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Peter Vanderschraaf [32]Peter P. Vanderschraaf [1]
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  1.  94
    Convention as Correlated Equilibrium.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (1):65 - 87.
    Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? In (...)
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  2.  37
    Common Knowledge.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  3.  19
    Precis of Strategic Justice: Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1701-1705.
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  4.  8
    Stability Challenges for Moehler's Second‐Level Social Contract.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):70-86.
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  5. Follow the Leader : Local Interactions with Influence Neighborhoods.Peter Vanderschraaf & J. McKenzie Alexander - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (1):86-113.
  6.  73
    War or Peace?: A Dynamical Analysis of Anarchy.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):243-279.
    I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic (...)
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  7. Covenants and Reputations.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):167 - 195.
    In their classic analyses, Hobbes and Hume argue that offensively violating a covenant is irrational because the offense ruins one’s reputation. This paper explores conditions under which reputation alone can enforce covenants. The members of a community are modeled as interacting in a Covenant Game repeated over time. Folk theorems are presented that give conditions under which the Humean strategy of performing in covenants only with those who have never offensively violated or performed with an offensive violator characterizes an equilibrium (...)
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  8. Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1999 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):325-358.
  9.  19
    Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2001 - Routledge.
    Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.
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  10.  11
    Reply to Critics.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1741-1756.
    I reply to commentaries by Justin Bruner, Robert Sugden and Gerald Gaus. My response to Bruner focuses on conventions of bargaining problems and arguments for characterizing the just conventions of these problems as monotone path solutions. My response to Sugden focuses on how the laws of humanity present in Hume’s discussion of vulnerable individuals might be incorporated into my own proposed account of justice as mutual advantage. My response to Gaus focuses on whether or not my account of justice as (...)
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  11.  17
    Learning Bargaining Conventions.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):237-263.
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  12.  8
    10. The Facts of the Matter: A Discussion of Norton's Material Theory of Induction The Facts of the Matter: A Discussion of Norton's Material Theory of Induction (Pp. 188-197). [REVIEW]Marc Ereshefsky, Mohan Matthen, Matthew H. Slater, Alex Rosenberg, D. M. Kaplan, Kevin Js Zollman, Peter Vanderschraaf, J. McKenzie Alexander & Gordon Belot - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (1):86-113.
  13. The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):215.
    Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as convention. Hume's importance as a forerunner of modern economics has also long been recognized. However, most of Hume's readers have not fully appreciated how closely Hume's analysis of convention foreshadows a particular branch of economic theory, namely, game theory. Starting with the work of Barry, Runciman and Sen and Lewis, there has been a flowering of literature on the informal game-theoretic insights to be found (...)
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  14.  94
    The Invisible Foole.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):37-58.
    I review the classic skeptical challenges of Foole in Leviathan and the Lydian Shepherd in Republic against the prudential rationality of justice. Attempts to meet these challenges contribute to the reconciliation project (Kavka in Hobbesian moral and political theory , 1986 ) that tries to establish that morality is compatible with rational prudence. I present a new Invisible Foole challenge against the prudential rationality of justice. Like the Lydian Shepherd, the Invisible Foole can violate justice offensively (Kavka, Hobbesian moral and (...)
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  15. Justice as Mutual Advantage and the Vulnerable.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):119-147.
    Since at least as long ago as Plato’s time, philosophers have considered the possibility that justice is at bottom a system of rules that members of society follow for mutual advantage. Some maintain that justice as mutual advantage is a fatally flawed theory of justice because it is too exclusive. Proponents of a Vulnerability Objection argue that justice as mutual advantage would deny the most vulnerable members of society any of the protections and other benefits of justice. I argue that (...)
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  16.  28
    In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):29-59.
    I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support (...)
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  17.  65
    The Circumstances of Justice.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2006 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (3):321-351.
    In this article, I analyze the circumstances of justice, that is, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between individual parties in society. Contemporary political philosophers almost unanimously accept an account of these circumstances attributed to David Hume. I argue that the conditions of this standard account are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for justice. In particular, I contend that both a Hobbesian state of nature and a prisoner’s dilemma are cases in which the conditions (...)
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  18.  50
    Hume’s Game-Theoretic Business Ethics.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):47-67.
