Naturalistic thinking and knowing, the tacit, experiential, and intuitive reasoning of everyday interaction, have long been regarded as inferior to formal reason and labeled primitive, fallible, subjective, superstitious, and in some cases ineffable. But, naturalistic thinking is more rational and definable than it appears. It is also relevant to design. Inquiry into the mechanisms of naturalistic thinking and knowledge can bring its resources into focus and enable designers to create better, human-centered designs for use in real-world settings. This article makes (...) a case for the explicit, formal study of implicit, naturalistic thinking within the fields of design. It develops a framework for defining and studying naturalistic thinking and knowledge, for integrating them into design research and practice, and for developing a more integrated, consistent theory of knowledge in design. It will (a) outline historical definitions of knowledge, attitudes toward formal and naturalistic thinking, and the difficulties presented by the co-presence of formal and naturalistic thinking in design, (b) define and contrast formal and naturalistic thinking as two distinct human cognitive systems, (c) demonstrate the importance of naturalistic cognition in formal thinking and real-world judgment, (d) demonstrate methods for researching naturalistic thinking that can be of use in design, and (e) briefly discuss the impact on design theory of admitting naturalistic thinking as valid, systematic, and knowable. (shrink)

"It is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic atmosphere of the time, a loosening of old landmarks, a softening of oppositions, a mutual borrowing from one another on the part of systems anciently closed, and an interest in new suggestions, however vague, as if the one thing sure were the inadequacy of extant school-solutions. The dissatisfactions with these seems due for the most part to a feeling that they are too abstract and academic. Life is confused (...) and superabundant, and what the younger generation appears to crave is more of the temperament of life in its philosophy, even though it were at some cost of logical rigor and formal purity." - William James (1904). -/- Abstract: The study of model-based reasoning (MBR) is one of the most interesting recent developments at the intersection of psychology and the philosophy of science. Although a broad and eclectic area of inquiry, one central axis by which MBR connects these disciplines is anchored at one end in theories of internal reasoning (in cognitive science), and at the other, in C.S. Peirce’s semiotics (in philosophy). In this paper, we attempt to show that Peirce’s semiotics actually has more natural affinity on the psychological side with ecological psychology, as originated by James J. Gibson and especially Egon Brunswik, than it does with non-interactionist approaches to cognitive science. In particular, we highlight the strong ties we believe to exist between the triarchic structure of semiotics as conceived by Peirce, and the similar triarchic stucture of Brunswik’s lens model of organismic achievement in irreducibly uncertain ecologies. The lens model, considered as a theory of creative abduction, provides a concrete instantiation of at least one, albeit limited, interpretation of Peirce’s semiotics, one that we believe could be quite fruitful in future theoretical and empirical investigations of MBR in both science an philosophy. (shrink)

What is the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik understood as a methodological framework for the attempt to combine a theory of historical times with a theory of historical time? In part (1) of this paper, I criticize the two most basic attempts to understand Koselleck’s one big idea as mistaken because they are exclusively interested either in history (in the singular) or in histories (in the plural) and thus miss the central relevance of structures of repetition (“Wiederholungsstrukturen”) for Koselleck’s (...) Historik. In part (2), I will clarify the rather hidden pre-history, the main ambition, the theoretical context and the substantial content of Koselleck’s concept of structures of repetition in history and language. In part (3), I will discuss four historiographical consequences of Koselleck’s structures of repetition. I will end the paper by observing a remarkable theoretical affinity between Barrington Moore’s search for recurring patterns in the field of sociology and Koselleck’s structures of repetition in history and language. Moore’s work illustrates the historiographical potential of the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik better than any other work I am aware of. (shrink)

This eye-opening read spans the foundations of ethics and key Buddhist concepts. Professor Peter Singer is a world-renowned moral philosopher and preeminent voice in bioethics whose writings have helped shape the animal rights and effective altruism movements. Venerable Shih Chao-Hwei of Taiwan is a Buddhist monastic and social activist who's been a key figure in the Buddhist gender equality movement. This unlikely duo came together in conversation at a meditation retreat center in 2016 and continued discussions in writing. They (...) shed light on the intersection of philosophy, religion, and day-to-day life. (shrink)

Susanne K. Langer (1895—1985) Susanne Langer was an American philosopher working across the analytic and continental divide in the fields of logic, aesthetics, and theory of mind. Her work connects in various ways to her central concerns of feeling and meaning. Feeling, in Langer’s philosophy, encompasses the qualitative, sensory, and emotional aspects of human experience. … Continue reading Susanne K. Langer →.

