This book addresses the need to create an "axiological epistemology". This term refers to knowledge of what is axiological, id est everything related to human values, and the know-how on how to manage the study of values. In knowledge societies, we know and live axiological projects that we do not receive from anyone, but that we must construct ourselves in a situation of continuous change. In view of the fact that the axiological crisis in which we are immersed is the (...) most serious one that humanity has suffered over its long history, the seriousness and urgency of the issue in question is evident. Adequate knowledge is required to solve this problem, which is at the root of all the problems we are experiencing. This work offers a potential solution that, in contrast to the past, cannot be definitive, but must be transformed throughout the continuous changes to ways of life as a result of technoscience. It will prove of great value to all those who must operate within human values and motivate groups, as well as to those interested in spirituality. (shrink)

Rapid changes in the ways of survival in human societies, passing quickly from pre-industrial to industrial societies or industrial societies to knowledge societies, characterized by innovation and constant change, require a kind of a non religious spirituality not tied to beliefs. No need to go to Eastern spiritual traditions, Buddhism, Yoga or Advaita Vedanta to show and experience the possibility of a non-religious spirituality; also within the Christian tradition, we find authors that allow non-religious spirituality. We can count on an (...) important notion of Nicholas of Cusa: The "No-Other" as the absolute dimension of all reality. The Cusano considers that this term is more appropriate to describe that absolute of all reality then the term God. It is also very convenient to live a spirituality that does not divide reality into two poles: the mundane and the divine, the relative and absolute in this world and the next. (shrink)

Background: In recent decades, the amount of research on social and emotional learning programs in schools has increased significantly, showing a great number of positive student outcomes, including greater ability to perceive, understand and manage emotions, better attitudes about self and others, less aggressive and/or disruptive behavior, higher levels of psychological well-being and improvement in academic performance among others. The purpose of this research was the design and implementation of the OKAPI emotional education program. A multidimensional program based on cooperative (...) learning methodology. Methods: 86 students of Primary Education, from 3rd to 5th grade (45 students in the experimental unit and 41 in the control group). Results: The implementation of the OKAPI has a positive impact in academic achievement. Conclusion: This program shows the convenience of incorporating programs that can be integrated into the school life and can be applied by the teaching staff using both social emotional learning and school climate approaches. (shrink)

En sociedades de innovación y cambio no podemos repetir el pasado, hay que prospectar el futuro posible para poderlo proyectar. Para ello hay que elaborar un saber lo más preciso posible del tratamiento de lo axiológico, en general, y de la cualidad humana, que nuestros antepasados llamaron espiritualidad. Partimos de nuestra condición de vivientes que hablan, con todas las consecuencias que eso tiene para nuestro acceso a la realidad. Contamos con la lingüística para conocer la formalidad de lo axiológico. En (...) las nuevas sociedades no hay ningún determinismo, pero sí hay condicionamientos creados por nuestras formas concretas de sobrevivir. No pretendemos hacer filosofía de la historia sino epistemología axiológica. No podemos rechazar el crecimiento acelerado de las tecnociencias, pero podemos adquirir la cualidad humana suficiente, individual y colectivamente, para conducir esas tecnociencias y sus consecuencias adecuadamente. Palabras clave: Epistemología Axiológica. Sociedades de Conocimiento. Cualidad Humana. Espiritualidad. Tecnociencias.Societies based on innovation and change cannot repeat the past, the future has to be prospected to be able to project it. This requires developing a knowledge -as accurate as possible- about the axiological processing in general, and about the human quality that our ancestors called spirituality. Our starting point is the human speaker condition, through which we have access to reality, and all the consequences that arise from this fact. Linguistics allows us to know about formality of the axiological. In the new societies there is no determinism, but there are constraints created by our concrete ways to survive. We do not intend to do philosophy of history but axiological epistemology. We cannot reject the extremely fast growth of technosciences, but we can acquire enough human quality, individually and collectively, so as to conduct properly these technosciences and their consequences. Keywords: Epistemology Axiological. Knowledge Society. Quality Human. Spirituality. Technosciences. (shrink)

