisme scientifique à l’anti-réalisme dans la philosophie des sciences standard. La philosophie des sciences construit la science comme une pratique plus que comme un réseau d’assertions. On soutient que le réalisme pratique permet d’éviter les défauts à la fois du réalisme scientifique standard et de l’anti-réalisme. On analyse un (...) livre important publié récemment, B. Bensaude-Vincent’s & J. Simon’s Chemistry — The Impure Science [Bensaude-Vincent & Simon 2008], et on interprète la position des auteurs comme une sorte de réalisme pratique. (shrink)

Reality exists independently of human observers, but does the same apply to its structure? Realist ontologies usually assume so: according to them, the world consists of objects, these have properties and enter into relations with each other, more or less as we are accustomed to think of them. Against this view, Rein Raud develops a radical process ontology that does not credit any vantage point, any scale or speed of being, any range of cognitive faculties with the privilege to (...) judge how the world ‘really’ is. In his view, what we think of as objects are recast as fields of constitutive tensions, cross-sections of processes, never in complete balance but always striving for it and always reconfiguring themselves accordingly. The human self is also understood as a fluctuating field, not limited to the mind but distributed all over the body and reaching out into its environment, with different constituents of the process constantly vying for control. The need for such a process philosophy has often been voiced, but rarely has there been an effort to develop it in a systematic and rigourous manner that leads to original accounts of identity, continuity, time, change, causality, agency and other topics. Throughout his new book, Raud engages with an unusually broad range of philosophical schools and debates, from New Materialism and Object-Oriented Ontology to both phenomenological and analytical philosophy of mind, from feminist philosophy of science to neurophilosophy and social ontology. Being in Flux will be of interest to students and scholars in philosophy and the humanities generally and to anyone interested in current debates about realism, materialism and ontology. (shrink)

The present study examines cross-cultural differences in people’s concept of lying with regard to the question of whether lying requires an agent to _say_ something they believe to be false. While prominent philosophical views maintain that lying entails that a person explicitly expresses a believed-false claim, recent research suggests that people’s concept of lying might also include certain kinds of deception that are communicated more indirectly. An important drawback of previous empirical work on this topic is that only few studies (...) have investigated people’s concept of lying in non-Western samples. In the present study, we compare people’s intuitions about lying with indirect deceptions (i.e., presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and non-verbal actions) in a sample of _N_ = 255 participants from Russia and _N_ = 300 participants from the United Kingdom. Our findings show a strong degree of similarity between lie ratings of participants from Russia and the United Kingdom, with both samples holding it possible for agents to lie with deceptive statements and actions that do not involve the agent _saying_ something they believe to be false. (shrink)

Chemistry, especially its historical practice, has in the philosophy of science in recent decades attracted more and more attention, influencing the turn from the vision of science as a timeless logic-centred system of statements towards the history- and practice-centred approach. The problem of pluralism in science has become a popular topic in that context. Hasok Chang’s “active normative epistemic pluralism” manifested in his book Is water H2O? Evidence, realism and pluralism, pursuing an integrated study of history and philosophy of science, (...) has provoked quite a widespread debate. It provides a good opportunity to discuss the topical philosophical issue of the nature of disagreements. The differences among disagreements in different domains have been pointed out in the disagreement literature. It has been noticed that in mathematics and science consensus is established more clearly than in philosophy where it remains largely unachievable. However, this conclusion is derived in the context of traditional logic-centred view of science. The aim of this paper is to consider the different nature of disagreements in science and in philosophy in the context of the history- and practice-centred approach. The analysis is focused on the critique of the received view of the Chemical Revolution which played quite a central role in Chang’s becoming a pluralist about science. Unlike Chang, however, a modified Kuhnian paradigm-conception of science and scientific revolutions is defended. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to propose a way to resolve a supposed dilemma currently troubling the debate about rational belief formation in cases of peer disagreement. In section 1, I will introduce the general debate in question as well as the kind of view figuring in the supposed dilemma. In section 2, I will describe how the supposed dilemma arises. In section 3, I will consider the replies that have hitherto been offered and explain in how far these (...) replies should be regarded as unsatisfying. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, I will propose and defend a new reply to the supposed dilemma. This reply consists in rejecting the intuitively appealing view that one should be conciliatory in the relevant kind of case, and in endorsing a more careful position, which respects the intuitions behind conciliationism and which, in contrast to the latter, does not give rise to the kind of dilemma in question. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISMVolume 13, Issue 3Stefan ReiningDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.47Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISMVolume 13, Issue 3Stefan ReiningDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.47Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISMVolume 13, Issue 3Stefan ReiningDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.47Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

