Many assert that affluent countries have contributed in the past to poverty in developing countries through wars of aggression and conquest, colonialism and its legacies, the imposition of puppet leaders, and support for brutal dictators and venal elites. Thomas Pogge has recently argued that there is an additional and, arguably, even more consequential way in which the affluent continue to contribute to poverty in the developing world. He argues that when people cooperate in instituting and upholding institutional arrangements that foreseeably (...) result in more severe or more widespread poverty or human rights deficits than would foreseeably result under feasible alternative arrangements, they are contributors to these harms. Because of this, he argues, they have stringent, contribution-based (or negative) duties to address this poverty. We will call this the ‘Feasible Alternatives Thesis' (FAT), and our aim in this article is to examine it critically. (shrink)

This article assesses the recently renewed interest in the just war criterion of sovereign authority from a Thomistic perspective. It contrasts the classical conceptualisation of authority as found in the work of St Thomas Aquinas with the argument made by today’s revisionist just war thinkers. The article points out that the two approaches start from fundamentally different units of moral analysis. While the Thomistic just war emphasises the common good of the political community revisionists advocate the perspective of moral individualism. (...) As a result, for Thomism, only those entrusted with the responsibility for the common good of the political community are entitled to wage war while, in contrast, revisionists argue that any individual has the right to wage war. The latter side’s position, the article criticises, is problematic from a moral point of view as it runs counter to the just war tradition’s concern about restraint in the employment of force. (shrink)

Troubled times often gives rise to great art that reflects those troubles. So too with political theory. The greatest work of twentieth century political theory, John Rawls's A theory of justice, was inspired in various respects by extreme social and economic inequality, racialized slavery and racial segregation in the United States. Arguably the most influential work of political theory since Rawls—Michael Walzer's Just and unjust wars—a sustained and historically informed reflection on the morality of interstate armed conflict—was written in the (...) midst of the Vietnam War. It should be no surprise, then, that the bellicose period of the past 20 years should give rise to a robust new literature in political theory on the morality of armed conflict. It has been of uneven quality, and to some extent episodic, responding to particular challenges—the increased prevalence of asymmetric warfare and the permissibility of preventive or preemptive war—that have arisen as a result of specific events. In the past decade, however, a group of philosophers has begun to pose more fundamental questions about the reigning theory of the morality of armed conflict warfare—just war theory—as formulated by Walzer and others. Jeff McMahan's concise, inventive and tightly argued work Killing in war is without doubt the most important of these challenges to the reigning theory of the just war. This review article discusses McMahan's work, some of the critical attention it has received, and its potential implications for practice. (shrink)

This field review discusses several recently published books that are concerned with historical, cultural, philosophical, or sociological aspects of the social sciences and humanities, past and present. It investigates similarities and differences between the various perspectives and approaches, and analyzes how these are informed by different visions of the field of SSH studies. In concluding, the review discusses three recurrent themes that will presumably move in the focus of debate in the near future: the debate on positivism in SSH and (...) its “epistemological others;” the impact of the Cold War on the gestalt of the SSH; and, finally, the adequacy of science, technology, and society approaches to describe techniques and practices in the SSH. (shrink)

Contemporary just war thinking has mostly been split into two competing camps, namely, Michael Walzer’s approach and its revisionist critics. While Walzerians employ a casuistical method, most revisionists resort to analytical philosophy’s reflective equilibrium. Importantly, besides employing different methods, the two sides also disagree on substantive issues. This article focuses on one such issue, the moral equality of combatants, arguing that while a methodological reconciliation between the two camps is impossible, contemporary debate would benefit from a ‘third-way’ approach. Presenting James (...) Turner Johnson’s historical method as such an approach, the article suggests that while revisionists are correct in considering the symmetry thesis as ethically indefensible, in order to arrive at this judgement, it is not necessary to employ far-fetched thought experiments and the use of historical cases is preferable. The root cause of Walzer’s problematic reasoning vis-à-vis the symmetry thesis, the histori... (shrink)

A social responsibility (SR) theory of the press has emerged in various democratic societies worldwide since World War II. The Hutchins Commission in the United States is the source of this paradigm in some cases, but a similar emphasis on serving society rather than commerce or government has also arisen in parallel fashion without any connection to Hutchins. Professionalism and codes of professional ethics are too narrow to serve as the framework for a global SR paradigm of the 21st century. (...) Instead, universal ethical principles are the most appropriate framework, and the cross-cultural axis around which these principles revolve is the sacredness of human life. Embedded in the protonorm of human sacredness are such ethical principles as human dignity, truthtelling, and nonmaleficence. These principles are citizen ethics rather than professional ethics; they are set in the social domain where SR gets its rationale. They provide a frame of reference internationally for assessing local news media practices and formulating codes of ethics. (shrink)

In A History of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century , Christian Delacampagne reviews the discipline's divergent and dramatic course and shows that its greatest figures, even the most unworldly among them, were deeply affected by events of their time. From Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose famous Tractatus was actually composed in the trenches during World War I, to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger -- one who found himself barred from public life with Hitler's coming to power, the other a member of the (...) Nazi party who later refused to repudiate German war crimes. From Bertrand Russell, whose lifelong pacifism led him to turn from logic and mathematics to social and moral questions, and Jean-Paul Sartre, who made philosophy an occasion for direct and personal political engagement, to Rudolf Carnap, a committed socialist, and Karl Popper, a resolute opponent of Communism. From the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School to the contemporary work of philosophers as variously minded as Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, and Hilary Putnam. The thinking of these philosophers, and scores of others, cannot be understood without being placed in the context of the times in which they lived. (shrink)