Resumen En sociedades preindustriales con estado, la religión como sistema de creencias que era simultáneamente sistema de programación colectiva y modo de expresar y vivir la dimensión absoluta de la realidad, el estado necesitaba de la religión y la religión del estado. La industrialización, las sociedades de innovación y cambio, y la subsiguiente democratización, han roto ese pacto y dependencia mutua. En las nuevas sociedades industriales, las religiones no podrán ofrecer sistemas de creencias con la pretensión de que se conviertan (...) en proyecto de vida colectiva, porque, interpretadas desde una epistemología mítica que da por real lo que dicen los mitos, son voluntad divina a la que hay que someterse. Por el contrario, si no se quiere quebrar la tradición, las religiones deberán hacer una oferta de espiritualidad, de calidad humana profunda, a las sociedades globalizadas en continua transformación, cuando más lo necesitan. Las nuevas sociedades no precisan de creencias que fijen, sino de calidad, de espíritu de vida. Las religiones y los estados debieran reconocer esta nueva situación por el bien de los pueblos, de la convivencia entre ellos y por el bien del planeta. Sociedades de una tecnociencia poderosa en continuo crecimiento y sin calidad, pueden ser muy peligrosas. Palabras clave : Mito; creencia; estado; religión; sociedad de conocimiento.In pre-industrial societies with a formal State, in which the religion appeared as a belief system that was both a programming system and a collective way of expressing and living the absolute dimension of reality, the state needed religion and religion needed the state. Industrialization, society in innovation and change, and the subsequent democratization broke this pact and its mutual dependency. In the new industrial societies, religions could not offer those beliefs systems that claim to be converted to a collective life project, interpreted from an mythic epistemology that take as real what the myths say, like a divine will to which we must submit. On the contrary, if you do not want to break with tradition, religions must offer a spirituality of profound human quality to the globalized societies, in continuous transformation, when they need it most. Such new societies do not need to support them, but they do need of a real density of spirit and of spirituality that gives quality to life. Religions and States must recognize this new situation for the good of peoples and the relationship between them and the good of the planet. Societies with a powerful techno science continuously growing and without quality can be very dangerous. Key words: Myth; belief; State; Religion; Knowledge Society. Resumo Nas sociedades pré-industriais com um Estado formal, em que a religião aparecia como aquele sistema de crenças que era simultaneamente um sistema de programação coletiva e um modo de expressar e viver a dimensão absoluta da realidade, o Estado necessitava da religião e a religião do Estado. A industrialização, as sociedades de inovação e mudança e a subseqüente democratização romperam esse pacto e dependência mútua. Nas novas sociedades industriais, as religiões não poderão oferecer sistemas de crenças com a pretensão de que se convertam em projeto de vida coletiva, interpretadas a partir de uma epistemologia mítica que dá por real o que dizem os mitos, como vontade divina à qual se deve submeter. Pelo contrário, se não se quer romper com a tradição, as religiões deverão ofertar uma espiritualidade, de qualidade humana profunda às sociedades globalizadas, em contínua transformação, quando mais a necessitam. As novas sociedades não precisam de crenças em que se fixar, mas de densidade de espírito e de espiritualidade que confira qualidade à vida. As religiões e os Estados devem reconhecer esta nova situação pelo bem dos povos, da convivência entre eles e pelo bem do planeta. Sociedades com uma tecnociência poderosa em contínuo crescimento e sem qualidade podem ser muito perigosas. Palavras-chave: Mito; crença; Estado; Religião; Sociedade do Conhecimento. (shrink)

Recensión: CORBI, Marià. Para uma espiritualidade leiga . São Paulo: Paulus, 2010. 294 p. [ Hacia una espiritualidad laica, sin creencias, sin religiones, sin dioses . Barcelona: Herder, 2007, 350 p.].

VIEIRA, José Álvaro Campos. Aurora de uma espiritualidade sem religião: análise dos sem religião a partir da concepção de espiritualidade não religiosa de Marià Corbi. 2014. Dissertação , Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.

