At the end of Being and Nothingness Sartre made the curious claim that his ethical views follow from his ontology and are based on it. Yiwei Zheng argues that there are unbridgeable gaps between Sartre's ontology and ethics that cannot be filled in, and in the process provides a careful study of some notoriously murky notions in Sartre's early philosophy.

The importance of the connotation theory in Ockham’s semantics and metaphysics can hardly be overstated---it is the main mechanism that brings forth Ockham’s famous ontological elimination. Yet none of the extant interpretations can satisfactorily accommodate three widely accepted theses: (1) there is no synonym in mental language; (2) a connotative term has a semantically equivalent nominal definition; and (3) there are simple connotative terms in Ockham’s mental language. In this paper I offer an interpretation that I argue can accommodate all.

The importance of the connotation theory in Ockham’s semantics and metaphysics can hardly be overstated---it is the main mechanism that brings forth Ockham’s famous ontological elimination. Yet none of the extant interpretations can satisfactorily accommodate three widely accepted theses: there is no synonym in mental language; a connotative term has a semantically equivalent nominal definition; and there are simple connotative terms in Ockham’s mental language. In this paper I offer an interpretation that I argue can accommodate all.

It is well known to Sartre scholars that Sartre claimed his ethical theory follows from his ontology in his early philosophy. However, this claim had not been examined as closely as it deserved. Some scholars accepted it, but none of them has given a plausible explanation of how ethics is supposed to follow from ontology. Others rejected it, without taking trouble to explore the possible connections between ontology and ethics. ;I think this claim should be taken seriously. For Sartre himself (...) took it seriously; he spent much time and energy developing ethical views that can be based on his ontology. Through a detailed study of two critically important notions in Sartre's early philosophy, "bad faith" and "pure reflection," I give a close and in-depth examination of this claim. On the basis of the examination, I conclude that Sartre's early ethical theory is a "failure." ;The first two chapters are preparatory. In the first chapter I clarify some of Sartre's basic terminologies in his early philosophy. In the second chapter I explicate Sartre's basic ontological project in Being and Nothingness. ;In the third chapter, I study the ontological characters of "pure reflection" that Sartre presented in Being and Nothingness, which prepares the ground for a study of the ethical characters of "pure reflection" in the fifth chapter. ;In the fourth chapter, I study the ethical implication of the ontological characters of bad faith. Through a detailed examination of the notion of "bad faith" in Being and Nothingness, I show that bad faith as Sartre presented it in Being and Nothingness has only trivial and non-salient ethical implication. ;In the fifth and last chapter, I study the ethical characters of pure reflection that Sartre presented in Notebooks for an Ethics, on the basis of which I show that the ethical characters of pure reflection do not exactly follow from its ontological characters. As a result of these studies, I conclude that in Sartre's early philosophy his ethics does not really follow from his ontology. (shrink)

In his recent work Professor Morris writes: ‘I am suggesting that, armed with a couple of fairly simple metaphysical distinctions we can begin to see how the doctrine of the Incarnation can possibly be true.’ What are these ‘metaphysical distinctions’ and do they stand up to critical examination? My answer to the latter part of this question in regard to the first distinction is a reserved ‘Yes’; in regard to the second distinction a definite ‘No’. If my criticism of the (...) second distinction holds good, then Morris's defence of the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation fails, for his defence crucially relies on the validity of that distinction. (shrink)

In this paper it is my intention to do the following: first, to make some general observations on the ‘Third Way’ of St Thomas Aquinas as set out in Summa Theologica , Pt. I Quaest. ii Art. 3; secondly, to offer interpretation of, comment on, and present an account of, the first premiss of the ‘Third Way’; and finally to offer a provisional account of what someone who advocates the ‘Third Way’ might be conceived of as doing in the light (...) of the account offered of the first premiss of that ‘Way’. I do not suggest thai the account I offer of the first premiss under consideration or the account of the argument as a whole which I shall offer, is one which St Thomas would have accepted. My claim is only that for reasons to be offered, it is a possible and plausible account I also want to make it clear from the outset that I shall not be discussing the validity of the ‘Third Way’; this is an independent question to my inquiry. (shrink)