This paper presents a survey of the philosophy of science in Estonia. Topics covered include the historical background (science at the 17th century Academia Gustaviana, in the 19th century, during the Soviet period) and an overview of the current situation and main areas of research (the problem of demarcation, a critique of the traditional understandings of science, φ-science, classical and non-classical science, the philosophy of chemistry, the problem of induction, the sociology of scientific knowledge, semiotics as a methodology).

In this paper, the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science which began in the author's previous papers is continued. It is argued that practical realism is opposed to standard scientific realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other. Standard scientific realism is challengeable due to its abstract character, as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological presupposition which raises the problem of the God's Eye point of view (as it was called (...) by Hilary Putnam). Joseph Rouse's conception of science as practice, Sami Pihlström's pragmatic realism, and even Ilkka Niiniluoto's critical scientific realism are interpreted as practical realist conceptions. Pihlström suggests that the contemporary scientific realist should be prepared to accept the pragmatically naturalized Kantian transcendental perspective on realism. It is argued, however, that this realistically naturalized Kantianism can be nothing more than practical realism, as originated by Karl Marx. (shrink)

This paper examines six cross-sector partnerships in South Africa and Zambia. These partnerships were part of a research study undertaken between 2003 and 2005 and were selected because of their potential to contribute to poverty reduction in their respective countries. This paper examines the context in which the partnerships were established, their governance and accountability mechanisms and the engagement and participation of the partners and the intended beneficiaries in the partnerships. We argue that a partnership approach which has proven successful (...) in one context can be used as a valuable learning resource. However, a partnership's work, which includes all aspects of the partnership and its activities, cannot necessarily be transferred directly to another partnership without a thorough and locally informed analysis of the context in which it is implemented. In addition, we suggest that it is difficult to assess whether the good intentions behind partnerships were translated into real benefits for target groups as effective monitoring and evaluation procedures were not in place in the partnerships studied. Similarly, the absence of regularised governance and accountability systems in partnerships made it difficult to support partner and beneficiary participation and engagement. We conclude that there is a need to move beyond a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to partnerships and that partnership replication should focus more strongly on the transfer of learning about partnership processes instead of simply copying partnership activities. Moreover, the development of stronger mechanisms for assessing and ensuring accountability towards both partners and intended beneficiaries is required if partnerships are to meet their intended objectives. (shrink)

The philosophical analysis of chemistry has advanced at such a pace during the last dozen years that the existence of philosophy of chemistry as an autonomous discipline cannot be doubted any more. The present paper will attempt to analyse the experience of philosophy of chemistry at the, so to say, meta-level. Philosophers of chemistry have especially stressed that all sciences need not be similar to physics. They have tried to argue for chemistry as its own type of science and for (...) a pluralistic understanding of science in general. However, when stressing the specific character of chemistry, philosophers do not always analyse the question ‘What is science?’ theoretically. It is obvious that a ‘monistic’ understanding of science should not be based simply on physics as the epitome of science, regarding it as a historical accident that physics has obtained this status. The author’s point is that the philosophical and methodological image of science should not be chosen arbitrarily; instead, it should be theoretically elaborated as an idealization (theoretical model) substantiated on the historical practice of science. It is argued that although physics has, in a sense, justifiably obtained the status of a paradigm of science, chemistry, which is not simply a physical science, but a discipline with a dual character, is also relevant for elaborating a theoretical model of science. The theoretical model of science is a good tool for examining various issues in philosophy of chemistry as well as in philosophy of science or science studies generally. (shrink)

Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 48-60.