Apresento neste artigo as linhas gerais do pensamento do filósofo e epistemólogo catalão Marià Corbí, bem como sua teoria acerca da função da religião nas sociedades tradicionais e da perda desta função nos quadros da moderna sociedade científica e tecnológica. Para Corbí, a era industrial fez desaparecerem as condições de vida que tornavam necessárias as culturas pré-industriais e suas mitologias e religiões. Os sistemas de programação coletiva baseados nessas religiões e mitologias perderam sua função, e por isso estão todos em (...) colapso. Em seguida abordo sua proposta de uma espiritualidade leiga, voltada para o conhecimento silencioso e o caminho interior. A espiritualidade leiga, livre da submissão a sistemas de crença, deve preservar o rico legado espiritual presente nas várias tradições religiosas como contribuição para uma sociedade mais humana e livre. Por fim, faço algumas observações e comentários sobre questões que considero sensíveis no modelo teórico de Corbí, sobretudo sua afirmação sobre o fim da religião e a falta de substitutos para ela, sua compreensão da história e a possível universalização de sua proposta de espiritualidade. Palavras-chave: Religião; Espiritualidade; Cultura; Revolução científica; Corbí.This article presents the general lines of thought of the catalan philosopher and epistemologist Marià Corbí, as well as his theory about the role of religion in traditional societies and the loss of this function within the frameworks of modern scientific and technological society. For Corbí, the industrial era made disappear the living conditions which made necessary the pre-industrial cultures and their mythologies and religions. Social programming systems based on these mythologies and religions have lost their function, so they are all collapsing. Then I discuss his proposal for a lay spirituality, which seeks the quiet knowledge and the interior path to oneself. This lay spirituality, free from submission to belief systems, should preserve the rich spiritual heritage present in the various religious traditions as a contribution to a more human and free society. Finally, I make some observations and comments on sensitive issues in Corbí´s theoretical model, especially his statement about the end of religion and the lack of substitutes for it, his understanding of history and the possible universality of his spirituality proposal. Key words: Religion; Spirituality; Culture; Scientific revolution; Corbí. (shrink)

MARTINS, Antonione Rodrigues. Tempo axial : um estudo sobre a epistemologia axiológica segundo Marià Corbí e as transformações no campo religioso brasileiro entre 1940 a 2010. Dissertação (Mestrado) 2013. 114p - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Belo Horizonte.

I1. Anil Gupta distinguishes between thin and thick experiences. There are thick experiences like, say, the American Experience of a European traveller. And thin experiences like looking at a yello...

Los pacientes con somatoparafrenia reportan que una extremidad no les pertenece. En filosofía, esta psicopatología motiva la discusión sobre el autopercatamiento, entendido como el sentido de propiedad que acompaña nuestras experiencias mentales. También motiva reflexiones sobre el autopercatamiento corporal; es decir, sobre la experiencia de un miembro como parte del propio cuerpo. Propongo que la somatoparafrenia involucra una dimensión intercorporal anómala. A diferencia de otras patologías de la espacialidad del cuerpo, en la somatoparafrenia se gana alteridad dentro de los límites (...) del cuerpo orgánico: el miembro pertenece a otro. Desarrollo mi propuesta en dos partes: en la primera, retomo discusiones de la filosofía sobre la autopercatamiento corporal usando la somatoparafrenia como ejemplo. En la segunda parte, planteo algunas reflexiones para entender el problema de la alteridad en la somatoparafrenia, y por qué este trastorno puede ubicarse dentro de las discusiones actuales sobre las vivencias intercorporales. (shrink)

Providing a novel multi-disciplinary theorization of memory politics, this insightful Handbook brings varied literatures into a focused dialogue on the ways in which the past is remembered and how these influence transnational, interstate, and global politics in the present. With case studies from Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Europe, South America, and the United States, the Handbook focuses on the political features of historical memory in international relations. Chapters examine key concepts of memory politics, including accountability, commemoration and memorialization, the (...) Europeanization of memory, and the politics of trauma and victimhood, as well as analyzing different sites of memory, from the human body and memorial sites to media, film, and television. It also answers essential questions such as who and what determines the relevance of the past in the present; how does memory become a political question; and what are the political effects and ethical implications of its mobilization? Exploring the links between the politics of memory, international ethics, law, and diplomacy, this stimulating Handbook will be essential reading for students and scholars of politics and international relations, cultural studies, history, and transitional justice. Its discussion of notable agents and practices of memory politics will also be beneficial for practitioners working in human rights, politics, and public policy. (shrink)

Robert Dunn and Richard Moran have emphasized the importance of deliberation to account for the privileged authority of self-ascriptions. They oppose a theoretical attitude toward oneself to a deliberative attitude that they regard as more intimate, as purely first-personal. In this paper, I intend to challenge Dunn’s and Moran’s understanding of how the deliberative attitude is to be conceived of and, in particular, I will call into question their claim that this attitude is wholly non-observational. More positively, I will elaborate (...) on the sort of self-observation that must play a central role in an agent’s deliberation if she is to recognize a certain belief, decision, or intention as genuinely her own and, therefore, as expressing a purely first-person point of view. In the elaboration of my argument, I will rely on a number of situations as they are described in Peter Carey’s novel Oscar and Lucinda. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.

