Este artículo explora el contexto intelectual y las fuentes eruditas de un manuscrito clandestino, que ha pasado inadvertido hasta la fecha, que en 1701 pertenecía a Charles Hornby y que incluía una versión de la obra polémica de Henry Stubbe Account of the rise and progress of Mahometanism, además de una traducción de los siete primeros capítulos de la obra en castellano de Muḥammmad Alguazir Apología contra la ley Cristiana. El artículo propone examinar cómo las polémicas islámicas anticristianas fueron encontradas, (...) utilizadas y cuestionadas, tanto por personajes librepensadores, como Stubbe y Toland, como por los estudiosos más ortodoxos. Para tal fin establece los distintos hábitos en la citación y utilización de la erudición “orientalista” que se emplearon entre 1650 y 1720, prestando especial atención a las grandes obras de Hotttinger y Pococke. El artículo argumenta que los librepensadores fueron perfectamente capaces de apropiarse de aspectos tanto de la erudición cristiana como de la teología islámica para sus fines antireligiosos. (shrink)

This chapter examines philosophical issues surrounding the classification of mental disorders by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular, the chapter focuses on issues concerning the relative merits of descriptive versus theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification and whether the DSM should classify natural kinds. These issues are presented with reference to the history of the DSM, which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952 and is currently in its fifth edition. While the (...) first two editions of the DSM adopted a theoretical (psychoanalytic) and etiological approach to classification, subsequent editions of the DSM have adopted an atheoretical and purely descriptive (“neo-Kraepelinian”) approach. It is argued that largest problem with the DSM at present—viz., its failure to provide valid diagnostic categories—is directly related to the purely descriptive methodology championed by the DSM since the third edition of the DSM. In light of this problem, the chapter discusses the prospects of a theoretical and causal approach to psychiatric classification and critically examines the assumption that the DSM should classify natural kinds. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Il y a and the UngrundLevinas and the Russian Existentialists Berdyaev and ShestovJames McLachlan (bio)Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the other than remains other — with an insurmountable allergy. It is for this reason that it is essentially a philosophy of (...) being, that the comprehension of being is its last word, and the fundamental structure of man.... The God of the philosophers... is a god adequate to reason, a comprehended god who could not trouble the autonomy of consciousness, which finds itself again in all its adventures, returning home to itself like Ulysses, who through all his peregrinations is only on the way to his native island.— Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other”Levinas is well known for his assault of the history of Western ontology and its allergy to otherness. In seeing all in terms of Being, philosophy subordinates ethics to ontology by reducing the other to an object of knowledge within Being. Recent work by Fiona Steinkamp, Joseph Lawrence, and Drew Dalton has called attention to a possible [End Page 213] dialogue between Schelling (especially the middle Schelling of Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom and The Ages of the World) and Levinas.1 Joseph Lawrence shows both Schelling and Levinas struggle with the difficulty of thinking the Good beyond being. Schelling thought that the very quest for reality forces us to philosophize from the point of view of practical rather than theoretical reason. He thought there is no adequate theoretical refutation of solipsism but there is a perfectly good practical refutation: to the extent that I treat others as real they reveal themselves as real to me. Lawrence points to Schelling’s claim in Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, “This is the secret of love, that it unites such beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can be without the other.”2The parallels between Schelling and Levinas are rooted in the latter’s appreciation of Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption. In the introduction to Totality and Infinity, Levinas famously notes that Rosenzweig’s masterpiece was “too often present in this book to be cited” (TI 28). Rosenzweig’s debt to Schelling is well documented. He carried The Ages of the World to the front with him in World War One and refers to it in correspondence. He even wrote, “It’s a great book to the last, had it been completed nobody except the Jews would give two hoots for the Star.”3 This is, without doubt, the correct historical stream to follow in connection with the relation between Schelling and Levinas and the proper way to see the connections between such Levinasian notions as the “there is” and hypostasis and the Schellingian conceptions that reflect similar ideas as the Ungrund, the emergence of the personal from the impersonal ground, and, above all, the importance of the practical ethical move beyond ontology.But there were also contemporaries holding such philosophical views in the Paris of the 1930s, and they can be seen to reinforce such positions. What is more striking is they come from Levinas’s fellow émigrés: Lev Shestov, Nicolas Berdyaev, and Alexandre Koyré. In one way or another, each either championed positions that emphasized the emergence of the particular from the general, rejected ontology, [End Page 214] or attacked the entire Western metaphysical tradition stemming from Parmenides for reasons similar to those held by Levinas. Levinas’s appreciation of Dostoevsky is also an important in connection to some of the ideas shared by Levinas, his fellow émigrés, and Schelling.4The Russian émigrés Shestov and Berdyaev were both Dostoevsky disciples; each offered major and influential studies on Dostoevsky and each viewed the novelist in quite different ways through the lens of each one’s philosophical position that had, in part, been formed by each thinker’s reading of Dostoevsky.5 Levinas’s friend, a student of Edmund Husserl, the philosopher of science Alexandre Koyré’s 1929 dissertation later... (shrink)

Pour examiner la consistance des thèses de Fichte en matière de cosmopolitisme et de nationalisme, on prend en compte notamment un aspect peu connu de sa pensée politique, son engagement maçonnique, et on analyse les textes de la période berlinoise, au cours de laquelle le thème de la nation prend une importance croissante. Comment interpréter en particulier les Discours à la nation allemande? Fichte y opère-t‑il une rupture avec les idéaux universalistes des Lumières? Et quel statut accorder à l’idée d’une (...) richesse des patrimoines nationaux à préserver? On cherche à montrer que Fichte reste fidèle à ses vues républicaines et universalistes, tout en reconnaissant l’ambiguïté du recours, pour des raisons stratégiques et rhétoriques, à un registre nationaliste, qui lui est foncièrement étranger. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo presenta una reconstrucción argumentativa del primer capítulo de la tercera sección de la Doctrina de la Esencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica de Hegel, el cual lleva como título "Lo Absoluto". Su hipótesis es que la critica de la metafísica contenida en este capítulo no solo aboga por una ontología relacional del proceso, sino que también establece implícitamente una distinción entre una teoría de lo absoluto de primer orden y una de segundo orden. La teoría de (...) lo absoluto de primer orden tiene como objetivo una exposición de lo absoluto libre de contradicciones analíticas. Por su parte, la teoría de lo absoluto de segundo orden no solo expone en qué consiste lo absoluto, sino que pretende también incluir el pensamiento y la teoría de lo absoluto en lo absoluto mismo. ABSTRACT This paper aims to reconstruct the arguments of the first chapter within the third section of the Doctrine of Essence, namely "The Absolute". Its hypothesis is that the critic of metaphysics within this chapter not only champions a relational process-ontology, but also states an implicit distinction between first and second order theories of the Absolute. The first-order theory of the Absolute purports to present a definition of the Absolute without analytic contradictions. The second-order theory of the Absolute not only sets out the nature of the Absolute, but also seeks to include the thought and the theory of the Absolute within the Absolute itself. (shrink)

