In this paper, the author considers the concepts of xenophobia and nationalism. He distinguishes between three diferent forms of nationalism: 1) classical nationalism, 2) anti-colonial nationalism, and 3) identitarian nationalism. The frst is based on a belief in the racial and civilizational superiority of one’s nation, and is used to justify colonialism as a kind of messianic civilizing of the “inferior” Other. The second type emerges as a reaction to the frst one and acts (...) as a defense against the cultural subordination carried out by colonizers. To these two categories, the author adds a new kind of nationalism: identitarian nationalism. This type of nationalism shares with anti-colonial nationalism a defensive rhetoric, but it also advocates the preservation of the home culture’s specifcity, which is believed to be threatened by impoverished immigrants. In today’s Europe, we see this in the reaction to Muslim immigrants. The author argues that the right of foreigners to settle in other countries as immigrants cannot be unlimited, but also suggests that the demand of identitarian nationalists to preserve their own cultural identity from foreigners who change it does not apply in the case of wealthy foreigners who contribute to the economy of the country they come to. (shrink)

Is republicanism defending whether nation or centralism ? Through the corsican example, and the shocks provoked by the Matignon project, the duo formed by republicans nationalists highlights their common identitarian tensions, and the difficulties in opening a political space where the varied ways of affirmation could confront each other.

This paper reconsiders liberal nationalism in light of the current autocratic nationalist threat. I argue that liberal nationalism cannot redress the social ailments which acclimatize people to the sorts of no-holds-barred political contestation favoured by autocratic nationalists – excessive polarization. I then argue that liberal nationalists do not recognize the degree to which ‘in-group’ racial solidarity motivates members of the racial/ethnic majority to preserve their status, and that the liberal nationalist approach to defending minorities’ rights therefore risks either (...) emboldening the majority to embrace autocracy or consolidating social hierarchies between the majority and minorities. On these bases, I show that democrats must seek to not only detach race/ethnicity from nationality but also redress those problematic racial/ethnic hierarchies. This suggests the need to develop liberal nationalism into multiculturalist nationalism. Multiculturalist nationalism, however, promises a sort of bounded solidarity that does not include all citizens: it makes use of targeted political antagonism against anti-democrats like White supremacists and Identitarians to help diffuse any social antagonism that might exist among minorities, inclusive members of the majority, and cultural conservatives. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This paper reconsiders liberal nationalism in light of the current autocratic nationalist threat. I argue that liberal nationalism cannot redress the social ailments which acclimatize people to the sorts of no-holds-barred political contestation favoured by autocratic nationalists – excessive polarization. I then argue that liberal nationalists do not recognize the degree to which ‘in-group’ racial solidarity motivates members of the racial/ethnic majority to preserve their status, and that the liberal nationalist approach (...) to defending minorities’ rights therefore risks either emboldening the majority to embrace autocracy or consolidating social hierarchies between the majority and minorities. On these bases, I show that democrats must seek to not only detach race/ethnicity from nationality but also redress those problematic racial/ethnic hierarchies. This suggests the need to develop liberal nationalism into multiculturalist nationalism. Multiculturalist nationalism, however, promises a sort of bounded solidarity that does not include all citizens: it makes use of targeted political antagonism against anti-democrats like White supremacists and Identitarians to help diffuse any social antagonism that might exist among minorities, inclusive members of the majority, and cultural conservatives. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This paper reconsiders liberal nationalism in light of the current autocratic nationalist threat. I argue that liberal nationalism cannot redress the social ailments which acclimatize people to the sorts of no-holds-barred political contestation favoured by autocratic nationalists – excessive polarization. I then argue that liberal nationalists do not recognize the degree to which ‘in-group’ racial solidarity motivates members of the racial/ethnic majority to preserve their status, and that the liberal nationalist approach (...) to defending minorities’ rights therefore risks either emboldening the majority to embrace autocracy or consolidating social hierarchies between the majority and minorities. On these bases, I show that democrats must seek to not only detach race/ethnicity from nationality but also redress those problematic racial/ethnic hierarchies. This suggests the need to develop liberal nationalism into multiculturalist nationalism. Multiculturalist nationalism, however, promises a sort of bounded solidarity that does not include all citizens: it makes use of targeted political antagonism against anti-democrats like White supremacists and Identitarians to help diffuse any social antagonism that might exist among minorities, inclusive members of the majority, and cultural conservatives. (shrink)