Peptidylprolyl‐isomerases (PPIases) comprise of the protein families of FK506 binding proteins (FKBPs), cyclophilins, and parvulins. Their common feature is their ability to expedite the transition of peptidylprolyl bonds between the cis and the trans conformation. Thus, it seemed highly plausible that PPIase enzymatic activity is crucial for protein folding. However, this has been difficult to prove over the decades since their discovery. In parallel, more and more studies have discovered scaffolding functions of PPIases. This essay discusses the hypothesis that PPIase (...) enzymatic activity might be the consequence of binding to peptidylprolyl protein motifs. The main focus of this paper is the large immunophilins FKBP51 and FKBP52, but other PPIases such as cyclophilin A and Pin1 are also described. From the hypothesis, it follows that the PPIase activity of these proteins might be less relevant, if at all, than the organization of protein complexes through versatile protein binding. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/A33la0dx5LE. (shrink)

Recent decades have witnessed a sharp increase of interest in the cultures and regions of South and East Asia, owing in part to the prominent role Asian economies have played in the era of globalization. Asian Worldviews: Religions, Philosophies, Political Theories is a unique, reader-friendly introduction to the intellectual heritage of the region. Assuming no previous background in Asian cultural history, Asian Worldviews moves beyond chronological and geographic boundaries to present an integrated treatment of the beliefs, teachings, and ideologies that (...) have shaped the worldviews of approximately half of the global population. Rein Raud explores forms of knowledge in China, India, Tibet, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, providing balanced coverage of all historical periods from antiquity to the modern day. -/- Asian Worldviews embraces the connections rather than the divisions between the religious and philosophical dimensions of South and East Asian thought, and emphasizes a robust engagement with each culture's political, social, and economic contexts. Clear, accessible chapters discuss the development of religious, philosophical, and political thought in India, China, and Japan, and provide succinct overviews of the history of ideas in Korea, Tibet, and Southeast Asia. Throughout the book, Raud uses a comparative approach to examine the mutual influence and productive dialogue, past and present, between Asian cultures as well as with the West, and considers the impact of various worldviews on the development of modern Asian societies. -/- Comprehensive and well-informed by recent developments in the scholarship, Asian Worldviews: Religions, Philosophies, Political Theories is an unparalleled resource for a broad range of courses in Asian studies, philosophy, religious studies, and global politics, as well as an excellent introduction for non-specialist readers looking for a contextual foothold in the rich cultural and intellectual history of South and East Asia. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to widen the scope of the current debate on peer disagreement by applying it to a kind of case it has hitherto remained silent about – namely, to cases of disagreement in which one of the disagreeing parties bases her opinion on a private religious experience to which the other party has no access. In order to do this, I will introduce a modified version of the notion of peerhood – a version that, in (...) contrast to the one employed in the current debate, can be fruitfully applied to the troublesome kind of case in question. I will then employ this new notion in order to specify the degree of conciliation rationally required from the disagreeing parties in the kind of case in question. (shrink)

In many of his works, Zygmunt Bauman has expressed a critical position regarding the politics of multiculturalism, showing how it can be and has been used to downgrade the problems of inequality and uneven access to education, while sequestering minorities in their inherited cultural situations, which are portrayed by the leaders of such communities as “fortresses under siege”. While agreeing with his critique of unequality, this article shows that the target of his criticism are not the honest efforts to find (...) a modus vivendi for multicultural societies that would preserve cultural identities while opening them up to a common social ground, but essentializing and simplifying political discourses that make use of multicultural vocabulary in order to promote other agendas. The article further develops a model in which to view the interests and legitimate rights of individuals and groups and shows how conclusion arises as a result of manipulating them. Finally, the article compares the cultural attitudes and relations to their particular environment of two groups, immigrant minorities and expats, and comes to the conclusion that expats, normally people who come from economically equal or wealthier backgrounds share many of the problems usually associated with immigrant cultural communities in contemporary societies, thus demonstrating that the discourse of multiculturalism can and should be legitimately and fruitfully separated from the discussion of other social problems. (shrink)

This is the first of an ongoing series of review essays in which the authors of significant new works of philosophy engage their readers. These inaugural two readings discuss Rein Raud’s important new reassessment of contemporary ontology, Being in Flux: A Post-Anthropocentric Ontology of the Self. They consider its accomplishments, both on its own terms and with reference to its East Asian and South Asian precursors. Raud then offers a response.

