This article investigates the prospect of giving de dicto- and de re-necessity a uniform treatment. The historical starting point is a puzzle raised by Aristotle's claim, advanced in one of the modal chapters of his Prior Analytics, that universally privative apodeictic premises simply convert. As regards the Prior and the Posterior Analytics, the data suggest a representation of propositions of the type in question by doubly modally qualified formulae of modal predicate logic that display a necessity operator (...) in two distinct positions. Can the N-operator occurring in these positions be given a unified semantical treatment (which would justify dispensing with a notational differentiation)? A positive answer, based on a suitably shaped truth condition for N-formulae, is given, and is supported in the final section with an alternative proof theoretically based conception of a property's essential belonging to an individual. (shrink)

Necessity can be ascribed not only to propositions, but also to feelings. In the Critique of Judgment (KdU), Immanuel Kant argues that a feeling of beauty is the necessary satisfaction instantiated by the ‘free play’ of the cognitive faculties, which provides the grounds for a judgment of taste (KdU 5:196, 217-19). In contradistinction to the theoretical necessity of the Critique of Pure Reason and the moral necessity of the Critique of Practical Reason, the necessity assigned to (...) a judgment of taste is exemplary necessity (KdU 5:237). Necessity can also be assigned by employing the de re/de dicto distinction, namely, by ascribing entailments of what must necessarily hold to either a thing (de re) or to a proposition (de dicto). Although Kant does not use the distinction in any of the three Critiques, this omission has not prevented Kant scholars from applying the distinction in their analyses of the first two Critiques. In this paper, I examine the role that modality plays in Kant’s third Critique and I attempt to bring the de re/de dicto distinction to bear on Kant’s famous aesthetic theory. Ultimately, I perform a retrospective classification of the modality of taste by arguing that because a judgment of taste is not a statement about an objective fact, a judgment of ‘x is beautiful’ can only be read as de dicto necessary. (shrink)

In recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle against quantified modal logic. But what he and Kripke debated was a notion of essence defined in terms of de re necessity. The new Aristotelian essentialists (...) regard essence as entailing but prior in the order of explanation to de re necessity. In what follows I argue that the concept of essence so understood has not been adequately explained and that any attempt to explain it, at least along the lines most familiar from the literature, must be flagrantly circular or make use of de re modal notions. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that we should break with the dominant Kripkean tradition concerning natural kind terms and theoretical identity. I claim that there is just no interesting connection between the metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, and demonstrate this by constructing a version of descriptivism that is combined with the same metaphysics – that is, a nontrivial version of essentialism – found in Kripke, but which effectively avoids all of the standard criticisms. With my version of descriptivism (...) in place, I present what I take to be the most reasonable version of metaphysical essentialism, positing only what I call 'thin' essences. I claim that thin essences are perfectly adequate to underpin scientific realism, and moreover that they are sufficient to support the version of descriptivism developed here. In effect, what I offer here is an error theory of the Kripkean tradition: Kripke is right to think that there are interesting things to say about meaning and essence, but just wrong about what those things are. Thus whilst Kripke thinks that it is possible to make discoveries about the meanings of natural kind terms, I think, rather, that we make empirical discoveries that lead to revisions in meaning. Furthermore, whilst Kripke thinks there is a dichotomy between de re and de dicto necessity, and that theoretical identities are necessary de re, I think this distinction is both misleading and inaccurate, and that the necessity of theoretical identities is neither entirely de re nor entirely de dicto. By separating and insulating questions concerning meaning from questions concerning essence I show that whilst scientific discoveries are contingent and a posteriori, the definition of scientific terms are both necessary and a priori. (shrink)

This chapter focuses mainly on how possible worlds relate to the truth and falsity of modal claims (or propositions), and therefore to whether claims are necessarily true, necessarily false, possibly true, possibly false, and so on. This issue is that of modality de dicto, modality concerning propositions. But there is another type of modality, namely modality de re. This has to do with the modal status of relations between things and their properties, with whether things possess properties necessarily, contingently (...) or not even possibly. This chapter introduces the distinction between de dicto and de re necessity, and then explores different ways of making sense of de re necessity‐necessities involving particular individuals. It talks about Strong Transworld Identity, and explores how Abstractionists respond to the Leibniz's Law argument. Some metaphysicians go farther and identify what is possible with what is conceivable, or perhaps with what we are justified in believing to be possible. (shrink)