In his 2018 book, Identity, the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Stanford University politi­cal scientist Francis Fukuyama addresses themes which might more properly be considered matters of political philosophy and the philosophy of law: How are we to navigate between traditional, ethnic, unitary conceptions of the nation on the one hand, and the threat of identitarian fragmentation on the other? Though Fukuyama affirms the importance of the concepts of human dignity and identity, more or less as (...) these are commonly understood, he also criticizes the contemporary phenomenon of identity politics—which he views as a danger to liberal democ­racy. “The rise of identity politics in modern liberal democracies,” writes Fukuyama, “is one of the chief threats that they face;” and moreover, “unless we can work our way back to more universal understand­ings of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict.” This paper raises the question of whether the well reasoned case against identity politics as a threat to national unity and purpose leaves room for skepticism of fast-paced and more ambitious (“Wilsonian”) pursuit of internationalist goals of globalization. Greater emphasis on political consensus at home may helpfully strengthen the hand of American foreign policy in support of liberal democracy. But we now look back with well founded skepticism on neo-conservative interventionism, and there are just and needed limits on globalizing internationalism imposed by and implicit in the retreat from identity politics. Having lost the unity of purpose of Cold War liberalism, we are yet to find a “golden mean” avoiding ethnic nationalism and short of political fragmentation. (shrink)

The circulation and entanglements of human beings, data, and goods have not necessarily and by themselves generated a universalising consciousness. The "global" and the "universal", in other words, are not the same. The idea of a world-society remains highly contested. Our times are marked by the fragmentation of a double relativistic character: the inevitable critique of Western universalism on the one hand, and resurgent identitarian and neo-nationalistic claims to identity on the other. Sources of an argumentation for a strong (...) universalism brought forward by Western traditions such as Christianity, Marxism, and Liberalism have largely lost their legitimation. All the while, manifold and situated narratives of a common world that re-address the universal are under way of being produced and gain significance. This volume tracks the development and relevance of such cultural and social practices that posit forms of what we call minor universality. It asks: Where and how do contemporary practices open up concrete settings so as to create experiences, reflections and agencies of a shared humanity? With contributions by Isaac Bazié, Anil Bhatti, Jean-Luc Chappey, Elsie Cohen, Leyla Dakhli, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Nicole Fischer, Albert Gouaffo, Stefan Helgesson, Fatma Hotait, Tammy Lai-Ming Ho, Christopher M. Hutton, Ananya Jahanara Kabir, Mario Laarmann, Rukmini Bhaya Nair, Olivier Remaud, Gisèle Sapiro, Bénédicte Savoy, Maria-Anna Schiffers, Laurens Schlicht, Sergio Ugalde, Hélène Thierard, Khadija von Zinnenburg Carroll. (shrink)

In Far-Right Revisionism and the End of History: Alt/Histories, historians, sociologists, neuroscientists, lawyers, cultural critics, and literary and media scholars come together to offer an interconnected and comparative collection for understanding how contemporary far-right, neo-fascist, Alt-Right, Identitarian, and New Right movements have proposed revisions and counter-narratives to accepted understandings of history, fact and narrative. The innovative essays found here bring forward urgent questions to diverse public, academic, and politically-minded audiences interested in how historical understandings of race, gender, class, (...) class='Hi'>nationalism, religion, law, technology and the sciences have been distorted by these far-right movements. If scholars of the last twenty years, like Francis Fukuyama, believed that neoliberalism marked an "end of history," this volume shows how the far right is effectively threatening democracy and its institutions through the dissemination of alt-facts and histories. (shrink)

