This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence (...) of this presence. (shrink)

The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman and ātman. Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but the very (...) seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such. (shrink)

& The functional equivalence of overt movements and dynamic imagery is of fundamental importance in neuroscience. Here, we investigated the participation of the neocortical motor areas in a classic task of dynamic imagery, Shepard and Metzler's mental rotation task, by time-resolved single-trial functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The subjects performed the mental-rotation task 16 times, each time with different object pairs. Functional images were acquired for each pair separately, and the onset times and..

The aim of this paper is to confirm that it was Hamann's translation of Hume's "Treatise" (I.4.7) which triggered Kant's critical turn in 1768/69. If this is indeed so, then Kant's inaugural dissertation must be reassessed, in particular the doctrine, to be found there, that we have cognitive access to the intelligible world. This doctrine is part of a strategy for tackling the problem highlighted by Hume; that there may be conflicting principles at work in the human mind, i.e., an (...) antinomy. The dissertation's strategy failed and so raised the question of how categories can refer to objects. (shrink)

A hypothetical evolutionary scenario is offered meant to account for the emergence of mental selves. According to the scenario, mental selves are constructed to solve a source-attribution problem. They emerge when internally generated mental contents are treated like messages arising from external personal sources. As a result, mental contents becomes attributed to the self as an internal personal source. According to this view, subjectivity is construed outward-in, that is, one's own mental self is derived from, and is secondary to, the (...) mental selves perceived in others. The social construction of subjectivity and selfhood relies on, and is maintained in, various discourses on subjectivity. (shrink)

We present a reconstruction of so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics using a notation which we believe is more legible than that of earlier accounts, and lends itself easily to computer implementation, for instance in PROLOG. By drawing from, and emending, earlier work of Balzer and Dawe (1986,1997), the present account presents the three most important lines of development of classical genetics: the so-called Mendel's laws, linkage genetics and gene mapping, in the form of a theory-net. This shows that the (...) set theoretic representation format used in the structuralist approach to the philosophy of science also applies to the domain of genetic theories. There construction is intended to lend more clarity to theme thodological, philosophical and didactical discussions of the foundations of genetics, and on the other hand to defend a formally, logically minded view of theories which seems to have become contested through the work of Feyerabend, Kuhn and Kitcher. (shrink)

We provide a finite axiomatization of the consequence $\vdash ^{\wedge}\cap \vdash ^{\vee}$ , i.e. of the set of common sequential rules for $\wedge $ and $\vee $ . Moreover, we show that $\vdash ^{\wedge}\cap \vdash ^{\vee}$ has no proper non-trivial strengthenings other than $\vdash ^{\wedge}$ and $\vdash ^{\vee}$ . A similar result is true for $\vdash ^{\leftrightarrow}\cap \vdash ^{\rightarrow}$ , but not, e.g., for $\vdash ^{\leftrightarrow}\cap \vdash ^{+}$.

In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I (...) suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension , namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences. (shrink)

The mental system of an individual usually generates a reality-model that includes a self-model and a world-model as fundamental components. Exceptional experiences (ExE) can be classified as subjectively experienced anomalies in the self-model or the world-model or in the relation of both. Empirical studies show significant correlations between specific patterns of ExE and socially and clinically relevant variables. In order to examine the ontological status of anomalous phenomena a psychophysical approach is presented in which the principle of complementarity is of (...) fundamental importance. Applying a generalized quantum theory to psychosocial and psychophysical systems, complementary aspects such as autonomy versus reliability or novelty versus confirmation are identified as possible local and global variables. The findings indicate that entanglement correlations could play a role in the occurrence of ExE and that specific psychological interventions can dissolve them. (shrink)

This article discusses the history of the concepts of potential infinity and actual infinity in the context of Christian theology, mathematical thinking and metaphysical reasoning. It shows that the structure of Ancient Greek rationality could not go beyond the concept of potential infinity, which is highlighted in Aristotle's metaphysics. The limitations of the metaphysical mind of ancient Greece were overcome through Christian theology and its concept of the infinite God, as formulated in Gregory of Nyssa's theology. That is how the (...) concept of actual infinity emerged. However, Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of human rationality went still further. He said that access to the infinity of God was to be found only in an asymptotic ascension, as expressed in apophatic theology, and this view endangered the rationality of theology. Deeply influenced by the apophatic tradition, Nicholas of Cusa avoided this danger by showing that infinity could be accessed by symbolic representation and asymptotic mathematical reasoning. Thus, he made an immense contribution in making infinity rationally accessible. This endeavor was finally realized by Georg Cantor. This rational accessibility revealed discernible structures of infinity, such as the continuum hypothesis, and the cardinal numbers. However, the probable logical inconsistency of Georg Cantor's all-encompassing Absolute Infinity points to an intuitive understanding of infinity that goes beyond its rational structures – as in apophatic theology. (shrink)

