Valéry, P. The idea of art.--Sartre, J.-P. The work of art.--Ingarden, R. Artistic and aesthetic values.--Merleau-Ponty, M. Eye and mind.--Moore, G. E. Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33.--Findlay, J. N. The perspicuous and the poignant.--Hungerland, I. C. Once again, aesthetic and non-aesthetic.--Wollheim, R. On drawing an object.--Elliott, R. K. Aesthetic theory and the experience of art.--Savile, A. The place of invention in the concept of art.--Bibliography (p. [178]-184).

Parmi les multiples énigmes de la généalogie de Jésus en Mt 1,1-17, la présence de quatre, voire de cinq femmes dans un texte où prédominent les hommes a suscité de nombreuses tentatives d’explication. Cet article part de l’observation que les quatre premières femmes sont en amont ou complices du roi David, tandis que la cinquième femme est la mère de celui qui est présenté comme Messie. Il constate par ailleurs que si l’on avait appliqué strictement les dispositions de la Torah (...) à leur égard, ni le grand roi, ni a fortiori la dynastie davidique n’auraient vu le jour. Le récit du dilemme de Joseph en 1,18-25 témoigne de son effort pour se frayer un chemin entre une certaine conformité avec la Loi et les exigences de la miséricorde en rapport avec le cas de sa femme enceinte. Ainsi, dès le début de l’évangile de Matthieu est posée la question de l’observance de la Torah face aux exigences des Prophètes et ultérieurement face à l’enseignement de Jésus. (shrink)

Unhappily, most writers who seek to relieve the present "dreary" situation in aesthetics offer us either verbal pettifogging or nineteenth century "systems." We are, therefore, indebted to Harold Osborne for publishing a brave, bold, wise, and defective book in the field. Despite their defects, these essays clarify some important issues in important ways. They deserve the serious attention of everyone seriously interested in art.

Clinical ethics consultation has become an important resource, but unlike other health care disciplines, it has no accreditation or accepted curriculum for training programs, no standards for practice, and no way to measure effectiveness. The Clinical Ethics Credentialing Project was launched to pilot‐test approaches to train, credential, privilege, and evaluate consultants.

В книге исследуется острая проблема совместной эволюции (коэволюции) Человека и Природы, условий выживания людей и окружающей среды, перспективы развития ноосферы – биосферы и Разума.

What, if anything, do we epistemically owe to each other? Various “traditional” views of epistemology might hold either that we don’t epistemically owe anything to each other, because “what we owe to each other” is the realm of the moral, or that what we epistemically owe to each other is just to be epistemically responsible agents. Basu (2019) has recently argued, against such views, that morality makes extra-epistemic demands upon what we should believe about one another. So, what we owe (...) to each other is not just a matter of word and deed, but also of belief. And in fact, Basu argues, sometimes those moral demands require us to believe in ways that cut against orthodox epistemic norms. This paper has three aims. First, to offer two strategies for accommodating the kinds of cases Basu discusses while nonetheless holding that only epistemic normativity makes demands on belief. Second, to offer an alternative account of what we owe to each other that does not hold that morality demands that we sometimes believe against our evidence or in violation of epistemic norms. And third, to give a brief diagnosis of why it seems intuitive that morality makes extra-epistemic doxastic demands on us. Ultimately, I argue that what we epistemically owe to each other does not require us to violate orthodox, invariantist epistemic norms. Morality demands that we have a proper regard for others, not that we sometimes believe against our evidence. (shrink)

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are answerable for (...) our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence. (shrink)

A theodicy is the attempt to discern God's reasons for permitting evil, whereas the antitheodicy view rejects all such attempts outright. This chapter explores two sets of arguments that could be offered in support of antitheodicy. The first group of arguments concerns the morality of theodicy, and seeks to show that theodicy‐making conflicts with or undermines central aspects of morality – for example, the motivation to fight against gratuitous evil. The second group of arguments point out nonmoral (e.g., conceptual or (...) metaphysical) failings in theodicy, such as the unduly anthropomorphic notion of God usually at work in theodicies. (shrink)