This paper is exploratory. I shall raise the following questions: How is it possible that that which is of its nature transcendent should become immanent or incarnate? In the context of Christian Theology: how is it possible for God to become man? How is it possible for one and the same individual, Jesus of Nazareth, to be both fully God and fully man? In relation to I shall attempt to give an account of how it is so possible for the (...) transcendent to become fully immanent and yet remain full transcendent by appealing to Professor Geach's account of Aquinas's doctrine of ‘Form’. I do not deny that there are difficulties for my attempted account. Some of these difficulties will be embraced in this paper, but clearly not all. Such would be imposible in an exploratory study. (shrink)

In this paper I shall be examining the following claims: that ‘God’ has no meaning, in the sense of ‘sense’; that it is a proper name analogous to a Russellian proper name in that it has reference only. More crudely, that we cannot describe God in any way but only name Him and refer to Him by name; that ‘God’ has no meaning, in the sense of ‘sense’ in that the nature of God is fundamentally inexpressible. That God is, as (...) some have said, ‘wholly other’ or even ‘the wholly other’. (shrink)

A real α is called a c. e. real if it is the halting probability of a prefix free Turing machine. Equivalently, α is c. e. if it is left computable in the sense that L = {q ∈ ℚ : q ≤ α} is a computably enumerable set. The natural field formed by the c. e. reals turns out to be the field formed by the collection of the d. c. e. reals, which are of the form α—β, where (...) α and β are c. e. reals. While c. e. reals can only be found in the c. e. degrees, Zheng has proven that there are Δ02 degrees that are not even n-c. e. for any n and yet contain d. c. e. reals, where a degree is n-c. e. if it contains an n-c. e. set. In this paper we will prove that every ω-c. e. degree contains a d. c. e. real, but there are ω + 1-c. e. degrees and, hence Δ02 degrees, containing no d. c. e. real. (shrink)

An experiment explored the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge of semantic prosody in a second language under incidental and intentional learning conditions. Semantic prosody is the conotational coloring of the semantics of a word, largely uncaptured by dictionary definitions. Contrary to some claims in the literature, we revealed that both conscious and unconscious knowledge were involved in the acquisition of semantic prosody. Intentional learning resulted in similar unconscious but more conscious knowledge than incidental learning. The results are discussed in (...) terms of second language learning and the nature of unconscious knowledge. (shrink)

A number of empirical studies have examined business ethics across cultures, focusing primarily on differences in ethical profiles between cultures and groups. When managers consider whether or not to develop a business relationship with those from a different culture, their decision may be affected by actual differences in ethical profiles, but potentially even more so by their perceptions of ethicality in the counterpart culture. The latter issue has been largely ignored in extant empirical research regarding cross-cultural ethical profiles. In this (...) study, we employ a design that allows for a more complete analysis of cross-cultural perspectives, examining both the manner in which selected cultures view themselves and the manner in which those same cultures perceive the ethical profiles of others. To this end, we surveyed master’s students in business fields at several universities in the United States and China—two countries/cultures that engage in a significant amount of business transactions—and examined differences in personal ethical profiles across cultures, differences in one group’s ethical profile and the way it is perceived by the other group, and differences in perceived ethical profiles across cultures; that is, differences in how groups view each other. Findings suggest meaningful discrepancies in the ethical perceptions formed toward the counterpart culture. Results support a role for ethical perceptions in future research, and further examination and inquiry into the development and adaptation of ethical perceptions in cross-cultural business dealings. (shrink)