Prémisses Notre sujet est ce moment qui suit le conflit, que l’on nomme le plus souvent l’après-guerre, perçu comme moment problématique, comme processus toujours inachevé. Voilà pourquoi nous avons préféré renvoyer, par notre titre, non pas à un objet défini et délimité par un substantif (« l’après-guerre ») mais, justement, à un questionnement lié à un moment sans frontières avérées, à une « qualité des temps », comme aurait dit Machiavel. Après la guerre... donc. Nous n’entendons pas en ef...

In this essay, I reflect on the divergent arguments about limited force made by Daniel R. Brunstetter and Samuel Moyn in their respective monographs. Arguing that their positions can be reconciled, I agree with Brunstetter that limited force has a role to play in establishing and maintaining a just world order. At the same time, however, I am mindful of Moyn's warning that limited force may lead to perpetual war. The way to ensure that limited force both works toward justice (...) and does not result in perpetual war, I argue, is to focus more on considerations of jus ante bellum (right before war) and jus post bellum (right after war), the so-called “growing edges of just war theory.” I hold that the responsible use of statecraft, which just war thinking seeks to inform, accepts that limited force constitutes a legitimate tool to facilitate order, justice, and peace. However, any justifiable use of force must be restrained and limited and aim for a just peace. The embrace of limited force should thus be complemented with an effort by state leaders to bolster the edges of just war in order to facilitate a security environment that requires the use of limited force less frequently. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article assesses whether the contemporary consensus of just war thinking to allow only for defence as just cause for war between states should also be applied to the practice of target...

There appears to be a widespread belief that the social sciences during the 1950s and 1960s can be characterized by an almost unquestioned faith in a positivist philosophy of science. In contrast, the article shows that even within the narrower segment of Cold War social science, positivism was not an unquestioned doctrine blindly followed by everybody, but that quite divergent views coexisted. The article analyses two ‘techniques of prospection’, the Delphi technique and political gaming, from the perspective of a comprehensive (...) set of ideas attributed to ‘positivism’. Both techniques were developed in the early 1950s by researchers at the RAND Corporation, a Californian think tank with tight relations to the US Air Force. Despite the closeness of origin, the two techniques show considerable differences in their basic epistemologies. The article thus concludes that more important than positivism in uniting US Cold War social science was the shared sense of urgency and of the potential of social science to put decision-making in foreign policy on a rational basis. In this sense, as far as the Cold War social sciences were of a piece, they were made so by the sense of danger and urgency of action evoked by the image of the Iron Curtain. (shrink)

This book assesses the ethical implications of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary conflicts. The American way of war is trending away from the heroic and towards the post-heroic, driven by a political preference for air-powered management of strategic risks and the reduction of physical risk to US personnel. The recent use of drones in the War on Terror has demonstrated the power of this technology to transcend time and space, but there has been relatively little debate in the (...) United States and elsewhere over the embrace of what might be regarded as politically desirable and yet morally worrisome: risk-free killing. Arguably, the absence of a relationship of mutual risk between putative combatants poses a fundamental challenge to the status of war as something morally distinguishable from other forms of violence, and it also undermines the professional virtue of the warrior as a courageous risk-taker. This book considers the use of armed drones in the light of ethical principles that are intended to guard against unjust increases in the incidence and lethality of armed conflict. The evidence and arguments presented indicate that, in some respects, the use of armed drones is to be welcomed as an ethically superior mode of warfare. Over time, however, their continued and increased use is likely to generate more challenges than solutions, and perhaps do more harm than good. This book will be of much interest to students of the ethics of war, airpower, counter-terrorism, strategic studies and security studies in general. (shrink)

The article examines the development of Paul Tillich’s understanding of Protestantism. Beginning with his 1913 ‘Systematic Theology’, the shifts in his theory of Protestantism, first developed after the First World War and then at the end of the 1920s, are reconstructed. It is demonstrated that, from the outset, Tillich extended the traditional soteriological interpretation of Protestantism into a universal-cosmological theory. Protestantism means not only critique, but also formation.

The anti-tuberculosis BCG vaccine was conceived and developed between 1905 and 1921 at Pasteur Institutes in France. Between 1921 and A. Calmette’s death in 1933, the vaccine went through a first period of national and international production and distribution for its use in humans. In France these activities were exclusively carried out by Calmette and his collaborators at the Pasteur Institute in Paris. Initially improvised production in a small room in the cellar gave way in 1931 to the construction of (...) the spacious and magnificent ‘New laboratories for research on tuberculosis and the preparation of the BCG’ within the premises of the Pasteur Institute. Presentation and image-building of the vaccine in France insisted on the fact that the BCG was not a commercial specialty but distributed free of charge. The technical monopoly of its production nevertheless lay with the Paris Pasteur Institute and standardization of scientific proof of safety, efficacy and stability was dominated by that Institute in France. In contrast, the international production and distribution of the vaccine was entrusted and transferred, free of charge, to trustworthy laboratories outside France. Multiplication of producers and users led to an increased need for standardization. For this process the analysis distinguishes between the standardization of scientific proof concerning safety, efficacy and stability of the vaccine and standardization of its medical uses. Whereas standardization was rather successful in the inter-war period in France, the international efforts remained rather unsuccessful. Only after world war II under Scandinavian leadership and in the context of mass vaccination programs supported by the WHO and UNICEF was the international standardization effectively implemented and succeeded at least to some extend. (shrink)

