Als Fritz Linder, Schtiler und Nachfolger von K. H. Bauer auf dem Heidelberger Lehrstuhl rur Chirurgie, am 12. Juli 1978 am Grabe seines Lehrers im Namen aller Freunde und Schuler sprach, erfuh­ ren wir, daB der Entschlafene "auf dem todlichen Krankenlager" noch seinen Briefwechsel mit Karl Jaspers las und ordnete. Diese letztwillige Vergegenwartigung einer freundschaftlichen Ver­ bindung aus den Jahren nach 1945 schien uns groBe menschliche Bedeutung zu haben, und wir waren erfreut, spater von Frau Bauer und Heinz Gotze, (...) Mitinhaber des Springer-Verlages, den Auftrag zur Herausgabe der Briefe zu erhalten, zumal sich mit beiden Kor­ respondenzpartnern eigene, dankbare Erinnerungen seit 1940 ver­ banden. Der Briefwechsel begann unmittelbar nach der ersten Begegnung yom 5.4. 1945 im Hause von Jaspers, als der Krieg rur Heidelberg vorbei war und politisch unbelastete Professoren vor der Aufgabe standen, die inzwischen geschlossene Universitat im Einvernehmen mit der Besatzungsbehorde wieder zu eroffnen und die Vorausset­ zungen rur die Wiederaufnahme freier Forschung und Lehre zu schaff en. Fur diesen Neubeginn, der natiirlich ein Neubeginn im Geiste des unveranderlich Gultigen sein sollte, war die daran anknupfende Freundschaft zwischen Bauer und Jaspers entscheidend. Die Person­ lichkeiten erganzten sich, und was beide damals suchten, war jeweils beim Partner zu finden: bei Jaspers die lebendige Idee in ihrem kla­ ren, wenn auch geschichtlich wandelbaren Wahrsein, bei Bauer die anpassungsfahige Vitalitat und die Gabe, Denken und Handeln zu verbinden. (shrink)

Wie vielleicht kein anderes seiner Werke reprasentieren Reinholds Verhandlungen sein lebenslanges Bemuhen, die Aufklarung in Kooperation und Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Selbstdenkern voranzutreiben. Sie umfassen drei Beitrage. Der zweite, der Entwurf zu einem Einverstandnisse unter Wohlgesinnten, resultiert aus Diskussionen, die Reinhold mit freimaurerischen Freunden fuhrte. Hier geht es im Kern um die Frage, wie sich dem aufgeklarten Denken kantischer Pragung die notige soziale Wirkung und organisatorische Kraft verschaffen liesse. Dieser Entwurf wurde weithin an Freunde und Bekannte verschickt, mit der Bitte, dem (...) Einverstandnis beizutreten. Aber auch konstruktive Kritik erbat Reinhold. Von den Antworten, die er erhielt, druckte er neun Briefe mit seinen eigenen Repliken ab - der dritte Beitrag. Der erste Beitrag enthalt Reinholds ausfuhrliche, im Umfang stark erweiterte Umarbeitung des Entwurfs. (shrink)