The active transition to digital civilization coincided with the pandemic of the new coronavirus. It can be assumed that it was the pandemic that accelerated this process. In any case, people immediately faced to new phenomena, which can affect both physical and social health. Many phenomena, including both digitalization and pandemic, have not been explained and properly assessed yet. Absence of proper explanation and assessment creates a fertile field for insurance, doubts and mistakes. Therefore at the present time the evaluative (...) and explanatory role of bioethics is invaluable. But a paradoxical situation arises: the more bioethics help is needed, the less attention is paid to its development. The transfer of bioethics study for medical students into a distance format eliminates its communicative meanings and deprives future doctors of the opportunity to develop skills and competencies in medicine. Something must be done in order not to lose the achievements of the national training system in the field of bioethics. Certain suggestions are expressed in the article. (shrink)

The article traces the forty-year history of the establishment of the Bioethics training course at the Volgograd State Medical University, which turns 85 this year. It is told about those who played a major role in the development of bioethics as a training course, what difficulties and successes were along this path. The logic of the institutionalization of bioethics through the creation of ethical examination procedures is traced. Actual problems of bioethics, as well as ongoing bioethical activities are not covered (...) and are not called, since the materials of the anniversary issue of the journal are devoted to them. (shrink)

The origins of the Western philosophical tradition lie in the ancient Greco-Roman world. This volume provides a unique insight into the life and writings of a diverse group of philosophers in antiquity and presents the latest thinking on their views on God, the gods, religious belief and practice. Beginning with the 'pre-Socratics', the volume then explores the influential contributions made to the Western philosophy of religion by the three towering figures of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The chapters that follow cover (...) the the leading philosophers of the major schools of the ancient world - Epicureanism, Stoicism, Neoplatonism and the early Christian Church. "Ancient Philosophy of Religion" will be of interest to scholars and students of Philosophy, Classics and Religion, while remaining accessible to any interested in the rich cultural heritage of ancient religious thought. (shrink)

The History of Western Philosophy of Religion brings together an international team of over 100 leading scholars to provide authoritative exposition of how history's most important philosophical thinkers - from antiquity to the present day - have sought to analyse the concepts and tenets central to Western religious belief, especially Christianity. Divided chronologically into five volumes, The History of Western Philosophy of Religion is designed to be accessible to a wide range of readers, from the scholar looking for original insight (...) and the latest research findings to the student wishing for a masterly encapsulation of a particular philosopher's views. Together these volumes provide an indispensable resource for anyone conducting research or teaching in the philosophy of religion and related fields, such as theology, religious studies, the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas. Volume 3 covers the early modern period which witnessed a revolution in science and natural philosophy that swept away two millennia of Aristotelian certainty in a human-centred universe. Covering some of the most important figures in the history of Western thought - notably Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant - Early Modern Philosophy of Religion charts the philosophical understanding of religion at a time of intellectual and spiritual revolution. (shrink)

In “Surmounting Elusive Barriers: The Case for Bioethics Mediation,” Bergman argues that professionals trained in bioethics, reluctant to acquire the skills of mediation, would better be replaced by a cadre of mediators with some bioethics knowledge, to which I respond, “yes . . . but.”.

The book is about three things. First, how Ancient thinkers perceived humans as like or unlike other animals; second about the justification for taking a humane attitude towards natural things; and third about how moral claims count as true, and how they can be discovered or acquired. Was Aristotle was right to see continuity in the psychological functions of animal and human souls? The question cannot be settled without taking a moral stance. As we can either focus on continuity or (...) on discontinuities, how should natural science draw the boundaries? Moral agents act and react in a world that they see under a certain description, and there is no value free science that can settle what is the correct description. This book asks us to think about where moral justification could come from, and suggests that the supposed ‘moral status’ of the object cannot provide the answer. For the moral status of the object is a product of our own imagination, and once we see that, we also see that there remains the question where we ought to have the will to see it. Furthermore, since the perception of moral truth involves the development of imagination and will, the means to attain it will be better served by engagement with poetry and literature than with enquiries that seek to exclude the engagement of the imagination, or any appeal to the beauty of nature or the love of one's fellow creatures. (shrink)