La confusion entretenue parfois ad nauseam entre l’intellectuel et le philosophe est bien fondée. Elle ne se justifie pas seulement par une tradition socratique revisitée par les Lumières ; elle porte trace d’une nouvelle identité du philosophe et d’une redéfinition de la philosophie dont Emerson l’Américain montre exemplairement dans Confiance en soi qu’elles répondent à un besoin historique de l’humanité à l’époque de la démocratie : face au conformisme résultant du scepticisme ambiant et de la domination des esprits par l’opinion (...) publique, le philosophe est l’intellectuel conséquent qui exhorte l’homme démocratique à restaurer en lui l’indépendance d’esprit qui fonde la liberté de parole et d’action. (shrink)

In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past needn’t be. A substantial literature arose in connection with this distinction, though no consensus emerged as to the proper way to analyze it. It is time, I believe, to revisit these issues. The central claim of this paper is that the attempts to analyze the hard/soft fact distinction got off on fundamentally the wrong track. The crucial feature of soft facts is that they (in some sense) depend on the future. Following recent work on the notion of dependence, however, I argue that the literature on the soft/hard distinction has failed to capture the sense of dependence at stake. This is because such attempts have tried to capture softness in terms of purely modal notions like entailment and necessitation. As I hope to show, however, such notions cannot capture the sort of asymmetrical dependence relevant to soft facthood. Arguing for this claim is the first goal of this paper. My second goal is to gesture towards what an adequate account of soft facthood will really look like. (shrink)

Think of the last thing someone did to you to seriously harm or offend you. And now imagine, so far as you can, becoming fully aware of the fact that his or her action was the causally inevitable result of a plan set into motion before he or she was ever even born, a plan that had no chance of failing. Should you continue to regard him or her as being morally responsible—blameworthy, in this case—for what he or she did? (...) Many have thought that, intuitively, you should not. Recently, Alfred Mele has employed this line of thought to mount what many have taken to be a powerful argument for incompatibilism: the “Zygote Argument”. However, in interesting new papers, John Martin Fischer and Stephen Kearns have each independently argued that the Zygote Argument fails. As I see it, the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns reveal some important questions about how the argument is meant to be—or how it would best be—understood. Once we make a slight (but important) modification to the argument, however, I think we will be able to see that the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns do not detract from its substantial force. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics has raised in an acute form three problems which go to the heart of man's relationship with nature through experimental science: (r) the public objectivity of science, that is, its value as a universal science for all investigators; (2) the empirical objectivity of scientific objects, that is, man's ability to construct a precise or causal spatio-temporal model of microscopic systems; and finally (3), the formal objectivity of science, that is, its value as an expression of what nature is (...) independently of its being an object of human knowledge. These are three aspects of what is generally called the "crisis of objec tivity" or the "crisis of realism" in modern physics. This crisis is. studied in the light of Werner Heisenberg's work. Heisenberg was one of the architects of quantum mechanics, and we have chosen his writings as the principal source-material for this study. Among physicists of the microscopic domain, no one except perhaps Bohr has expressed himself so abundantly and so profoundly on the philosophy of science as Heisenberg. His writings, both technical and non-technical, show an awareness of the mysterious element in scientific knowledge, far from the facile positivism of Bohr and others of his contemporaries. The mystery of human knowledge and human SUbjectivity is for him an abiding source of wonder. (shrink)

The papers contained in this special issue are evidence that the philosophy of conspiracy theory is undergoing a ‘normative turn’, with earlier concerns about the epistemological soundness of conspiracy theories now being supplemented by a shift to concerns about discursive and epistemic justice. This is a welcome development. Nonetheless, these normative concerns need to be seen within the context of an ongoing and largely undeclared disagreement between generalists and particularists over just how conspired the world really is.

Presents a new interpretation of Aristotle's Analytics (the Prior and Posterior Analytics) as a unified whole, and argues that to "loose up" or solve—rather than to reduce or break up—is the principle meaning which best characterizes the Analytics.