Millán-Puelles and Maritain suitably delimited the fields of ethics and art, doing what justice; self-determination of art and dignity of man demanded. Nevertheless, our reverence for the autonomy of art and dignity of man should neither lead us to declare the latter innocent nor to free it from all responsibility. This is what George Steiner strongly states. The followers of absolute freedom seem not to realize the deep impact the work of art exercises upon the reader. Censorship is far more (...) complex and intricate than champions of absolute freedom believe. At any rate, such a responsibility is no concern of the State but rather of the social community, specially the family and what has been called "the tribe". The art critic must assume his responsibility not only on what refers to aesthetic aspects; he must do so on what refers to the concept of man that springs from the work of art he analizes. (shrink)

Cet article étudie ce que l’on peut entendre par « ce qui dépend de nous » dans la tradition aristotélicienne. L’auteur interroge les tenants de l’apparition d’un Self chez les Stoïciens et remet vivement en question certaines conceptions de l’histoire de la philosophie. Il soutient qu’il n’y a pas de raison, et même moins, de voir en Épictète l’inventeur du « libre arbitre », pas plus qu’il n’y en a de voir chez les Stoïciens une quelconque naissance de la subjectivité (...) en raison de l’innovation qu’aurait été la notion d’assentiment. L’argumentation repose sur la conception « libertarienne » du « ce qui dépend de nous » par Alexandre d’Aphrodise.De « ce qui dépend de nous »This paper examines that what is the meaning of « what depends on us » in the Aristotelian tradition. The Author adresses all those who think that the Self was originated by the Stoics. He criticizes in a provocative way some manners in the history of philosophy. He champions that there is no cause, or even less, to understand Epictetus as any creator of the liberum arbitrium, no more than to understand the Stoics as the origine of our modern conception of the subjectivity because of their notion of assent. The argument rests on the « libertarian » conception of « what depends on us » by Alexander of Aphrodisias. (shrink)

Consider any choice that affects some social policy. A decision that considers evidence will, at its heart, contain some kind of explicit or implicit “because” statement: “We are doing X because the evidence says Y.” But can evidence ever truly speak for itself, in the sense of being reducible to objective utterances that are either correct or in need of correction? Before answering, consider what you'd prefer. Would you rather receive evidence that was free of any value judgments imposed by (...) human actors, that was laden with value judgments that you agree with, or laden with value judgments that you disagree with? The central assertion of this essay is that, throughout policy analysis but especially in assessments of the costs and benefits of regulating versus encouraging new technologies (cost‐benefit analysis, or CBA), the first possibility above is a mirage, and the second and third are self‐contradictory. Instead, we are overwhelmingly confronted with a fourth possibility: we receive evidence that appears to be (or is deliberately touted as) value neutral but is suffused with hidden value judgments.In the second part of this essay, entitled “A Guided Tour through Inevitable Value Judgments,” I identify in a systematic way approximately sixty‐five value judgments that are routinely (in some cases, invariably) made in CBA, but that are kept hidden. For each judgment, I discuss its genesis as it is most commonly invoked in CBA, explain how it is hidden in plain sight, and offer one or more value judgments that could be made instead of or in addition to the conventional one. The alternative judgments highlight the width of the spectrum of reasonable conclusions an analyst could reach merely by substituting other judgments for the ones currently embedded.Bringing hidden value judgments to light is doubly valuable. First, it allows discussion to ensue on a level playing field; instead of conclusory statements about what the evidence says, transparency permits statements taking the form of “when channeled through these value judgments, the evidence says this.” Perhaps more importantly, transparency about value judgments permits participants in the discussions to offer interpretations of evidence contingent on there being different value judgments chosen at one or more points in the analysis, interpretations that may suggest that alternative course(s) of action are preferable to the one being championed. (shrink)

L’article examine la reprise que le « prince des Averroïstes » Jean de Jandun fait de cette phrase délicate d’Averroès, tirée de son Grand Commentaire du De anima d’Aristote : « forte igitur philosophia invenitur in maiori parte subiecti in omni tempore ». On cherche à montrer par l’analyse des textes que l’interprétation du maître ès arts s’écarte radicalement de la pensée du Cordouan qu’il prétend suivre. Tandis qu’Averroès suppose l’existence continue d’au moins un philosophe dans le monde, Jean de (...) Jandun, rejetant comme irréaliste l’idée d’un homme parfait en qui s’incarnerait tout le savoir, et tributaire d’une erreur de traduction arabo-latine qui donne « sujet » pour « lieu », soutient qu’il n’y a chaque fois de perfection que si l’on totalise tous les savoirs particuliers des différents penseurs en activité sur la terre. Autrement dit, la philosophie est parfaite, certes, mais il n’y a pas de philosophe parfait. C’est coniunctim que la science est achevée, et non pas divisim. Un tel constat, qui rapproche l’analyse de Jean de celle menée par Dante au début de sa Monarchia, permet deux révisions : d’une part, l’idée d’un « averroïsme » latin réactionnaire, se contentant de répéter les paroles du maître, est à revoir ; d’autre part, cela signifie qu’il n’y a pas chez Jean les bases théoriques de l’idéal éthico-intellectualiste dont l’historiographie moderne assure qu’il en fut le champion parisien. (shrink)

