El artículo de Sebastián Salgado trata de explicar las relaciones que la filosofía de Sartre comnparte con Spinoza. De esta manera, este artí culo quiere mostrar el significado del "deseo" como imposibilidad onto lógica del sujeto, es decir, como necesidad existencial de la libertad. En resumen, este articulo expone que la filosofía de Sartre ha conseguido resolver el problema de la fenomenología a través de la ética y la políti ca de Spinoza.

Este artículo desafía la narrativa tradicional de la historia de las mujeres colombianas en la filosofía. Para ello se evita el recurso de la historia heroica de los “grandes pensadores” y se propone el método de pensar causas comunes. Como se trata de una apuesta del feminismo filosófico, se subraya la importancia de una ontología corporal y una política de posicionamiento, a partir del estudio de caso del IV Congreso Internacional femenino realizado en Bogotá (1930). En el cierre, el método (...) de la causa común nos permitió sortear lo que la filósofa Kristie Dotson denomina “la cultura de la justificación” que encierra la filosofía en una serie de normas disciplinarias y en cambio apostamos por lo que ella también llama una cultura de la praxis que permite visibilizar múltiples formas del ejercicio filosófico. (shrink)

The confluence of different Jewish traditions in the Qumran library is evident. The Enochic traditions are not only counted as the oldest influences in Qumran, they also give it a certain theological unity. This is even more true in the case of demonology. Belial’s figure brings together a rich lexicographic heritage in which different traditions are integrated under the characteristics of the Watchers and Giants of the Enochic tradition (1 En 6—8). This study analyzes the theological characterization of the demonological (...) figures found in Qumran to specify the Enochic influence on it. (shrink)

In vertebrate development, the HOX genes act to specify cell identity along much of the anterior‐posterior axis of the embryonic central nervous system. In all vertebrates examined to date, the vitamin A metabolite retinoic acid is implicated in the patterning of the anterior posterior axis and the induction of HOX gene expression. Two recent papers have extended the study of retinoic acid induction of HOX genes to the closest relatives of the vertebrates, amphioxus and tunicates(1,2). In both these species, exogenous (...) retinoic acid is able to induce ectopic expression of HOX 1 genes in the anterior central nervous system. This suggests that retinoic acid control of anterior‐posterior axis formation and HOX induction is not specific to vertebrates. However, in the more distantly related echinoderms and arthropods, retinoic acid does not seem to act in the same way. Thus the role of retinoic acid in anterior‐posterior axis specification may be a chordate innovation, perhaps linked to the evolution of another chordate character, the dorsal neural tube. (shrink)

In the text we approach the trajectory of the Peruvian thinker Aníbal Quijano and how he came to the formulation by which he is known, the explanatory pair modernity / coloniality. We propose a problematizing reading of his intellectual itinerary, recovering a recurrent and highly suggestive metaphor in his approach, the explanatory allegory of the knot. We consider that this figure has multiple potentialities, both in the epistemic-philosophical and political-cultural dimension.

Quasi-realism prominently figures in the expressivist research program. However, many complain that it has become increasingly unclear what exactly quasi-realism involves. This paper offers clarification. It argues that we need to distinguish two distinctive views that might be and have been pursued under the label “quasi-realism”: conciliatory expressivism and quasi-realism properly so-called. Of these, only conciliatory expressivism is a genuinely meta-ethical project, while quasi-realism is a first-order normative view. This paper demonstrates the fruitfulness of these clarifications by using them to (...) address Terence Cuneo’s recent challenge that quasi-realist expressivists lack the resources to plausibly accommodate certain sorts of data points. (shrink)

In a recent article entitled “The problem of molecular structure just is the measurement problem”, Alexander Franklin and Vanessa Seifert argue that insofar as the quantum measurement problem is solved, the problems of molecular structure are resolved as well. The purpose of the present article is to show that such a claim is too optimistic. Although the solution of the quantum measurement problem is relevant to how the problem of molecular structure is faced, such a solution is not sufficient to (...) account for the structure of molecules as understood in the field of chemistry. (shrink)