This essay investigates the change in the Catholic attitude toward nuclear weapons as articulated by Pope Francis. Francis has generally followed the position of his immediate predecessors with regard to the Catholic teaching on just war. While the resort to armed force remains a morally justifiable option if the principles of just war have been met, the pope forcefully emphasises the tools of nonviolent peacebuilding. Recently, however, Francis made an original just war argument when he broke with the Church’s established (...) position on nuclear weapons. The pope declared both the use and possession of nuclear weapons “immoral” and, thus, abandoned the Church’s reluctant acceptance of nuclear deterrence that had survived the end of the Cold War. In this essay, I analyse the rationale behind Francis’s decision to break with nuclear deterrence, which is mainly grounded in the disillusionment about the failed promise of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, I assess the impact of the new position with regard to Catholic soldiers serving in nuclear armed militaries. (shrink)

Der logische Aufbau der Welt wurde 1928 publiziert, zwei Jahre nachdem Carnap sich in Wien mit dem Manuskript des Buches habilitiert hatte. Entstanden ist Carnaps Buch jedoch in einer Zeit, in der dieser noch nicht in Wien tätig war. Die Niederschrift erfolgte im Jahr 1925 in Buchenbach bei Freiburg; die Vorgeschichte reicht zurück bis ins Jahr 1920. Wie viel Wien oder Wiener Kreis steckt also eigentlich im Aufbau? Wie sehr spiegelt der Aufbau umgekehrt die philosophische Situation in Carnaps frühem Umfeld (...) in Jena und Freiburg wieder? Ist der Aufbau ein Stück österreichische oder ein Stück deutsche Philosophie oder beides? Um diese Fragen auf einer soliden empirischen Grundlage beantworten zu können, wird hier das vorhandene Material ausgewertet, das die Entstehung von Carnaps Buch dokumentiert. Dabei handelt es sich, neben den publizierten Texten Carnaps aus dieser Zeit, um folgende Quellen: Carnaps Tagebücher und Leselisten, verschiedene Briefwechsel, Manuskripte und Fragmente aus den Nachlässen von Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, Franz Roh und anderen. (shrink)

This book asks how a more liberating economics could be constructed and taught. It suggests that if economists today are serious about emancipation and empowerment, they will have to radically change their conception about what it means for a citizen to act rationally in a complex society. Arnsperger emphasises that current economics neglects an important fact: Many of us ask not only 'what's in it for us', within a given socio-economic context; we also care about the context itself. The author (...) argues that if citizens keen on exercising their critical reason actually demanded economic theories that allowed them to do so, economics would have to become a constantly emerging, open-ended knowledge process. He claims that in a truly free economy, there would be no all-out war between 'orthodox' and 'heterodox' approaches, but an intricate and unpredictable 'post-orthodox' pluralism that would emerge from the citizens' own complex interactions. Offering an original and path-breaking combination of insights from Hayek, the theory of complexity, and the Frankfurt School of social criticism, Arnsperger discusses how such a free economy would generate its specific brand of economics, called 'Critical Political Economy'. (shrink)

The doctrine of the moral equality of combatants holds that combatants on either side of a war have equal moral status, even if one side is fighting a just war while the other is not. This chapter examines arguments that have been offered for and against this doctrine, including the collectivist position famously articulated by Walzer and McMahan’s influential individualist critique. We also explore collectivist positions that have rejected the moral equality doctrine and arguments that some individualists have offered in (...) its favor. We defend a non-categorical version of the moral equality doctrine, according to which combatants on either side of a just war sometimes (but not always) have equal moral status. On our view, some degree of culpability is necessary for liability, and non-culpable combatants may therefore sometimes remain non-liable even when they fight for an unjust cause. (shrink)

The First World War was both an historical and a philosophical event. Philosophers engaged in what Kurt Flasch aptly called "the spiritual mobilization" of philosophy. Max Scheler was particularly important among these "war philosophers", given that he was the one who penned some of the most influential philosophical writings of the First World War, among them Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg. As I aim to show, Max Scheler's war writings were crucial for Jan Patočka's interpretation of the (...) First World War in the sixth of his Heretical Essays. However, the importance of Scheler's war writings goes far beyond the First World War for Patočka, since they offer Patočka a far-reaching interpretation of the 'excessive' character of the 20 th century. As I will show through the example of Max Scheler, the German war philosophers succumbed to a dangerously romantic conception of "force" – and it is this ominous force, which Patočka takes to lie at the root of the increasingly excessive character of the 20 th and 21 st centuries. (shrink)