Ligado directamente a la dinámica de los movimientos renovadores del arte que surgieron en la España de los años veinte, el texto de Ortega y Gasset ofrece unas perspectivas más amplias y entronca con la renovación de la estética y la historia del arte que había iniciado la tradición teórica e historiográfica alemana a finales del siglo XIX. Ofrecemos, además otros escritos que, como «¿Una exposición Zuloaga?», «La Gioconda», «Diálogo sobre el arte nuevo», «Ensayo de estética a manera de prólogo» (...) y «Sobre la crítica del arte», permiten una mejor comprensión del pensamiento de Ortega y del debate artístico y estético en España. La presente edición va precedida de un prólogo de Valeriano Bozal. (shrink)

Dans son Esthétique, Benedetto Croce présente Descartes comme la figure emblématique d’un courant rationaliste qui exclut l’imagination poétique de la pensée philosophique et empêche de reconnaître l’intuition comme mode de connaissance esthétique spécifique. Pour lui, les conséquences néfastes de l’esprit mathématique diffusé en France par le cartésianisme se retrouvent chez Locke, Leibniz, Wolff et Baumgarten, et il n’y a guère à la même époque que chez « l’italiano Giambattista Vico » que l’on peut parler d’une véritable science esthétique. Au cours (...) des années où prend corps sa Philosophie de l’esprit, Croce est amené à plusieurs reprises à stigmatiser l’intellectualisme de Descartes, le caractère abstrait de sa science et de sa morale ainsi que son ignorance de l’histoire. Si sa lecture est dépourvue d’originalité et dénote l’influence sur lui du climat culturel de son temps, elle s’appuie néanmoins sur une conception de l’art fortement novatrice et dont l’influence sera décisive dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. Un examen plus détaillé de l’œuvre vaste et complexe de Croce montre que sa lecture de Descartes révèle une connaissance profonde de l’histoire de la philosophie : Croce est capable à la fois de corriger les interprétations simplificatrices de certains aspects de la pensée cartésienne de la part de Vico, Hegel ou Valéry, et de reconnaître sa dette à l’égard de la théorie cartésienne de l’erreur. Certes, ses schématisations excessives donnent parfois lieu à quelque malentendu, par exemple sur le thème des passions de l’âme. Dans les écrits de Croce postérieurs à la Première guerre mondiale, la figure de Descartes commence à jouer un rôle différent. Le philosophe napolitain éprouve alors le besoin de réagir aux irrationalismes, aux vitalismes et aux nationalismes qui ont conduit au conflit, à la décadence de la culture européenne et mèneront à la seconde guerre mondiale. Il importe désormais de défendre la raison, dont Descartes reste le champion. Le philosophe français redevient pour lui le chef de file de la tendance fondamentale de la philosophie moderne. Loin de signifier un changement dans sa conception des axes primaires de la philosophie de l’esprit, ce déplacement d’accent reflète au contraire l’aptitude de la pensée de Croce à intégrer les exigences toujours nouvelles que l’histoire fait apparaître dans son développement. (shrink)

Dans son Esthétique (1902-1908), Benedetto Croce présente Descartes comme la figure emblématique d’un courant rationaliste qui exclut l’imagination poétique de la pensée philosophique et empêche de reconnaître l’intuition comme mode de connaissance esthétique spécifique. Pour lui, les conséquences néfastes de l’esprit mathématique diffusé en France par le cartésianisme se retrouvent chez Locke, Leibniz, Wolff et Baumgarten, et il n’y a guère à la même époque que chez « l’italiano Giambattista Vico » que l’on peut parler d’une véritable science esthétique. Au (...) cours des années où prend corps sa Philosophie de l’esprit, Croce est amené à plusieurs reprises à stigmatiser l’intellectualisme de Descartes, le caractère abstrait de sa science et de sa morale ainsi que son ignorance de l’histoire. Si sa lecture est dépourvue d’originalité et dénote l’influence sur lui du climat culturel de son temps (l’idéalisme ; Francesco De Sanctis), elle s’appuie néanmoins sur une conception de l’art fortement novatrice et dont l’influence sera décisive dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. Un examen plus détaillé de l’œuvre vaste et complexe de Croce montre que sa lecture de Descartes révèle une connaissance profonde de l’histoire de la philosophie : Croce est capable à la fois de corriger les interprétations simplificatrices de certains aspects de la pensée cartésienne de la part de Vico, Hegel ou Valéry, et de reconnaître sa dette à l’égard de la théorie cartésienne de l’erreur. Certes, ses schématisations excessives donnent parfois lieu à quelque malentendu, par exemple sur le thème des passions de l’âme. Dans les écrits de Croce postérieurs à la Première guerre mondiale, la figure de Descartes commence à jouer un rôle différent. Le philosophe napolitain éprouve alors le besoin de réagir aux irrationalismes, aux vitalismes et aux nationalismes qui ont conduit au conflit, à la décadence de la culture européenne (allemande in primis) et mèneront à la seconde guerre mondiale. Il importe désormais de défendre la raison, dont Descartes reste le champion. Le philosophe français redevient pour lui le chef de file de la tendance fondamentale de la philosophie moderne. Loin de signifier un changement dans sa conception des axes primaires de la philosophie de l’esprit, ce déplacement d’accent reflète au contraire l’aptitude de la pensée de Croce à intégrer les exigences toujours nouvelles que l’histoire fait apparaître dans son développement. (shrink)