In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.

In Values and the Reflective Point of View (2006), Robert Dunn defends a certain expressivist view about evaluative beliefs from which some implications about self-knowledge are explicitly derived. He thus distinguishes between an observational and a deliberative attitude towards oneself, so that the latter involves a purely first-person point of view that gives rise to an especially authoritative, but wholly non-observational, kind of self-knowledge. Even though I sympathize with many aspects of Dunn's approach to evaluative beliefs and also with his (...) stress on the practical significance of self-knowledge, I argue that his proposal seriously misinterprets the role of observation and evidence within the first-person point of view and, derivatively, in the formation of evaluative beliefs. (shrink)

Abstract: There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first-person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes between the deliberative (...) and the theoretical attitudes is ultimately inconsistent with a satisfactory account of psychoanalytic practice; mainly because, despite Moran's claims to the contrary, such a distinction is still inspired by a Cartesian picture of the self. I argue that, in the light of his distinction, Moran may emphasize that an agent's psychological dispositions should be permeable to her decisions and projects, but is forced to reject the idea that permeability could go the other way too. I explore Bernard Williams' notion of acknowledgment and Simone Weil's distinction between two notions of necessity, in order to articulate a notion of receptive passivity which may help us to characterize this second direction of permeability. I finally outline why receptive passivity (and, thereby, the double direction of permeability) is crucial in order to identify the goal of psychoanalytic treatment and, derivatively, to understand how a certain kind of awareness may have a significant therapeutic effect. (shrink)

: In The View From Here, Jay Wallace emphasises that an agent's capacity to regret a past decision is conditioned by the attachments that she may have developed as a result. Those attachments shape the point of view from which she retrospectively deliberates. Wallace stresses, however, that not every normative aspect of her decision is affected by this change in perspective, because her decision will remain as unjustified as it was in the past. I will argue, however, that this approach (...) to justification is inconsistent with the normative import that Wallace ascribes to the actual dynamics of our attachments in his defence of the rationale of regret. If I am right, Wallace's approach is caught in the following dilemma: Either he renounces a nonperspectival approach to justification or he revises his view about the normative import of the actual dynamics of our attachments. (shrink)

This volume includes a lucid discussion of recent developments by philosophers such as Block, Davidson, Fodor, Kim, Lewis, Mellor, Putnam, Schiffer, Shoemaker, ...

One influential interpretation of Newton's formulation of his calculus has regarded his work as an organized, cohesive presentation, shaped primarily by technical issues and implicitly motivated by a knowledge of the form which a "finished" calculus should take. Offered as an alternative to this view is a less systematic and more realistic picture, in which both philosophical and technical considerations played a part in influencing the structure and interpretation of the calculus throughout Newton's mathematical career. This analysis sees the development (...) of Newton's calculus not principally as a calculated movement toward "rigorous" justification (in the sense of Cauchy, Weierstrass, and their 19th century contemporaries) and refinement of techniques, but as an evolution in the light of his involvement in debates over philosophical and scientific issues central to the rise of modern philosophy and science in the 17th and early 18th centuries. (shrink)

Contrary to what he expected, Primo Levi didn’t experience his life after being released from Auschwitz as cheerful and light-hearted. He – like many other survivors – was haunted by an obscure and solid anguish. It took some effort for him to discern the object or source of this anguish. He finally identified it as springing from a sense of shame or guilt in front of the drowned, that is, of those who were exterminated in the Lager. He could not (...) determine, however, whether his shame or guilt was at all rational. In this paper l examine Levi’s shame in light of what I regard as the dominant conception of practical deliberation, according to which principles and emotional detachment are central to our ability to deliberate appropriately. This conception underlies the role that John Rawls ascribes to the original position in the determination of the fundamental principles of justice. Deliberation in the original position is supposed to abstract away from any particular moral situations that one may actually have faced, since these are purely circumstantial elements to be discarded as both irrelevant and misleading for a proper deliberation on the principles of justice. In this paper, I intend both to make a case against the conception of practical deliberation on which Rawls’ original position relies and to vindicate the rationality of Levi’s shame, once some well-entrenched assumptions are brought to light and challenged. (shrink)