This profound metaphysical treatise is carefully and subtly argued. It merits the author recognition as one of the major contemporary philosophers in the United States. Plantinga begins by distinguishing logical necessity from causal necessity, what we will not give up, what is self-evident, and what we can know a priori. In the first chapter he also reviews why classical and contemporary philosophers have distinguished between saying that it is necessary that a proposition is true and saying of an (...) object that it is necessarily such and such. The second and third chapters are primarily a defense of the distinction between de dicto and de re necessity, despite the fact that he shows, to those who claim only to understand de dicto necessity, how assertions of de re necessity can be read as assertions of de dicto necessity. Plantinga mischievously observes in passing that assertions of de dicto necessity can be interpreted as de re assertions of a proposition that it is necessarily true. He defends the legitimacy of asserting necessity de re so that he can say of objects that they have properties essentially. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard by Irene BininiWolfgang LenzenIrene Binini. Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard. Investigating Medieval Philosophy Series. Leiden: Brill, 2021. Pp. xii + 326. Hardback, $166.00.This book is an impressive work written by a young Italian scholar who received her PhD only five years ago in Pisa. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 gives (...) a survey of "Early 12th-Century Debates on Modal Propositions"; part 2 is devoted to "Abelard's Modal Logic"; [End Page 327] part 3 deals with the views of "Abelard on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Modalities." The author displays a profound knowledge of the relevant literature. The primary sources comprise twenty manuscripts preserved in various European libraries, plus forty-eight printed works (from Abelard to William of Sherwood). The list of secondary sources contains altogether 136 items from A (Astroh) to Z (Zagzebski), but, interestingly, it does not mention a monograph that, by its very title, claims to give an exposition of Abelard's logic, namely Maria Teresa Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli's La Logica di Abelardo (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1964).As far as I can judge (as a nonnative English-speaker), the linguistic quality of Binini's book is quite good. The explanations in the main text, including the translations from Latin sources, are easily comprehensible, and the many quotations (distributed over no less than 655 footnotes) are almost without any fault. Thus, the book rightly deserves inclusion in the prestigious series Investigating Medieval Philosophy. Yet, at least according to my taste, the book contains many redundancies. Again and again, the author first explains a certain issue at some length, then confirms the correctness of her interpretation by means of a longer (English) quotation, and finally reconfirms it by fully quoting the Latin text in the footnotes.As Binini explains in the book's concluding chapter, her aim is to present "an all-encompassing reflection on [Abelard's] works on modalities" and "a comparison between these works and the parallel reflections advanced by other masters and logicians in the early 12th century" (308). She undoubtedly achieves this goal. The comparison of Abelard's views on possibility and necessity with the views of other logicians is mainly carried out in chapters 1–3. Ancient and early medieval logicians such as, in particular, the Stoics and Boethius favored the basic idea that "something," p, is necessary if and only if p is always the case (or true). Accordingly, p is possible if and only if p is at least sometime the case. Abelard, however, was not willing to accept that each possibility has to become realized at some time. He instead offered a "nature-based characterization of possibility" that can "account for unrealized, past, counterfactual, and even unactualizable possibilities" (308). Abelard's idea is that something, x, is possibly a P if and only if the property of being P is compatible with the nature of x. Hence this view basically amounts to a de re conception of possibility that attributes modalities to things, while the temporal view attributes modal properties primarily to propositions (or states of affairs) and hence can be labeled de dicto (or de sensu).Let us now turn to Binini's twofold aim (as formulated on the back cover of her book) to present a "uniform and consistent" reassessment of Abelard's theory of modalities and of his modal logic. The former task is tackled in chapters 8–10. After summarizing, in chapter 8, Abelard's general views on "Nature and Modalities," chapter 9 is devoted to a detailed discussion of the "Many Senses of Possibility." In five consecutive sections, Binini investigates the conception of (1) possibility as "non-repugnancy with nature" (illustrated by the thesis that "any man can be a bishop" [235]); (2) unrealizable but "conceivable" possibilities (such as the existence of humans lacking the ability to laugh [240]); (3) determinate potencies (like that of an amputee who nevertheless "can walk" [248]); (4) past and counterfactual potencies (like that of a blind person who might be able to see); and (5) other puzzling de re possibilities (such as "irrational humans" [261]).The final... (shrink)

I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity . The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm? My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. (...) The results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality. According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism. The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality. (shrink)

In his book The Philosophy of Nature, Ellis presents "the new essentialism" as resting on the notions of a property, an intrinsic property, an essential property, natural necessity and possibility, a natural kind, a fixed natural kind, and a natural law. The present paper argues that the central notions in this group are susceptible of a logical analysis, Ellis's notion of natural possibility has a historical precedent in the work of Abéelard, the notion of natural possibility contains both de (...) re and de dicto elements, and Ellis's essentialist claims, when joined to any plausible definition of natural possibility, lead to inconsistency. (shrink)