Examines the common sense attractiveness of contextualism over invariantism, and ultimately takes such a common sense attractiveness to be a function of our intellectual habits as opposed to a reflection of objective fact. The claim that there do not exist semantic approaches that are more favorable than either contextualism or invariantism is made and argued for via an appeal to sortalism, superinvariantism, and supercontextualism, which are also rejected as brutally implausible. The possibility that any of these three semantic approaches might (...) be as good as either contextualism or invariantism merely serves to support semantic relativity. A foundation for semantic relativity is located within the vagueness of natural language terms. (shrink)

Applies the semantic relativism developed in the previous chapters to key terms in several philosophical debates in order to establish philosophical relativity. In all of these cases, invariantism forces the skeptical position whilst contextualism resonates with our common sense views. These philosophical debates and their relevant terms are the problem of epistemic skepticism via “know,” the problem of freewill and determinism as instanced by compatibilism and incompatibilism via “can” and “freewill,” the problem of specifying causal conditions via “cause,” and the (...) problem of explanation via “explanation.”,, and are straightforward categorical problems in that the skeptic's success will simply mean that the terms involved fail to apply. by contrast is a conditional problem such that it is contingent on the truth of determinism itself, which few assent to. (shrink)

Explores the distinction between the prevalent approach to ostensible intuitions, which takes such intuitions to be indicative of semantic conditions, and the broadly psychological approach, which does not. An attack is made against Kripke and Putnam's causal theory of reference via Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiments. Our responses to such examples may be distinguished into two types, a dominant response, and a dominated response. The common aspect to all demonstrable counterexamples to the causal theory of reference turns on the individual (...) differences among the responses. The prevalent approach must deny semantic competence to dissenting agents. We may maintain, in a relativist spirit, that there is no absolutely right answer in such cases. Kripke's distinction between epistemological examples and metaphysical examples is noted and the two are united in order to generate combined examples. The failure of the causal theory of reference to deal with any such examples in a successful and systematic way tells against the prospect of maintaining an internalized semantics. Historical and current versions of the causal theory of reference are explored, with neither accurately capturing our natural responses, strengthening the objection against the prevalent approach and supporting the broadly psychological approach, which in contrast to the prevalent approach attributes agents’ responses to the examples to their egocentric bias, which may not be fully rational. As such, the relativist now has a direct reply to the objection from semantic intuitions, this being that such common sense intuitions are not a function of an internalized semantics. Supposing that the broadly psychological approach is no stronger than the prevalent approach merely strengthens the relativist's position. (shrink)

Examines a different objection against the relativity hypotheses, the objection from superficiality, which takes the relativity hypotheses to be leaving deep philosophical issues aside. A similar objection is that the relativity hypotheses take many traditional philosophical problems to have the status of pseudoproblems. The objection from superficiality comes in several forms: the objection from particular expressions, the objection from a particular language, the objection from overgeneralization, and the objection from unnaturalness. All four forms of the objection from superficiality are countered (...) and the point is argued that many traditional philosophical problems are left untouched by the relativity hypotheses. With regards to those that are not, there is still much philosophical work to be done in these areas. The relativity hypotheses do not imply that such philosophical problems may be easily solved. The positive aspect of the relativity hypotheses is that the specific areas where they are active may be identified and distinguished in order to reveal the aspects of particular philosophical problems that may admit of nonarbitrary solutions. (shrink)

The „petite éthique” which Ricoeur develops in Soi-meme comme un autre is distinctive in its way of paying attention to the individual, the other and the society all at the same time. For this very reason the problem of the distribution of social goods is fundamental. Ricoeur tries to solve this problem through a synthesis of teleological and deontological considerations, and here the approach of Rawls occupies a central place. On the one hand, the attempt to solve this problem in (...) the framework of a teleological approach draws on principles of justice which Rawls establishes through formal procedure; on the other hand, Rawls‘ position depends on a number of teleological presuppositions which are not compatible with his deontological approach. Ricoeur does not only attempt to refute Rawls, but to interpret his principles of justice as the result of a rationalisation of a sense of justice which is simply presupposed. (shrink)

Band I. Das Körperbild und seine Störungen -- Band II. Unfassbare Zeitlichkeit.