The epistemological literature on conspiracy theory has established that strict generalism about conspiracy theories is untenable. This chapter argues, however, that this does not license a move to naive or strict particularism. Rather, any consideration of specific conspiracy claims needs to address conspiracy theory not simply as a formal category of explanation, but as a distinctive social practice, with a history and explanatory repertoire that can give us important, if defeasible, reasons for rejecting at least some such types of claim. (...) These reasons are not merely epistemic. The moral costs of participating in such practices, and of levelling conspiracy accusations in general, generate corresponding ethical requirements for reticence about entertaining conspiracy theories. This doesn’t mean we can retreat to generalism; but it does mean particularism must be governed by a reluctance that, in practice, will rule out a great many conspiracy theory claims as candidates for serious investigation. (shrink)

This book explores how the creations of great authors result from the same operations as our everyday counterfactual and hypothetical imaginations, which cognitive scientists refer to as 'simulations'. Drawing on detailed literary analyses as well as recent research in neuroscience and related fields, Patrick Colm Hogan develops a rigorous theory of the principles governing simulation that goes beyond any existing framework. He examines the functions and mechanisms of narrative imagination, with particular attention to the role of theory of mind, (...) and relates this analysis to narrative universals. In the course of this theoretical discussion, Hogan explores works by Austen, Faulkner, Shakespeare, Racine, Brecht, Kafka and Calvino. He pays particular attention to the principles and parameters defining an author's narrative idiolect, examining the cognitive and emotional continuities that span an individual author's body of work. (shrink)

The philosophical thought of John Locke, a physician by profession, was colored by Locke's medical outlook to a much greater degree than had ever been suspected. Patrick Romanell, in John Locke and Medicine, examines Locke's relatively unknown medical writings and asks how Locke's own distinctive conception of human knowledge, traditionally classified under British empiricism, developed. He finds that, of all of Locke's interests, it is medicine that accounts most directly and effectively for his practical ideal of life and for (...) his constant appeal to "profitable knowledge." In his masterpiece An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke attempted, as he stated it, "to describe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their minds do, when they perform that action, which they call knowing." Locke was intent on describing "the natural history of knowledge" and he required an appropriate method of inquiry. Romanell shows that it was Locke's medical thought and his background as a physician that provided the paradigm for his famed "historical, plain method" of inquiry that he applied to his philosophical analysis of human understanding. In addition to the light this sheds on Locke's philosophy, this new information causes us to reconsider several other significant issues: the nature of the debate between the competing schools of Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism; the position of Sydenham the physician in Locke's intellectual development; and the subtle differences of temper within the long tradtition of British Empiricism itself. John Locke and Medicine is the first book to discuss the hitherto neglected relationship between Locke the phycisian and Locke the philosopher. A major contribution to the study of John Locke, it is also a fascinating account of one of the many instances of the meeting of medicine and philosophy in the history of ideas. (shrink)

Philosophers, anthropologists and biologists have long puzzled over the question of human nature. It is also a question that Kant thought about deeply and returned to in many of his writings. In this lucid and wide-ranging introduction to Kant’s philosophy of human nature - which is essential for understanding his thought as a whole - Patrick R. Frierson assesses Kant’s theories and examines his critics. He begins by explaining how Kant articulates three ways of addressing the question ‘what is (...) the human being?’: the transcendental, the empirical, and the pragmatic. He then considers some of the great theorists of human nature who wrestle with Kant’s views, such as Hegel, Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud; contemporary thinkers such as E.O.Wilson and Daniel Dennett, who have sought biological explanations of human nature; Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Clifford Geertz, who emphasize the diversity of human beings in different times and places; and existentialist philosophers such as Sartre and Heidegger. He argues that whilst these approaches challenge and enrich Kant’s views in significant ways, all suffer from serious weaknesses that Kant’s anthropology can address. Taking a core insight of Kant’s - that human beings are fundamentally free but finite - he argues that it is the existentialists, particularly Sartre, who are the most direct heirs of his transcendental anthropology. The final part of the book is an extremely helpful overview of the work of contemporary philosophers, particularly Christine Korsgaard and Jürgen Habermas. Patrick R. Frierson explains how these philosophers engage with questions of naturalism, historicism, and existentialism while developing Kantian conceptions of the human being. Including chapter summaries and annotated further reading, What is the Human Being? is an outstanding introduction to some fundamental aspects of Kant’s thought and a judicious assessment of leading theories of human nature. It is essential reading for all students of Kant and the philosophy of human nature, as well as those in related disciplines such as anthropology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