There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first‐person authority may be consistent with self‐knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first‐personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes between the deliberative and (...) the theoretical attitudes is ultimately inconsistent with a satisfactory account of psychoanalytic practice; mainly because, despite Moran's claims to the contrary, such a distinction is still inspired by a Cartesian picture of the self. I argue that, in the light of his distinction, Moran may emphasize that an agent's psychological dispositions should be permeable to her decisions and projects, but is forced to reject the idea that permeability could go the other way too. I explore Bernard Williams' notion of acknowledgment and Simone Weil's distinction between two notions of necessity, in order to articulate a notion of receptive passivity which may help us to characterize this second direction of permeability. I finally outline why receptive passivity (and, thereby, the double direction of permeability) is crucial in order to identify the goal of psychoanalytic treatment and, derivatively, to understand how a certain kind of awareness may have a significant therapeutic effect. (shrink)

Marta Suria writes *Ella soy yo* as part of her response to the irruption of the memories of the sexual aggressions she had suffered since childhood. She is convinced that the way she narrates her experience will transform and liberate her. How is it at all possible that a certain kind of narrative may transform and li- berate us? In this paper, we will first describe the conception of the relationship between language and experience that lies behind this perplexity and, (...) secondly, we will sketch an alternative conception that will hopefully allow us to account for the transformative power of certain kinds of narratives. This alternative conception will hinge on the idea of expression and on the concept of aspect perception. For this purpose, we will firstly argue that language can be used not only to describe or evaluate our experience, but also to express it; we will, then, defend the view that linguistic or gestural expressions of our experiences not only announce or manifest them, but contribute to shaping and modulating them; finally, we will highlight the transformative, humanizing power of certain expressive uses of language. (shrink)

The received view about rationalizing explanations divides our psychological status into two kinds: beliefs and desires. In *The Retrieval of Ethics*, Talbot Brewer makes a case against this view. In this paper, I examine our experience as readers of *The Castle* by Franz Kafka to support Brewer's critical program, that is, his challenge to the received view. I will argue, however, that a proper analysis of this experience poses a serious problem to Brewer's alternative approach, that is, to his attempt (...) to retrieve our agency thanks to a proper understanding of the role of the good in rationalizing explanations. (shrink)

This essay examine Samuel Beckett's *Trilogy to specify the conditions under which we could make sense of practical necessity. Among other things, I will show how Ajax' must is connected to Mol/oy's attempt to visit his mother and to the need to keep talking that both Molloy and the Unnamable share. I will conclude that their dislocated pursuit of certainty reveal - among other things - how the conditions under which practical necessity can be properly experienced have been extirpated from (...) our social and cultural context. Still, the fact that its vestiges nevertheless subsist provide some reason to regard practical necessity as a constitutive aspect of our agency. This will provide a particular sense in which the Unnamable may coherently claim: "I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I will go on.". (shrink)

Robert Dunn, David Finkelstein and Richard Moran have recently contributed to broadening the debate on self-knowledge within the analytic tradition. They raise questions concerning the sort of awareness that may have a healing effect in psychoanalytic therapy, and enhance the relevance to self-knowledge of a deliberative, and practically committed, attitude toward oneself. They reject, however, that self-observation could play a significant role in a strictly first-person attitude toward oneself, since they conceive of it as essentially detached and, in this respect, (...) similar to the kind of attitude that a third party might adopt. I will appeal to Simone Weil's distinction between two sorts obedience and to the contrast between two characters in *The Karamazov Brothers* to elucidate a kind of self-awareness that involves a kind of observation that is constitutively committed. This line of reasoning will also serve to elucidate a fundamental sort of self-knowledge that derives from the subject's capacity to acknowledge her own position within the ethical world and is closely associated to the goal of psychoanalytic therapy. (shrink)