In the addenda to his Naming and Necessity, Kripke provides an account of how necessary aposteriori statements are possible. In such a case, there is an apriori general principle telling us that it is necessary if true at all. Though straightforward in its broad compass, this account faces two obvious questions in its application: in each case of necessary aposteriori statements, what is the underlying principle and how is it established apriori? I treat these questions with respect to theoretical (...) identity statements concerning chemical substances, such as ‘water is H2OH2O’. I argue that the general principle underlying the necessity of the statements is that if a chemical substance has a certain chemical composition, then it could not have had any other chemical composition. Then I defend the view that the principle is a conceptual truth by providing a novel derivation of it from the theoretical concept of chemical substance with a sufficient level of formal rigor. The logical principles required for the derivation will also be stated and defended. (shrink)

J. Ladyman, Ladyman and Ross refine J. Worral's structural realism, by developing an ontic structural realism which they argue is a consistently naturalistic means of characterizing the ontology of fundamental physics. I argue that particular elements of M. Lange and M. Eklund strengthen and refine their project of characterizing fundamental physics via OSR and by extension, their presentation of information-theoretic structural realism. I demonstrate this point by situating M. Lange’s discussion of nomological modality and natural necessity within Ladyman and (...) Ross’s discussion of ITSR. The logical hierarchy evinced in Lange’s notion of ‘nomic stability’ further refines Ladyman and Ross’s claims through the addition of nuanced modal distinctions in a systematic framework. Moreover, I argue that what Lange considers are the ‘lawmakers’ serve as a de dicto rendition of some of Ladyman & Ross’s fundamental de re extensions and refinements of ‘real patterns’. (shrink)

The problem of determinism and freedom in the human being has always been a fruitful philosophical debate. In this discussion Spinoza is a reference in this regard, since since the publication of his works he has generated controversy around the problem. This work seeks to clarify the concept of necessity that Spinoza uses in his philosophy, in order to unravel the meaning of determinism that he builds from it. Within the analysis I show that in Spinoza’s philosophy there is (...) no clear distinction between logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, I argue that the concepts of contingency and possibility are de dicto and not de re issues in the author’s philosophy. That is to say, that they are not properties of the things themselves, but ways of speaking about them. Finally, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis on determinism should be understood mainly as a necessitarianist theory, which can be compatible with a certain sense of freedom in the human being. (shrink)

In this textbook, Michael Morris offers a critical introduction to the central issues of the philosophy of language. Each chapter focusses on one or two texts which have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various traditions of dealing with them. Texts include classic writings by Frege, Russell, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, Austin, Grice and Wittgenstein. Theoretical jargon is kept to a minimum and is fully (...) explained whenever it is introduced. The range of topics covered includes sense and reference, definite descriptions, proper names, natural-kind terms, de re and de dicto necessity, propositional attitudes, truth-theoretical approaches to meaning, radical interpretation, indeterminacy of translation, speech acts, intentional theories of meaning, and scepticism about meaning. The book will be invaluable to students and to all readers who are interested in the nature of linguistic meaning. (shrink)

Type specimens are used to designate species. What is the nature of the relation between a type specimen and the species it designates? If species names are rigid designators, and type specimens ostensively define species, then that relation is, at the very least, a close one. Levine :325–338, 2001) argues that the relationship of type specimen to a named species is one of necessity—and that this presents problems for the individuality thesis. Namely, it seems odd that a contingently selected (...) specimen should belong to a species of necessity. In considering Levine’s argument, LaPorte suggests that recognizing the distinction between de re and de dicto necessity resolves Levine’s worries. I reconsider the motivating question: does a type specimen belong of necessity to the species that it designates? In light of taxonomic cases and practice the answer is clear: definitively not. This is particularly clear in the case of re-designation of types by taxonomic decree. I explain how this helps reveal how taxonomists prioritize competing theoretical commitments, and offer a defense of the individuality thesis as applied to these particular cases. In short, I demonstrate how to misidentify a type specimen. (shrink)

En el presente escrito, los autores pretenden una nueva interpretación de las principales tesis de la más conocida obra de Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Se atiende a las nociones de a priori (y de necesidad) y a posteriori (y contingencia), la noción de designador rígido (con su explícita crítica a la teoría descriptivista fregeana de los nombres) y su revisión de los conceptos metafísicos de modalidad de dicto y modalidad de re. Más tarde, se definirá mínimamente la noción (...) de realismo y se intentará situar a Kripke en el tipo que más cómodamente se adapte a sus presupuestos teóricos de carácter ordinario. Todo ello permitirá situar la teoría kripkeana de los nombres dentro de un marco realista que posibilitará, en otro momento ulterior, formular ciertas críticas a esta Teoría Causal de la Referencia y al realismo metafísico a ella asociada. (shrink)