This 1945 “Preface” is intended to answer the question “What is phenomenology?” and to justify it as the methodology of the long work of philosophical psychology to follow. Merleau-Ponty approaches this task by first setting out the apparent paradoxes and contradictory claims that have been advanced by phenomenology, in a long and eloquent survey section that is built on a series of “X, but also Y” rhetorical devices. He then surveys four prominent themes of phenomenology. Just as he does in (...) the introductory section of the essay “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” Merleau-Ponty here presents himself as the chief interpreter and champion of Husserl's later philosophy. The first major theme considered is that phenomenology is a matter of describing the field of perception. This sets it in contrast to the prevalent explanatory methodologies of a) scientific empiricism and b) metaphysical idealism. Empirical science (such as mathematical physics) begins with observation, but then abstracts entirely from lived experience to consider idealized schematic cases (such as motion across a frictionless surface) that may reveal universal laws. Such a methodology is obviously fruitful in important respects, but is nonetheless naïve and dishonest in its renunciation of the specifics of observed events. The metaphysical idealism of Kant or Descartes likewise abstracts from the experienced particularity of perception to posit an “inner man” that constitutes the world according to 2 internal, transcendental principles. Merleau-Ponty's criticism is the same, whether these principles are “reason” of Rationalism, “the categories of understanding” of Critical Rationalism, or the rules governing the “association of ideas” posited by Empiricism. Phenomenology indicates that perception is not an act but a fact; the world is not an object but rather the unified setting of perception; and the inner man is a myth, along with his allegedly privileged access to univocal truth. The second theme is the technique of “phenomenological reduction,” the suspension of belief in the assemblage of everyday assumptions known as the “natural attitude.” Husserl's understanding of the reduction long led him to an idealist position: that all particular consciousnesses are united in a transcendental ego.. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article will examine the ways in which de-personalization of consciousness constitutes an unavoidable reading clue in order to understand the existential phenomenological conception of human freedom championed by Jean-Paul Sartre. Thus, the study of The Transcendence of the Ego, and of Being and Nothingness, among a few other of Sartre's writings from the thirties, will allow the reader to discover that the consciousness as an impersonal transcendental field is built as an onto-phenomenological foundation for the full assertion of (...) human freedom. Man is only free, by definition, when he is capable of exiling the ego from consciousness. RESUMEN En este artículo se examina cómo la despersonalización de la conciencia constituye una pista de lectura ineludible a efectos de comprender la concepción fenomenológico-existencial de la libertad humana defendida por Jean-Paul Sartre. Así, el estudio de La trascendencia del Ego, de El ser y la nada, entre otros escritos sartrianos del treinta, nos permitirá descubrir que la construcción de la conciencia como campo trascendental impersonal se erige a manera de fundamento onto-fenomenológico para la afirmación plena de la libertad humana. Exilando al yo de la conciencia, el hombre es, por definición, libre. (shrink)

Pourquoi a-t-on souvent eu tendance a etudier chez Voltaire les notions de tolerance et de justice comme si c'etaient des entites distanciees ou parfois meme separables? Pourquoi n'a-t-on pas juge bon d'etudier le cheminement de sa pensee simultanement dans ces deux domaines qui etaient non seulement conjugues dans son esprit, mais aussi et surtout dont le contenu etait en perpetuel devenir? Pourquoi a-t-on privilegie l'etude de son action en faveur de certaines causes celebres au detriment, parfois total, de celles - (...) evidemment beaucoup moins illustres - qu'on n'evoque que peu souvent, sinon jamais? Pourquoi enfin, dans le contexte global de la carriere de ce champion de la tolerance et de la justice, le lecteur doit-il se contenter d'une mosaique incomplete, peu apte a faire apprecier la complexite de sa philosophie? La reponse a ces questions est sans doute simple: c'est que le canon litteraire accessible, plutot limite, ne faisait constamment favoriser, jusqu'il y a une vingtaine d'annees, que des vues d'ensemble partielles et guere changeantes. C'est la parution progressive, depuis 1970, et l'essor vigoureux, depuis 1988, de la grande edition scientifique des OEuvres Completes, procuree par la Voltaire Foundation, qui invite au contraire a decouvrir un nombre considerable de textes meconnus ou carrement inconnus, qui sont desormais devenus incontournables si l'on veut redefinir l'action de Voltaire en tant que champion des opprimes. Ce volume donne un apercu des contours d'une future etude d'ensemble actuellement en cours d'elaboration. (shrink)

In this dissertation I propose a new reading of the philosophical itinerary of Hilary Putnam on the matter of realism. In essence, my purpose is to argue that there is much more continuity than is normally understood, and even a degree of permanence, in the way in which Putnam has viewed the question of realism throughout his career. To arrive at this interpretation of Putnam I essentially followed two veins in his work. First, in a volume published in the early (...) 2000s entitled Ethics without Ontology (2004), Putnam establishes a parallel between his conception of objectivity in the philosophy of mathematics and in ethics. The second vein comes from a comment he made in the introduction to the first volume of his Philosophical Papers (1975) to the effect that the kind of realism he presupposed in his work of the 1960s and 70s was the same that he upheld in the philosophy of mathematics and wished to argue for at a later date in ethics. Following the first vein makes it possible to better grasp Putnam’s general conception of objectivity, but in order to understand how such a conception of objectivity is not unique to mathematics but is instead a general conception of objectivity one must follow the second vein. There, in the 1960s and 70s, Putnam adopted the same kind of realism in the philosophy of science and in ethics as he had in the philosophy of mathematics. Following this path, one realises that there exists a very strong structural similarity between Putnam’s first realism and his internal realism. After establishing this connection between Putnam’s first and second realism, I draw on Putnam’s remarks and compare the internal realism discourse to his current realism (the natural realism of ordinary people) to demonstrate, contrary to the prevalent interpretation, that there has been a great deal of consistency in his conception of realism from the 1960s to the present day. I conclude the dissertation by demonstrating how my new interpretation of Putnam’s philosophical itinerary makes it possible to shed light on the kind of realism he wishes to champion in ethics./Dans cette thèse, je propose une lecture renouvelée de l’itinéraire philosophique d’Hilary Putnam concernant la problématique du réalisme. Mon propos consiste essentiellement à défendre l’idée selon laquelle il y aurait beaucoup plus de continuité, voir une certaine permanence, dans la manière dont Putnam a envisagé la question du réalisme tout au long de sa carrière. Pour arriver à une telle interprétation de son oeuvre, j’ai essentiellement suivi deux filons. D’abord, dans un ouvrage du début des années 2000, Ethics without Ontology (2004), Putnam établit un parallèle entre sa conception de l’objectivité en philosophie des mathématiques et en éthique. Le deuxième filon vient d’une remarque qu’il fait, dans l’introduction du premier volume de ses Philosophical Papers (1975), affirmant que la forme de réalisme qu’il présupposait dans ses travaux des années 1960-1970 était la même que celle qu’il défendait en philosophie des mathématiques et qu’il souhaitait défendre ultérieurement en éthique. En suivant le premier filon, il est possible de mieux cerner la conception générale que se fait Putnam de l’objectivité, mais pour comprendre en quel sens une telle conception de l’objectivité n’est pas propre aux mathématiques, mais constitue en réalité une conception générale de l’objectivité, il faut suivre le second filon, selon lequel Putnam aurait endossé, durant les années 1960-1970, le même type de réalisme en philosophie des sciences et en éthique qu’en philosophie des mathématiques. Suivant cette voie, on se rend compte qu’il existe une similarité structurelle très forte entre le premier réalisme de Putnam et son réalisme interne. Après avoir établi la parenté entre le premier et le second réalisme de Putnam, je montre, en m’inspirant de commentaires du philosophe ainsi qu’en comparant le discours du réalisme interne au discours de son réalisme actuel (le réalisme naturel du commun des mortels), que, contrairement à l’interprétation répandue, il existe une grande unité au sein de sa conception du réalisme depuis les années 1960 à nos jours. Je termine la thèse en montrant comment mon interprétation renouvelée de l’itinéraire philosophique de Putnam permet de jeter un certain éclairage sur la forme de réalisme que Putnam souhaite défendre en éthique. (shrink)