Die Transformation der Kernphysik aus dem akademischen Labor über die Großforschung hin zum gescheiterten großtechnologischen Projekt war eng verknüpft mit der Implementierung transnationaler Wissensströme. Christian Forstner zeigt am Beispiel Österreichs, wie Industrie, Wissenschaft, Politik und Zivilgesellschaft interagieren müssen, um erfolgreiche Innovation möglich zu machen. Zunächst analysiert er die frühe Radioaktivitätsforschung bis zur Kernspaltung und dem NS-Forschungsverbund Uranverein. Anschließend folgt der Weg von den österreichischen Forschungsreaktoren im Rahmen des US-amerikanischen Atoms for Peace-Programms bis hin zum Bau des Kernkraftwerks Zwentendorf, das nach (...) dem „Nein zu Zwentendorf“ als Ergebnis einer Volksabstimmung im November 1978 nie in Betrieb ging. Der Autor: PD Dr. Christian Forstner ist Physiker und Wissenschaftshistoriker und derzeit Privatdozent für Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Er leitet den Fachverband „Geschichte der Physik“ der Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft. (shrink)

À la fin du xvie siècle et au début du xviie, la France sort d’une série de massacres et d’une trentaine d’années de violences extrêmes. Et durant ces Guerres de religion, l’un et l’autre camp se sont référés à la notion d’holocauste, prise au sens religieux et littéral du terme. Si les protestants ont été plus enclins à pratiquer cette référence biblique du point de vue de la victime, les catholiques, en particulier ligueurs, l’ont plutôt employée dans le sens d’un (...) holocauste des réformés. Toujours est-il que les deux camps, réciproquement, se saignent à blanc et font subir à toute une population, impliquée ou non, une horreur qui marque les esprits des « gens d’après ». Si bien que, durant la période de paix intérieure relative qui suit l’accession d’Henri IV au pouvoir, la conscience d’une catastrophe juste passée s’impose, en particulier au théâtre et dans les tragédies. Une catastrophe à laquelle les contemporains se réfèrent comme événement radical du monde d’alors, un pire absolu de ce que l’humanité peut produire d’inhumain, une horreur qu’il faudrait peut-être oublier et/ou sur laquelle il est pourtant nécessaire de faire retour, pour tenter de la penser. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Bonhoeffer and King: Their Legacies and Import for Christian Social ThoughtCharles W. ChristianBonhoeffer and King: Their Legacies and Import for Christian Social Thought Edited by Willis Jenkins and Jennifer M. McBride Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010. 304 pp. $25.00Countless books have been written about Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King Jr., assessing their individual leadership in the areas of social justice and theology in the twentieth century. Relatively few (...) works have brought these two individuals together in comparative analysis. This book, edited by Willis [End Page 216] Jenkins (assistant professor of social ethics at Yale Divinity School) and Jennifer M. McBride (visiting lecturer at Candler Divinity School), seeks to do that; it brings together a wide array of scholars in the fields of ethics, theology, pastoral ministry, political theory, African American studies, and feminist theology.As McBride points out in her introduction, the “significant differences in their historic, sociopolitical contexts” can present challenges in comparing the work of these two men and in seeking to contemporize them (8). However, the thought and life of both martyrs “demand[s] action”; in other words, the “thought” of both Bonhoeffer and King remains incomplete without “courageous, constructive, redemptive social engagement” (3). It is in this spirit that the book unfolds.The book is divided into four parts. The first four chapters compose part 1 (titled “Critical Distance”), which takes a broader look at the legacies, key concepts, and limitations or critiques of the thought of Bonhoeffer and King. For example, the second chapter by Stephen R. Haynes (“King and Bonhoeffer as Protestant Saints”) reminds us of the perils of the larger-than-life legacies of both these individuals. When noteworthy persons become personalities or cultural heroes, key aspects of their legacies can be minimized or overlooked. This is particularly important in contemporary American settings where politicians and commentators tend to reduce the legacies of both Bonhoeffer and King to fit their own political agendas.Part 2 pays specific attention to the influence of Bonhoeffer and King on matters related to social justice, such as poverty, racism, and violence. Among the notable contributions in this section is the chapter by Craig J. Slane that deals with the “unexpected turn toward violence” (112) for Bonhoeffer during his involvement in the plot to assassinate Hitler during World War II. Part 3 looks at the ways in which the lives and teaching (and especially preaching, in King’s life in particular) of Bonhoeffer and King are instruments of social redemption. In addition to noting the influence of Niebuhr’s emphasis on social sin and social redemption on King’s preaching and leadership, it points out that both Bonhoeffer and King were deeply influenced by the economic and social upheavals of their time; their preaching, teaching, and writing sought to address, in concrete ways, the racial, economic, and political realities of their contexts. In part 4, “Peacemaking,” four authors highlight the contributions King and Bonhoeffer have made to peacemaking and the influence these contributions continue to have. They discuss both men’s commitment to nonviolence and pacifism and the particular challenges this commitment created for them (especially for Bonhoeffer, given his participation in a plot to overthrow Hitler).The essays in this book do not present these two martyrs as unblemished. The book contains rich discussions that honestly assess their personal struggles [End Page 217] of conscience as well as their contextual struggles with such issues as the role of women. Furthermore, the reader will find a solid introduction to the lives and thought of both men while at the same time sitting in on a diverse conversation about how their influential interpretations of the Christian faith can continue to be fleshed out. May this kind of conversation (and action) continue!Charles W. ChristianMount Vernon Nazarene UniversityCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Im Zentrum dieses Bandes stehen die Beiträge einer Tagung, die im Oktober 2017 an der Universität Konstanz stattgefunden hat. Thema der Tagung war ein den historischen Kontext einbeziehender Blick auf den frühen Rudolf Carnap, vom Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Emigration Ende 1935. Der 1891 in Ronsdorf bei Wuppertal geborene Rudolf Carnap entschloss sich erst relativ spät zu einer Karriere als akademischer Philosoph, nämlich 1920, nachdem er sein durch den Krieg unterbrochenes Studium der Physik und Philosophie in Jena und (...) Freiburg abgeschlossen und kurze Zeit überlegt hatte, als Lehrer in der Schulreform-Bewegung zu arbeiten. Es folgte die philosophische Promotion im Jahr 1921, bei Bruno Bauch in Jena, mit einer Doktorarbeit zum Raumproblem. 1923 organisierte Carnap, gemeinsam mit Hans Reichenbach und anderen, eine für die Entstehung des Logischen Empirismus bedeutsame kleine Tagung in Erlangen. Auf Einladung von Moritz Schlick habilitierte er sich 1926 an der Universität Wien und verbrachte die Zeit bis 1931 zumindest teilweise in Wien, als eines der Kernmitglieder des Wiener Kreises um Moritz Schlick. Seine Habilitationsschrift erschien 1928 unter dem Titel Der logische Aufbau der Welt (hier immer Aufbau). 1931 folgte Carnap einem Ruf an die Deutsche Universität Prag. In den darauffolgenden Jahren blieb aber der enge Kontakt mit Wien und dem Wiener Kreis erhalten. Carnaps hauptsächliche Arbeit in dieser Zeit war seinem zweiten großen Buchprojekt gewidmet, der 1934 publizierten Logischen Syntax der Sprache. Daneben verfasste Carnap in seiner Zeit in Wien und Prag auch zahlreiche Aufsätze, zu unterschiedlichen Aspekten der Logik, der Metaphysikkritik und der Wissenschaftstheorie. Er war Mitautor des Manifests Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis und nahm regen Anteil an den zahlreichen wissenschaftlichen Aktivitäten des Logischen Empirismus, von der Gründung der Zeitschrift Erkenntnis bis hin zum Projekt einer Enzyklopädie der Einheitswissenschaft. Spätestens ab 1933 musste Carnap jedoch feststellen, dass an eine weitere wissenschaftliche Karriere in dem von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus geprägten politischen Klima in Kontinentaleuropa nicht zu denken war. Er strebte deshalb die Emigration ins englischsprachige Ausland an, die schließlich Ende 1935 gelang, als Carnap ein Angebot von der Universität Chicago erhielt. Obwohl Carnap nur den kleineren Teil der in diesem Band abgedeckten eineinhalb Jahrzehnte in Wien verbracht hat, widmet sich der Großteil der hier versammelten Beiträge schwerpunktmäßig der für Carnaps philosophische Karriere zentralen Wiener Zeit. (shrink)

