Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried (...) to analyse every kind of phenomenal character in terms of indicative contents. But there is another possibility: Affective phenomenology, in fact, depends on imperative representational content. This provides a satisfactory solution to the aforementioned difficulties. (shrink)

This paper articulates an account of imperatives that sensibly supports the idea of a logic of imperative inferences. We rebuke common objections to the very possibility of such a logic, from a perspective based on recent linguistic work on the morphosyntax of imperatives. Specifically, we develop the notion that the content of an imperative sentence includes both a force operator alongside an imperational content to which the force applies. We further argue that this account of the (...) content of imperatives constitutes a plausible and flexible framework to develop a logic of imperative by examining a number of reconstructions of this idea using semantical analogs of widespread modal semantics. After studying the performance of those approaches, we conclude that progress in imperative logic has been hindered by the failure to adopt conflict-tolerant and resource-sensitive semantics, but suggest that such considerations can be incorporated in this flexible framework. Finally, we also propose a simple account of the difference between operators applying to the content of imperatives and imperative operators, in a way that sheds light on some of the issues underlying the usual antinomies. (shrink)

Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject (...) their accounts. Against Klein, I use dissociation cases to argue that possession of ‘imperative content’ cannot wholly constitute pain. Against them both, I further claim that possession of such content cannot even constitute pain’s unpleasant, motivational aspect. For, even if it were possible to specify the relevant imperative content—which is far from clear—the idea of a command cannot bear the explanatory weight Klein and Hall place on it. (shrink)

Several authors have recently argued that the content of pains (and bodily sensations more generally) is imperative rather than descriptive. I show that such an account can help resolve competing intuitions about phantom limb pain. As imperatives, phantom pains are neither true nor false. However, phantom limb pains presuppose falsehoods, in the same way that any imperative which demands something impossible presupposes a falsehood. Phantom pains, like many chronic pains, are thus commands that cannot be satisfied. I (...) conclude by showing that some of the negative psychological consequences of chronic pain are a direct consequence of their imperative nature. (shrink)

According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I (...) argue that, although imperative theories constitute an apparently promising version of strong intentionalism, they cannot provide an imperative content that meets their own criteria of both sufficiency and necessity. I further argue that this issue cannot be solved by impure imperative theories either. (shrink)

Recent neo-Anscombean work in praxeology (aka ‘philosophy of practical reason’), salutarily, shifts focus from an alienated 'third-person' viewpoint on practical reason to an embedded 'first-person' view: for example, the 'naive rationalizations' of Michael Thompson, of form 'I am A-ing because I am B-ing', take up the agent's view, in the thick of action. Less salutary, in its premature abandonment of the first-person view, is an interpretation of these naive rationalizations as asserting explanatory links between facts about organically structured agentive processes (...) in progress, followed closely by an inflationary project in 'practical metaphysics'. If, instead, praxeologists chase first-personalism all the way down, both fact and explanation vanish (and with them, the possibility of metaphysics): what is characteristically practical is endorsement of nonpropositional imperatival content, chained together not explanatorily, but through limits on intelligibility. A connection to agentive behavior must somehow be reestablished—but this can (and can only) be done ‘transcendentally’: through a constraint on shifts between the first- and third-person views, inaccessible within any single viewpoint. (shrink)

I respond to an objection recently formulated by Barlassina and Hayward against first-order imperativism about pain, according to which it cannot account for the self-directed motivational force of pain. I am going to agree with them: it cannot. This is because pain does not have self-directed motivational force. I will argue that the alternative view—that pain is about dealing with extramental, bodily threats, not about dealing with itself—makes better sense of introspection, and of empirical research on pain avoidance. Also, a (...) naturalistic theory of body-involving commands falls straightforwardly out of our most prominent naturalistic metasemantic accounts, while the token-reflexive contents that would underlie self-directed motivation are more problematic. (shrink)

I argue that imperatives express contents that are both cognitively and semantically related to, but nevertheless distinct from, modal propositions. Imperatives, on this analysis, semantically encode features of planning that are modally specified. Uttering an imperative amounts to tokening this feature in discourse, and thereby proffering it for adoption by the audience. This analysis deals smoothly with the problems afflicting Portner's Dynamic Pragmatic account and Kaufmann's Modal account. It also suggests an appealing reorientation of clause-type theorizing, in which the (...) cognitive act of updating on a typed sentence plays a central role in theorizing about both its semantics and role in discourse. (shrink)

In What the Body Commands, Colin Klein proposes and defends a novel theory of pain. Klein argues that pains are imperative; they are sensations with a content, and that content is a command to protect the injured part of the body. He terms this view "imperativism about pain," and argues that imperativism can account for two puzzling features of pain: its strong motivating power and its uninformative nature. Klein argues that the biological purpose of pain is homeostatic; (...) like hunger and thirst, pain helps solve a challenge to bodily integrity. It does so by motivating you to act in ways that help the body recover. If you obey pain's command, you get better. He develops his account to handle a variety of pain phenomena and applies it to solve a number of historically puzzling cases. Klein's intent is to defend the imperativist view in a pure form -- without requiring pain to represent facts about the world.Klein presents a model of imperative content showing that intrinsically motivating sensations are best understood as imperatives, and argues that pain belongs to this class. He considers the distinction between pain and suffering; explains how pain motivates; addresses variations among pains; and offers an imperativist account of maladaptive pains, pains that don't appear to hurt, masochism, and why pain feels bad. (shrink)

Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.