Es ist klar, dass jede Gemeinschaft bereits Organisation ist und der Mensch ist, ob er will oder nicht, Glied einer Gesellschaft und leistet in ihr Dienste. Jedoch: wenn ein Volk sich die Organisation seines Kollektivlebens als Hauptaufgabe stellt, so tut es das um den Preis der Individualität seiner Mitglieder. Es stellt sich heraus, dass Organisation im Allgemeinen das individuelle Leben der Menschen ausschaltet; man verlangt von dem Menschen, dass er aufhört, Individuum zu sein. Organisation entmenschlicht in gewissem Sinne den Menschen; (...) das Amt ist eine Rolle, eine "Maske". Der Verfasser erörtert dann das schwere Problem der Gegenwart: ob oder in welchem Masse das Kollektive menschlich ist und ob Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, Staat allzu abstrakte Dinge sind, als dass wir sie jederzeit gegenwärtig haben könnten. Er behandelt ferner die Frage: ist eine 'Gemeinschaft' von Individuen nicht eine Gemeinschaft von 'Individuen', das heisst von Menschen, individuellen Existenzen? Und wenn diese herunterkommen, ist es nicht klar, dass dann auch die Gemeinschaft herunterkommt? Die bis jetzt ziemlich romantische Frage, ob man sich für die kollektivistischen oder für die individualistischen Theorien zu entscheiden gedenkt, nimmt so eine neue und und spannende Gestalt an, ob nämlich die gegenwärtigen Gesellschaften nicht an sich von kollektiver Verfassung sind und, ihrer eigenen Schwerkraft überlassen, das persönliche Leben schliesslich ersticken und zu menschlichen Ameisenhaufen werden lassen müssen. Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts machte man den Versuch einer Analyse der Gesellschaft und begann ein Buch unter dem Titel 'Soziologie; aber es kam nicht über die ersten Zeilen hinaus; wahrscheinlich glich die neue Wissenschaft nicht genügend der Physik. Und dank diesem Umstand befinden wir uns heute in einer Lage in der es von höchster Dringlichkeit wäre, klare Vorstellungen davon zu haben, was das Soziale oder was ein Kollektivum ist und in welcher Beziehung es zu dem Menschen steht. Ortega y Gasset schlägt schliesslich eine Rundfrage vor um mit aller Strenge die Vorstellungen festzustellen zu suchen, welche die einflussreichsten Männer des Erdballes mit Vokabeln wie 'Gesellschaft', 'Kollektivität', 'Masse', 'Brauch', 'öffentliche Meinung', 'menschliches Individuum', 'Revolution', 'Staat' u.s.w. verbinden. Das Ergebnis wäre niederschmetternd, besonders wenn man die urweltliche Grobheit dieser Ideen dann mit der Präzision der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung vergleicht. Die wirtschaftliche Krise hat ausserdem die Unzulänglichkeit der Nationalökonomie blossgelegt. Der Verfasser vermutet, die Mangelhaftigkeit der herkömmlichen Wirtschaftslehre möchte vielleicht daher rühren, dass sie eine soziale Spezialwissenschaft ist, deren Fundamente in der Luft hängen, solange es keine soziologische Grundwissenschaft gibt; genau wie keine gute Optik oder Akustik möglich ist, wenn man keine gute Mechanik hat. (shrink)

There is currently an evidentiary gap in the scholarship concerning medical tourism's impact on low- and middle-income destination countries (LMICs). This article reviews relevant evidence that exists and concludes that there are signs of correlation between medical tourism and the expansion of private, technology- intensive health care in LMICs, which has largely remained out of reach for the majority of the local patients. In light of this health care inequity between local residents and medical tourists in LMICs, we argue that (...) the presumption should not be in favor of medical tourism and that governments have a legitimate interest in seeking to regulate this industry to ensure that the net effects for their citizens is positive. Moreover, sending countries, particularly those in the developed world, have the responsibility to adopt public policies to diminish demand on the part of their citizens for medical tourism and to work with LMICs to ensure that the growth of medical tourism does not occur at the expense of the poorest of the poor. (shrink)

Meanings have an empirical genesis and status. This simple claim has often been denied or ignored. Some metaphysicians in their exaltation of the eternal have regarded meanings as essences, or eternal objects, or neutral entities, in a subsistential or supernatural realm that is changeless and has no roots in nature. Some logicians in their zest to manipulate meanings isolate them so completely as forms of reason, or as syntactical symbols that at no point is their connection with natural events made (...) intelligible. Yet meanings, all meanings, have relation to mind. It is this empirical, psychological aspect of meaning that I shall analyze. The larger philosophic question as to what the relation of the psychological aspect is to the metaphysical or the logical will not concern us except indirectly. (shrink)

All these activities of living beings, and the functioning of their organs, and the functioning of instruments demand a teleological explanation. Why do human beings toil? Why do living beings try to maintain the activities of the organism? What are the functions of specific organs or instruments? Intelligible answers can be given in teleological terms. Of course, one could ask many questions about these situations that would not require the teleological explanation; for example, questions concerning the mechanical structure of living (...) beings or of instruments. Yet this fact would not eliminate the legitimacy nor the utility of the teleological category. (shrink)

All these activities of living beings, and the functioning of their organs, and the functioning of instruments demand a teleological explanation. Why do human beings toil? Why do living beings try to maintain the activities of the organism? What are the functions of specific organs or instruments? Intelligible answers can be given in teleological terms. Of course, one could ask many questions about these situations that would not require the teleological explanation; for example, questions concerning the mechanical structure of living (...) beings or of instruments. Yet this fact would not eliminate the legitimacy nor the utility of the teleological category. (shrink)