This paper identifies and addresses persistent gaps in the consideration of ethical practice in ‘technology for good’ development contexts. Its main contribution is to model an integrative approach using multiple ethical frameworks to analyse and understand the everyday nature of ethical practice, including in professional practice among ‘technology for good’ start-ups. The paper identifies inherent paradoxes in the ‘technology for good’ sector as well as ethical gaps related to (1) the sometimes-misplaced assignment of virtuousness to an individual; (2) difficulties in (...) understanding social constraints on ethical action; and (3) the often unaccounted for mismatch between ethical intentions and outcomes in everyday practice, including in professional work associated with an ‘ethical turn’ in technology. These gaps persist even in contexts where ethics are foregrounded as matters of concern. To address the gaps, the paper suggests systemic, rather than individualized, considerations of care and capability applied to innovation settings, in combination with considerations of virtue and consequence. This paper advocates for addressing these challenges holistically in order to generate renewed capacity for change at a systemic level. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 624-633, September 2021.

El propósito de este texto es abordar la problemática de las inteligencias artificiales y su incidencia en la sociedad contemporánea. Para ello, se realizan lecturas paralelas de las sociedades distópicas creadas por Isaac Asimov y Philip K. Dick. A partir de estas, se identifican algunos rasgos existentes en nuestro contexto inmediato, enfocándonos en tres ejes principales: la sociedad de vigilancia y control tecnológico, el problema de lo natural en los ciber-seres, y la visión del siglo XXI en la ciencia ficción (...) para analizar si esta es ilusoria o, por el contrario, forma parte de nuestra realidad inmediata. Todo esto con el fin de definir al género como un espejo de nuestro futuro, basándonos en la lectura de nuestro presente para interpretar los mundos posibles y el futuro como fuente de reflexión filosófica y tecnológica. En este artículo, analizaremos a grandes rasgos los elementos de la ciencia ficción de Isaac Asimov y Philip K. Dick, enfocándonos en aspectos como la naturalidad de los individuos, las sociedades de control y las líneas que separan lo humano de lo artificial como bases para la reflexión filosófica. A través de este ejercicio, examinaremos diversas obras de ambos autores, tales como El hombre bicentenario (Asimov 2019b), Satisfacción Garantizada (Asimov 2019a), La última pregunta (Asimov 2019a), ¿Sueñan los androides con ovejas eléctricas? (Dick 2017) y El hombre en el castillo (Dick 2021). El objetivo es identificar elementos que nos permitan interpretar el siglo XXI como una obra de ciencia ficción en constante desarrollo. (shrink)

A pesar de haber trascurrido diecisiete años desde su publicación, por su interés en el campo de su investigación y por ser aun relativamente desconocido en el medio de la exégesis latinoamericana se puede juzgar pertinente analizar esta obra. El libro de Pamela E. Kinlaw presenta una visión de las expectativas que la audiencia del antiguo mundo mediterráneo (AMM) pudo tener respecto a la epifanía de Jesús. Asimismo, ofrece categorías literarias sobre el concepto joánico de encarnación, y abre un debate (...) polémico respecto a las tendencias teológicas adoptadas por el autor(res) del cuarto evangelio y sus oponentes. Estas razones son más que suficientes para leer con detenimiento las tesis que en su libro ofrece. (shrink)

This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific (...) status of intelligent design, and further discuss confirmation, reduction, and concept formation. (shrink)

The Introduction to this volume identifies and briefly summarizes certain issues which have been of central concern to philosophers in the transcendental tradition, including: the question of its relation to metaphysics; the relation of transcendentalism to transcendental idealism; the Kantian concept of a condition of possibility; the concepts of transcendental logic and of transcendental proof or argumentation; the concept of the transcendental turn and the issue of its justification; and the standpoint of transcendental reflection.

Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

While largely studied because of their harmful effects on human health, there is growing appreciation that bacteria are important partners for invertebrates and vertebrates, including man. Epithelia in metazoans do not only select their microbiota; a coevolved consortium of microbes enables both invertebrates and vertebrates to expand the range of diet supply, to shape the complex immune system and to control pathogenic bacteria. Microbes in zebrafish and mice regulate gut epithelial homeostasis. In a squid, microbes control the development of the (...) symbiotic light organ. These discoveries point to a key role for bacteria in any metazoan existence, and imply that beneficial bacteria‐host interactions should be considered an integral part of development and evolution. (shrink)

This paper offers a further look at Husserl’s late thought on the transcendental subject and the Husserl–Heidegger relationship. It attempts a reconstruction of how Husserl hoped to assert his own thoughts on subjectivity vis-à-vis Heidegger, while also pointing out where Husserl did not reach the new level that Heidegger attained. In his late manuscripts, Husserl employs the term ‘transcendental person’ to describe the transcendental ego in its fullest ‘concretion’. I maintain that although this concept is a consistent development of Husserl’s (...) earlier analyses of constitution, Husserl was also defending himself against Heidegger, who criticized him for framing the subject in terms of transcendental ego rather than as Dasein. Husserl was convinced that he could successfully respond to Heidegger’s critique, but he did not grasp that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology. (shrink)

A number of contemporary philosophers of mind have brought considerations from the study of aspect to bear on the ontological question how perceptual experiences persist over time. But, apart from rare exceptions, relatively little attention has been devoted to assess whether the way we talk about perceptual occurrences is of any relevance for discussions of ontological matters in general, let alone discussions about the ontological nature of perception. This piece examines whether considerations derived from the study of lexical aspect have (...) a significant bearing on what ontological views of perception we should endorse: I shall argue that such aspectual considerations are in fact of very little use for settling the relevant ontological issue. (shrink)

If intelligent design (id) is to compete with evolutionary theory (et), it must meet the modified falsifiability challenge, that is, make some deductive or probabilistic observational assertions. It must also meet the modified translatability challenge, which it fails if et makes all the observational assertions of id, while id does not make all the observational assertions of et. I discuss four prominent but diverse formulations of id and show that each either fails one of the two challenges or is analytically (...) false. (shrink)

This essay aims to extend Paul Ricœur’s account of recognition to address some of the concerns of globalization, especially those voiced by Enrique Dussel. The extension is accomplished in two parts. First, Dussel’s account of spatial existence as dwelling is reviewed as it is pertinent to the concerns of globalization. Next, it is demonstrated that each of the aspects of Ricœur’s account of recognition may be given a spatial re-articulation. The results thus establish an outline of how recognition theory might (...) address some of the concerns of globalization. The essay concludes with several consequences for the modification of recognition politics as one finds it in the late work of Ricœur and in Axel Honneth’s ongoing inquiries. . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CRUCIFIXION: ACCIDENT OR DESIGN? Sebastian Moore, O.S.B. Downside Abbey Lastyear I was visited by an old friend from my Liverpool days. Mike and I had worked together with the young of the parish, and one summer the two of us took a couple of boys camping in France, a trial of patience which made us known to each other at some depth. He was in fact a passionately convinced (...) Catholic, and very pastoral with it. We had many and long theological discussions. On his recent visit to Downside, I was showing him and some friends round our church, when, à propos ofquite what I don't remember, he made a remark about the Catholic cult of suffering, and said, "and it's all because ofthe crucifixion, isn't it? Why don't we recognize that the crucifixion was an accident?" I didn't react, because I was dumbfounded at what seemed to be the denial ofthe mystery ofthe cross by a friend who I had no reason to believe had stopped being a Catholic. And I'm sure he hasn't. He would certainly have told me ifhe had. It has taken me over a year to figure out what is going on here, and this would not have been possible without intensive study of the work of René Girard. The only alternative to saying that the crucifixion was an accident is to say that it was "ordained by God." It is only as ordained by God that this horrible event could be presented to people as a divine affirmation that suffering is to be sought and espoused. Also, it is only as ordained by God that the crucifixion can be thought of as "appeasing God" in some way. Both the moral and the dogmatic implication ofthe crucifixion—that suffering is a good thing, and that God required a victim—are grounded in the notion that God required the crucifixion ofhis Son. And it is because this idea is quite unacceptable, unworthy of God and ofthe human mind made in God's image, that my friend concludes that the crucifixion was not required by God, not written into the eternal scheme ofthings, but an accident. 156Sebastian Moore Once the problem is clarified in these terms, more and more instances come to mind, of rejection, by Christians and others, of the whole divine ordination ofthe cross. Gore Vidal refers to Christianity as "that lugubrious religion." Mary Hunt, a prominent American Catholic feminist, introduced a workshop with the statement, "we are not about naked guys nailed to crosses, blood all over the place!" Where divine ordering is accepted the special painfulness and darkness ofthe idea is noted. Anselm refers to the doctrine as the Narnia Chronicles, to commend the notion, by referring to a dark law written into the nature ofthings beyond our comprehension. The children's suggestion that Asian should simply not comply with the Snow Queen's requirement is rejected by Asian with a mysterious impatience—the children justhaven't grown up, like the romantics who, according to Matthew Arnold, "did not know enough." Again, during a day on "the roots of violence" that I led here yesterday there was much questioning about the role ofGod die Father in the crucifixion. The problem is crystallized in the famous cry from the cross, "Why have you forsaken me?" To my confessedly lame suggestion that Jesus was "only quoting a psalm," someone remarked, "to quote that psalm at thatjuncture and not mean it, is somewhatmisleading!" Again it's the same problem. How can God be understood as ordaining the crucifixion, compatibly with the notion of God as all-loving which Christianity of course affirms? Hans Urs Von Balthasar, who is 90% pro-Girard, in the other 10% wants to hold on to something he calls "the wrath of God." Thus the seeming necessity of having God require and ordain the crucifixion is the main crisis of Christian belief. The six-year-old Willie, in Thomas Klise's amazing novel, The Last Western, puts the problem with childlike directness. He keeps interrupting catechism class with, "Why did God kill Jesus?" and is shushed by Sister. I recall that Illtyd Trethowan said to... (shrink)