Dans la perspective de Gilbert Durand, cette étude traite de la conception de la création en général et, en particulier, de la création littéraire. Dans un premier temps, elle met l’accent sur le rôle de la création artistique en valorisant l’impératif de l’œuvre, puis, dans un second temps, sur celui de la création littéraire. Le but est de réfléchir sur la création et aussi sur son propre contenu, constitué de sens et de significations, du point de vue de l’imaginaire. La (...) méthodologie est basée sur le couple compréhension-explication de l’œuvre de l’auteur. En conclusion, il est important de souligner que la conception de la création durandienne s’exprime à travers l’impératif de l’œuvre, du lointain et de la fonction fantastique de l’imaginaire. The present study deals, from the perspective of Gilbert Durand, with the conception of creation, in general, and of the literary creation, in particular. At first, it focuses on the role of artistic creation by valuing the imperative of the work while, in a second moment, it focuses on the literary creation. The objective is to reflect on the creation and its own content, constituted of senses and meanings, from the perspective of the imaginary. The methodology is based on the explanation-understanding binomial and on the author’s work. As a conclusion, it is important to underline that the conception of Durandian creation is told through the imperative of the work, the Remote and the fantastic function of the imaginary. (shrink)

The previous volume of the series Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Warsaw University---entitled Imperatives from Different Points of View---was the first result of the project Theory of Imperatives and Its Applications realized by the group composed by Anna Brożek, Jacek Jadacki and Berislav Žarnić. The project was supported by the Foundation for Polish Science within the program Homing Plus. One of the most important points of this project was the International Symposium Imperatives in Theory and Practice which took (...) place in Warsaw, on the 18th and 19th May, 2012. The symposium was the meeting of many specialists in the domain of the theory of imperatives – from China, Croatia, Japan, Poland and The United States. Contents: Berislav Žarnić, Logical Root of Linguistic Commitment; Jacek Jadacki, Witwicki’s Square; Tomoyuki Yamada, On the Very Idea of Imperative Inference; Fengkui Ju, Semantics of Sentences in Mixed Moods of Indicative and Imperative; Piotr Kulicki & Robert Trypuz, Two Faces of Obligation; Bartosz Brożek, Types of Obligations; Anna Brożek, Functional Ambiguity of Imperatives; Anna Brożek, Logic of Prescriptions and Instruction; Aleksandra Horecka, Imperative Sentence as a Performative Sentence, which Refers to the Optative State of Affairs; Jakub Bazyli Motrenko, The Concept of Praxiological Directive; Maciej Witek, How to Establish Authority with Words: Imperative Utterances and Presupposition Accommodation; Wojciech Załuski, Remarks on the Lexical Order of Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice; Natalia Miklaszewska, Acts of Will as Convictions; Anna Brożek, Imperatives in the Gospel. (shrink)