This piece revisits this old Asian American trope, “the perpetual foreigner-stranger over there and here,” by showing how and why irony, “invAsian” irony in particular, becomes the constant in the cultural ontology and phenomenology of Asian Americana, where the Asian American subject still figures as encroaching builder or unbuilding resident, a transfigurative threat to the narrative coherence of the nationalist US imaginary. These particularly “InvAsian,”1 dangerous and honorary “CauASIAN,” characters—however outdated and yellowing they may seem in the year 2015—still seem (...) real enough; they are downwardly mobile noodle delivery men or upwardly mobile medical overachievers, riding up and down on the Great Chain of American Being, except that they are not laterally mobile, for they are still a little too strange, stupidly or smartly. So, the alien permanence of the “invAsian” irony of permanent aliens: how does this diehard cliché of fascination and fear, this contradictory object of condescension and condemnation, exist or subsist? The economized, i.e., selective and “invested”2 performance and mobilization of ethnoracial stereotypes captures the invAsian irony of America, which mirrors the deeper and wider Euro-American irony of identitarian anxieties over mythologized reality or territorialized origin. America, come on, really, where is your originality from? (shrink)

In her everyday work, the translator faces the multiplicity of languages, experiencing their irreducible diversity. Is this a condition of imperfection or something that can have a positive meaning? This question is the starting point for some reflections about the philosophical meaning of translation. What does the experience of translation teach us? In the wake of some authors who reflected on it – such as F. Schleiermacher and J. Ortega y Gasset -, we will consider how translation is an essential (...) praxis in the development of cultures, which fosters their osmosis and above all allows them to become aware of their diversity. If, on one hand, to translate can be the symptom of a deep-rooted nationalism, on the other hand, it can be a way to prevent the totalitarian closure: translation, as Ortega said through a very beautiful metaphor, is “a voyage to the foreign.” The task of the translator has therefore a great political and cultural meaning: that of fostering such encountering, on the limit between identitarian closure and feeling of diversity. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersections between national identity and the production of medical/population genomics in Mexico. The ongoing efforts to construct a Haplotype Map of Mexican genetic diversity offers a unique opportunity to illustrate and analyze the exchange between the historic-political narratives of nationalism, and the material culture of genomic science. Haplotypes are central actants in the search for medically significant SNP’s (single nucleotide polymorphisms), as well as powerful entities involved in the delimitation of ancestry, temporality and variability ( (...) www.hapmap.org ). By following the circulation of Haplotypes, light is shed on the alignments and discordances between socio-historical and bio-molecular mappings. The analysis is centred on the comparison between the genomic construction of time and ethnicity in the laboratory (through participant observation), and on the public mobilisation of a “Mexican Genome” and its wider political implications. Even though both: the scientific practice and the public discourse on medical/population genomics are traversed by notions of “admixture”, there are important distinctions to be made. In the public realm, the nationalist post-revolutionary ideas of Jose Vasconcelos, as expressed in his Cosmic Race ( 1925 ), still hold sway in the social imaginary. In contrast, admixture is treated as a complex, relative and probabilistic notion in laboratory practices. I argue that the relation between medical/population genomics and national identity is better understood as a process of re-articulation (Fullwiley Social Studies of Science 38:695, 2008 ), rather than coproduction (Reardon 2005 ) of social and natural orders. The evolving process of re-articulation conceals the novelty of medical/population genomics, aligning scientific facts in order to fit the temporal and ethnic grids of “Mestizaje”. But it is precisely the social and political work, that matches the emerging field of population genomics to the pre-existing projects of national identity, what is most revealing in order to understand the multiple and even subtle ways in which population genomics challenges the historical and identitarian frames of a “Mestizo” nation. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the Alt-Right needs to be taken seriously by the liberal establishment, the general public, and leftist cultural elites for five main reasons: 1) its ‘right-wing Gramscianism’ borrows from the French New Right and the French and pan-European Identitarian movement. This means that it is engaged in the continuation of a larger Euro-American metapolitical struggle to change hearts and minds on issues related to white nationalism, anti-Semitism, and racialism; 2) it is indebted to (...) the metapolitical evolution of sectors of the violent neo-Nazi and earlier white nationalist movements in the USA; 3) this metapolitical orientation uses the mass media, the internet, and social media in general to reach and influence the masses of Americans; 4) the ‘cultural war’ means that the Alt-Right’s spokesman Richard Spencer, French ND leader Alain de Benoist, and other intellectuals see themselves as a type of Leninist vanguard on the radical right, which borrows from left-wing authors such as Antonio Gramsci and their positions in order to win the metapolitical struggle against ‘dominant’ liberal and left-wing political and cultural elites; and 5) this ‘cultural war’ is intellectually and philosophically sophisticated because it understands the crucial role of culture in destabilizing liberal society and makes use of important philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt, Julius Evola and others in order to give credence to its revolutionary, racialist, and anti-liberal ideals. (shrink)