This paper analyses the early history of David Bohm’s mechanics from the perspective of Ludwik Fleck’s thought-collectives and shows how the thought-style of the scientific community limits the possible modes of thinking and what new possibilities for the construction of a new theory arise if these limits are removed.

This article contributes to the debate among just war theorists about the ethics of using armed drones in the war on terror. If violence of this kind is to be effectively restrained, it is necessary first to establish an understanding of its nature. Because it is difficult to conceptualize drone-based violence as war, there is concern that such violence is thus not captured by the traditional jus ad bellum framework. Drone strikes probably do not constitute a law enforcement practice, so (...) the peacetime ethics of criminal justice do not apply either. One possible solution is to develop and apply a legitimization framework of jus ad vim in which vim is “force short of war,” although this depends upon a vim–bellum distinction being a sustainable one. Moving beyond discussion of these three alternative concepts of drone-based violence, the article suggests a fourth—vis perpetua —and explores the ethical implications thereof. As a form of violence that presents no physical risk to individual users of force, a program of drone strikes poses a moral problem if it is intended to continue indefinitely, leading to the systematic endangerment of innocents without the eventual promise of peace. (shrink)

What mechanisms led to the intractable legal situation of “enemy combatants” detained by the U.S. government in Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere? And what does the role of the judiciary in the enemy combatants cases suggest about politically contentious court cases in general? This article develops a two-stage theory of political justice that is based on the U.S. post-9/11 terrorism cases. It demonstrates mechanisms by which politically contentious cases turn into political justice. Political justice in these cases is mainly the result (...) of violations of the separation of powers that are legitimized by portraying the defendants/detainees as enemies beyond the law. (shrink)