,Etwa zwei Monate vor dem Tode sagte Husserl:,Man solle seine Vergangenheit nicht trivialisieren. ' "1 Die Herausforderung dieser Worte lieB sich nur schwer abschatzen, als ich dem Stifter des Husserl-Archivs, meinem Freund Pater Van Breda, im Januar I974- zwei Monate vor seinem unzeitigen Hingang- den von ihm so sehr begruBten und geforderten EntschluB, eine Husserl-Bio­ graphie zu schreiben, naher erlauterte. Mancherlei ware darin ein­ zubringen gewesen: Ubersicht uber die Geschicke des Bismarck­ Staates und das aufkommende Hitler-Reich, Vertrautheit mit Stifter (...) und Hofmannsthal, Kenntnis der Theorie mathematischer Funktionen wie der Psychologie der Wurzburger Schule, Einsicht in die Einfuhlungslehre von Lipps wie auch Heideggers Seins­ frage. Aber solche Absicht erwies sich hauptsachlich deswegen als undurchfiihrbar, weil es derzeit noch am Notigsten fehlt: an einer verlaBlichen Durcharbeitung von Husserls Denken und seiner Entwicklung, wie sie sich in den veroffentlichten Werken, vor al­ lem aber im Meer bewahrter Manuskripte niederschlug. Hier galt es, da viel bisher im Dunkeln liegt, die Materialien zu einer Bio­ graphie erst einmal bereitzustellen und, wenn auch oft nur um­ riBhaft, fur die Zukunft sicherzustellen. Ergebnis dieser Beschei­ dung ist die vorliegende Chronik. GewiB, Husserl ware selbst der befugteste interpres sui gewe­ sen. Doch was er unterm 20. Juni rg2r an den Meiner Verlag schrieb - der,Stand seiner Lebensarbeit" erlaube es ihm zur Zeit nicht, zu der in diesem Verlag erscheinenden Reihe von Selbstdarstellungen einen Beitrag zu liefern (F I r8/r + 25) -, galt, wie gerade unsere Chronik deutlich macht, fur ihn zeitlebens. (shrink)

Der Kunsthistoriker Ernst Hans Josef Gombrich hat einen „wissenschaftlichen“ oder kognitiven Ansatz zur Erforschung der Geschichte und Psychologie der Künste entwickelt, der sehr maßgeblich von der Wissenschaftstheorie seines engen Freundes Karl Popper beeinflusst worden ist. Die geistige Nähe zwischen beiden wird in Gombrichs zentraler Arbeit zur Wiederentdeckung der Repräsentation in der Renaissance und zur Historiografie der Kunst deutlich. Ihre Differenzen verdienen allerdings ebenfalls Beachtung. Gombrichs Ansicht zufolge verändern sich Geschmack und Stil entsprechend der von ihm so genannten „Logik der (...) Mode“. Gombrich hat dargelegt, auf welch vielfältige Weise Veränderungen in der Kunst sich vollziehen. Während sich die Moden in der Kunst auf unvorhersehbare, launenhafte Weise wandeln, tauchen technische Veränderungen als Lösungen für technische Probleme auf und werden im Modus von Versuch und Irrtum ermittelt. Auf diese Weise stieß Gombrich auf eine Antinomie in der Kunsttheorie: Handwerkliche Fähigkeiten und Können wandeln sich durch rationalen Fortschritt, während sich Stile durch den irrationalen Mitläufereffekt verändern. In der Kunst ist der relativistische Pluralismus zur Mode geworden, und diese Mode hat seine Antinomie ignoriert – und zwar, sofern er richtig liegt, recht willkürlich. (shrink)

Die Soncino-Gesellschaft war ein bibliophiler Verein, der sich 1924 in Berlin gründete und bis zu seiner Auflösung 1937 über hundert Publikationen aus vielen Gebieten der jüdischen Geschichte und Kultur herausgegeben hat. Sie versammelte Mitglieder aus allen Strömungen des Judentums unter ihrem Dach und entwickelte sich mit ihrem Anspruch, ästhetische Vorbilder für das jüdische Buch zu geben, zu einem jüdischen Integrationsprojekt. Der Beitrag geht den kulturzionistischen Bruchlinien nach, die sich in der zionistischen Rezeption, dem Streit um die hebräische Bibelausgabe und der (...) Positionierung einiger prominenter Protagonisten der Soncino-Gesellschaft zeigen. Diese Bruchlinien blieben jedoch so marginal, dass sie den bibliophilen Konsens nicht gefährdeten. Im historischen Rückblick kann das Programm der Soncino-Gesellschaft vielmehr als Kanon der deutsch-jüdischen Integration in der Diaspora gelesen werden. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz stellt den Versuch dar, die normative Seite von Wittgensteins Frühwerk herauszuarbeiten und dabei an seinem Ansatz insofern Kritik zu üben, als gezeigt wird, wie sehr dessen Implikationen mit unseren üblichen ethischen Vorstellungen in Konflikt stehen. Die Arbeit hat aber auch einen etwas wohlwollenderen Aspekt: Sie versucht zu zeigen, wie Wittgensteins scheinbar widersinnige Ansichten so formuliert werden können, daß sie zumindest begreifbar erscheinen. Zu diesem Zweck beginnen wir mit der Untersuchung des demjenigen Wittgensteins erstaunlich ähnlichen ethischen Ansatzes, wie (...) er von einem seiner frühen väterlichen Freunde vertreten wurde, nämlich von Karl Kraus. (shrink)