This paper explores what insights can be drawn from critical theory to enrich and strengthen Sen’s capability approach in relation to technology and human development. The two theories share some important commonalities: both are concerned with the pursuit of “a good life”; both are normative theories rooted in ethics and meant to make a difference, and both are interested in democracy. The paper provides a brief overview of both schools of thought and their applications to technology and human development. Three (...) areas are identified where critical theory can make a contribution to the capability approach: conceptually, by providing a critical account of individual agency and enriching the concept of technology beyond the simplistic notion of commodities; methodologically, by sensitising towards reification and hegemony of scientific tools, and, finally, by emphasising reflexivity of researchers. (shrink)

In recent times evolutionary psychologists have offered adaptation explanations for a wide range of human psychological characteristics. Critics, however, have argued that such endeavors are problematic because the appropriate evidence required to demonstrate adaptation is unlikely to be forthcoming, therefore severely limiting the role of the adaptationist program in psychology. More specifically, doubts have been raised over both the methodology employed by evolutionary psychologists for studying adaptations and about the possibility of ever developing acceptably rigorous evolutionary explanations of human psychological (...) phenomena. We argue that by employing a wide range of methods for inferring adaptation and by adopting an inference to the best explanation strategy for evaluating adaptation explanations, these two doubts can be adequately addressed. We illustrate how this approach can be fruitfully employed in evaluating claims about the evolutionary origins of language, and conclude with a brief discussion of the future of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

This paper contrasts a picoeconomic approach to theexplanation of akrasia with Davidson's divided-mind approach and defends theformer in a wider context. The distinctive merits of a picoeconomic model of mindlie in the following aspects: First, it relies on a scientifically well-groundeddiscovery about motivational dynamics of animals for its explanation of preference change,which elucidates or materializes some philosophers' speculations both about thepossible mismatch between valuation and motivation and about the relevance of temporalfactors to akrasia. Second, it grounds the necessity of endogenous (...) higher-order constraints,expressible in forms of judgment, in an intrapersonal dynamic process of interactivefirst-order temporary preferences. Thus the motivational basis for the normativeconstruction of the rationality of `best judgment' can also be illuminated with this model. (shrink)

Over the last two hundred years, there have been many occasions where the name of a newly-discovered element has provoked controversy and dissent but in modern times, the naming of elements after scientists has proved to be particularly contentious. Here we recount the threads of this story, predominantly through discourses in the popular scientific journals, the first major discussion on naming an element after a scientist ; the first definitive naming after a scientist ; and the first naming after a (...) living scientist. (shrink)

Recent investigation on the short-time dynamic scaling of critical dynamics is reviewed, with the aim of applying it to the field theory. The contents of this paper are as follows: (1) Short-time behavior of the critical relaxation dynamics, (2) Numerical evidence of the short-time scaling—2-dimensional Ising model and Universality, (3) Theoretical background of the generalized scaling form, (4) Application to a field theoretical model—(2+1)-dimensional SU(2) lattice gauge theory at finite temperature, and (5) Concluding remarks.

Let h : ℕ → ℚ be a computable function. A real number x is called h-monotonically computable if there is a computable sequence of rational numbers which converges to x h-monotonically in the sense that h|x – xn| ≥ |x – xm| for all n andm > n. In this paper we investigate classes h-MC of h-mc real numbers for different computable functions h. Especially, for computable functions h : ℕ → ℚ, we show that the class h-MC coincides (...) with the classes of computable and semi-computable real numbers if and only if Σi∈ℕ) = ∞and the sum Σi∈ℕ) is a computable real number, respectively. On the other hand, if h ≥ 1 and h converges to 1, then h-MC = SC no matter how fast h converges to 1. Furthermore, for any constant c > 1, if h is increasing and converges to c, then h-MC = c-MC. Finally, if h is monotone and unbounded, then h-MC contains all ω-mc real numbers which are g-mc for some computable function g. (shrink)

Andrews et al. effectively argue that, despite prominent criticism, adaptationism can be a viable research strategy. We agree. In our complementary commentary, we discuss the neglected method of inference to the best explanation and argue that it is a valuable addition to the adaptationist's methodological practice.

Austin rejects the contention that every proposition has a contradictory. This paper finds problems with the case Austin makes for rejecting the contention in question.