It is astonishing that we humans are able to have, act on and express moral beliefs. This dissertation aims to provide a better philosophical understanding of why and how this is possible especially when we assume metaethical expressivism. Metaethical expressivism is the combination of expressivism and noncognitivism. Expressivism is the view that the meaning of a sentence is explained by the mental state it is conventionally used to express. Noncognitivism is the view that the mental state expressed by a moral (...) sentence is a noncognitive, desire-like state. The central question of this dissertation is this: "How can metaethical expressivists explain that we are able to express moral beliefs?" The shortest answer this dissertation will give is the following: "by becoming `dispositional expressivists´." Dispositional expressivists hold that moral beliefs are dispositions to be in certain mental states that resemble desires. More precisely, a central thesis of this study is that to hold a moral belief is to be disposed to be in a desire-like, noncognitive state where this state has some specific structure. This dissertation arrives at and justifies this thesis by making a number of steps. It starts with preparing the ground by developing a general theory of what it is for a sentence to express a mental state. Roughly, this theory states that for a sentence to express a mental state is for that sentence to be conventionally used to perform a speech act which counts as sincere only if the user or speaker is in that mental state. This theory of expressing satisfies all the constraints that must be satisfied for it to be compatible with the purposes of metaethical expressivism. The next step is to provide a solution to the most notorious semantic problem confronting metaethical expressivism, the problem of explaining how sentences containing moral words can have compositional meaning and stand in logical relations also known as the Frege-Geach or embedding problem. Building on the research of Mark Schroeder, a new expressivist semantics, called `Attitude Semantics´, will be developed for a first-order language. The motivating idea underlying attitude semantics is that expressivists can avoid the problematic feature of so-called `biforcation´ if they treat the structures of the mental states expressed by moral sentences as well as that expressed by non-moral sentences as being isomorphic. In order to give those structures a philosophically interesting interpretation, it will be suggested that we treat sentences as expressing dispositional states. As a toy example we will treat the sentence `murder is wrong´ as expressing the disposition to be for blaming for murder. After dealing with the Frege-Geach problem, I turn to the metaethical expressivists' project of quasi-realism. Two major goals of this project are to explain how moral sentence can be truth-apt and how the states expressed by them can be regarded as moral beliefs. In order to establish those goals I critically examine a number of theories of truth-aptness by providing counterexamples to them. I then present my own theory which says that a sentence is truth-apt iff and because there is a conventional way to use it to express a belief. What is new about this theory is that it treats expressing a belief as being explanatorily more basic than being truth-apt. Belief, according to this theory, explains truth-aptness, not vice versa. This has the important consequence that it shows that what I call the `orthodox strategy´ of quasi-realists is mistaken and needs to be inverted: expressivists must `earn the right´ to moral belief before they can establish that moral sentences are truth-apt, and not the other way round. The second part of this dissertation is then concerned with the question of what it is to hold a moral belief and how they can figure in rational reasoning. In short: it is concerned with earning the right to moral belief. After discussing the major problems confronting a noncognitivist theory of belief, most importantly what I call the `tightrope problem´, I argue for a dispositional form of noncognitivism about moral belief that combines elements from Eric Schwitzgebel's dispositionalism about belief and Sebastian Köhler's `conceptual role expressivism´. This dispositional noncognitivism perfectly matches and justifies the dispositionalist interpretation of the expressivist semantics developed before. In order to fully earn the right to moral belief, however, metaethical expressivists must also deal with several epistemological objections concerning the rationality of moral belief. The first objection I deal with comes from Derek Baker and is directed against Mark Schroeder's specific development of expressivism. I deal with this objection because my own theory bears close resemblance to Schroeder's theory and so it might be worried that it confronts the same issues. Fortunately, we will see that Baker's objection rest on a number of mistaken assumptions and so neither applies to Schroeder's expressivism nor to the version which I defend in this study. The other epistemological objection to metaethical expressivism I deal with is Cian Dorr's famous wishful-thinking objection. In contrast to previous replies to this objection I attack it by directly questioning the central assumption on which it rests, namely that reasoners can never be justified in basing a factual belief on a desire-like state. I argue that this is false, and that under certain conditions reasoning from desire-like mental states to factual beliefs is justified. My argument shows that even if holding a moral belief is being in a desire-like noncognitive state, basing factual belief on a moral belief can give one an epistemic reason for the factual belief. Hence, even if moral thoughts are wishes, moral thinking is not wishful thinking. I take my arguments to earn the dispositional expressivist the right to moral belief. By the previously defended theory of truth-aptness in terms of belief, this allows the dispositional expressivists to conclude that moral sentences are also truth-apt. This finishes the quasi-realist project of this dissertation. In the last part of this dissertation I switch gears and present two unnoted problems for metaethical expressivists having to do with explaining moral motivation. Both arguments are surprisingly simple. The first one is this: if motivation requires a belief as well as a desire (Humeanism), and moral judgments motivate by themselves (internalism), then moral judgments cannot be desires only. If this argument is sound, it shows that the famous `motivation argument´ not only entails the falsity of cognitivism, but also the falsity of noncognitivism. The second argument is the following: moral judgments when combined with suitable external desires motivate to act (externalism), but if motivation requires belief as well as desire (Humeanism), then moral judgments cannot be desires only. I discuss several ways in which noncognitivists might want to deal with those problems, but leave it as an open question whether those solutions will ultimately be viable. Overall, this dissertation makes serious contributions to the research program of metaethical expressivism. It makes proposals for how to solve a number of notorious problems, such as the Frege-Geach problem in semantics and the wishful-thinking problem in epistemology. Besides this, however, it also raises two new problems for metaethical expressivism in the philosophy of action. For those reasons this dissertation will be of interest for anyone who wants to defend or criticize expressivism in metaethics, and more generally, anyone who wants to better understand our astonishing ability to express moral beliefs. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 2 Seiten: 211-238.