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view (...) that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable. (shrink)

The new theoretical perspective proposed by the Open Theism theologians, compels us to study in depth and to evaluate the “classic” argumentative tools used to solve the ancient antinomy between divine omniscience and human freedom, to which the thesis of the Open Theism try to give an innovative solution. Among these tools – invoked by many authors in the contemporary debate about omniscience, in analytic philosophy of religion – several ones are part of Thomas Aquinas’ thought: the division in primary (...) and secondary causes, the division of God’s knowledge, the distinction between propositions understood in sensu composito or in sensu diviso, the division between necessity de dicto or de re, and others. This paper aims to analyze the interpretation of these tools developed in the contemporary context and tries to draw some conclusions on the overall efficacy of the “Thomistic Solution” that we can build starting from these tools. La nuova prospettiva teoretica proposta dai sostenitori dell’Open Theism ha reso necessario un approfondimento e una valutazione degli strumenti argomentativi “classici” utilizzati per risolvere l’antica antinomia tra onniscienza divina e libertà umana, alla quale le tesi dell’Open Theism cercano di dare una soluzione innovativa. Tra questi strumenti – recuperati da molti autori nel contemporaneo dibattito sull’onniscienza, all’interno della filosofia analitica della religione – ve ne sono molti attribuiti a Tommaso d’Aquino: la divisione in causa prima e cause seconde, la suddivisione della conoscenza di Dio, la distinzione tra proposizioni intese in senso composto o in senso diviso, quella tra necessità de dicto e necessità de re, e altri. Il presente contributo si propone di analizzarne l’interpretazione sviluppata nel contesto contemporaneo e trarre alcune conclusioni sull’efficacia complessiva della “soluzione tomistica” che si può delineare a partire da questi strumenti. (shrink)

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view (...) that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy has recently demonstrated a revived interest in metaphysical problems about possibility and necessity. Graeme Forbes here provides a careful description of the logical background of recent work in this area for those who may be unfamiliar with it, moving on to d discuss the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto and the ontological commitments of possible worlds semantics. In addition, Forbes offers a unified theory of the essential properties of sets, organisms, artefacts, substances, (...) and events, based on the doctrine that identity facts must be intrinsically grounded, and analyzes and rejects apparent counterexamples to this doctrine. (shrink)

I discuss three objections to essentialism. The first objection is from Gilbert Harman, who claims that because numbers can be identified or reduced to sets it follows that numbers cannot have essential properties. In the second objection, William Kneale argues for the conclusion that objects have essential properties only relative to a certain way of specifying or selecting the object. Kneale's argument suffers from a de re/de dicto confusion and the disambiguated reading of his argument is unsound. The third (...) objection, Quine's mathematical cyclist, contains a similar confusion. (shrink)

I explain modality de re in terms of modality de dicto because there are those who feel that modality de dicto is easier to understand. I argue that the de dicto properties of what I call the kernel proposition can indicate whether x has P essentially. I then provide directions on how to determine the kernel proposition for an object x and a property P. I conclude by addressing some objections. In particular, I argue that my account (...) is not circular despite its reliance on proper names. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el tratamiento escéptico que Quine hace de la necesidad proposicional (de dicto) y no-proposicional (de re) a través de su teoría de tres grados de compromiso modal. Argumento que, a pesar de poseer diversos aspectos valiosos, sufre de varias limitaciones importantes que lo ..

Abstract It would be puzzling if the morally best agents were not so good after all. Yet one prominent account of the morally best agents ascribes to them the exact motivational defect that has famously been called a “fetish.” The supposed defect is a desire to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto . If the morally best agents really are driven by this de dicto desire, and if this de dicto desire is really (...) a fetish, then the morally best agents are moral fetishists. This is puzzling. I resolve the puzzle by showing that on a proper understanding of the interaction between de dicto and de re moral motivation, it is not only not fetishistic, but quite possibly desirable, to be motivated by a de dicto desire to do the right thing. My argument relies partly on an appeal to a non-buck-passing account of moral rightness, according to which rightness is itself an additional reason-giving property over and above the right-making properties of an action. If this account of moral rightness is correct, then we would expect the morally best agents to exhibit de dicto moral motivation. However, since their de dicto desire acts in concert with de re desires, there is no reason to consider it a fetish. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-19 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9825-z Authors Vanessa Carbonell, Philosophy Department, University of Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210374, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