Entiende Christine Korsgaard que sólo una vida gobernada por principios universales responde a nuestra condición de sujetos, pues, de otro modo, quedaríamos reducidos a un amasijo de impulsos inconexos. Quiere, no obstante, alejarse de la imagen del sujeto escindido entre razón y pasión y reivindica la necesidad de unificar cada una de las partes que lo constituyen. Tal unificación deberá descansar, según Korsgaard, en el respeto a principios morales de carácter universal, si bien confía en que una vida gobernada por (...) tales principios permita atender suficientemente los proyectos y compromisos con los que el sujeto se identifica y que constituyen su identidad práctica. En este escrito, trataré de mostrar que la propuesta de Korsgaard no acaba de alejarse de la concepción dividida del sujeto. Argumentaré, en este sentido, que las asimetrías que establece entre la identidad moral y otros tipos de identidades prácticas sólo pueden entenderse desde esa concepción escindida. (shrink)

In this chapter, I focus on the experience of torture and, more specifically, on Jean Améry's account of it in his book *At the Mind's Limits*. There he claims that the loss of confidence in the world is the most devastating effect he experienced as a victim of torture. I thus explore what cosmopolitan aspiration may be revealed by this loss and also discuss whether it is to be discredited as an irrational reaction on the victim's side or instead as (...) proportional to the facts and, consequently, as relevant to the conditions under which a certain cosmopolitan aspiration could be achieved or, at least, favored. (shrink)

at seek to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a work to count as fiction. She argues that this goal cannot really be achieved; instead, she appeals to the notion of genre to distinguish between fiction and nonfiction. This notion is significantly more flex- ible, since it invites us to identify standard—but not necessary—and counter-standard features of works of fiction in light of our classificatory practices. More specifically, Friend argues that the genre of fiction has the genre of nonfiction—and (...) only that genre—as its con- trast class. I will refer to the particular way in which Friend elaborates this claim as the contrast view. I have, nevertheless, the impression that this view unnecessarily narrows down the array of perspectives and attitudes from which we can approach works of fiction. I will thus develop a line of reasoning to the effect that the contrast view should rather be construed as picking out a particular way of relating to works of fiction that lies at the end of a continuum defined by different degrees of reflectivity and estrangement. This implies that the contrast view is false as a general claim about how we experience works of fiction, even though this view may appropriately de- pict a specific way of approaching such works. (shrink)

For decades, the dominant research paradigm has included trials conducted in clinical settings with little involvement from communities. The move toward community engaged research (CEnR) necessitates the inclusion of diverse perspectives to address complex problems. Using a relationship paradigm, CEnR reframes the context, considerations, practical steps, and outcomes of research.

For decades, the dominant research paradigm has included trials conducted in clinical settings with little involvement from communities. However, concerns about the relevance and applicability of the processes or outcomes of such research have led to calls for greater community engagement in the research process. As such, there has been a shift in emphasis from simply recruiting research participants from community settings to engaging community members more broadly in all aspects of the research process. The move toward community engaged research (...) is in part driven by the recognition that inclusion of diverse perspectives in multidisciplinary teams is essential to addressing complex problems. Investigators have come to recognize the inherent value of engaging community members as collaborators in multidisciplinary teams that are conducting research on issues of concern to communities. The insider perspective from community members is now recognized as essential in designing effective and well-received recruitment strategies, culturally appropriate measures, and identifying meaningful and broad-reaching venues for dissemination. (shrink)

To begin, I introduce an analysis of interlevel relations that allows us to offer an initial characterization of the debate about the way classical and connectionist models relate. Subsequently, I examine a compatibility thesis and a conditional claim on this issue.With respect to the compatibility thesis, I argue that, even if classical and connectionist models are not necessarily incompatible, the emergence of the latter seems to undermine the best arguments for the Language of Thought Hypothesis, which is essential to the (...) former. (shrink)

In the context of any attempt to rethink the modalities, possibilities, conditions and limitations of critical thought, the otherwise sober and restrained notion of ‘critical distance’, with all it...