In all epistemological studies one has to employ, in one way or another, the concepts of “sensuous and rational knowledge,” “empirical and theoretical knowledge,” “essence and phenomenon.” But, unfortunately, the logical relationships of these concepts are not understood unambiguously, which prevents many epistemological issues from being examined with sufficient theoretical clarity. '.

This chapter discusses three different ways of talking about mood enhancement. First, if we do want to enhance, what is good enhancement? Second, if one wants to enhance, what is the usefulness of enhancement? Third, if we want to enhance, what might be the beneficial (or harmful) effects? To illustrate the conceptual analysis in this chapter, two classes of drugs to enhance mood are used. First is the class of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and the other class is of (...) beta blocking agents, which are claimed to be good as “memory‐smoothing” drugs. Three different ways of using the terms “good” or “bad” are shown to be in play in mood enhancement: instrumental goodness and badness, utalitarian goodness and badness, and benefactorial goodness and badness. Mood‐improving and memory‐smoothing drugs may serve different purposes, which are linked to the general purpose of improving the mood or smoothing memories. (shrink)

In reference to the different approaches in philosophy(of medicine) of the nature of (medical) technology,this article introduces the topic of this specialissue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, that is,the way the different forms of medical technologyfunction in everyday medical practice. The authorselaborate on the active role technology plays inshaping our views on disease, illness, and the body,whence in shaping our world.

The analysis of the reciprocal relations of the discipline of philosophy and other cultural phenomena requires a few disclaimers. First of all, the characterization of philosophy as a cultural phenomenon along with literature, music and theater, or culinary arts, fashions and sports, rejects claims that philosophy somehow relates to absolute truths which transcend the limits of any particular cultural context and mean the same things for anyone who manages to reach the heights and/or depths necessary for that purpose. This also (...) entails that any pursuit of philosophy, including Buddhist philosophy in Japan, is only possible within the network of textualities and cultural practices that surround it, and the people engaged in it relate to the cultural codes and institutions of their environment just as they relate to the internal rules of their philosophy and its received heritage. Secondly, we have to acknowledge two major aspects in approaching any cultural phenomenon, namely, its texts and its practice. The texts produced by the people engaged in, say, philosophy or literature or cooking are distinct from, yet always related to, the practical aspects of that phenomenon, which determine who produces these texts, how and why they are produced, and how they are used and disseminated. Alternatively, seen from the aspect of practice, texts are a sort of by-product of what people do; for example, reciting Buddhist sutras does not imply a deep understanding of their semantic, textual, and philosophical content. Both of these aspects are equally relevant to the phenomenon as a whole, and neither can be sufficiently analyzed without the knowledge of the other. In this article, I will focus on some key categories and issues mainly as they have been reflected in the domain of literature, especially since it can be argued that literature is the filter through which Buddhist influence, and its philosophical aspect, in particular, has been mediated to other spheres of culture. (shrink)

The chapter contributes to the debate on Dōgen’s theory of time by discussing key concepts of the Shōbōgenzō’s “Uji” fascicle in a broader context, comparing them with other cases of usage in the entire work, their provenance in the tradition of Zen thought, as well as with their possible translational equivalents and their connotations in the Western tradition. A central claim for which I argue is that a presentist reading of the fascicle (as well as other related passages in Dōgen’s (...) work) leaves the fewest of the cryptic passages unexplained. It does this while blending seamlessly with Dōgen’s other claims about reality, language, our ways to understand them, and praxis.I begin, however, by touching on the much-discussed issue of Dōgen’s relationship with philosophy, arguing that it is incorrect to exclude non-Western traditions from the domain of philosophy because of particular features that certain canonically recognised Western thinkers and texts also possess. The issue is important, because it legitimates a register of reading of texts such as Dōgen’s in a way that places them in dialogue with ideas that they have historically had no connection with. And it also enables us to use them in contexts for which they have no historical relevance — something that treating them solely as subject matter for the history of ideas would not let us do. (shrink)

Mein Ziel in diesem Artikel ist es, unsere moralischen Verpflichtungen gegenüber zukünftigen Generationen mithilfe der sogenannten Goldenen Regel moral-theoretisch zu begründen. Zu diesem Zweck werde ich im ersten Abschnitt die gängigen Varianten dieser Regel hinsichtlich ihrer Tauglichkeit als allgemeine Moralvorschriften untersuchen, und anschließend im zweiten Abschnitt eine aussichtsreichere Variante präsentieren. Abschließend werde ich im dritten Abschnitt diese Variante der Goldenen Regel auf Verpflichtungen gegenüber zu künftigen Generationen anwenden.