Is the macro grounded in the micro? That is, is every truth about a macroscopic object fully grounded in a truth wholly about its microscopic parts? In a recent interesting paper, Martin Glazier argued for a negative answer. Following him, call the position that the macro is grounded in the micro ‘priority micro pluralism’ (‘pluralism’ for short). In this discussion note, I propose a way out for the pluralist. In brief, it consists in the recognition that some metaphysical positions, including (...) pluralism, are best expressed by fundamentally de dicto grounding claims. In that these claims have a distinctive modal force, this recognition has far-reaching consequences that go beyond a defence of pluralism. (shrink)

This book explores noteworthy approaches to modal syllogistic adopted by medieval logicians including Abélard, Albert the Great, Avicenna, Averröes, Jean Buridan, Richard Campsall, Robert Kilwardby, and William of Ockham. The book situates these approaches in relation to Aristotle's discussion in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and other parts of the Organon, but also in relation to the thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Boethius on the one hand, and to modern interpretations of the modal syllogistic on the other. Problems explored (...) include: Aristotle's doctrine of modal conversion, the pure and mixed necessity-moods, modal ecthesis, the pure and mixed contingency-moods, and Aristotle's use of counter-examples. Medieval logicians brought various concepts to bear on these problems, including the distinction between per se and per accidens terms, the notion of essential predication, the distinction between ut nunc and simpliciter propositions, the distinction between de dicto and de re modals, and the notion of ampliation. All these are examined in this book. (shrink)

We present a computational analysis of de re, de dicto, and de se belief and knowledge reports. Our analysis solves a problem first observed by Hector-Neri Castañeda, namely, that the simple rule -/- `(A knows that P) implies P' -/- apparently does not hold if P contains a quasi-indexical. We present a single rule, in the context of a knowledge-representation and reasoning system, that holds for all P, including those containing quasi-indexicals. In so doing, we explore the difference between (...) reasoning in a public communication language and in a knowledge-representation language, we demonstrate the importance of representing proper names explicitly, and we provide support for the necessity of considering sentences in the context of extended discourse (for example, written narrative) in order to fully capture certain features of their semantics. (shrink)

Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 303-311, December 2021.

In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of Lewis and Langford, among others, are constructed. A matrix, or many-valued semantics, for sentential modal logic is formalized, and an important result that no finite matrix can characterize any of the standard modal logics is proven. Exercises, some of which show independence results, help to develop logical skills. A separate sentential (...) modal logic of logical necessity in logical atomism is also constructed and shown to be complete and decidable. On the first-order level of the logic of logical necessity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism is valid and every de re sentence is provably equivalent to a de dicto sentence. An elegant extension of the standard sentential modal logics into several first-order modal logics is developed. Both a first-order modal logic for possibilism containing actualism as a proper part as well as a separate modal logic for actualism alone are constructed for a variety of modal systems. Exercises on this level show the connections between modal laws and quantifier logic regarding generalization into, or out of, modal contexts and the conditions required for the necessity of identity and non-identity. Two types of second-order modal logics, one possibilist and the other actualist, are developed based on a distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. The result is a deeper second-order analysis of possibilism and actualism as ontological frameworks. Exercises regarding second-order predicate quantifiers clarify the distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. Modal Logic is ideally suited as a core text for graduate and undergraduate courses in modal logic, and as supplementary reading in courses on mathematical logic, formal ontology, and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

I shall argue that you can substantially refute the most persuasive variety of solipsism by taking its most plausible version seriously, and then showing that it is not rational to hold, once one understands the nature of actualist metaphysical commitments.1 In the first section, I argue that the only viable form of solipsism involves de dicto self-reference. In the second, I argue that this position involves a claim of contingent identity, for which some actual worlds are those where solipsism (...) is not the case. The argument turns on a conception of metaphysics that involves the study of the universal features of actually possible worlds (i.e., realistic necessity). _*Draft. Acknowledgements welcome, but please do not cite.*_. (shrink)

In both "individuals" and "the bounds of sense" p f strawson has argued that the no-Ownership theory of mental states is incoherent. He has argued for example, That the no-Ownership theorist must use, In stating his theory, A concept the validity of which the theory attempts to deny (i.E., That experiences are necessarily owned). I show that this argument is based on a confusion of modalities, Mistaking "de dicto" for "de re" necessity. I further show that the very (...) claim that sets of experiences are identifiable only through reference to their "havers" is mistaken. Mental events are individuated and grouped together exactly as physical events are. I therefore conclude that a person "consists" of, "inter alia", Mental particulars; his thoughts are his in the same sense that his legs are his own. Siding with hume against kant, Strawson, And shoemaker, I argue that there are criteria for ascription of experience to persons and a person must use those criteria in ascribing experiences, Even current ones, To himself. Hence, A person who misapplies those criteria may be mistaken in believing of a certain experience that it is (or is not) his own. (shrink)