Zygmunt Bauman addresses the question to what extent today's resurgence of populism and nationalism is an appropriate answer to the very concrete loss of economic, social but also cultural security. He argues that the populist, nationalist and religious promises are no longer in a position to counter effectively and truly the multifarious problems people face today. Postmodern individualization and globalization undermine any possibility for an identitarian and nationalist solution to the loss of security. Only a political approach that (...) takes into account and addresses the global dimension of the current insecurity of citizens can have success in re-establishing a sense of security. (shrink)

This essay explores the narratives of Claudio Magris and Amin Maalouf as a literature of identity, memory and testimony that seeks to foster social justice, dialogue and inclusivity in twenty-first-century Europe and the Mediterranean. In On Identity (Les Identités meurtrières, 1998) Maalouf investigates individual and collective identities, their elusive and treacherous dynamics, through a reflection that encompasses the Levant, the north-south Mediterranean divide and its endless permutations. Similarly, Magris’s fictional characters occupy liminal worlds in which identities contaminate, overlap, and often (...) dissolve, while exclusivist belonging reveals itself as a deceptive chimera. In Blindly (Alla cieca, 2006), Magris explores the legacy of twentieth-century destructive identitarian myths and presents an alternative history that derives from inhabiting alterity, in a process that makes his characters privileged interpreters of the past, often brothers and sisters of the subversive castaways of history. Maalouf’s Balthasar’s Odyssey (Le Périple de Baldassare, 2000) spans the Middle East and Europe and scrutinizes their respective fault lines and connective tissues that solicit transcultural and composite approaches to identity. Balthasar records his permanent alterity by unceasingly questioning and adapting his own perception of the self in an ever-changing world, at a time of impending catastrophe. From the vantage point of Mitteleuropa, Mediterranean Europe, and the Levant, considered not as independent geopolitical entities, but as interconnected, rhizomatic geopolitical networks, the works of Maalouf and Magris emphasize the need to give voice to “other” accounts of history, to question our identitarian assumptions and to nurture the European project, a fragile, but irreplaceable possibility for a shared future. (shrink)

Ernest Gellner's final book, first published in 1998, is a synoptic interpretation of the thought of Wittgenstein and Malinowski.

COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come. Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we propose the fair priority for residents framework, in which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for their residents only to the extent that they are needed to maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are (...) implementing reasonable public health interventions. Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that experienced during a bad influenza season, which society considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This “flu-risk standard” is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic. Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country: having developed a vaccine, raising taxes to pay for vaccine research and purchase, wanting to eliminate economic and social burdens, and being ineffective in combating COVID-19 through public health interventions. (shrink)

What is the norm of Americanness today, how has it changed, and how pluralistic is it in reality? from the Introduction In this volume philosophers and social ...