Die sogenannte Syphilisfrage ist von Beginn an ein Thema der Nietzscheforschung. Das vorliegende Buch versucht diese Frage zu beantworten, indem es sich auf eine aufwändige Spurensuche bis zurück zur Syphilis der Renaissance-Päpste begibt. Wie war in verschiedenen Zeiten der Umgang mit der Krankheit und der fortwährenden Furcht, infiziert zu sein? Mit welchen Subtexten bringen Dichter und Denker zur Zeit Nietzsches das Thema zur Sprache? Und wie gab Nietzsche selbst in seinen Werken und Briefen davon Kunde? Das Buch betrachtet Nietzsche im (...) europäischen Kontext des 19. Jahrhunderts, in dem die Angst vor der Lustseuche allgegenwärtig war. Christian Niemeyers Nietzsche-Lektüre im Zeichen der Syphilis eröffnet überraschende Deutungsmöglichkeiten im Werk Friedrich Nietzsches. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 24-38 [Access article in PDF] Arne Naess, Val Plumwood, and Deep Ecological SubjectivityA Contribution to the "Deep Ecology-ecofeminism Debate" Christian Diehm Karen Warren's recent essay, "Ecofeminist Philosophy and Deep Ecology," begins by noting that the philosophical positions found under the heading "deep ecology" are anything but monolithic. This point, which has been overlooked by deep ecologists as often as by others, is crucial (...) for those who are interested in the "deep ecology-ecofeminism debate," for just as one must specify which of the ecofeminisms are in question, so too one must be clear about which of the deep ecologies is being debated, if one is to make one's way through the complex relationships between them. In the course of her article, Warren recounts with approval Val Plumwood's "Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism," an essay which locates, discusses, and critiques three versions of the "self" that various deep ecologists offer. In light of Plumwood's comments, Warren argues that the work of Arne Naess differs significantly from other deep ecologists such that "Naess' deep ecology position is or could be compatible with ecofeminism" (Warren 1999, 255). [End Page 24]In this essay, I propose to continue the analysis offered by Warren by examining how Naess might respond individually to the objections Plumwood voices. This will be done by looking closely at Naess's articulation of what he refers to as the "ultimate premises" of his view, premises that are not necessarily aspects of deep ecology per se, but of his own ecophilosophy, "Ecosophy 'T'." 1 I will argue that even though Naess may not be subject to Plumwood's most immediate criticisms, her work exposes the problematic tendency of his philosophy of identification to stress sameness in relations with others. I will conclude by suggesting a critical revision of the notion of identification that would allow one to retain key features of Naess's view—most notably his gestaltist understanding of the "self" or "subject" and his emphasis on "Self-realization" as an ultimate norm—while responding to the problems that Plumwood's work exposes. The Self as Transpersonal One of the three senses of self specified by Plumwood is the "transpersonal" self. Her discussion of the transpersonal self focuses on the work of Warwick Fox who, in his Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, describes three "varieties of identification": personal, ontological, and cosmological. 2 Fox favors the latter two because they are less local than personal identification, and this is due to the fact that they are not rooted in the immediate reality in which one moves, but rather within broader, more encompassing views, and thus are said to be "impartial" (Fox 1995, 256). As such, it is claimed that these trans-personal forms of identification escape the problem that accompanies personal identification, which is that, qua personal, it is necessarily biased in favor of those with whom one has personal contact, and thus seems to "have far more to do with the cause of possessiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and ecological destruction than with the solution to these seemingly intractable problems" (262). But this is not meant to imply an outright rejection of personal identification, and Fox cites as proof of this Naess's approval of the "felt nearness" of others as a principle for resolving conflicts. Fox's point is to show that trans-personal identification "proceeds from a sense of the cosmos... and works inward to each particular individual's sense of commonality with other entities" (258), but that within this framework personal identification remains important as "an inescapable aspect of living and... plays a fundamental role in human development" (266-7).Plumwood's critique of this view is that the privileging of the transpersonal [End Page 25] over the personal repeats a patriarchal gesture of the exclusion of a "corrupting and self-interested" particularity in favor of an impersonal and abstract universality (Plumwood 1991, 15). And, ultimately, such a position "cannot allow for the deep and highly... (shrink)