This paper takes a renewed look at Husserl's method of the phenomenological reduction. It interprets "the reduction" as shorthand for the meaning of Husserl's entire phenomenology in its mature stage. In the same way, the method of reduction might have different manners of execution but they are nevertheless guided by a common intent. The text takes its starting point by considering the different metaphors Husserl uses - the "flatland creatures" and the reduction as akin to a religious conversion - and (...) spells out their implications, which lead me to consider their metaphilosophical significance. In this way, this article attempts a metaphilosophical reading of the meaning of the reduction in Husserl, which is equal to considering the meaning philosophy has for Husserl in the most general terms. In this way, some unorthodox reflections are carried out that shed new light on central phenomenological concepts, such as evidence and eidetic variation, phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism, and the notorious problem of the lifeworld. In this way, Husserl's phenomenology is interpreted as a peculiar representative of Enlightenment philosophy that restitutes a special notion of responsibility. (shrink)

The sensorimotor account of perception is akin to Gibsonian direct realism. Both emphasize external properties of the world, challenging views based on the analysis of internal visual processing. To compare the role of distal and retinotopic parameters, distractor effect – an optomotor reaction of midbrain origin – is considered. Even in this case, permanence in the environment, not on the retina, explains the dynamics of habituation.

En este trabajo se estudia el caso de la cosmología del filósofo y científico Robert Grosseteste como un ejemplo de la notable influencia del neoplatonismo en la ciencia medieval. Uno de los propósitos de la cosmología de Grosseteste consistió en explicar la secuencia efectiva de la creación del cosmos. Sostengo que la explicación que ofrece Grosseteste acerca de la creación es una expresión renovada de algunas ideas de Plotino a propósito de cómo el Uno engendra lo múltiple. Me interesa resaltar (...) tres aspectos de la estrecha relación entre el sistema cosmológico de Grosseteste y el sistema metafísico de Plotino: Unidad de principio, Mecanismos de generación y Unidad del sistema. (shrink)

Racjonalizm w kulturze europejskiej istnieje już od starożytności. Jednak w każdej z epok, przyjmował różną postać: metafizyczną, klasyczną i pragmatyczną. Te różne postacie racjonalizmu miały wpływ na kształtowanie się w przestrzeni duchowej podobnych postaw, poglądów i paradygmatów. I tak, w starożytności racjonalizm nie był przeciwieństwem metafizyki, wręcz się z nią łączył, w średniowieczu nastąpił podział na racjonalizm metafizyczny, który łączył się on z chrześcijaństwem, i racjonalizm, który po nowożytności zyskał miano klasycznego. Natomiast w dobie współczesności racjonalizm przybrał formę pragmatyczną i (...) teoretyczną w różnych społecznych ideach, będąc dalekim od tego, co w starożytności określano mianem praktyki, a to z kolei przełożyło się na społeczne problemy, które nazwać można kryzysem kultury. (shrink)

This paper discusses the status of about childhood in Theodor Adorno’s critical theory, focusing on his reflections on the body, on technique and on play that mark childhood as another form of reason. Childhood is portrayed by Adorno as a place of the “first utopia,” that longed for and permanently uninhabited homeland that resists any rescue attempt, but illuminates the desire we once experienced, in a play between body and thought, dream and reality. Adorno’s child evokes the experience of another (...) order of reason that feeds on the memory of the human’s animal nature, without, however, being exempt from the dominant historical forces that affect the processes of subjectivation. These reflections start with the writings of Adorno and what his dialogues with interlocutors, such as Benjamin, Freud, and Huizinga, contribute to the analysis of the topic. In the second part of the article, in an effort to understand the potential and the limits of technologically-mediated play, we discuss several studies of virtual reality, especially electronic games. Conjectures about how contact with reality is already damaged in childhood by the relationship with technology, which establishes a desire for instant gratification, suggest a critique of the quality of attention that children receive in their education, and provide clues about the increasing appearance of socio-affective disorders, which culminate in the preference to dispense with time, the body, and real contact with other children in favor of electronic play. (shrink)

Después de definir el concepto de yihad, se hace un sucinto repaso histórico sobre la evolución de la teoría del yihad, entendido como “guerra santa”, en las edades medias. Enseguida se pasa a examinar la teoría y la práctica de la misma en época contemporánea, poniendo de relieve su aceptación por diferentes grupos fundamentalistas islámicos; cosa que entronca con corrientes, más o menos radicales, tan antiguas como el propio islam. A historical review about the yihad term, understood as “holy war” (...) during the Middle Ages, is made after defining the concept of yihad. We examine the theory and the praxis in our days; emphasizing its acceptation by the different fundamentalist Islamic groups; situation that is related to extremist movements as old as the Islam itself. (shrink)