The claim that liberal democratic normative commitments are compatible with nationalism is challenged by the widely acknowledged fact that national identities invariably depend on historical myths: the nationalist defence of such publicly shared myths is in tension with liberal democratic theory’s commitment to norms of publicity, public justification, and freedom of expression. Recent liberal nationalist efforts to meet this challenge by justifying national myths on liberal democratic grounds fail to distinguish adequately between different senses of myth. Once this is (...) done (drawing on Arthur Danto’s analytical philosophy of history), it becomes apparent that historical narratives cannot be justifiably shielded from criteria of truth and significance, and that genuinely historical myths are incompatible with liberal democratic political philosophy. (shrink)

Arguments from stability for liberal nationalism rely on considerations about conditions for the feasibility or stability of liberal political ideals and factual claims about the circumstances under which these conditions are fulfilled in order to argue for nationalist conclusions. Such reliance on factual claims has been criticised by among others G. A. Cohen in other contexts as ideological reifications of social reality. In order to assess whether arguments from stability within liberal nationalism, especially as formulated by David Miller, (...) are vulnerable to a comparable critique, the rationale for their reliance on factual claims is discussed on the basis of a number of concerns in John Rawls’s political liberalism. The concern with stability in liberal nationalism differs from stability in Rawls’s work, mainly because of the stronger non-ideal or ‘realist’ focus of the former. In so far as the ‘realism’ of arguments from stability for liberal nationalism is recognized, they are not vulnerable to the reification charge. But if the arguments are construed as realist, this at the same time makes for other tensions within liberal nationalism. (shrink)

Drawing on an analysis of German national cybersecurity policy, this paper argues that cybersecurity has become a key site in which states mobilize science and technology to produce state power. Contributing to science and technology studies work on technoscience and statecraft, I develop the concepts of “territorialization projects” and “digital territory” to capture how the production of state power in the digital age increasingly relies on technoscientific expertise about information infrastructure, shifting tasks of government into the domain of computer scientists (...) and network engineers. The notion of territorialization projects describes states’ ongoing struggle to mobilize science and engineering in order to transform globally distributed information infrastructure into bounded national territory and invest it with patriotic meaning: making digital territory. Digital territory, in other words, is nationalized information infrastructure: it includes building and monopolizing infrastructure as well as normative ideas about nation—who is a digital citizen, and who isn’t; or what constitutes “good” and “bad” digital citizens. Nationalizing information infrastructure and placing statecraft into the hands of scientists and engineers might indicate an emerging form of “techno-nationalism”—a combination of nationalist and technocratic tendencies—raising urgent questions for STS scholarship to investigate the consequences of territorialization projects for justice, democracy, and civic life. (shrink)

The Addresses to the German Nation is one of Fichte's best-known works. It is also his most controversial work because of its nationalist elements. In this book, David James places this text and its nationalism within the context provided by Fichte's philosophical, educational and moral project of creating a community governed by pure practical reason, in which his own foundational philosophical science or Wissenschaftslehre could achieve general recognition. Rather than marking a break in Fichte's philosophy, the Addresses to the (...) German Nation and some lesser-known texts from the same period are shown to develop themes already present in his earlier writings. The themes discussed include the opposition between idealism and dogmatism, the role of Fichte's 'popular' lectures and writings in leading individuals to the standpoint of idealism, the view of history demanded by idealism and the role of the state in history. (shrink)

The three major normative theories of secession are just-cause theories, choice theories, and national self-determination theories. Just-cause and choice theories are problematic because they view secession in terms of the application of liberal theories of justice or a liberal principle of autonomy, without regard for the dynamics of nationalist mobilitization and national politics. National self-determination theories can be supported by a collective autonomy argument. This is related to a particular view of the relationship between collective self-government and territory.