Literature provides us with otherwise unavailable insights into the ways emotions are produced, experienced and enacted in human social life. It is particularly valuable because it deepens our comprehension of the mutual relations between emotional response and ethical judgment. These are the central claims of Hogan's study, which carefully examines a range of highly esteemed literary works in the context of current neurobiological, psychological, sociological and other empirical research. In this work, he explains the value of literary study for a (...) cognitive science of emotion and outlines the emotional organization of the human mind. He explores the emotions of romantic love, grief, mirth, guilt, shame, jealousy, attachment, compassion and pity - in each case drawing on one work by Shakespeare and one or more works by writers from different historical periods or different cultural backgrounds, such as the eleventh-century Chinese poet Li Ch'ing-Chao and the contemporary Nigerian playwright Wole Soyinka. (shrink)

To make abstractions hold good in actuality means to destroy actuality.

The present paper revisits the debate between realists about gravitational energy in GR and anti-realists/eliminativists. I re-assess the arguments underpinning Hoefer’s seminal eliminativist stance, and those of their realist detractors’ responses. A more circumspect reading of the former is proffered that discloses where the so far not fully appreciated, real challenges lie for realism about gravitational energy. I subsequently turn to Lam and Read’s recent proposals for such a realism. Their arguments are critically examined. Special attention is devoted to the (...) adequacy of Read’s appeals to functionalism, imported from the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This book is an introduction, entirely by example, to the possibilities of using computer models as tools in phosophical research in general and in philosophical logic in particular. Topics include chaos, fractals, and the semantics of paradox; epistemic dynamics; fractal images of formal systems; the evolution of generosity; real-valued game theory; and computation and undecidability in the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma.

An e-mail discussion can be rendered into print in several ways. Rather than trying to imitate a genuine conversation, this is a personal essay containing comments and replies by the other contributors. Most of the substantial points made in the e-mail discussion are contained here, although not always in the order they happened.

Standard reasoning about Kripke semantics for modal logic is almost always based on a background framework of classical logic. Can proofs for familiar definability theorems be carried out using anonclassical substructural logicas the metatheory? This article presents a semantics for positive substructural modal logic and studies the connection between frame conditions and formulas, via definability theorems. The novelty is that all the proofs are carried out with anoncontractive logicin the background. This sheds light on which modal principles are invariant under (...) changes of metalogic, and provides (further) evidence for the general viability of nonclassical mathematics. (shrink)

I denne teksten blir følgende spørsmål tatt opp til drøfting: Er det å ta medisinsk teknologi i bruk for å selektere et døvt barn mer etisk problematisk enn det motsatte; å bruke teknologien for å sikre seg et hørende barn? På bakgrunn av fire premisser konkluderer jeg med at både seleksjon for døvhet og for hørsel er tilnærmet like etisk problematisk. De fire premissene er 1) at seleksjonskriteriet sykdom eller skade bør erstattes av autentisitetsbetraktninger, 2) at døve og hørende har (...) samme potensial for autentisk livsutfoldelse, selv om det ikke kan avvises at døvhet kjennetegnes ved manglende hørsel, 3) at seleksjon innebærer fravalg av liv som har autentisk potensialitet enten som døv eller hørende, og 4) at dette fravalget involverer en etisk kostnad. Konklusjonen har enkelte andre implikasjoner og en restproblematikk som belyses avslutningsvis. (shrink)