Interviews met denkers uit het gehele politieke spectrum over het populisme.

Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.

Through case studies on biodiversity, deforestation, pollution, and war, among others, Stoett analyzes the ability of international policy to provide environmental protection and discusses the ever-present factors of equality, sovereignty, and human rights integral to these issues. While providing a panoramic view of the actors and structures producing these policies. Stoett reminds readers that the topic is personal, that effective governance is not solely the responsibility of governments but of individuals and communities as well. Environmental diplomacy may not always meet (...) its intended goals, but positive steps are being achieved, and change can only happen when angst is replaced with an educated determination to work toward environmental justice. The Second Edition will explore new events, issues, and agreements since 2011; notably the Paris Agreement. The UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be a new theme added throughout and highlighted in each case study. (shrink)

The volume presents the views of ten authors from four PostCommunist Central and East European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Latvia) on the impact of emerging technologies on human condition. They analyse the topic from anthropological, ethical, philosophical, ontological, empirical and legal perspectives.

How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops (...) and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness. (shrink)

The Centered Mind offers a new view of the nature and causal determinants of both reflective thinking and, more generally, the stream of consciousness. Peter Carruthers argues that conscious thought is always sensory-based, relying on the resources of the working-memory system. This system enables sensory images to be sustained and manipulated through attentional signals directed at midlevel sensory areas of the brain. When abstract conceptual representations are bound into these images, we consciously experience ourselves as making judgments or arriving (...) at decisions. However, our amodal propositional attitudes are never actually among the contents of this stream of conscious reflection. Our beliefs, goals, and decisions are only ever active in the background of consciousness, working behind the scenes. They are never themselves conscious.Drawing on extensive knowledge of the scientific literature on working memory and related topics, Carruthers challenges the central assumptions of many philosophers. In addition to arguing that non-sensory propositional attitudes are never conscious, he also shows that they are never under direct intentional control. Written with his usual clarity and directness, The Centered Mind will be essential reading for all philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of human thought processes. (shrink)

There has been a groundswell of interest in the account of modality that Kant sets forth in his pre-Critical Only Possible Argument. Andrew Chignell's reconstruction of Kant's theistic argument in terms of what he calls has a prima facie advantage in that it appears to be able to block the plurality objection (namely, that even if every modal fact presupposes some ground, this does not entail that all modal facts share the same ground). I argue that it is both textually (...) and philosophically problematic to interpret Kant's argument in terms of real harmony. Then, I set forth an alternative response to the plurality objection which does not require the adoption of the problematic notion of real harmony. Instead, I argue that the objection can be overcome by observing that the argument seeks to ground modal facts as a totality and that, according to Kant, such relations can be accounted for only by their schematization in a single intellect. (shrink)

Do we think in natural language? Or is language only for communication? Much recent work in philosophy and cognitive science assumes the latter. In contrast, Peter Carruthers argues that much of human conscious thinking is conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. However, this does not commit him to any sort of Whorfian linguistic relativism, and the view is developed within a framework that is broadly nativist and modularist. His study will be essential reading for all those interested (...) in the nature and significance of natural language, whether they come from philosophy, psychology or linguistics. (shrink)

In this systematic study, Professor Achinstein analyzes such concepts as definitions, theories, and models, and contrasts his view with currently held positions that he finds inadequate.