I argue that popular understandings of white nationalist double speak strategies do not fully represent the practice of these strategies, and identify a linguistic tactic used by white nationalists that I call sugar-coating. Sugar-coating works by packing an otherwise unacceptable utterance together with some kind of reward, thereby promoting uptake. I contrast this with existing notions of double speak, such as figleaves (Saul 2017, 2021), dogwhistles (Haney-López 2014), and bullshit (Kenyon and Saul 2022). I argue that sugar-coating more accurately reflects (...) the practice of white nationalist recruitment rhetoric, as described in the Daily Stormer Style Guide. (shrink)

The nation is usually taken to be an expression, and ?nationalism? a defence, of culture. But we may have sanguinary national conflict (as in Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia) where cultural difference is small; and we may have minimal conflict (as in Switzerland or Belgium) where cultural difference is great. This essay proposes a shift, away from seeing nations as grounded in culture, to seeing them as grounded in ?identity? ? often forged by historical forces having nothing to (...) do with culture per se. This essay rejects a cultural argument for liberal nationalism (associated with the work of Raz, Miller and Kymlicka among others) precisely because it confounds national identity with common culture. Since nations diverge despite a common culture, ?common culture? cannot explain them. Identity is more fundamental. It persists where culture changes. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a way in which John Rawls’s original position thought experiment can be brought closer to nationalism. The social science laws can be taken from a nation’s heritage.

[T]he modern [conceptions of] freedom, independence, human rights, democracy, and so forth, which were suited to the era of Western industrial capitalism, could not undergo a truly in-depth investigation after the May Fourth Movement [of 1919], nor were they ever subjected to a Marxist, indepth analysis and investigation. Instead, during the tide of "national salvation and revolution," they were simplistically rejected as the merely worrisome garbage of the bourgeois class. Today, while inheriting and developing the tradition of the May Fourth (...) Movement, besides reemphasizing these ideas, we ought to analyze them further, investigate them carefully, and construct new theories about them. This should be the case with regard to all Chinese traditions, and we should not allow ourselves to remain bogged down in the emotionalism of the May Fourth period, or the abstract negation characterizing the post-May Fourth revolutionary period. (shrink)

Attila M. Demeter, Republikanizmus, nacionalizmus, nemzeti kisebbségek (Republicanism, nationalism, national minorities) Pro Philosophia, Cluj, 2005.

The paper deals with the phenomenon of mythicism of the history in the contemporary period of globalisation. It pays attention also to its roots in the history of Slovak nationalism in the first half of the 20th century. The author points to the importance of the mythicized history not only for nations involved in the processes of their national emancipation, in which it serves the legitimization of national communities, but also for the preservation of the national idea even in (...) fully developed and stabilised nations. She focuses mostly on several basic kinds of myths, often recurring in the ideologies of nationalism and having their representations also in the history of Slovak nationalism. (shrink)

To some extent, the current Russian-Ukrainian may be described as a conflict between two visions of nation, respectively, ethnic and civic models. Putin believes that a language defines a nation. In his understanding, since many Ukrainians are Russian speakers, they are Russians. His perception of Ukraine is anachronistic. He has failed to notice Ukraine's radical transformation since it gained independence. The current Ukrainian identity has a strong civic component. Its core is represented by a new urban middle class with a (...) new set of values. Sustainability of this identity largely depends on longevity and results of the war. (shrink)

This article discusses high-technology development in Indonesia. Focusing on the Indonesian Aircraft Industry (IPTN), it critically examines how nationalism becomes an impetus for technological development and addresses the implications of nationalism in the pursuit of high technology. Situated in the NewOrder regime, influential elements of the regime’s economic and political systems that accommodate the idea of technological leapfrog are traced. It is argued that the failure of the leapfrog idea is because of overreliance on a technological determinist view (...) and the practice of strong technocracy. Furthermore, it is posited that technological nationalism is a rhetorical strategy used by technological elites to legitimate the high-technology policy and to absorb ample economic and political resources that unexpectedly produce farreaching implications in society. (shrink)