Maura Tumulty has raised two objections to my imperative account of pain.1 First, she argues that there is a disanalogy between pains and other imperative sensations like itch, hunger, and thirst. Suppose (with Hall) one thinks that an itch says “Scratch here!”2 Scratch the itch, and it dutifully disappears. Not so with pain. The pain of a broken ankle has the content ‘Do not put weight on that ankle!’ Yet the coddled ankle still throbs: obeying the (...) class='Hi'>imperative does not extinguish it. Second, Tumulty argues that the imperative account cannot handle certain pains, particularly pains of the deep viscera. On my account, pains proscribe against taking action with the painful body part. Yet some pains are associated with body parts over which we have no control. Kidney stones cause intense pain, but I cannot (voluntarily) control my kidney. What action, then, could that pain possibly proscribe? Lacking such a story, it is hard to say (as I do) that pains are exhausted by their imperative content. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kategorische und andere Imperative: Zur Entwicklung von Kants praktischer Philosophie his 1785Heiner F. KlemmeClemens Schwaiger. Kategorische und andere Imperative: Zur Entwicklung von Kants praktischer Philosophie his 1785. Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung. Hrsg. von Norbert Hinske und Clemens Schwaiger. Abt. 2, Monographien, vol. 14. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. 252. Cloth, DM 88.00.Diese Studie zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der praktischen Philosophie Kants, die den Zeitraum von (...) 1762 bis zur Publikation der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten untersucht, orientiert sich an der in Abschnitt II der Schrift von 1785 vorgenommenen Einteilung aller Imperative in problematische, assertorische und apodiktische. Da diese Einteilung in besonderem Maße geeignet ist, "die Architektonik von Kants praktischer Philosophie insgesamt zu erhellen" (S. 19), wird man durch den behutsamen Nachvollzug ihrer Ausdifferenzierung erwarten dürfen, neue Einsichten in die Entwicklung von Kants Denken zu gewinnen. Damit ist für den Interpreten keine leichte Aufgabe gestellt. Ohne philologische Umsicht, breite Kenntnis der zeitgenössischen Literatur, des Kantischen Oeuvres und der internationalen Sekundärliteratur sowie ein Gespür für Fragen der Datierung und Gewichtung von Kants Reflexionen und den studentischen Nachschriften seiner Vorlesungen, ist ein derartiges Unterfangen von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Schwaiger verfügt über diese Fähigkeiten und Kenntnisse.Nach einer informativen Einleitung, in der Stellung bezogen wird zum Stand der Forschung, der Kantischen Dreigliederung der Praxis als dem Leitfaden der Untersuchung, zur Methodik und den erzielten Ergebnissen, wendet sich Schwaiger in Teil I zunächst Kants moralphilosophischen Texten bis einschließlich 1770 zu. Mit Blick auf die 1762 verfasste und 1764 publizierte Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral weist Schwaiger den entscheidenden Einfluss von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (vgl. S. 43) auf Kant nach, wohingegen seiner Einschätzung nach die Bedeutung von Crusius in der Literatur bei weitem überschätzt worden ist. Der moralphilosophische Ansatz von Baumgarten ist vor allem auch deshalb für Kant so wichtig, weil dieser Ansatz am Begriff der Verbindlichkeit ausgerichtet ist (vgl. S. 50). Kant übernimmt von Baumgarten den von diesem bereits verbindlichkeitstheoretisch gedeuteten Terminus des Imperativs, nicht ohne jedoch darauf hinzuweisen, dass Baumgartens moralische Grundregeln tautologisch sind (vgl. S. 166 f.). Als weitere mögliche Quelle für Kants strengen Begriff der moralischen Verbindlichkeit verweist Schwaiger auch auf eine Abhandlung von Elie de Joucourts, die in David Fordyce´ Anfangsgründe der moralischen Weltweisheit (Zürich, 1757) erschien (vgl. S. 59 f.).Die Ausdifferenzierung des Baumgartenschen Praxisbegriffs in Kants ´Bemerkungen´ in den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen ist nach Schwaiger als eine genuin Kantische Leistung anzusehen, auf die Rousseau, wie einige Autoren meinten, keinen Einfluss gehabt hat. Die Inauguraldissertation von 1770 gibt schließlich Kants Gedanken einer Metaphysik der Sitten einen neuen Gehalt. Schwaiger vertritt gegenüber Josef Schmucker und Dieter Henrich die wohlbegründete These, dass Kants Ethik nicht schon um 1765 in ihren wesentlichen Grundzügen vorliegt. Erst nach der [End Page 443] "´platonischen Revolution´" (S. 25) von 1770 sind die Voraussetzungen für den Weg zur Grundlegung geschaffen, erst nach 1770 verwendet Kant beispielsweise den Terminus ´Imperativ´. Hätte Kant bereits in der Mitte der sechziger Jahre eine Metaphysik der Sitten publiziert, wäre der Anteil der empirischen Moral sicherlich sehr umfangreich gewesen (vgl. S. 80).Auch die in Teil II vorgelegten Resultate sprechen für eine allmähliche Ausbildung der kritischen Ethik, die nicht geradlinig verlaufen ist. Die 1770er Jahre sind nach Schwaiger durch Kants Bemühen gekennzeichnet, die im Bereich der Logik gewonnene Unterscheidung zwischen problematischen, assertorischen und apodiktischen Urteilen auch auf praktische Sätze anzuwenden. Des weiteren findet sich erst in den siebziger Jahren, nach Kants Wende zur reinen Moralphilosophie, die Unterscheidung zwischen einem Dijudikations- und einem Exekutionsprinzip (vgl. S. 91 ff.).Schwaigers Studie zeigt eindrucksvoll, dass quellengestützte begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen für die Erforschung der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen praktischen Philosophie unverzichtbar sind. Aber sie scheint in dieser methodischen Einseitigkeit auch mit einigen Mängeln behaftet zu sein. Ich möchte drei Gründe für dieses Urteil nennen. Erstens wird nicht recht deutlich, dass die Kenntnisnahme der entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Aspekte für das philosophische Verständnis von Kants Einteilung der Imperative, so wie sie... (shrink)

According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I (...) argue that, although imperative theories constitute an apparently promising version of strong intentionalism, they cannot provide an imperative content that meets their own criteria of both sufficiency and necessity. I further argue that this issue cannot be solved by impure imperative theories either. (shrink)

Husserl develops his reflection on ethics mainly in his lecture courses. These lectures can be divided into two parts, according to a principle that is both chronological and pertaining to content, and following thus the respective editions in the Gesammelte Werke.1 The common aspect of the two different phases of Husserl’s research can be detected in the critical confrontation with Kant’s practical philosophy, starting with the question concerning the formality.

Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive (...) positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents. (shrink)

‘The Will to Believe.’ The mere mention of this title cannot fail to elicit a reaction from philosophers. Written almost 100 years ago, it continues to intrigue, inspire, perplex and repel, often all in the selfsame reader. Few who make acquaintance with this robust and insightful lecture can remain neutral toward it. In 100 years there has been continuous debate about both the content of the argument and its merits. I will confess to being among those intrigued and inspired (...) by this lecture of James's – and, until recently, also much perplexed by it. The sources of my intrigue have been its guiding insights: that living is choosing in the midst of uncertainty; that in pressing cases, waiting for evidence is no escape from risk; and that believing can create certain truths. The sources of my inspiration have been its vibrant presence and its gallant call to courage. But the main source of my perplexity was the shape of the argument itself: Just what was James's case here? What was the conclusion? What were the premises? Off and on, I pondered the matter for years without resolution, and it was only after I abandoned the very frame of the question that I found a way out of my puzzlement. What I have come to see is that James is not pressing toward one key conclusion in ‘The Will to Believe’. There are two, the second far bolder, far more sweeping than the first. What makes this especially difficult to see is that James himself nowhere acknowledges it. Indeed, he expressly disavows the second conclusion, and this for good reason: The two conclusions are incompatible. In what follows, I want first to take you to the source of my problem in understanding James's classic lecture, then to explain to you why my two-argument theory seems its unavoidable if inelegant resolution. Finally, I want to turn to the properly philosophical task. I want to inquire into the truth of his more sweeping claim. (shrink)

One of the main problems in computer science is to ensure that programs are implemented in such a way that they satisfy a given specification. There are many studies about methods to prove correctness of programs. This work presents a method, belonging to the constructive synthesis or proofs-as-programs paradigm, that comes from the Curry-Howard isomorphism and extracts the computational contents of intuitionist proofs. The synthesis process proposed produces a program in an imperative language from a proof in many-sorted intuitionist (...) logic, where the axioms define the abstract data types, using Natural Deduction as deductive system. It is proved the correctness, as well as the completeness of the method regarding the Heyting arithmetic with ω-rule . A discussion about the use of the finitary induction instead of computational ω-rule concludes the work. (shrink)

This book examines Greek engagements with the past as articulations of memory formulated against the contingency of chance associated with temporality. Based on a phenomenological understanding of temporality, it identifies four memorializing strategies: continuity , regularity , development, and acceptance of chance. This framework serves in pursuing a twofold aim: to reconstruct the literary field of memory in fifth-century bce Greece; and to interpret Greek historiography as a memorializing mode. The key contention advanced by this approach is that acts of (...) memory entailed an “idea of history” that was articulated not only in historiography, but also in epinician poetry, elegy, tragedy, and oratory. The book offers a rich account of poetic conventions and contexts through which each of these genres counterbalanced contingency through the use of exemplary and traditional modes of memory. This fine analysis highlights the grip of the present on the past as a significant feature of both historiographical and nonhistoriographical genres.The essay argues that this work fills a disciplinary gap by extending the reflection on memory to a new period, Greek antiquity. The retrospective positioning of this period at the outset of Western historical thought brings Grethlein's investigation to the center of debates about memory, temporality, and the meaning history. In engaging with the book's argument, the essay suggests that historiographical memory emerged in Greece not as a first-order encounter with time, but as a second-order encounter with forgetting. This confrontation marked a certain separation of historiography from other memorializing genres. Whereas poetic and rhetorical memories were posited against contingency, historiography sought to retrieve those aspects of the past that may otherwise have been irretrievably lost and forgotten. In doing so, it formulated the historiographical imperative as a negation of forgetting that problematized the truth-value of memory and the very act of remembering the past. (shrink)