Zusammenfassung1989/90 war die DDR ein ökologisch gescheiterter Staat. Doch während Eingaben aus der Bevölkerung und kritische Umweltgruppen im Laufe der 1980er Jahre immer offener gegen die vorhandenen Umweltprobleme protestierten, blieben die etablierten Wissenschaften merkwürdig stumm und waren allem Anschein nach nicht in der Lage, geeignete Konzepte zur Lösung der Umweltkrise zu entwickeln. Knapp 20 Jahre zuvor hatte jedoch in der DDR ein umweltpolitischer Aufbruch eingesetzt, der maßgeblich von wissenschaftlichen Reforminitiativen getragen wurde. Die Aufnahme des Natur- und Umweltschutzgedankens in die Verfassung (...) von 1968 und die Verabschiedung des Landeskulturgesetzes zwei Jahre darauf, waren Ausdruck eines gesellschaftspolitischen Konsenses in der Umweltfrage.Wie ist diese scharfe Diskrepanz zu erklären? Der Aufsatz fragt nach dem Einfluss wissenschaftlicher Umweltkonzepte auf den umweltpolitischen Aufbruch in der DDR. Am Beispiel des wissenschaftlichen Naturschutzes, der seit 1951 institutionell in der Deutschen Akademie der Landwirtschaftswissenschaften verankert war, wird gezeigt, dass Naturschützer in den 1950er Jahren eine Phase der „Normalisierung“ durchliefen, die eine wesentliche Voraussetzung dafür war, ihren Anliegen politische Legitimation zu verleihen. Dieser erzwungene Anpassungsprozess beeinflusste aber nicht nur die Konzepte und Ziele des ostdeutschen Naturschutzes, sondern eröffnete seinen Protagonisten auch Partizipationsmöglichkeiten.In diesem Aufsatz plädiere ich für eine Neubewertung der ostdeutschen Umweltgeschichte, die bislang einseitig vom Ende her blickt. Zudem schlage ich vor, das begriffliche Konzept der „partizipatorischen Diktatur“ (Fulbrook) auf die Wissenschaftsgeschichte der DDR zu übertragen und vorhandene Ansätze damit zu erweitern. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 24-38 [Access article in PDF] Arne Naess, Val Plumwood, and Deep Ecological SubjectivityA Contribution to the "Deep Ecology-ecofeminism Debate" Christian Diehm Karen Warren's recent essay, "Ecofeminist Philosophy and Deep Ecology," begins by noting that the philosophical positions found under the heading "deep ecology" are anything but monolithic. This point, which has been overlooked by deep ecologists as often as by others, is crucial (...) for those who are interested in the "deep ecology-ecofeminism debate," for just as one must specify which of the ecofeminisms are in question, so too one must be clear about which of the deep ecologies is being debated, if one is to make one's way through the complex relationships between them. In the course of her article, Warren recounts with approval Val Plumwood's "Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism," an essay which locates, discusses, and critiques three versions of the "self" that various deep ecologists offer. In light of Plumwood's comments, Warren argues that the work of Arne Naess differs significantly from other deep ecologists such that "Naess' deep ecology position is or could be compatible with ecofeminism" (Warren 1999, 255). [End Page 24]In this essay, I propose to continue the analysis offered by Warren by examining how Naess might respond individually to the objections Plumwood voices. This will be done by looking closely at Naess's articulation of what he refers to as the "ultimate premises" of his view, premises that are not necessarily aspects of deep ecology per se, but of his own ecophilosophy, "Ecosophy 'T'." 1 I will argue that even though Naess may not be subject to Plumwood's most immediate criticisms, her work exposes the problematic tendency of his philosophy of identification to stress sameness in relations with others. I will conclude by suggesting a critical revision of the notion of identification that would allow one to retain key features of Naess's view—most notably his gestaltist understanding of the "self" or "subject" and his emphasis on "Self-realization" as an ultimate norm—while responding to the problems that Plumwood's work exposes. The Self as Transpersonal One of the three senses of self specified by Plumwood is the "transpersonal" self. Her discussion of the transpersonal self focuses on the work of Warwick Fox who, in his Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, describes three "varieties of identification": personal, ontological, and cosmological. 2 Fox favors the latter two because they are less local than personal identification, and this is due to the fact that they are not rooted in the immediate reality in which one moves, but rather within broader, more encompassing views, and thus are said to be "impartial" (Fox 1995, 256). As such, it is claimed that these trans-personal forms of identification escape the problem that accompanies personal identification, which is that, qua personal, it is necessarily biased in favor of those with whom one has personal contact, and thus seems to "have far more to do with the cause of possessiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and ecological destruction than with the solution to these seemingly intractable problems" (262). But this is not meant to imply an outright rejection of personal identification, and Fox cites as proof of this Naess's approval of the "felt nearness" of others as a principle for resolving conflicts. Fox's point is to show that trans-personal identification "proceeds from a sense of the cosmos... and works inward to each particular individual's sense of commonality with other entities" (258), but that within this framework personal identification remains important as "an inescapable aspect of living and... plays a fundamental role in human development" (266-7).Plumwood's critique of this view is that the privileging of the transpersonal [End Page 25] over the personal repeats a patriarchal gesture of the exclusion of a "corrupting and self-interested" particularity in favor of an impersonal and abstract universality (Plumwood 1991, 15). And, ultimately, such a position "cannot allow for the deep and highly... (shrink)

Ethical analysis of armed drones has to date focused heavily on their use in foreign wars or counterterrorism operations, but it is important also to consider the potential use of armed drones in d...

Zusammenfassung1989/90 war die DDR ein ökologisch gescheiterter Staat. Doch während Eingaben aus der Bevölkerung und kritische Umweltgruppen im Laufe der 1980er Jahre immer offener gegen die vorhandenen Umweltprobleme protestierten, blieben die etablierten Wissenschaften merkwürdig stumm und waren allem Anschein nach nicht in der Lage, geeignete Konzepte zur Lösung der Umweltkrise zu entwickeln. Knapp 20 Jahre zuvor hatte jedoch in der DDR ein umweltpolitischer Aufbruch eingesetzt, der maßgeblich von wissenschaftlichen Reforminitiativen getragen wurde. Die Aufnahme des Natur- und Umweltschutzgedankens in die Verfassung (...) von 1968 und die Verabschiedung des Landeskulturgesetzes zwei Jahre darauf, waren Ausdruck eines gesellschaftspolitischen Konsenses in der Umweltfrage.Wie ist diese scharfe Diskrepanz zu erklären? Der Aufsatz fragt nach dem Einfluss wissenschaftlicher Umweltkonzepte auf den umweltpolitischen Aufbruch in der DDR. Am Beispiel des wissenschaftlichen Naturschutzes, der seit 1951 institutionell in der Deutschen Akademie der Landwirtschaftswissenschaften verankert war, wird gezeigt, dass Naturschützer in den 1950er Jahren eine Phase der „Normalisierung“ durchliefen, die eine wesentliche Voraussetzung dafür war, ihren Anliegen politische Legitimation zu verleihen. Dieser erzwungene Anpassungsprozess beeinflusste aber nicht nur die Konzepte und Ziele des ostdeutschen Naturschutzes, sondern eröffnete seinen Protagonisten auch Partizipationsmöglichkeiten.In diesem Aufsatz plädiere ich für eine Neubewertung der ostdeutschen Umweltgeschichte, die bislang einseitig vom Ende her blickt. Zudem schlage ich vor, das begriffliche Konzept der „partizipatorischen Diktatur“ (Fulbrook) auf die Wissenschaftsgeschichte der DDR zu übertragen und vorhandene Ansätze damit zu erweitern. (shrink)