Grown up as versatile people, Ottoman intellectuals had holistic views towards science, art and literature, and wrote in a variety of disciplines. It was not uncommon for a mathematician to write in philosophy, for a ḥadīth (report of the words and deeds of the Prophet) scholar to write history books, for a statesman to be busy with calligraphy or for a Shaykh al-Islām (the highest ranking Islamic legal authority) to have a “Dīwān” (a collection of poems). However, possibly due to (...) specialization-based scientific understanding of modern researchers, one side of these people generally came to the fore and some capabilities of them remained unknown. Grown up in Istanbul, capital town of Ottoman Empire, in late 16th and early 17th centuries, Okchuzāde Mehmed Shāhī was also one of these personalities called “hezār-fan” (polymath). Mehmed Shāhī served in top level offices of the State, was busy with art and literature, and became known for inshāʾ (composition) kind of works written with elaborate prose. Mehmed Shāhī earned a deserved fame with these capabilities and he was also a poet. Indeed, due to poems he wrote in his early ages, he was noticed by some biography writers about poets and his poems were mentioned in some anthologies. In addition to poetry anthologies, he had some classical works, and some couplets, quatrains and verses included in his prose works. In the present study, a collection and evaluation of poems by Mehmed Shāhī were presented.Summary: Ottoman statesman Okchuzāde Mehmed Shāhī was born in 1562 AD (970 AH) in Istanbul. He was son of Okchuzāde Mehmed Pasha (d. 995 AH/1587 AD) and served as Kātib (scribe), Defterdār (treasurer), Reīs-ul-kuttāb (chief of the scribes), Governor General of Cyprus and Aleppo. His real name was Mehmed, but he was mentioned in different sources by names such as Mehmed Bey, Mehmed Shāh, Mehmed Shāhī, Mir Mehmed Shāhī and Okchuzāde Mehmed Shāhī. Starting at a young age, he was well educated in madrasah (college). With his vibrant character and superior genius, he came to the forefront among his peers. He was educated under the supervision of Māʿlūlzāde Nakīb Efendi (d. 993 AH/1585 AD) and graduated in 988 AH/1580 AD at the age of 18. When Nakīb Efendi became Shaykh al-Islām in the same year, he started his official duty as Dīwān-ı Humāyūn (imperial council) secretary. With the duty of Executive Assistant, he became the secretary of Damad İbrahim Pasha who started to his office in 1004 AH/1596 AD. He worked under the patronage of the Pasha until Pasha’s death in 1010 AH/1601 AD. Mehmed Shāhī succeeded Musa Chelebi as Reīs-ul-kuttāb and Basdefterdar (chief treasurer) in 1005 AH/1596 AD, and was appointed as title deed and cadastre director in 1006 AH/1597 AD. However, he was dismissed from this duty and was included among the officials to join military campaign. He was prosecuted and tried for imprisonment for the accusation of coming to Istanbul without permission. He succeeded Hamza Pasha as Nishanci (high-ranking bureaucrat) in 1007 AH/1599 AD and was assigned to military campaign. Mehmed Shāhī was dismissed from his duty in 1008 AH/1600 AD. Although he was reappointed to his duty in the same year, he was dismissed again in 1010 AH/1601 AD. While Hamza Pasha was reappointed to his office, Mehmed Shāhī was not assigned to any duty. He succeeded Murad Efendi as the Defterdar of Egypt in 1013 AH/1605 AD. After this duty, one of the vassal Sanjak (administrative district) Beyliks (principalities) in Egypt was given to him. When vassal Sanjak Beyliks were abolished by Kara Mehmed Pasha, Beylerbeyi (governor) of Egypt, in 1016 AH/1608 AD, he returned to Istanbul. He was not appointed to an office for a long time. In 1029 AH/1620 AD, he was appointed as title deed and cadastre director in 1029 AH/1620 AD, and became Nishanci again in 1030 AH/1621 AD. He served in military campaign to Poland, but was dismissed from this duty during the campaign. He was appointed as Nishanci for the fifth time during the second reign of Sultan Mustafa (1622-1623). He was dismissed in 1033 AH/1624 AD and retired. In early 1039 AH/1630 AD, he died at the age of 69 in Istanbul. His tomb is near Ekmekchioghlu tomb in the vicinity of Sunbul Efendi.What is known about his family is limited to his son named Vakʿi Ahmed Efendi (d. 1060 AH/1650 AD). Ahmet Efendi learned Naskh, Thuluth and tevkīʿi types of calligraphy styles from his father. He served as anthology writer for Shaykh al-Islām Bahāī Efendi. He died in 1060 AH/1650 AD when he was serving as teacher in Sulaymaniyah Madrasah. His tomb is around Shaykh Vefa tomb.In addition to his administrative duties, Mehmed Shāhī was also interested in poetry, prose, calligraphy, mysticism, ḥadīth and tafsīr (exegesis). Possibly also due to his dismissal of duties many times in his life, he produced many works. Among them are Aḥsan al-ḥadīth, an-Naẓm al-mubīn fī āyāt al-erbaʿīn, al-Maqām al-Maḥmūd, Tarjuma-i Tuḥfa as-ṣalavāt, Jāmiʿ al-ghāyāt, Mukhtār al-akhyār, Qānūn-i Jadīd-i Arāḍi, Munsheat ve Dīwān. Famed for his prose works, the author was also a poet. With his couplets which he wrote under pseudonym of Zaynī, he managed to get on the anthology of Kınalızāde at his twenties. He was celebrated with the expression of “Arrow of word from his bow of soul has reached the target of approval from masters; he is at a young age (at his twenties)”. Subsequently adopting pseudonym of Shāhī, the poet had some poems published within the works of Beyānī, Nevʿizāde and Mustaqimzāde as well as within his own prose works. Mustaqimzāde even mentioned that Mehmed Shāhī had a dīwān. Nevertheless, this work of him has not been found yet. A total of 30 poetry works of Mehmed Shāhī were found in various sources, except for his translations of 40 ḥadīth and 40 Qur’ān verses written in poetry. Of his 30 poetry works, 26 were written in Turkish and 4 in Persian. Various sections of ʿarūḍ (meter) were used in these works written as couplets, quatrains and verses. It could be stated that his poems rich in Persian and Arabic words had a rich rhyme frame. In his poetry works in which religious, literary, historical, legendary and mysticism themes were worked, concepts and figures such as Allah, the Lord, Messiah, Messenger, Risālet (messengership), intercession, Kāfūr al-Ikhshīdī (966-968), Mustaʿsim (d. 656 AH/1258 AD), Ibn Alkamī (d. 656 AH/1258 AD), Naṣīr-i Tūsī (d. 672 AH/1274 AD), Jamshīd, Keyumars, Uftade, Hudāyī, Majūsī, Kizilbash, Bayramī and muftī (jurist capable of giving a formal legal opinion). His poems were about intercession demand from the Messenger (PBUH), sin of serving to Persian, importance of an invention, praise of Uftade Sultan (d. 988 AH/1580 AD), effect of prayer, fate of administrator favoring his relatives, futility of envying the rich, importance of fighting with Zoroastrian, benefits of exhibition of sorrow, value of skillful people, resembling of the world to a bride with a thousand grooms, beauty of eloquence, ignominy of leaving chastity for lust, asking for forgiveness for sins, talent of understanding the words, not giving quarter to enemies, praise of Hz.ʿUmar, humbleness, value of lack of worldly things, sufferance due to the beauty of the beautiful, needing not to wonder why the beloved one is far away, evil of protecting the snot, richness of Arabic language, deeds of Anatolian fāḍils (virtuous), importance of endeavor in succeeding the closeness to God and respectability of ʿAzīz Maḥmūd Hudāyī (d. 1038 AH/1628 AD). Okchuzāde Mehmed Shāhī was an Ottoman statesman who also earned a well-deserved fame for his works written in inshāʾ (composition) genre of elaborate prose. In addition, he also had poetry works. Praised for the poems which he wrote in his early ages by anthology writers who included his poems in their anthologies, the poet also had some couplets and quatrains scattered among his own prose works. His poems in the form of couplets and quatrains within abovementioned works mostly were about religious, literary, legendary, historical and mysticism themes.Mehmed Shāhī was knowledgeable in tafsīr, ḥadīth, mysticism and calligraphy, and had good levels of Arabic and Persian. Writing poems in Persian, Mehmed Shāhī was decorated his prose works with Arabic expressions such as Qur’ān verses, ḥadīths and proverbs. It could be stated that such decorations made the language of his poems more difficult. Nevertheless, his poems are plainer and easier compared to his prose works. The poet who also had lyrical poems generally preferred ḥikamī (sapiential) style and wrote genres such as munacaat (prayer to God), shafaatnāme (intercession epistles), historical quatrain, medhiye (panegyric) and hicviye (epigram). His poems in anthologies were lyrical, those in Aḥsan al-ḥadīth and an-Naẓm al-mubīn were didactical and those in Munsheat were epic. Based on an evaluation of these poems, it could be stated that he was a poet with a style, though not a poet of first class. (shrink)