This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't. I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn of his dilemma can be (...) resisted. I then move on to clarify the nature of the propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of. I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been. I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology. I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use modal language. (shrink)

I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue---a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. (...) This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of "propositional attitudes.". (shrink)

Almost everyone believes in modality de dicto. Necessarily, puppies are young dogs. The necessity here derives from the meaning of “puppy.” The term means young dog. Essentialism is belief in a more exotic sort of modality, one that does not derive from meaning in this direct and simple way. In the first two sections of this paper, I consider indexical and nonindexical kind terms and the sort of modality applicable to each. In the last section, I consider individuals (...) and proper names. (shrink)

Aristotle assesses as valid three first figure syllogisms, each of which contains at least one premiss expressing a de re contingency. In fact, all three of these moods (namely, Barbara-QQQ, Barbara-XQM, and Barbara-LQM) are invalid. Utilizing the concept of ampliation, this paper shows how the mood Barbara-QQQ must be refined if it is to be deemed valid. It can then become clear as to how Barbara-XQM and Barbara-LQM can be disambiguated and ultimately validated. In treating all three moods, some theses (...) from S4 will be exploited in the context of distinguishing de dicto and de re modes of attributing possibility and necessity. Various Aristotelian propositional forms and rules of inference, including argumentation by ecthesis, will shape the presentation. The viability of Aristotle’s views on the convertibility of universal negative apodeictic propositions will emerge as decisive in evaluating the success of his modal syllogistic. (shrink)

Aristotle assesses as valid three first figure syllogisms, each of which contains at least one premiss expressing a de re contingency. In fact, all three of these moods (namely, Barbara-QQQ, Barbara-XQM, and Barbara-LQM) are invalid. Utilizing the concept of ampliation, this paper shows how the mood Barbara-QQQ must be refined if it is to be deemed valid. It can then become clear as to how Barbara-XQM and Barbara-LQM can be disambiguated and ultimately validated. In treating all three moods, some theses (...) from S4 will be exploited in the context of distinguishing de dicto and de re modes of attributing possibility and necessity. Various Aristotelian propositional forms and rules of inference, including argumentation by ecthesis, will shape the presentation. The viability of Aristotle’s views on the convertibility of universal negative apodeictic propositions will emerge as decisive in evaluating the success of his modal syllogistic. (shrink)

pt. 1. De dicto: Necessary and contingent truths, by G. W. Leibniz. New essays concerning human understanding, by G. W. Leibniz. Introduction to the critique of pure reason, by Immanuel Kant. On the nature of mathematical truth, C. G. Hempel. Two dogmas of empiricism, by W. V. O. Quine. In defense of a dogma, by H. P. Grace and P. F. Strawson. The a priori and the analytic, by A. Quinton. The truths of reason, by R. Chisholm.--pt. 2. De (...) re: Reference and modality, by W. V. O. Quine. De re et de dicto, by A. Plantinga. World and essence, by A. Plantinga.--Bibliography (p. 200-202). (shrink)