Nach den Anschlagen in Paris, Brussel und Nizza und den verzweifelten Erklarungsversuchen sind die Baden-Badener Reden von Alfred Grosser, Hans Gert-Pottering und Robert Zollitsch eine grosse Hilfe. Eine Hilfe, die schmerzenden Erfahrungen des Augenblicks in einen grosseren Zusammenhang zu bringen. Wenn etwa Alfred Grosser in seiner Rede den Bogen zu seiner eigenen Biografie hin zu den Banlieues unserer Tage in Paris spannt. "Ich bin seit 1937 Franzose, unsere Erziehungsministerin ist Franzosin seit 1995, unser Premierminister seit 1982, die Burgermeisterin von Paris (...) seit 1973, Nicolas Sarkozy ist Fluchtlingssohn. Niemand wird sagen, sie sind nicht Franzosen. Aber die jungen Leute in den sogenannten "Vororten" sind fast alle franzosische Staatsburger und werden total diskriminiert. Also, sie haben die franzosische Identitat, gewiss, aber sie suchen eine andere Identitat und das ist der Islam. Nicht der Islam war zuerst da, sondern die Diskriminierung.". (shrink)

À la fin du xvie siècle et au début du xviie, la France sort d’une série de massacres et d’une trentaine d’années de violences extrêmes. Et durant ces Guerres de religion, l’un et l’autre camp se sont référés à la notion d’holocauste, prise au sens religieux et littéral du terme. Si les protestants ont été plus enclins à pratiquer cette référence biblique du point de vue de la victime, les catholiques, en particulier ligueurs, l’ont plutôt employée dans le sens d’un (...) holocauste (nécessaire) des réformés. Toujours est-il que les deux camps, réciproquement, se saignent à blanc et font subir à toute une population, impliquée ou non, une horreur qui marque les esprits des « gens d’après ». Si bien que, durant la période de paix intérieure relative qui suit l’accession d’Henri IV au pouvoir (1593-1594), la conscience d’une catastrophe juste passée s’impose, en particulier au théâtre et dans les tragédies. Une catastrophe à laquelle les contemporains se réfèrent comme événement radical du monde d’alors, un pire absolu de ce que l’humanité peut produire d’inhumain, une horreur qu’il faudrait peut-être oublier et/ou sur laquelle il est pourtant nécessaire de faire retour, pour tenter de la penser. (shrink)

On 5 May 1957, Leopold Löwenheim passed away in a Berlin hospital following a short but severe illness, unnoticed by the community of mathematical logicians who believed that he had perished in a Nazi concentration camp in or shortly after 1940 (the year of publication in the Journal of Symbolic Logic of his last paper before the end of World War II). The 50th anniversary of his death seems an appropriate date for the posthumous publication of a paper that was (...) supposed to appear in Fundamenta Mathematicae in 1939, the galley proofs of which Löwenheim had already seen and corrected when German troops invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Löwenheim managed to save the proofs through the War, despite the loss of most of his possessions during the bombing of Berlin in 1943 and 1944. By another lucky chance, a copy of the proofs survived in the present author's possession, when the originals were lost during a flat clearing in Berlin as part of the estate of Johannes Teichert (1904?1994), Löwenheim's step-son, when his widow moved into a nursing-home in May 1999. Later, I will expand these short remarks slightly but seize the present opportunity to resume (and in some places add to) the extant data on Löwenheim's life and writings. (shrink)

Tugendhats Versuch, die Möglichkeit einer freien Handlung des Menschen in einer als deterministisch angenommenen Natur aufzuzeigen, war von Anbeginn zum Scheitern verurteilt. Denn ein kausaler Naturmechanismus lässt per definitionem zu jedem Zeitpunkt nur ein einziges reales Ereignis zu, dessen Ursache Natur und nicht der freie Mensch ist. Unter dieser Voraussetzung kann die gefühlte und im Moralurteil vorausgesetzte Wahlfreiheit des Menschen, hier und jetzt A und nicht-A tun zu können, nur noch als, wenn auch unvermeidlicher, moralischer Schein, der trügt, in den (...) Blick treten. Tugendhat spürt diese Konsequenz und gerät in den nihilistischen Sog eines Denkens, das aus ,,intellektueller Redlichkeit" nicht mehr an seine Verantwortlichkeit glauben kann. Ich zeichne diesen für das Individuum ,Mensch' verheerenden psychologischen Prozess in groben Zügen nach. Erst in einer Prinzipienreflexion, so meine These gegen Tugendhats Ansatz: ,,Anthropologie statt Metaphysik", werden die Einschränkungen einer wesenhaft nichtkausalen Natur als Möglichkeitsbedingung der Freiheit des Menschen, der im Text dieser Welt allein die auf endliche Weise sich selbst erwirkende Ur-Sache ,Grund' ist, evident. (shrink)