This article investigates the portrayal of Spanish women in a rarely discussed work by the German popular philosopher Christoph Meiners (1747–1810). Between 1788 and 1800 Meiners wrote four substantial volumes titled History of the Female Sex: Comprising a View of the Habits, Manners, and Influence of Women, Among all Nations, from the Earliest Ages to the Present Time, which sought to give an account of the physical and moral qualities of women, and their treatment at the hands of men “at (...) all times in all lands” (Vol. 1, p. III). This article explores the two chapters of this work that address the qualities and status of Spanish women, in order to shed light on perceptions of Spain in northern Europe in the eighteenth century. The decline of the Iberian Peninsula as a seat of European imperial power from the seventeenth century, and the emergence of northern European countries such as France, the British Isles, and even the German provinces, as centres of Enlightenment thinking ushered in a new era of geographical dualism in Europe. This article will build upon recent critiques of the “Orientalisation” of Spain by northern Europeans, showing how the marginalisation of Spain served the nationalist strivings of this provincial German scholar. ☆ Heather Merle Benbow would like to thank the Australian Academy of the Humanities and the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Cambridge, for support towards this research. (shrink)

Political choices favoring one''s country or one''s nationality are wrong if they conflict with a principle of universal free acceptability, prohibiting choices that violate every set of rules to which any willing cooperator would want all to conform. Despite its universalism, this principle requires patriotic favoritism in political choices and permits individuals to assert nationalist interests in claims for state aid. But it deprives patriotism and nationalism of any distinctive role in establishing the legitimacy of wars and uprisings. These (...) restrictions are appropriate even if stronger forms of patriotism and nationalism are psychologically indispensable for achieving social goals required for universal free acceptability. (shrink)

This essay seeks to examine the history of the intellectual comradeship between J.L. Talmon and the philosopher, political thinker, and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997). The scholarly dialog between the two began in 1947, continued until Talmon's death in 1980, and is well documented in their private correspondence. I argue that there were two levels to this dialog: First, both Berlin and Talmon took part in the Totalitarianism discourse, which was colored by Popperian terminology, and thus I claim that (...) their ideas should be examined as part of the Cold-War political discourse. The second level stemmed from their similar East-European origin, their mutual Jewish identity, and their attitude towards the Zionist movement. At times the two levels of discourse conjoined commensurably, but in other cases the juxtaposition of the two created conceptual tensions. Examining Berlin and Talmon's thought from this dual perspective, I argue, can shed new light on the inner conflicts and conceptual tensions that each of them had to face. In particular, I claim that both thinkers tried to integrate their Anglophile liberal heritage with their support of National movements in general, and the Jewish National movement in particular. Nevertheless, the different approaches of Talmon and Berlin present two concepts of liberal Nationalism: While Talmon assumed that Zionism solved the Jewish individual's dilemmas by making Jews members of a commune attached to soil; Berlin sought to preserve the individual in an inviolable sphere and thus was more ambivalent in his attitude towards the state of Israel. In conclusion, I offer to see Talmon as a classic Zionist liberal and Berlin as a supporter of what I call “Diaspora Zionism”, an approach, which would later provide the grounds for Berlin's celebrated pluralism. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper connects geography, gender studies, and the histories of science and empire. It uses the framework of geography, exploration, and adventure travel to shed light on the interplay of gender, nationalism, and space in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British society. During this period, the extent of the British Empire reached a peak, as did its sponsorship for exploration, and scores of men and a few women scrambled to fill in the world’s remaining blank spaces. Drawing on archival (...) sources, travel accounts as well as contemporary scholarship, this study investigates the shifting identities of Victorian explorers. It connects British exploration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to broader societal norms of gender and nationalism, then it shows how female explorers both reaffirmed and challenged these traditional Victorian values. This investigation demonstrates that Victorian explorers were often self- described outsiders in British society who deliberately chose their profession as a vehicle for liberation or escape. Space played a critical role in these agents’ ability to both reaffirm and evade British national identity. British nationalist rhetoric celebrated such figures as quintessential Britons who expanded their nation’s influence and modeled its prestige, strength, dignity, and grace. Yet agents of British exploration operated primarily on the physical, social, and ideological frontiers of British society. On these margins of empire, British understandings of gender and national identity were formed, reaffirmed, challenged, and ultimately transformed. This study contributes to contemporary scholarship by highlighting the value of a spatial lens in histories of science, gender, and empire. (shrink)

Introduction -- Before bushido: considering samurai thought and indentity -- First explanations of bushido in the Meiji Era -- The early bushido boom, 1894-1905 -- The late bushido boom, 1905-1914 -- The end of the bshido boom -- The Showa bushido resurgence -- Bushido in post-war Japan -- Conclusions and considerations.