Section 1 contains a Kripke-style completeness theorem for arbitrary intermediate consequences. In Section 2 we apply weak Kripke semantics to splittings in order to obtain generalized axiomatization criteria of the Jankov-type. Section 3 presents new and short proofs of recent results on implicationless intermediate consequences. In Section 4 we prove that these consequences admit no deduction theorem. In Section 5 all maximal logics in the 3 rd counterslice are determined. On these results we reported at the 1980 meeting on Mathematical (...) Logic at Oberwolfach. This paper concerns propositional logic only. (shrink)

Sections 1, 2 and 3 contain the main result, the strong finite axiomatizability of all 2-valued matrices. Since non-strongly finitely axiomatizable 3-element matrices are easily constructed the result reveals once again the gap between 2-valued and multiple-valued logic. Sec. 2 deals with the basic cases which include the important F i from Post's classification. The procedure in Sec. 3 reduces the general problem to these cases. Sec. 4 is a study of basic algebraic properties of 2-element algebras. In particular, we (...) show that equational completeness is equivalent to the Stone-property and that each 2-element algebra generates a minimal quasivariety. The results of Sec. 4 will be applied in Sec. 5 to maximality questions and to a matrix free characterization of 2-valued consequences in the lattice of structural consequences in any language. Sec. 6 takes a look at related axiomatization. problems for finite algebras and matrices. We study the notion of a propositional consequence with equality and, among other things, present explicit axiomatizations of 2-valued consequences with equality. (shrink)

Elaborating on the substantial parallels between Molina’s and Kant’s attempts to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge and natural causal determinism respectively, my aim is to establish a proper historical connection as well. Leibniz is shown to be the crucial mediator in two respects: (i) Kant knew Molina’s account of divine knowledge in general in its Leibnizian version through Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. In this work, scientia media plays no role in the explication as to how God knows absolute future contingents. (ii) (...) In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant resorted to doctrines similar to Molina’s in his criticism of Leibniz’s alternative explication which drew on complete concepts of monads. (shrink)

First, I will discuss several reasons as to why there is still almost a reluctance to reading Kant’s philosophy in the context of the scholastic tradition. The focus will be on (i) the label “revolutionary” often attached to Kant’s thought thereby suggesting a radical break with the past, especially with regard to philosophers often perceived as conservative, and (ii) the issue of confessional ramifications (not unrelated to the first point) will also be touched upon, albeit briefly. Then, two examples will (...) be investigated with regard to which a recourse to this context provides important clues to the philosophical points at issue. These are Kant’s claims that on the one hand, existence is not a real predicate, and on the other, that appearances are nothing but representations. (shrink)

An infinite binary sequence X is Kolmogorov–Loveland random if there is no computable non-monotonic betting strategy that succeeds on X in the sense of having an unbounded gain in the limit while betting successively on bits of X. A sequence X is KL-stochastic if there is no computable non-monotonic selection rule that selects from X an infinite, biased sequence.One of the major open problems in the field of effective randomness is whether Martin-Löf randomness is the same as KL-randomness. Our first (...) main result states that KL-random sequences are close to Martin-Löf random sequences in so far as every KL-random sequence has arbitrarily dense subsequences that are Martin-Löf random. A key lemma in the proof of this result is that for every effective split of a KL-random sequence at least one of the halves is Martin-Löf random. However, this splitting property does not characterize KL-randomness; we construct a sequence that is not even computably random such that every effective split yields two subsequences that are 2-random. Furthermore, we show for any KL-random sequence A that is computable in the halting problem that, first, for any effective split of A both halves are Martin-Löf random and, second, for any computable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function g and almost all n, the prefix of A of length n has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity at least n−g. Again, the latter property does not characterize KL-randomness, even when restricted to left-r.e. sequences; we construct a left-r.e. sequence that has this property but is not KL-stochastic and, in fact, is not even Mises–Wald–Church stochastic.Turning our attention to KL-stochasticity, we construct a non-empty class of KL-stochastic sequences that are not weakly 1-random; by the usual basis theorems we obtain such sequences that in addition are left-r.e., are low, or are of hyperimmune-free degree.Our second main result asserts that every KL-stochastic sequence has effective dimension 1, or equivalently, a sequence cannot be KL-stochastic if it has infinitely many prefixes that can be compressed by a factor of α<1. This improves on a result by Muchnik, who has shown that were they to exist, such compressible prefixes could not be found effectively. (shrink)