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 st1:*{behavior:url } This part of the Soviet philosophy that corresponds approximately to theoretical philosophy and philosophy of science on the example of Estonia and proceeding from the University of Tartu is discussed. The author concentrates on the period of approximately 1960–1990, when he himself was engaged in the field, i.e. the time before 1960 is not included. The aim of this paper is not to provide an overview of the individual philosophers in Estonia (...) at the time and their works, but to give a more general description of the philosophy of the Soviet era. The Soviet and the East European philosophy of the time have received rather little critical treatment in literature in English. However, a few general overviews trying to prove that this Soviet and East European philosophical legacy is worth studying have still been published. This paper is focused on the question what kind of philosophical researches it was possible to engage oneself in under the abnormal conditions at the time and whether some starting points and problem issues in theseresearches might be viable also today. Estonian experience confirms the general conclusion of these authors who, analyzing the legacy of Marxism, have found that although Marxism is nowadays—not to mention how it existed in the Soviet totalitarian regime—mainly not considered a serious philosophy but rather an ideological basis of a failed political doctrine, it has nevertheless quite something to offer when treated in a more depoliticized manner, in the general context of philosophical quests. Teoreetiline ja teadusfilosoofia Nõukogude ajal: mõned märkused Eesti näitel 1960-1990 Vaatluse all on Eesti näitel ja lähtudes Tartu ülikoolist see osa Nõukogudeaegsest filosoofiast, mis vastab umbes teoreetilisele filosoofiale ja teadusfilosoofiale. Autor peatub ajavahemikul umbes 1960–1990, mil ta ka ise tegev oli, st 1960-ndate aastate eelset aega ei käsitleta. Artikli eesmärgiks ei ole ülevaate andmine Eestis sel ajal tegutsenud filosoofidest ja nende töödest, vaid Nõukogudeaegse filosoofia üldisem iseloomustamine. Nõukogude ja selleagset Ida-Euroopa filosoofiat on ingliskeelses kirjanduses üsna vähe kriitiliselt uuritud. Üksikuid ülevaateteoseid, milles on püütud näidata, etsee Nõukogude ja Ida-Euroopa filosoofiline pärand väärib uurimist, on siiski ilmunud. Käesolevas artiklis on keskendutud eelkõige küsimusele, mis laadi filosoofilise uurimistööga sai tolle aja ebanormaalsetes tingimustes tegelda ja kas mõned lähtekohad ja probleemipüstitused selles on elujõulised ka veel nüüd. Eesti kogemus kinnitab nende autorite üldist järeldust, kes marksismi pärandit uurides on leidnud, et kuigi marksismi tänapäeval — rääkimata sellest, missugune see oli Nõukogude totalitaarses režiimis — enamasti ei peeta tõsiseltvõetavaks filosoofiaks, vaid pigem läbikukkunud poliitilise õpetuse ideoloogiliseks aluseks, on tal siiski nii mõndagi öelda, kui teda käsitleda depolitiseeritumalt, filosoofiliste otsingute üldises kontekstis. Märksõnad: dialektiline materialism, dialektika, ‘eessõna-marksism’, filosoofia põhiküsimus, Nõukogude filosoofia, ‘ontologistid’ ja ‘epistemologistid’, praktika. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that Frege thought ordinary language to be seriously defective. Yet his remarks about ordinary language are not always unflattering. Comparing the relation between his formal language and ordinary language to the relation between the microscope and the eye, Frege remarked: ‘[the eye], because of the range of its applicability and because of the ease with which it can adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, has a great superiority over the microscope’. The point, of course, is (...) that, for Frege, the deficiencies of ordinary language arise in connection with the scientific endeavour: ordinary language is not an acceptable medium in which to pursue truth. As he goes on to observe: ‘… viewed as an optical instrument [the eye] reveals many imperfections … as soon as scientific purposes place strong requirements upon sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be inadequate. On the other hand, the microscope is perfectly suited for just such purposes’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I compare the idea of ‘substitution’, central to the later work of Emmanuel Levinas, to the idea of jinen hōni, or ‘natural acts’, proposed by Shinran Shōnin. For Levinas, ‘substitution’ meant the acceptance of responsibility for the suffering of the Other that one hasn’t caused, giving oneself up to ‘persecution’ and ‘accusation’ of the Other in absolute passivity. For Shinran, a similar passivity is implied by the unability of the ‘I’ to act in order to liberate itself (...) from its conditioned existence, a result which can be achieved by giving up one’s own agency in favour of the Other. For both thinkers, ethical selfhood is thus attainable only by forsaking of one’s worldly ego, described in remarkably similar terms, even though their understanding of alterity itself is radically different. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophies versus Philosophy:In Defense of a Flexible DefinitionRein RaudIt is strange that no one has taken up Carine Defoort's clearly formulated and timely argument about the intercultural tensions in interpreting what philosophy is, although the issue deserves at least a roundtable, if not an international conference.1 I doubt that this is because there is a general consensus that the matter is now settled, and I would therefore like to (...) develop the argument a bit further and offer a few additional factors to consider. It is also obvious that the problem is not limited to the subject of Chinese philosophy alone: all traditions of thought from all over the world, but most notably the Indian, Islamic, and Japanese heritages, are affected by the positions we adopt. As in most debates about the commensurability of cultural traditions, we can find differences when we look for them, and similarities if these are what we would like to see, so the "conflict of sensitivities"2 is also a matter of attitudes. My own position is that regardless of what we prefer to call the practice of deeper thought (and 'philosophy' is a very good name), it would be extremely useful for all of its participants, whatever their origin and upbringing, to find a common denominator for them to be able to exchange ideas and mutually enrich each other on its basis. In what follows I shall try to sketch a perspective from which this could, in my opinion, be theoretically grounded.Four PositionsDefoort has identified four possible points of view on the problem of whether classical Chinese thought could or should be called 'philosophy,' which could be summarized as follows.1. Chinese classical thought is not philosophy, because it does not satisfy the conditions of philosophy as it is generally and traditionally understood in the West.2. Chinese classical thought is philosophy, because it reveals the necessary characteristics if analyzed with the help of an appropriate (Western-type) observation language.3. Chinese classical thought can be called philosophy, but only if we redefine philosophy in order to accommodate some of its nontypical or clearly deviant features.4. Chinese classical thought should not be called philosophy, because philosophy is a culturally closed Western phenomenon with a limited scope and incapable of understanding fundamentally different modes of thought. [End Page 618]If we dismiss the birthright variety of the first position, we could label it essentialist, and its weakest point is certainly that Western philosophy has not remained unchanged during the course of history. It is highly doubtful that Socrates, Diogenes, scholastics, Nietzsche, and Gareth Evans could all be members of the same set if the same strict criteria were applied to all periods and all cultural settings in the same way, and, as Defoort herself stresses,3 the fact that seventeenth-century Jesuits (the basis of whose original worldview, we should think, was much farther from the Chinese than ours) had no problem in calling Chinese thought philosophy should show us that the paradigm shift of the thing called 'philosophy' has occurred in the West and is, so to speak, our problem and not theirs.Now, it is also possible that in some circles even some prominent names in the Western tradition do not qualify as real philosophers, in the sense in which Hegel was treated by Bertrand Russell4 and Heidegger was dismissed by Alfred Ayer5 in their respective histories of philosophy (while they nevertheless felt compelled to include chapters or passages on them). A definition of philosophy that puts forward such criteria that a considerable number of thinkers would have to remain outside its borders should be labeled sectarian-and it can still be met, even if ever less often, in some analytical schools of philosophy. It is my conviction, however, that in our globalizing world any definition that would leave non-European philosophy outside the borders of 'philosophy proper' should be considered sectarian in nature. The main problem that I have with Defoort's family model6 is precisely that in it the head of the family, who makes the decisions as to who can be adopted and who cannot, is always Western, and the... (shrink)