There has been extensive discussion in research ethics literature surrounding the appropriate form of informed consent for biobanking, whether with adapted content, or adapted forms such as broad or tiered consent. These discussions presuppose that it is possible to disclose adequate information at the outset to facilitate an informed choice to donate to a biobank. I will argue that informed consent cannot be achieved because in the biobanking context, we are either consenting to an enterprise that is not research (...) or to future research. Nor is the solution to abandon the idea that informed consent ethically requires the disclosure of a certain minimal amount of information to make an informed choice by misleadingly identifying broad, blanket or even tiered consent as forms of ‘informed’ consent. Rather, we should abandon the idea that informed consent for research can be adapted to the type of endeavor that biobanking is, and understand the goal as to develop alternatives not as alternative forms of informed consent, but rather alternatives to informed consent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Educational Imperative: A Defense of Socratic and Aesthetic LearningMark StockerThe Educational Imperative: A Defense of Socratic and Aesthetic Learning, by Peter Abbs; x & 250 pp. Bristol, Pennsylvania: Taylor & Francis, 1994, $29.00 paper.O tempora! o mores! Peter Abbs begins by deploring “the cultural catastrophe” of British education in the mid-1990s. He states in his always lucid and accessible prose: “I want to come (...) clean; I want to place the general argument of the book in the current arena of public debate, and to do so without apology and without equivocation.” He bemoans today’s massive denial of spiritual energy, of intellectual enquiry, of aesthetic beauty and public virtue. In a better world, he says, education would serve, “willingly and lovingly... the transcendent ends” of culture and society. Abbs decisively rejects the “Cato” model where teachers are unquestioning skill-based technicians who employ [End Page 393] “managerial” language. Instead, he advocates a Socratic view, which is “to reaffirm that education should be primarily concerned with critical reflection, with personal development and with the sustained enquiry into the various forms of meaning.”Subsequent chapters apply this approach to the arts curriculum. Its failure to gain proper recognition and the absurd and continued conflation of Dance and Physical Education are indicted. Abbs convincingly attacks the notion of “self-expression” in art and language long upheld by educationalists. Its application at the expense of reason, abstract thinking, and the study of “the truly significant writers through the centuries” has in his view helped to trivialize and to marginalize the arts. Nowhere is this more apparent than in so-called “educational drama.” For three generations it has denied “the aesthetic field of drama, the symbolic field of its own form,” and has elevated one genre, improvisation, and made it the totality.Abbs is committed to reconciling “the creative energies of the individual and the creative energies of the culture.” Who would argue with that? And who could deny the value of critical reflection or indeed public virtue? He declares, rather ponderously: “The vested interests of Coca-Cola manufacturers or political missionaries have to be seen as too ‘recent and relevant’ to be allowed” to shape education. The Abbs academy requires “a formally protected place, an institutional space more like the theatre than Tesco [a supermarket chain], more like the cathedral than the Stock Exchange.” For all this patent seriousness and sincerity, here is an educationalist irrevocably and irreconcilably out of joint with the present. The austere modernism of Herbert Read profoundly influenced Abbs in his teens; he also admires F. R. Leavis, Richard Hoggart, and David Holbrook, whose writing at its most influential spans the 1930s and the 1960s. Abbs’s most recent source of inspiration is the art critic Peter Fuller, whose abiding legacy was a romantic nationalism that eloquently celebrated an “essentially symbolic and figurative” tradition in British art from J. M. W. Turner to Henry Moore.Modern Painters, which Fuller edited, could afford to eschew popular culture and its connections with “higher” arts. Fine for a periodical, but how could such a fastidious approach be applied to the classroom experience? Abbs describes an experiment that he performed on student-teachers at the University of Sussex to understand their aesthetic responses. Among the events and objects that the students were asked to consider were John Constable’s The Haywain, Richard Strauss’s The Four Last Songs, a visit to Claude Monet’s garden and a performance of Coriolanus. Abbs’s list does not, however, contain Pulp Fiction, a Courtney Love concert, or an S. E. Hinton novel. What place, if any, do the latter have in the arts curriculum? Must they be ruled out for being too “recent and relevant”? Can student responses to them be brought to bear on their comprehension of higher culture? Or is there a great and ultimately irreconcilable divide? Abbs never faces these issues and instead, in his fogyish [End Page 394] coda, denounces once more “the consumer society” which has “trivialized on an unprecedented scale” and has “tarnished whatever it has touched.”Mark StockerUniversity of Canterbury, New ZealandCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This is a slightly more polished version of a presentation I wrote for the Author-Meets-Critics session on Colin's book at the Eastern APA session on Jan 4, 2017, in Baltimore. I’ve decided to post this commentary online pretty much as is -- I am afraid I don't have time to prepare a version suitable for publication. I hope the reader will find it helpful. At any rate, please treat this piece as a rough draft originally intended to be delivered to (...) a live audience. Although my commentary is mostly critical, I admire Colin's book for its originality, breadth, and depth. It stimulated my thought like no other books in recent years. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Knowing Better: Sex, Cultural Criticism, and the Pedagogical Imperative in the 1990sRichard Burt (bio) and Jeffrey Wallen (bio)Teacher Petting“A distinguished professor and her graduate student French-kissed in front of a semicircle of gaping students. Were they furthering ‘an exploration of the erotics of the relation between teacher and student’ as the professor says—or was it part of a pattern of sexual harassment as the student later charged?” (...) So ran the copy on an envelope advertising in 1994 an “extraordinary one-time offer $9.95 trial subscription” to Lingua Franca in 1994. 1 The enclosed letter relates an anecdote about two complaints against Jane Gallop filed by two female graduate students alleging she had sexually harassed them. Gallop defended having French-kissed a graduate student in a bar in front of other students in the same class by saying it was a pedagogical performance. The letter quotes from a Lingua Franca cover story that came to Gallop’s defense [Talbot].As sex between students and professors has become a topic of new interest in the wake of sexual harassment legislation, as colleges have adopted campus sexual conduct codes or debate doing so, and as debates and incidents involving sex and teaching have attracted widespread media attention, the anecdote has become central. Some critics might want to dismiss the Lingua Franca story as nothing more than titillating tabloid gossip or take it seriously only by regarding it as an effort to combat a right-wing agenda to smear innocent professors who, as feminist or queer, are politically and intellectually well to the left of the mainstream. But the anecdotal interests us precisely because it involves more than just a tabloid scandal in any simple sense. Sex is not merely a way one can slur kinds of criticism one doesn’t like by tarnishing its proponents (for teaching sexual, transgressive material to shock, pervert, or in the extreme case—as in this instance—literally seduce students) though it can sometimes function in this way. For sex comes up in anecdotes told by cultural critics to one another, and when it comes up, it comes up in the same way it does in “tabloid” coverage. The anecdote about sex is never really just about sex, about who did or didn’t (French) kiss, suck, and/or fuck whom: it is rather a story about something in the pedagogical relation that has gone wrong, about a connection that has gone off track. Anecdotes about sex and teaching are really stories about criticism, about pedagogy itself as a form of criticism, and about failed pedagogy as the occasion for self-criticism.Yet if the anecdote is not really about sex, sex is hardly irrelevant to the production of what the anecdote is really about, namely, criticism. Indeed, we want to focus on the question of sex between students and professors because it is precisely sexuality that puts pressure on different, key aspects of the project of cultural criticism and on the present contestation over it within and outside of academia. Campus codes are being introduced [End Page 72] as new pedagogical practices, and new courses are being introduced into the classroom: disruption though impersonation, performative strategies, bringing the personal and the erotic into the classroom, and classes making use of pornography, even hardcore visual pornography, often taught by feminist women. 2 According to leading cultural critics, destabilizing gender roles shows us how gender is constructed, and tells us about power in ways that are politically and performatively effective. 3But there is often a moment when the game breaks down in the classroom. Someone gets offended, and given the way that for some sexual harassment extends from unwanted sexual advances or trading grades for sexual favors to classroom materials (both written and visual), offense can easily move into complaint, legal action, media attention, and of course administrative and professorial panic. The usual rationale for transgressive pedagogy is that this disruption will be successful, not just anarchic: it will be successful in that it gets in the way of the replication and reproduction of power (this is the new mission for teaching: to disrupt the transmission and reproduction of patriarchal power structures... (shrink)