In the debate about heterologous embryo transfer (HET), or embryo adoption, within marriage, discussion to date has proceeded predominantly from the perspective of the acting woman, with less attention paid to the effects on her spouse. In directing the focus of this paper to the man’s experience, the author is confirmed in his opinion that HET is contrary to the man’s dignity as husband and father. It is an infidelity to the exclusive union of his marriage, an affront to the (...) husband’s right to be the means by whom his wife becomes a mother, and a sacrilege to the sacrament by which his fatherhood is called to be an expression of God’s creative love. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.2 (Summer 2013): 287–297. (shrink)

La claridad y la argumentación sirven de refugio frente a la charlatanería en el filosofar, pero quienes enfatizan tales principios metodológicos tienden a identificar la claridad con la literalidad y la argumentación con la formalización. En este trabajo, considero los límites de una elucidación filosófica de nuestras prácticas morales que descanse en tal identificación; para ello, examino la relevancia de la posición original de John Rawls para la determinación de los principios de la justicia y, en general, de los experimentos (...) mentales para el estudio de la moralidad. La relevancia de la posición original depende, a mi entender, de un supuesto de concordancia según el cual, a menos que incurramos en algún error deliberativo, no puede haber discrepancia alguna entre nuestros juicios relativos a la justicia acerca de una situación hipotética y nuestros juicios cuando nos enfrentamos realmente a la misma. A lo largo del texto, trato de mostrar que tal supuesto es insostenible a partir del examen de una experiencia moral particular: a saber, la experiencia del soldado; y, para ello, revindico las virtudes deliberativas de la conciencia expresiva de ciertos hechos frente a una mera conciencia declarativa de los mismos; finalmente, extraigo algunas consecuencias de esta distinción para la definición de un estilo filosófico. Astress on clarity and argumentation may serve as a refuge against quackery, but often those who focus on such methodological principles tend to identify clarity with literalness and argumentation with formalization. My reflection upon the limits of a philosophical style inspired in such an identification is mainly concerned with the use of thought experiments in the elucidation of our moral practices and, more specifically, with the relevance of John Rawls' original position for the determination of the basic principles of justice. To this purpose, I emphasize that the relevance of the original position rests on a matching assumption according to which, if agents deliberate appropriately, there should not be any gap between our judgments concerning justice about a hypothetical situation and our judgments whenever we are actually confronted with it. I will, nevertheless, explore a particular moral experience, namely, that of the soldier, only to conclude that such an assumption is untenable. More specifically, I will defend the deliberative virtues of an expressive awareness of certain facts as opposed to a mere declarative awareness of them. In the last section, I will derive some implications of this distinction as to the articulation of a philosophical style. (shrink)

Presentación de las tres conferencias impartidas por Barry Stroud en la Càtedra Filosofia i Ciutadania J.L. Blasco, 2014.

In response to a growing movement opposed to conscientious objection in medicine, the medical profession should resist the privatization of conscience in general and accept the challenge, presented by conscientious objection, of rethinking its practices and being true to its calling. These claims are informed by the traditional understanding of conscience and the thought of Jürgen Habermas on the relevance of religious truths in public debate and the legitimacy of public dissent.

Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper,I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.

This article focuses on two problems associated with tragedy. One ancient: what is it that draws us to the dramatic presentation of events of terrible suffering and loss? And one modern: namely, that while tragedies are still performed and appreciated, little new tragedy is being written. It will be argued in relation to the second problem that the vitality of tragedy as a dramatic form requires a less rigid approach to what might be considered tragic. And in relation to the (...) first problem it will be argued that this more expansive conception of tragedy will allow an understanding of the ‘pay-off’ of tragedy in a way that draws both on the tradition that focuses on tragedy as cathartic therapeutic, and on the tradition that sees it as a thought laboratory that allows ethical dilemmas to be posed and explored from different perspectives. This argument constitutes a two-fold dialectical synthesis and the effect of this is to facilitate an understanding of tragedy as establishing a ‘critical distance’ that sets the scene for the possibility of thinking. (shrink)

In _Deaths in Venice_ Philip Kitcher explores the bearing that _Death in Venice_ by Thomas Mann may have on 'the oldest and deepest question of philosophy: _how to live_'. In this paper, I will distinguish two ways in which this question can be interpreted. One one reading, it amounts to the question 'how to lead a valuable or worthy life?', whereas on the other it involves a more elusive idea, namely, that a person may breath and walk and still be (...) dead in a relevant sense, that is, from the perspectivo in which being alive does not reduce to biological survival. In my view, Kitcher's reflection on Mann's novella relies on the first, more standard reading. I argue, though, that the being-alive interpretation sheds a more unified light on _Death in Venice_; in fact, I will conclude that the need to shift from one to another interpretation constitutes a fundamental concern in the novella. (shrink)