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls The paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract—contractualism. This (...) problem inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate. (shrink)

The rise in the public profile of “alt-right” and “white nationalist” groups in recent years is often described as a rise in “hate groups.” The presumption in this nomenclature is that these sorts of groups are defined essentially in terms of their shared hatred for some or all nonwhite individuals and groups. However, the rhetoric of such groups is couched not as hatred, but rather in terms of “self-love”—they do not hate other groups, they are just looking out for themselves. (...) The author's argument in this article is that, even if we assume the sincerity of white nationalists' claims to be only interested in sustaining and defending whites and whiteness, the kind of “self-love” this exhibits is morally and politically pernicious precisely because it is constitutively linked to a foundational contempt for nonwhites. (shrink)

This article addresses two shortcomings in the literature on nationalism: the need to theorize transformations of nationalism, and the relative absence of comparative works on Latin America. We propose a state-focused theoretical framework, centered on conflicts between states elites and social movements, for explaining transformations of nationalism. Different configurations of four key factors — the mobilization of excluded elites and subordinate actors, state elites’ political control, the ideological capacities of states, and polarization around ethnoracial cleavages — shape (...) how contrasting trajectories of nationalism unfold over time. A comparative analysis of early– and mid–twentieth century Mexico, Argentina, and Peru illustrates the explanatory power of our theoretical framework. (shrink)

Giuseppe Mazzini - Italian patriot, humanist, and republican - was one of the most celebrated and revered political activists and thinkers of the 19th century. This volume is the first to show how his thought and image were received and transformed across Europe, the Americas, and India.

The principle of national self-determination holds that a national community, simply by virtue of being a national community, has a prima facie right to create its own sovereign state. While many support this principle, not as many agree that it should be formally recognized by political institutions. One of the main concerns is that implementing this principle may lead to certain types of inequalities—between nations with and without their own states, members inside and outside the border, and members and nonmembers (...) inside the same nation state. While these inequalities may arise, I shall argue that they are not unjust. These worries are partly the results of confusing two types of interests that a national group may have—in cultural affairs and in political affairs. While a national community should enjoy rights over their cultural affairs, this does not grant them authority over other non-cultural, political affairs. Once the distinction is drawn, we can see that there are constraints on the implementation of this principle. Consequently, these inequalities justify setting limits to a group’s right of self-government, although they do not conclusively refute the right itself. (shrink)

This article attempts to make sense of India's obsession with Kashmir by way of a gendered analysis. I begin by drawing attention to the historical and continuing failure of Indian democracy in Kashmir that results in the violent and multifaceted dehumanisation of Kashmiris and, in turn, domesticates dissent on the question of Kashmir within India. This scenario has been enabled by the persuasive appeal of a gendered masculinist nationalist neoliberal state currently enhanced in its Hindutva avatar. I focus on understanding (...) how the violence enacted upon Kashmiri bodies is connected to feminised understandings of the body of Kashmir in India's imagination of itself as a nation state. I argue that the gendered discourses of representation, cartography and possession are central to the way in which such nationalism works to legitimise and normalise the violence in Kashmir. I conclude with a few reflections on how Kashmir is a litmus test for the discourse on (anti-)nationalism in contemporary India. (shrink)

Singing a Hindu Nation: Marathi Devotional Performance and Nationalism. By Anna C. Schultz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xii + 231. $21.95.

This letter attempts to put some preliminary thoughts on the COVID-19 pandemic in relation to Foucault's writings on Biopower, critique of Capitalism, and global wealth injustice. The Letter concludes that schemes, such as COVAX, which are meant to overcome global wealth inequalities, serve better as visible symptoms of these inequalities.