How do we judge whether we should be willing to follow the views of experts or whether we ought to try to come to our own, independent views? This book seeks the answer in medieval philosophical thought. In this engaging study into the history of philosophy and epistemology, Peter Adamson provides an answer to a question as relevant today as it was in the medieval period: how and when should we turn to the authoritative expertise of other people in (...) forming our own beliefs? He challenges us to reconsider our approach to this question through a constructive recovery of the intellectual and cultural traditions of the Islamic world, the Byzantine Empire, and Latin Christendom. Adamson begins by foregrounding the distinction in Islamic philosophy between taqlid, or the uncritical acceptance of authority, and ijtihad, or judgment based on independent effort, the latter of which was particularly prized in Islamic law, theology, and philosophy during the medieval period. He then demonstrates how the Islamic tradition paves the way for the development of what he calls a "justified taqlid," according to which one develops the skills necessary to critically and selectively follow an authority based on their reliability. The book proceeds to reconfigure our understanding of the relation between authority and independent thought in the medieval world by illuminating how women found spaces to assert their own intellectual authority, how medieval writers evaluated the authoritative status of Plato and Aristotle, and how independent reasoning was deployed to defend one Abrahamic faith against the other. This clear and eloquently written book will interest scholars in and enthusiasts of medieval philosophy, Islamic studies, Byzantine studies, and the history of thought"-- Back cover. (shrink)

Al-Kindi was the first philosopher of the Islamic world. He lived in Iraq and studied in Baghdad, where he became attached to the caliphal court. In due course he would become an important figure at court: a tutor to the caliph's son, and a central figure in the translation movement of the ninth century, which rendered much of Greek philosophy, science, and medicine into Arabic. Al-Kindi's wide-ranging intellectual interests included not only philosophy but also music, astronomy, mathematics, and medicine. Through (...) deep engagement with Greek tradition al-Kindi developed original theories on key issues in the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, physical science, and ethics. He is especially known for his arguments against the world's eternity, and his innovative use of Greek ideas to explore the idea of God's unity and transcendence. Despite al-Kindi's historical and philosophical importance no book has presented a complete, in-depth look at his thought until now. In this accessible introduction to al-Kindi's works, Peter Adamson surveys what is known of his life and examines his method and his attitude towards the Greek tradition, as well as his subtle relationship with the Muslim intellectual culture of his day. Above all the book focuses on explaining and evaluating the ideas found in al-Kindi's wide-ranging philosophical corpus, including works devoted to science and mathematics. Throughout, Adamson writes in language that is both serious and engaging, academic and approachable. This book will be of interest to experts in the field, but it requires no knowledge of Greek or Arabic, and is also aimed at non-experts who are simply interested in one of the greatest of Islamic philosophers. (shrink)

This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong and others as uninterestingly weak. Strong forms dismissed include the view that language is conceptually necessary for thought (endorsed by many philosophers) and the view that language is _de facto_ the medium of all human conceptual thinking (endorsed by many philosophers and social scientists). Weak forms include (...) the view that language is necessary for the acquisition of many human concepts, and the view that language can serve to scaffold human thought processes. The paper also discusses the thesis that language may be the medium of _conscious_ propositional thinking, but argues that this cannot be its most fundamental cognitive role. The idea is then proposed that natural language is the medium for non-domain-specific thinking, serving to integrate the outputs of a variety of domain-specific conceptual faculties (or central-cognitive ‘quasi-modules’). Recent experimental evidence in support of this idea is reviewed, and the implications of the idea are discussed, especially for our conception of the architecture of human cognition. Finally, some further kinds of evidence which might serve to corroborate or refute the hypothesis are mentioned. The overall goal of the paper is to review a wide variety of accounts of the cognitive function of natural language, integrating a number of different kinds of evidence and theoretical consideration in order to propose and elaborate the most plausible candidate. (shrink)

Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other species? The volume's four parts together offer a state of the art survey of the (...) major topics in the theory-theory/simulationism debate within philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, the aetiology of autism and primatology. The volume will be of great interest to researchers and students in all areas interested in the 'theory of mind' debate. (shrink)

This study presents a substantial and often radical reinterpretation of some of the central themes of Locke's thought. Professor Alexander concentrates on the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and aims to restore that to its proper historical context. In Part I he gives a clear exposition of some of the scientific theories of Robert Boyle, which, he argues, heavily influenced Locke in employing similar concepts and terminology. Against this background, he goes on in Part II to provide an account of Locke's (...) views on the external world and our knowledge of it. He shows those views to be more consistent and plausible than is generally allowed, demonstrating how they make sense and enable scientific explanations of nature. In examining the views of Locke and Boyle together, the book throws light both on the development of philosophy and the beginnings of modern science, and in particular it makes a considerable and original contribution to our understanding of Locke's philosophy. (shrink)