Kant, having identified the formulas of the supreme principle of morality, offers a succinct explanation of their interrelation. What Kant says is, “The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and any one of them of itself unites the other two in it.”1 This claim – hereafter the “Unity Claim” – plays the role of the eccentric cousin in the family of Kant’s ethics: although glaringly present, (...) it is little spoken of, but seldom disowned. Most commentators, at any rate, focus their attention on more important matters, such as the content of the individual formulas, the moral psychology, or the deduction of freedom. Such matters are sufficiently absorbing to leave the Unity Claim often passed over without remark. But the Unity Claim should not be ignored. Kant does assert it, which compels us to attempt to find a place for it in his moral theory. It would seem to constrain the interpretation of the other, more momentous issues. How one interprets the content of the categorical imperative, in particular, would seem to be significantly restricted by the Unity Claim; one could not, given the Unity Claim, offer a complete interpretation of any single formula without also at least referring to the other formulas. And, as I shall argue in Part III below, the Unity Claim is no accident. Kant is committed to the Unity Claim by virtue of some basic features of his moral theory. This paper will thus offer what amounts to an extended commentary on the Unity Claim. I shall review the various suggestions of what it might mean, and how it might, or might not, be accommodated within Kant’s moral theory. The structure of this paper will be as such. Part II will examine the two main strategies for including the Unity Claim within Kant’s moral theory, and explain why they are both inadequate. Part III will examine the other main approach to the 2 Unity Claim: giving up on it.. (shrink)

In two fascinating papers, Jules Coleman has been considering an idea, first articulated and defended by Scott Shapiro in his forthcoming book Legality , that law calls for a moral semantics. In a recent paper, Coleman argues it is a conceptual truth that legal content stating behavioral requirements, whether construed as propositions or imperatives, can "truthfully be redescribed as expressing a moral directive or authorization" ( Coleman 2007 , 592). For example, the directive "mail fraud is illegal" expresses , (...) if not that mail fraud is morally wrong, then the idea that we have a content-independent moral reason for not committing mail fraud. In this essay, I will attempt to explicate and evaluate Coleman's arguments, as well as to determine what the "Redescription Thesis," as I call it, amounts to. (shrink)