Mit Hilfe von Leo Strauss, seinem Freund und philosophischen Kollegen, verließ Hans Jonas Israel und siedelte 1949 nach Kanada. Nachdem Jonas einige Jahre in Kanada an der Carleton University gelehrt hatte, erhielt er 1955 einen Ruf als Professor an die New School for Social Research. Leo Strauss und Karl Löwith, die beide dort lehrten, hatten sich für ihn eingesetzt.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:196 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in 1943, was to write an Epilogue to Julian Marias' History o] Philosophy. In early 1944, the Epilogue was conceived as a volume of 400 pages, and later of 700. In 1945 a part of the Epilogue was to be detached and given the title The Origin ol Philosophy. Then one completed part of that was published in 1953 as an essay in a Festschrift (...) for Karl Jaspers. That, and other sections, have been put together here. The first part of the book treats philosophy as a cumulative enterprise in which each man rethinks and thinks further what other men have thought. Even when past thought has reached an end, or taken a direction we will not follow, it is only for the reason that it has already happened that we do not have to do it ourselves. This is not because history is rational but because thought is historical, rooted in ideas we did not ourselves create and based on methods we have acquired and sometimes altered. The second part of the book deals with the origin of philosophy--and the origin of "philosophy" for Ortega is concerned throughout with language and etymology. The word "philosophy" is not one Ortega likes; he prefers the word "aletheia," which was used by Parmenides and his contemporaries. In popular language, aletheia meant discovery, exposure, denudation, revelation. For the thinker, "aletheia" is "truth" as a verb, the activity of uncovering reality, which is concealed under the robes of appearance or falsehood. Philosophy, for Ortega, begins with Parmenides and Heraclitus; "proto-philosophers" he calls them. The Ionians had been scientists; their attempts at natural explanation upset religion and tradition, and prepared the way for philosophy. In a remarkably subtle and complex analysis for so short a space, Ortega argues that skepticism, atheism, wealth, and knowledge of nature created a freedom based on a need to create or choose one's own beliefs in a world in which relative abundance demands choice, since in poverty "an individual is never in the position of being able to choose; for choice assumes that the circle of one's possibilities is notably greater than that of one's needs" (p. 98). The social need to define the thinker and so grant him professional status that might minimize the hostility of the tradition-ridden and reactionary populace, especially in Athens, led to the name "sophist," which became disreputable to a hostile citizenry, and then to "philosopher." Socrates was, unfortunately, the only philosopher, the man who liked, had a taste for, or loved wisdom, but made no pretense that he had any, saying only he sought it. But the name persisted, and helped institutionalize the new profession. I haven't even intimated the delight of Ortega's incidental insights. He was probably justified in believing that his stature as a thinker was much greater than his reputation. A first-rate, full-scale study of Ortega in English would help, but what we need most is a collection and translation of his complete works. RSLPH ROSS ~cripps College Discourse on Thinking. By Martin Heidegger. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Pp. 93. $3.50.) This is a translation of a speech and conversation originally published under the thematic title Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Giinther Neske, 1959). Heidegger uses this unusual German word to remind us that there is another way of thinking than the calculative and dialectical modes made prominent by the mathematical sciences and modem cultural philosophy respectively. We have forgotten a less busy mode of thinking, a thinking released from all desire to control reality. Gelassenheit is rendered throughout as "releasement" in this translation. But Gelassenheit does not just mean letting go, or freedom from, as "releasement" may suggest. It also has the more positive sense of composure and a patient letting things be. In the context of Heidegger's attempts to define a mode of thinking not concerned with dominating reality, Gelassenheit comes to mean the freedom to be open to reality. BOOK REVIEWS 197 Heidegger stresses the ability to wait for insight, which is not, however, a mere passive waiting for something fixed. It would be... (shrink)

It features Easton and Guddat's own highly regarded translations (based on the best German editions as well as on the original manuscripts and first editions) ...