[Lichas] ‘videbatur mihi secundum quietem Priapus dicere: “Encolpion quod quaeris, scito a me in navem tuam esse perductum”.’ exhorruit Tryphaena et ‘putes’ inquit ‘una nos dormiisse; nam et mihi simulacrum Neptuni, quod Bais tetrastylo notaveram, videbatur dicere: “in nave Lichae Gitona invenies”.’ ‘hinc scies’ inquit Eumolpus ‘Epicurum hominem esse divinum, qui eiusmodi ludibria facetissima ratione condemnat.’ ceterum Lichas ut Tryphaenae somnium expiavit: ‘quis’ inquit ‘prohibet navigium scrutari, ne videamur divinae mentis opera damnare?’ Priapus and Epicurus have frequently been claimed to (...) be major influences, each in their particular way, on the plot and composition of the Satyrica. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel, neo-republican account of just state surveillance in the information age. The goal of state surveillance should be to avoid and prevent domination, both public and private. In light of that conception of justice, the paper makes three substantive points. First, it argues that modern state surveillance based upon information technology and predicated upon a close partnership with the tech sector gives the state significant power and represents a serious potential source of domination. Second, it argues (...) that, nonetheless, state surveillance can serve legitimate republican ends and so unilateral and private technological attempts to block it may be wrongful. Third, it argues that, despite the serious normative failings of current institutions, state surveillance can be justly regulated and made accountable through a legal liability regime that incentivizes tech company intermediaries to ally with civil society groups in order to safeguard the privacy rights of potential subjects of state surveillance. (shrink)

The target article by Wiggins and Wilbanks (2019) reports on the history and typology of the models of citizen science emerging in health and biomedical research with the rapid dispersion and repur...

The paper investigates the status of gravitational energy in Newtonian Gravity, developing upon recent work by Dewar and Weatherall. The latter suggest that gravitational energy is a gauge quantity. This is potentially misleading: its gauge status crucially depends on the spacetime setting one adopts. In line with Møller-Nielsen’s plea for a motivational approach to symmetries, we supplement Dewar and Weatherall’s work by discussing gravitational energy–stress in Newtonian spacetime, Galilean spacetime, Maxwell-Huygens spacetime, and Newton–Cartan Theory. Although we ultimately concur with Dewar (...) and Weatherall that the notion of gravitational energy is problematic in NCT, our analysis goes beyond their work. The absence of an explicit definition of gravitational energy–stress in NCT somewhat detracts from the force of Dewar and Weatherall’s argument. We fill this gap by examining the supposed gauge status of prima facie plausible candidates—NCT analogues of gravitational energy–stress pseudotensors, the Komar mass, and the Bel-Robinson tensor. Our paper further strengthens Dewar and Weatherall’s results. In addition, it sheds more light upon the subtle link between sufficiently rich inertial structure and the definability of gravitational energy in NG. (shrink)

This essay addresses a stream of thought manifested in some forms of social justice activism – namely, that members of marginalized groups have privileged insight into the nature of social reality which others cannot understand, much less critique. This position, which I call “epistemic isolationism,” seems to rest on the claim that the knowledge that is embedded in lived experience is incommunicable. The essay proceeds in three parts: first, there is a brief overview of standpoint epistemology, including a recent version (...) which seems to support epistemic isolationism. Second, there is an explication of the concept of “lived experience” as developed by Wilhelm Dilthey. Third, there is an argument against the claim that lived experience is incommunicable, drawing from the work of Dilthey, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur. The payoff of the argument is that sharing lived experience through expressions like literature and narrative inspires mutual recognition and respect which can, in turn, support a robust form of solidarity and serve as a foundation for more effective social justice advocacy. (shrink)

Abstract. We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of (...) their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self-consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives. (shrink)

The role of the concept of invariance in physics and geometry is analyzed, with attention to the closely connected concepts of symmetry and objective meaning. The question of why the fundamental equations of physical theories are not invariant, but only covariant, is examined in some detail. The last part of the paper focuses on the surprising example of entropy as a complete invariant in ergodic theory for any two ergodic processes that are isomorphic in the measure-theoretic sense.

Questions about dirty hands have often focused on legitimate, secure leaders deciding whether to violate important deontological principles or the rules of interpersonal morality. The purpose of this paper is to show that revolutionaries have dirty hands; revolutionaries do wrong by engaging in unilateral usurpation of the existing system with the hope that latter benefits will justify their actions. Yet, once the revolution securely generates improvements for the common good, the initial usurpation becomes increasingly irrelevant to judgments of the new (...) government’s legitimacy. The paper argues that only retroactive justification—where later success forces opponents and advocates to reinterpret the wrongness of the initial action—can fully capture the complex moral dynamics of revolutions. (shrink)

McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier’s article seeks to bridge a gap between theological and secular bioethics. It should be noted that the “theological” emphasis in the a...