This article is based in a critical recognition of the determinate influence of Mary Daly's feminist ethical and theological reflection, particularly as found in her earlier work, on the development of Christian feminist theologies. It argues that the content and form of Daly's rejection of traditional religion constitute a clear alignment of feminist commitment with rejection of traditional religion that is fundamentally problematic for those advocating the possibilities of creative and liberative feminist Christian encounters. The rejection of traditional religion (...) is posited as an imperative of feminist consciousness, and as a testimony to feminist realisation. Such is the impact of Daly's critical articulation of the incompatibility of feminism and Christianity; she has influenced a dominant discourse about whether it is possible to be a Christian and a feminist. (shrink)

This paper aims to reconstruct Kant’s derivation with the help of the resources of speech act theory. The main exegetical hypothesis is that the derivation envisaged by Kant consists in deriving the formula from the success-conditions of giving categorical imperatives. These conditions, which are analogous to the success-conditions of giving ordinary orders, contain restrictions for the successful construction of a system of moral laws that determine what the content of moral laws must be.

This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 5.

Hegel's empty formalism charge is taken, virtually without exception, as a serious objection to Kant's categorical imperative and a powerful refutation of his formalist ethics. The dominant interpretation is represented by Bradley, Paton, Mill, Korsgaard, Guyer, Wood, Schneewind, Sedgwick, more recently, Freyenhagen, and others. So far, the dominant interpretation has remained powerfully influential and virtually unchallenged.However, the dominant interpretation tends to take Hegel's empty formalism in isolation from other texts in the corpus, his holistic system, and dialectical method in (...) general. What makes this non-contextualised approach problematic is that it ignores his remarks on formalism in other texts where his use of dialectical and sceptical method is more in evidence. Hegel's emptiness remarks span his entire career, from their appearance in Jena right up to the end of his career in Berlin. In Jena, his views on formal thinking in a logical sense developed alongside his views on formalism in ethics. Prima facie, the arguments bring together two subject matters that seem to have nothing to do with one another. This may explain why no one has given an interpretation that brings the two domains together. But it is worth noting that Kant himself brings logical considerations to bear on his conception of the moral principle. His distinction between the form of a moral principle and its empirical content recalls his characterisation of logical laws in the firstCritique. (shrink)

The Hill Burton Act, which was signed into law in 1946 and ended in 1997, was one of the most significant forces that shaped the health care system we have today. Providing grants and loans for the construction and expansion of hospitals across the country, it required beneficiary hospitals to give some amount of uncompensated care to the poor and uninsured in return.The act not only led to our health care system's current emphasis on the acute‐care hospital as the primary (...) site of health care delivery, but it also had a profound effect on nursing, fully involving the profession in an acute‐care world. The act created jobs for nurses at an unprecedented level. There are over 3.4 million nurses in the United States, and in 2013, 63 percent of all nurses worked for hospitals. Nursing education continues to emphasize acute care, despite the calls for shifting the curriculum to more community‐based content and experiences that focus on health promotion and wellness for individuals, families, and communities. It is my premise that the nursing profession and all who profess to be committed to promoting health have a moral obligation to help the nation adopt a Hill‐Burton Act of the twenty‐first century that will focus on building healthy communities, supporting families in ways that promote health, and helping individuals to live healthier lives. This would require a shift in resources from a costly health care system to investing in community development, whether job creation, building safe places to play and exercise, providing access to affordable and nutritious foods, advancing the quality of education, or other approaches to addressing and improving the social determinants of health. Making this kind of investment would speak to the principles of beneficence, least harm, and justice, particularly for socioeconomically stressed communities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"An Option for Art But Not an Option for Life":Beauty as an Educational ImperativeJoe Winston (bio)IntroductionIn a recent meeting of the academic staff in the university department where I work, we were asked to state our current research interests. Responses progressed around the circle and everyone listened quietly and respectfully until I stated that my interest was beauty, to which there was general laughter—complicit, not derisory, as if (...) everyone laughing presumed it was a joke. In the same week, I heard a story from a colleague who works in another institution. She had been interviewing a prospective female candidate for their postgraduate teacher training course with a deputy principal from a local school. When it came to a decision, the latter had not been in favor of offering the young woman a place; she was "too beautiful," she thought, to the extent that she would "be a distraction" in the classroom.I offer these stories as illustrative of a fact little discussed—that beauty is a problem in educational discourse, seen as either wildly irrelevant or discordant with the job of teaching. Yet it was not always the case. Beauty has in the past been understood as one of the highest aims of education. For Schiller, it fulfilled a core human need, and he wrote in the second of his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man that "it is only through Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom."1 Matthew Arnold argued that it was in beauty that the "human race finds its ideal."2 Emerson saw beauty as "the form under which the intellect likes to study the world,"3 and Iris Murdoch argued that it should be at the base of any education in the virtues, citing Plato's argument that beauty is the one spiritual quality that we love by instinct.4 These figures could hardly be described as philosophical lightweights, yet their sentiments and the complex arguments through which they expressed [End Page 71] them have for years been neglected; only recently has this begun to change. Elaine Scarry, in particular, has written an influential book on the topic, taking up the argument of Iris Murdoch and developing a strong case for the educational power of beauty, allying it strikingly with an education in social justice.5 Two recent articles in this journal have also heralded a re-evaluation of beauty as a concept of profound significance for both the arts and education. Stuart Richmond sees in the development of our capacities to create and appreciate beauty "a way to bring us back into contact with what is sensual and intrinsically worthwhile,"6 and Howard Cannatella argues passionately "that something of the indelible quality of poiesis and delight in beauty should be the focus of specific educational concern, a factor at its core."7This article is an attempt to add further substance to the claim that-beauty should be one of our core educational values. In doing so, it develops the ideas that connect these perspectives: that beauty's power is instinctive, that it delights, that it is of deep human value. As do Murdoch and Scarry in their different ways, I will argue that beauty is powerfully formative and intrinsically associated with virtue, an idea developed in the final section of the article. First, however, I wish to consider what happened to beauty and why it became a neglected concept not only in education but also in the arts.What Happened to Beauty?Language and world refer to each other and presuppose each other for their mutual intelligibility. In this count, human learning becomes the process of aligning language and world.8In considering beauty, we begin inevitably with the word itself and with its usage. Like all evaluative concepts captured through language, beauty is a historical and cultural entity and, as such, it has both gathered and discarded meanings with the passage of time. Consequently, its nature is elusive and open to revision and debate. Is it characterized by perfect harmony and balance, as the classical world would have it, or by the soaring solidity of a medieval Gothic cathedral? Do we associate it with goodness... (shrink)