    In recent years, a number of authors have used gametheoretic reasoning to explain why purely self-interested agentswould ever conform their economic activities with the requirements of justice, when by doing so they forego opportunities to reapunilateral net gains by exploiting others. In this paper, I argue that Hume's justification of honest economic exchanges between self-interested agents in the Treatise foreshadows this contemporary literature. Hume analyzes the problem of explaining justice in self-interested economic exchange as a problem of agents coordinating on (...)
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  19.  63
    Learning to Take Turns.Peter Vanderschraaf & Brian Skyrms - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):311-347.
    Learning to take turns in repeated game situations is a robust phenomenon in both laboratory experiments and in everyday life. Nevertheless, it has received little attention in recent studies of learning dynamics in games. We investigate the simplest and most obvious extension of fictitious play to a learning rule that can recognize patterns, and show how players using this rule can spontaneously learn to take turns.
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  20.  18
    Instituting the Hobbesian Commonwealth.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2001 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3-4):383-405.
  21.  42
    Endogenous Correlated Equilibria in Noncooperative Games.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (1):61-84.
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  22.  57
    Joint Beliefs in Conflictual Coordination Games.Peter Vanderschraaf & Diana Richards - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (3):287-310.
    The traditional solution concept for noncooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium, which contains an implicit assumption that players’ probability distributions satisfy t probabilistic independence. However, in games with more than two players, relaxing this assumption results in a more general equilibrium concept based on joint beliefs. This article explores the implications of this joint-beliefs equilibrium concept for two kinds of conflictual coordination games: crisis bargaining and public goods provision. We find that, using updating consistent with Bayes’ rule, players’ beliefs (...)
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  23.  21
    Reputational Enforcement of Covenants.Peter Vanderschraaf - unknown
    Peter Vanderschraaf. Reputational Enforcement of Covenants.
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  24.  70
    Common Knowledge: Analysis and Applications.Peter Vanderschraaf - unknown
    One does not simply predict where the other will go, which is wherever the first predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so ad infinitum. Not "What would I do if I were she?" but "What would I do if I were she wondering what she would do if she were wondering what I would do if I were she...?".
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  25.  18
    Hume on Decisions, Convention, and Justice.Andrew Valls & Peter Vanderschraaf - 2018 - In Andrew Valls & Angela Coventry (eds.), David Hume on Morals, Politics, and Society. Yale University Press. pp. 317-338.
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  26. A Study in Inductive Deliberation.Peter P. Vanderschraaf - 1995 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    In this dissertation, I develop a theory of rational inductive deliberation in the context of strategic interaction that generalizes previous theories of inductive deliberation. In this account of inductive deliberation, I model rational deliberators as players engaged in noncooperative games, such that: They are Bayesian rational, in the sense that every deliberator chooses actions that maximize expected utility given the beliefs this deliberator has regarding the other deliberators, and They update their beliefs about one another recursively, using rules of inductive (...)
     
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  27.  78
    Game Theory Meets Threshold Analysis: Reappraising the Paradoxes of Anarchy and Revolution: Articles.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):579-617.
    I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some political theorists apply game theory to analyze the paradox of anarchy: War is apparently inevitable in anarchy even though all warring parties prefer peace over war. Others apply tipping threshold analysis to resolve the paradox of revolution: Joining a revolution is apparently always irrational even when an overwhelming majority of the population wish to replace their regime. The usual game theoretic analysis of anarchy yields the conclusion (...)
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  28.  16
    No Title Available: Reviews.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):88-96.
  29.  52
    Review of The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences. [REVIEW]Peter Vanderschraaf - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):88-96.
  30. Special Issue of the Business Ethics Quarterly.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1996 - Journal of Business Ethics 15 (2).
     
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  31. Strategic Justice: Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2018 - Oup Usa.
    The author defends the ancient claim that justice is at bottom a body of social conventions. Recent analytical and empirical concepts and results from the social sciences together with insights and arguments of past masters of moral and political philosophy are integrated into a new game-theoretic conventionalist analysis of justice.
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  32.  37
    Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together, Francesco Guala. Princeton University Press, 2016, Xxx + 222 Pages. [REVIEW]Peter Vanderschraaf - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):475-484.