In the first chapter I have introduced Carnapian intensional logic against the background of Frege's and Quine's puzzles. The main body of the dissertation consists of two parts. In the first part I discussed Carnapian modal logic and arithmetic with descriptions. In the second chapter, I have described three Carnapian theories, CCL, CFL, and CNL. All three theories have three things in common. First, they are formulated in languages containing description terms. Second, they contain a system of modal logic. Third, (...) they do not contain the unrestricted classical substitution principle, but they do contain the classical substitution principle restricted to non-modal formulas and the Carnapian substitution principle, which says that two terms can be substituted salva veritate if they are necessarily coreferential. There are two major differences between the three theories. First, CCL and CFL allow universal instantiation with description terms, whereas CNL does not. Moreover, the quantificational theory of the CCL is classical, whereas the quantificational theory of CFL is a free logic. Another difference is that CCL and CFL contain different description principles. Most importantly, the description principle of CCL ensures that even improper descriptions have a denotation, whereas the description principle of CFL does not guarantee this. CNL does not have a description principle. In the third chapter, I have studied collapse arguments for CCL, CFL, and CNL. A collapse argument is an argument for the following statement: if p is true, then it is necessarily true. A crucial role in the proofs of these collapse results was played by so-called self-predication principles, which say that under certain conditions the predicate that expresses the descriptive condition can be combined by the description term formed out of that predicate with the result being a true sentence. In this chapter I have discussed a collapse argument for the extension of CCL with a self-predication principle, I have given a collapse argument for a similarly extended CFL, and most importantly, I have given a collapse argument for the extension of CNL with a self- predication principle. Finally, I have argued that the relevant self-predication principles are unsound under a Carnapian interpretation. In the fourth chapter, I have studied the extension of Peano Arithmetic with a Carnapian modal logic C, which is a dummy letter standing for either CCL or CFL. One can prove that the principle of the necessity of identity is a theorem of CPA. This implies that one gets a collapse result for CPA. The standard principle of weak induction was crucial for the proof. One can also prove that, if one assumes a particular self-predication principle, and if one assumes the principle of strong induction or, equivalently, the least-number principle, then one gets a partial collapse of de re modal truths in de dicto modal truths. I have argued that, if the box operator is interpreted as a metaphysical necessity operator, then Platonists would not be inimical to the collapse result. But if CPA is extended with a physical theory, then there is a threat that physical truths become physical necessiti es. It was shown that, under a Carnapian interpretation, the standard principle of weak induction is unsound, and that it can be replaced by a Carnapian principle of weak induction that is sound. The problem of logical and mathematical omniscience prevents ordinary Carnapian intensional logic from being taken seriously as a logic adequate for describing the principles of demonstrability. Yet many of the proof-theoretic results of the first part carry over to the part on Carnapian epistemic arithmetic with descriptions, since proof-theoretic results are independent of the informal reading of the operators. In the fifth chapter, I looked at extensions of arithmetic with a modal logic in which the box operator is interpreted as a demonstrability operator. A first extension in that sense is Shapiro s Epistemic Arithmetic. Shapiro himself offered the problem of mathematical omniscience as a reason why it is difficult to find a model theory for EA. Horsten attempted to provide a model theory via the detour of Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic. The attention of the reader was drawn to an incoherence in the model theory of. Two alternative solutions were presented and, after a short discussion of the problem of de re demonstrability one of those alternatives was chosen. The discussion of the problem of de re demonstrability made it clear that it would be interesting to study the epistemic properties of notation systems. Horsten himself provided a framework for this, viz. Carnapian Epistemic Arithmetic, and he started a systematic study of the epistemic properties of notation systems within that framework. However, he did not provide non-trivial but adequate models. To make a start with solving the problem of finding good models for CEA, I introduced Carnapian Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic In constructing CMEA I incorporated the lesson about the principle of weak induction learnt in the fourth chapter. In the sixth chapter, I gave a critical assessment of an argument concerning the limits of de re demonstrability about the natural numbers. The conclusion of the Description Argument is that it is undemonstrable that there is a natural number that has a certain property but of which it is undemonstrable that it has that property. A crucial step in the Description Argument involved a self-predication principle. Making good use of one of the results obtained in the third chapter, I proved a collapse result for the background theory against which the Description Argument was formulated. I concluded that either the either the Description Argument is sound but its conclusion is trivial, o r the Description Argument is unsound, or it is a cheapshot. As an appendix I included an article co-authored by prof. dr. Leon Horsten and me. The topic of the article is indirectly related to some other topics investigated in my dissertation. Also, it backs up one of the addition al theses I might be asked to publicly defend during my doctoral exam. T he topic of the appendix is the set of the so-called paradoxes of strict implication. Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. Pace Lowe, it is argued that Lowe s notion of implication does not achieve this aim. Moreover, a general argument is offered to the effect that no other variation on Lewis notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural language conditional s in a satisfactory way. (shrink)

The so-called New Theory of Reference (Marcus, Kripke etc.) is inspired by the insight that in modal and intensional contexts quantifiers presuppose nondescriptive unanalyzable identity criteria which do not reduce to any descriptive conditions. From this valid insight the New Theorists fallaciously move to the idea that free singular terms can exhibit a built-in direct reference and that there is even a special class of singular terms (proper names) necessarily exhibiting direct reference. This fallacious move has been encouraged by a (...) mistaken belief in the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, by the myth of the de re reference, and a mistaken assimilation of "direct reference" to ostensive (perspectival) identification. The de dicto vs. de re contrast does not involve direct reference, being merely a matter of rule-ordering ("scope"). The New Theorists' thesis of the necessity of identities of directly refened-to individuals is a consequence of an unmotivated and arbitrary restriction they tacitly impose on the identification of individuals. (shrink)