Business models are developed and managed to create value. While most business model frameworks envision value creation as a uni-directional flow between the focal business and its customers, this article presents a broader view based on a stringent application of stakeholder theory. It provides a stakeholder value creation framework derived from key characteristics of stakeholder theory. This article highlights mutual stakeholder relationships in which stakeholders are both recipients and creators of value in joint value creation processes. Key findings include that (...) the concept and analysis of value creation through business models need to be expanded with regard to different types of value created with and for different stakeholders and the resulting value portfolio, i.e., the different kinds of value exchanged between the company and its stakeholders. This paper details the application of the stakeholder value creation framework and its theoretical propositions for the case of business models for sustainability. The framework aims to support theoretical and empirical analyses of value creation as well as the management and transformation of business models in line with corporate sustainability ambitions and stakeholder expectations. Overall, this paper proposes a shift in perspective from business models as devices of sheer value creation to business models as devices that organize and facilitate stakeholder relationships and corresponding value exchanges. (shrink)

An autobiographic instinct may be as old as Man Writing; but only since 1800 has Western Man placed a premium on autobiography. A bibliography of all autobiographic writing prior to that time would be a small fascicule; a bibliography since 1800 a thick tome. The ground behind this simpleminded assertion of a quantitative measure cannot be explained away by easy reference to the mass literacy of the modern world or the greater ease of publishing. It is as much a fact (...) of cultural conditions as is the significant relation of rhetoric to the intense public mindedness of classical men, the relative insignificance of tragedy in a thoroughly Christianized world view, the disappearance of epic from a nonaristocratic world, or the powerful assertion of the novel in an age of burghers. The usage of the term "autobiography" itself is suggestive, although this mode of historical explanation is always defective in the sense that such older terms as "hypomnemata," "commentarii," "vita," "confessions," or "memoirs" may well have covered the functions subsequently encapsulated in a newly fashionable term. In German the term makes its appearance shortly before 1800; the Oxford English Dictionary attributes first English usage to Southey in an article on Portuguese literature from the year 1809. Karl J. Weintraub, Thomas E. Donnelley Professor of History and dean of the Division of the Humanities at the University of Chicago, is the author of Visions of Culture and numerous articles. His introduction to a new edition of Goethe's Autobiography will prove of special interest to our readers. (shrink)

According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I (...) show that their objections to the Timing Argument fail as attempts to refute the argument in its most challenging form. (shrink)

Our engagement with social media, smart and mobile technologies is ambiguous and raises existential questions about the naturalness and desirability of hyper-connectivity. On the one hand, we benefit from using these technologies in organizing and socializing our everyday life. On the other hand, they further complicate our lives. Hence, in recent years, more and more people choose to abstain from digital media by taking on a so-called ‘digital detox,’ a period of living without these technologies. In this article, we look (...) at ‘digital detoxing’ from an existential perspective by introducing Kierkegaard’s existential categories of repetition and recollection to tackle the question whether ‘dropping out’ is a meaningful act or a temporary respite. What would it mean, so we ask, to find a proper balance in a world that demands constant connectivity? (shrink)