Qaṣeeda-i Burdah written by Egyptian sufi poet Busīrī (d. 695/1296) as an eulogy for Beloved Messenger Moḥammed has received great attention in the Islamic world. This work has been recited both in cultural/social ceremonies such as weddings, holidays and funerals. On the other hand, it was also annotated, translated, and takhmīs, tesdīs, tesbī‘ and taşṭīr were written to it by the pen of scholars and litterateurs in literary circles. These activities, which have been carried out over and over again, has (...) been going on from the 15th century to the present day. Not only the reputed people, but also unknown ones or ones whose names were later forgotten have tried to translate it to their own language. The subject of the study is one of this type of poetic translations of the eulogy. Like its translator, date of this poetic translation is also unknown. This work was written in the remel baḥr type of ‘arūż in 162 verses using the spelling of the classical period. Although a significant portion of the rhyme words was adapted from the source text, it has a more understandable style than its counterpart. In terms of poetry, it is above the average. The translator decorated the meaning that he borrowed from the original text with his own poetic ability and tried to express it in a unique manner. For this aim, it is more literary, lyrical and successful than most other translations of Qaṣeeda-i Burdah. In the present study, text of the mentioned work was given with transcription along with mentioning of some of its features. Summary: Qaṣeeda-i Burdah written by Egyptian sufi poet Buṣīrī (d. 695/1296) has an important place in the Islamic world. Named by the poet himself as al-Kavākib-al-durriya fī madḥi khayr-al-bariyya, this work is also known as al-Qaṣeedat-al-mīmiyya since its rhyme letter is Arabic mim, as Qaṣeeda-i Bur’ah since it caused Buṣīrī to recover from a disease, as Qaṣeeda-i Burdah due to the rumor that this event took place while he was wearing a coat by the hands of Beloved Messenger Moḥammed. In order to prevent confusion with the eulogy of Ka‘b b. Zuhayr (d. 24/645) with the same name, it is known in cultural circles as Qaṣeeda-i Bur’ah. However, in literature, it is commonly referred as Qaṣeeda-i Burdah. The work was written in simple baḥr style of ‘arūż, and consists of 161 couplets. It has ten sections in terms of its content: longing for the beloved, complaining about the soul, eulogy for Beloved Messenger Moḥammed, his birth, miracles, dignity of the Holy Qur’ān, miracle of mi‘rāc, importance of jihad, sorrow, hope, prayer and request. The eulogy, which has an effective style, has gained great acclaim in the Islamic geography and has been read for various purposes for centuries. Some people recite it in wedding ceremonies, while some others use it in funerals. The sick people recite it with the hope of healing, while calligraphers wrote it for practice.Owing its fame more to its story rather than its value of art, the eulogy was translated into Eastern languages such as Persian, Malay, Pashto, Punjabi, Turkish and Urdu, as well as into Western languages such as German, French, Greek, English, Spanish, Italian and Latin. In addition, many annotations, footnotes, takhmīs, tesdīs, tesbī‘, taşṭīr and replies were written to it. For example, the poem annotated in Arabic by Ebū Shāme al-Maqdisī (d. 665/1266), Khalid b. ‘Abdullah al-Ezherī (d. 905/1499), Ibrahim b. Moḥammed al-Bacurī (d. 1277/1860), ‘Omer b. Aḥmed al-Ḥarpuṭī (d. 1299/1882) was translated into Persian by the men of letters such as Molla Ḥafıẓ Sharaf (d. after 810/1407), ‘Iṣāmuddin b. ‘Arabshah al-Isfarayinī (d. 945/1538), ‘Ali b. Ḥasan Zavareī (d. 968/1560). The work was annotated by Le‘alī Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafa (d. 971/1563), Sayyid Ḥasan b. ‘Abdurraḥman (d. 1071/1661), Naẓifī Ismail Aqḥiṣarī (d. after 1205/1790), Shaykh-al-Islam Makkī Meḥmed (d. 1212/1797), Moḥammed b. Fayżullah (d. 1231/1816), Moḥammed b. Aḥmed (d. 1318/1900), Anqara Governor ‘Abidin Pasha (d. 1324/1906) in Turkish language. Takhmīs was written to the work by poets such as Ṭashkoprizade Kemaleddin (d. 1030/1621) Khocazāde Asad (d. 1034/1625), Sayyid Moḥammed Sharifī (d. 1040/1631), Shaykh-al-Islam Yahya (d. 1053/1644), Suleyman Naḥifī (d. 1151/1738), ‘Abdullah Ṣalaḥī (d. 1197/1783), Shaykh-al-Islam Makkī Meḥmed, Mollacıqzāde Raif (d. 1238/1823), Muṣṭafa Maqṣud (d. 1258/1843), Yemliḥazāde Muṣṭafa (d. 1294/1878), Meḥmed Said Pasha (d. 1308/1892), Moḥammed Favzī (d. 1318/1900) while Ismail Mufid (d. 1217/1803) wrote tesdīs and Niyazī-i Mıṣrī (d. 1105/1694) wrote tesbī‘ to it.The work was translated into Turkish language by poets such as ‘Abdurraḥim Qaraḥiṣarī (d. after 888/1483), Kemal Pashazāde (d. 940/1534), Ahmed-i Rıḍvan (d. before 945/1538) Le‘alī Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafa, Shamsaddin Sivasī (d. 1006/1597), Kemalatī Meḥmed (d. before 1015/1606), Esasī (d. before 1041/1631), Sayyid Ḥusayin (d. after 1050/1641), Mehmed Ṭalib (d. 1089/1679), Sukutī Meḥmed (d. 1103/1691), ‘Abdulhay Jalvatī (d. 1117/1705), Sulayman Naḥifī, ‘Abdullah Ḥulvanī (d. 1159/1746), Aḥmed ‘Arifī (d. after 1195/1781), ‘Abdullah Ṣalaḥī, Ismail Mufid, Sivaslı Aḥmed Suzī (d. 1246/1830), Evranyali ‘Abdurraḥim (d. 1282/1865), Meḥmed Said Pasha, Qonyalı Fakhreddin (d. 1365/1950), Sazai Qaraqoç (d. 1933), Ilhan Armutchuoghlu (d. 1937), Maḥmut Qaya (d. 1945), but there are also translations whose translators are unknown. The present study deals with such a translation of the work. To our best knowledge, the translation that has not been paid much attention by scholars to date and was mentioned only by Ṣadıq Yazar. Even he articulated only a few sentences about the translation based on a deficient copy of the work. Both in the library records and in its copies, there was no information about the translator and the translation date of the work. The translation, which beginns directly without a section such as an introduction at the opening, was written in 162 verses with the spelling of the classical period. It has a remel baḥr style of ‘arūż structure with fā‘ilātun fā‘ilātun fā‘ilātun fā‘ilun rhythm. Although it has some ‘arūż mistakes, it can be said that it is successful in terms of rhythm. Using the source text rhyme of mīm letter, the translator directly adapted some rhyme words from the Arabic text, while converting some others to appropriate Turkish words. Although he used some of them only once, he used some others several times. This finding implies that the translator may have had difficulties in finding words for the rhyme. It is noteworthy that he used some of those words in different meanings, and he employed 99 different rhymes in 162 couplets. The translator used the original text for purposes other than the rhyme words. He used some words directly without translating them or only removed the ḥarf-i ta‘rif. He transformed some words to others with the same stem or to their counterparts in Persian. While converting some of the phrases to forms suitable for the structure of the Turkish language using various practices, he used the old Anatolian Turkish as well as living Turkish. Like Buṣīrī’s eulogy, the poem, which consists of 10 parts in terms of contents, is suitable for the contents of the source text, but it is not a literal translation. The translator, who cared about literary rhetoric, largely preserved or even contributed to the harmony elements of the text. He reinterpreted the meaning of Buṣīrī’s work using his poetry skills, and produced a successful translation in terms of poetry with minimal rhyme flaws. Considering other translations of Qaṣeeda-i Burdah, the translation has similarities with that by Uskudarlı ‘Abdulhay Jalvatī in terms of rhyme letter, with that by Sayyid Husayin Amasī in terms of rhyme, and with that by Ismail Mufid Afandi in terms of direct adaptation of some words in original text, while it has common characteristics with the translation by Naḥifī in terms of both rhyme letter and direct adaptation of most rhyme words from the original text. On the other hand, the translation has similarities with the translations by Kemal Pashazāde, Ahmed-i Rıḍvan, Esasī Afandi, ‘Abdullah Ṣalaḥī and Na‘imī in terms of rhyme letter, rhyme and adaptation of most rhyme words from the original text. However, it is simpler compared to the translation by Kemal Pashazāde, more loyal to the content of original text compared to the translation by Ahmed-i Rıḍvan and more robust in terms of rhyme compared to the translation by Na‘imī. (shrink)

Science can (also) be studied as responsible and rational human activity, guided and legitimated by its own normative system: a finite and ordered set of norms and values for agents in a given field of activity. Such norms of inquiry are needed for a rationality requirement of science, which also presupposes a partial agreement on (acceptance of, respect for) these norms between scientists and their social environment. The notions of scientific accountability, autonomy, and freedom of inquiry are elucidated by means (...) of an action-theoretic definition of science and by a certain use of the distinction between internal methodological) and external norms of science. (shrink)

Articles on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo Ghose, 1872-1950, philosopher and writer from India.