One of the most surprisingly prominent themes in Robert Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust is the role of genealogical explanations. Brandom sees genealogies or ‘debunking arguments’ as significant because of their ability to deprive our discursive acts of the normative status they require to be genuinely discursive or conceptual. His solution to the problem of genealogy is to offer rationalizing reconstructions of others’ discursive acts, which credit them with normative status. He calls this “forgiveness”. In this paper, I provide some (...) additional conceptual resources to explicate Brandom’s notions of genealogy and forgiveness. These resources allow me to discriminate between two alternate and seemingly incompatible ways of responding to genealogies. One way depends on rationalizing explanations that still attempt to attribute commitments to their subjects, the other avoids making such attributions in favor of explaining commitments only in terms of norms accepted by the rationalizer. I argue that Brandom’s work sometimes promotes the latter response to genealogy but that this tendency should be eliminated from the account. (shrink)

I clarify the notion of necessity that I will be examining in the book. In the first section, I claim that the relevant notion of necessity is ‘broad logical necessity’, which I distinguish from causal necessity, unrevisability and a proposition being self‐evident or a priori. In the second section, I distinguish between modality de dicto and modality de re. An assertion of modality de dicto predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition, while (...) a claim of modality de re asserts of an object that it possess a property either essentially or contingently. I conclude by examining the use of the de dicto/de re distinction in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G.E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm. (shrink)

Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non‐factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, called ‘de objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified (...) property – in each world the same individual, which or who need not exist actually. The philosophical benefits of our analysis of propositional attitudes include a refined account of the behaviour of proper names as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports. Some remarks about perception and about the hallucination argument are also presented. (shrink)

During the last few decades, the historical turn within the tradition of the analytic tradition has experienced growing enthusiasm concerning the procedure of rational reconstruction, whose validity or importance, despite its paradigmatic examples in Frege and Russell, has not always enjoyed a consensus. Among the analytic philosophers who are the frontrunners of this movement, Robert Brandom is one of a kind: his work on Hegel as well as on German Idealism has been increasing interest in, as well as awareness of, (...) Hegel´s possible contributions to some current problems in that tradition, and connecting Hegel scholars to current questions. Thus, this work aims to explore Brandom´s methodology of rational reconstruction, as well as his dialogue with history of Philosophy, mainly exposed in his Tales of the mighty dead (2002). As we will see, Brandom´s distinction between a de dicto and a de re approach intends to present a way of identifying and analyzing a given philosopher´s theoretical (hidden) commitments that can be useful to improve the quality of the dialogue with past philosophers. From such methodological exposition, I to turn to Kierkegaard in order to make explicit some of his ontological commitments and presenting Brandom’s approach as a valuable tool for doing history of philosophy. (shrink)

Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non-factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, called ‘de objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified (...) property – in each world the same individual, which or who need not exist actually. The philosophical benefits of our analysis of propositional attitudes include a refined account of the behaviour of proper names as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports. Some remarks about perception and about the hallucination argument are also presented. (shrink)

What role should a motivation to do the right thing, read de dicto, play in the life of a virtuous agent? According to a prominent argument from Michael Smith, those who are only motivated by such a desire are moral fetishists. Since Smith’s argument, a number of philosophers have examined what role this desire would play in the life of the morally virtuous agent. My primary aim in this paper is an historical one. I will show that much of (...) this discussion can be found in Adam Smith’s The Theory of the Moral Sentiments (1764), published over two hundred years before Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem. I will then argue that there is an important insight to be found in Adam Smith’s book that is missing from the contemporary discussion. According to Adam Smith, while a de dicto desire to do the right thing can play an important role in the life of a virtuous agent, the person who is only ever motivated by this desire will often be epistemically disadvantaged compared to the person who possesses the appropriate sentiments. I will argue that Adam Smith’s claim is plausible given his own view of the moral sentiments as providing the foundation of morality. In addition, there is good reason to accept Smith’s claim even for those who do not accept his view of the foundational role of the moral sentiments. (shrink)

Martin Bell; X*—The De Dicto/De Re Distinction in Relation to Actions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 159–174.

The paper completes a “serial” of my contributions to the hot problems of current semantics, i.e. propositional / notional attitudes, de dicto / de re, synonymy, homonymy, equivalence, meaning, sense, denotation, reference. Two kinds of believing, knowing, etc. are distinguished, namely implicit believing of an ideal believer and explicit believing of a logical / mathematical ignorant . A special case of a week, hidden homonymy is considered and we show that when claiming two expressions being synonymous we have to (...) be careful, for a more fine-grained analysis may reveal that there is a semantic difference between them. The distinction between de dicto / de re supposition is defined and a special case of ‘existence’ being de dicto / de re is solved. (shrink)