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind (...) associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Occasionally, people are called upon to estimate probabilities after an event has occurred. In hindsight, was this an outcome we could have expected? Could things easily have turned out differently? One strategy for performing post hoc probability judgements would be to mentally turn the clock back and reconstruct one's expectations before the event. But if asked about the probability of an alternative, counterfactual outcome, a simpler strategy is available, based on this outcome's perceived closeness to what actually happened. The article (...) presents five studies exploring the relationship between counterfactual closeness and counterfactual probability. The first study indicates that post hoc probabilities typically refer to the counterfactual rather than the factual outcome. Studies 2-5 show that physical, temporal, or conceptual proximity play a decisive role for post hoc probability assessments of counterfactual events. When margins are narrow, the probabilities of, for instance, winning a match (when losing), and of losing (when actually winning) may even be rated higher than the corresponding probabilities of what really happened. Closeness is also more often referred to, and rated to be a better reason for believing there is a ''good chance" of the counterfactual rather than of the factual result occurring. Finally, the closeness of the alternative outcome in success and failure stories is shown to be significantly correlated to its rated probability. (shrink)

Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing not her ontological claim, but the methodology behind her rejection of eliminativism – I focus on ordinary objects. Thomasson thinks that by endorsing the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment eliminativism goes wrong; a theory eschewing quantification over a kind may nonetheless be committed to its existence. I argue (...) that, contrary to Thomasson's claims, we should retain the Quinean criterion. Her arguments show that many eliminativist positions are flawed, but their flaws lie elsewhere: the Quinean criterion is innocent. Showing why reveals the importance of pragmatism in ontology. In §1 I compare Thomasson's account and the eliminativist views to which it stands in opposition. In §2 I re-construct Thomasson's reasons for rejecting the Quinean criterion. In §3 I defend the Quinean criterion, showing that the eliminativists’ flaws are not consequences of applying the Quinean criterion, before explaining the criterion's importance when properly understood. I conclude that Thomasson, though right to criticise the methodology of ordinary-object eliminativists, is wrong to identify the Quinean criterion as the source of their mistake. (shrink)

With the publication of Reason and Existenz, originally delivered as a series of five lectures at the University of Groningen in 1935, one of the most important of Jaspers's philosophic works is made available to the English-speaking world. It concerns itself with a general statement of the principal philosophic categories which have given uniqueness to Jaspers's thinking: existence, freedom, and history, and the limit-situations of death, suffering, and sin. Written shortly after Jaspers's major systematic work and before his analysis of (...) the problem of truth, Reason and Existenz occupies a primary position in the development of his thought. (shrink)

Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research presents a compilation of six decades of Basic Income literature. It includes the most influential empirical research and theoretical arguments on all aspects of the Basic Income proposal. -/- Includes six decades of the most influential literature on Basic Income Includes unpublished and hard-to-find articles The first major compendium on one of the most innovative political reform proposals of our age Explores multidisciplinary views of Basic Income, with philosophical, economic, political, and sociological views (...) Features contributions from key and well-known philosophers and economists, including Atkinson, Simon, Friedman, Fromm, Gorz, Offe, Rawls, Pettit, Van Parijs, and more Presents the best theoretical and empirical arguments for and against Basic Income -/- . (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Anna Christensen raises an ‘Epicurean challenge’ to Don Marquis’ much-discussed argument for the immorality of abortion. According to Marquis’ argument, abortion is pro tanto morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of ‘a future like ours’. Drawing on the Epicurean idea that death cannot harm its victim because there is no subject to be harmed, Christensen argues that neither fetuses nor anyone else can be deprived of a future like ours by dying. Thus, (...) Christensen suggests, the moral wrongness of abortion cannot be grounded in the relevant individual’s being deprived of a future like ours. In this reply, I argue that on no interpretation of Christensen’s Epicurean challenge does it succeed. (shrink)

Muss Philosophie immer eine bierernste Angelegenheit sein? Einer, der das vehement bestritten hat, war der griechische Denker Diogenes, jener berühmte Tonnen-Philosoph, der bis heute als eine der schillerndsten und originellsten Gestalten des Altertums gilt. Seine Gesellschaftskritik lebte er mit einer nachgerade schockierenden Konsequenz vor. Seine Forderung: nicht mehr und nicht weniger als der konsequente Ausstieg aus der Zivilisation. Karl-Wilhelm Weeber stellt in diesem locker geschriebenen Band den scharfzüngigen, schlagfertigen und respektlosen Philosophen und seine Ideenwelt vor.