Die vorgelegte Summe des Hochidealismus ersetzt – der neuen Forschungs- und Quellenlage entsprechend – die alte Konstruktion vom Dreischritt, der von Fichtes Jenaer Wissenschaftslehre ausgeht, in die Naturphilosophie Schellings übergeht und in Hegels System vollendet aufgeht, durch die Gegenthese: Der Deutsche Idealismus ist die Begründung der Vernunftwissenschaft im Widerstreit von drei Vollendungsansprüchen, erhoben im Identitätssystem und der positiven Philosophie Schellings, in Hegels Onto-Theo-Logik und der ungeschriebenen Lehre Fichtes, d. i. den mündlichen Vortragszyklen nach 1800. Die eingehende Ausarbeitung dieses dreiseitigen Widerstreites (...) hebt einen Vorrang heraus. Fichtes ungeschriebene Lehre ist die einzige der drei Vollendungsgestalten, die im Begreifen des Wahrheits- und Systemgrundes, des Absoluten, transzendentale Besinnung in absoluter Reflexion bewahrt und daher auch vorzüglich in der Lage ist, unser Zeitalter der Nichtbesinnung herauszufordern. (shrink)

This paper attempts to shed light on Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and appearances. It draws on the early modern debate about the nature of divine knowledge which resonates in Kant’s lectures on metaphysics and natural theology. The problem as to how divine foreknowledge of human actions is compatible with their freedom is of particular relevance, since the solution to the problem of human freedom is at the core of transcendental idealism. Philosophers such as Molina take divine cognition of (...) free human acts to arise independently of objects external to the divine mind and to be concerned first and foremost with mind-internal ideas. This strategy is crucial for solving an important puzzle, as it shows that a two-world and a two-aspect reading of the distinction are compatible after all, since – at least in the sense of a conceptual possibility – things in themselves have correlates. (shrink)

The notions of freedom and equality in a group are precisely defined in terms of individual exertions of influence or power. Freedom is discussed in the version ‘freedom from’ influence rather than in the version ‘freedom to do’ what one wants. It is shown that at the ideal conceptual level complete freedom implies equality. Given the plausibility of the definitions this shows that political ‘folk rhetorics’ in which freedom and equality often are put in opposition are misled and misleading. Quantitative (...) notions of ‘more freedom’ and ‘more equality’ are introduced and shown to be independent of each other. The bearing of these conceptual exercises on the comparison of political systems is discussed. (shrink)

An International Symposium In Honor of the 90th Birthday Year of Charles Townes October 6-8, 2005, UC Berkeley.

The 'Hard Problem' of consciousness and its 'Explanatory Gap' can only be explained if we develop a physical theory which recognizes the Universe as a cognitive being and is based upon a fundamental process that transforms mind into body and back again. The physical requirements needed to realize such a transformation cycle are investigated and an explicit implementation of the consciousness process is presented. This implementation consists of an integrated mind-body activity that explains mental experiences with a model of the (...) activity itself. Such a self-referential loop is shown to be both a fundamental physical process and a container of primitive self- awareness from which complex experiences can be built. Explaining consciousness requires an expansion of current physical theories. To develop this expansion I will first associate the components of the consciousness process with individual operations occurring in the architecture of quantum theory. This will provide explicit mathematical equations required to describe conscious phenomena and show their limits. Because quantum equations apply to the content of space, but not to the sensation of space itself, they can only represent an approximate description of the consciousness process and are hence incomplete. I will, therefore, go on to discuss the approximations which limit quantum theory from providing a complete explanation of consciousness and suggest the metaphysical underpinnings required to expand quantum physics into a more complete description of reality. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of a reality model in which all parts of the universe, including the reader, are fundamentally self- measurement processes and the sensation of space is not that of an a priori container, but rather a 'what it feels like' to be a time-stable event. (shrink)