A defense of Kant’s moral philosophy. The author seeks to counteract those interpretations of Kant that restrict their focus to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. He argues that one must look at the whole of Kant’s writings, the earlier and later ethical writings as well as the theoretical works. This makes it possible for him to challenge the popular misconceptions of Kant’s teaching: the overemphasis on the correct motive of an action, the mistaken impression that consequences are of (...) no consequence when evaluating the moral worth of an act, and the overattention paid to logical contradiction as the test of a maxim’s morality. The Groundwork is not simply a conclusion of Kant’s early reflections on morality, but it also represents a new departure whose full significance is not seen until the later works. With the Groundwork Kant realizes that morality cannot be established on the grounds set out by the Critique of Pure Reason but requires an independent foundation. His new concept of practical necessity represents a revolution in morality. It is a mistake, then, to read the practical philosophy solely in the light of the theoretical critique. Though founded on a blind "fact of reason," Kant’s teaching is yet not abstract, overly formalistic, or rigoristic. "One must go through all the different formulas [of the categorical imperative] to understand the concept of moral judgment". Rossvaer’s rethinking brings him to stress that "the categorical imperative has no validity beyond being the form of... sensuous striving". This contention that the intellectual and sensuous faculties are not to be radically divorced leads to the ultimate intent of Rossvaer’s work. He argues that the categorical imperative is a principle of execution and only assumes its fullest form in a social philosophy. Consideration of Kant’s notion of the highest good, especially as it is developed in the later works on religion and history, allows Rossvaer to argue for the social and historical relevance of Kant’s teaching. "Since the highest good cannot be justified within an individualistic perspective, but only within a philosophy which takes up society as a problem, morality is meaningless from a human point of view unless we consider ourselves obligated to realize a universal, ethical community". With this, the kingdom of ends is transformed into an historical idealism, practical philosophy becomes a theory of action, and Kant turns out to be not so different from his detractors, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Habermas, and others. Yet the historicization of the moral agent is yet not complete in Kant. The moral agent retains his critical standpoint, that is the distinction between rationality and the social system. Yet one is brought to ask how this critical distance can be maintained. To what extent does Kant’s overstepping the bounds of theoretical reason also entail the loss of that critical validity won by the first Critique? And, if one is forced in the end to justify one’s practical philosophy only by a social philosophy which does not find its foundation in a theoretical critique, then is the original fear of the first Critique confirmed, that morality may be meaningless after all? (shrink)

The usual conception of transcendence is as the success of a process or practice of mediation, meditation, transmutation, salvation, supplication, application or implication. Blanchot's unusual transcendence escapes the inevitable ruin of such achievements by arriving in the form of the failure of immanence. Although it is impossible to describe that failure explicitly, it can be approached apophatically. Following an impossible imperative to see the whole, immanence generates inadvertent transcendence “thus exposing the essential ambiguity of transcendence and the impossibility that (...) this ambiguity be measured according to truth or legitimacy.” ( Writing of the Disaster p.65). The demanding process of bringing enough ambiguity into play in order to elucidate the failure of immanence and demonstrate a glimpse of an unavowable transcendence shall be undertaken through an assemblage of fragments from The Writing of the Disaster , interpreted as instructions for constructing and interrogating a temporary singularity. (shrink)

With its envisioned benefits of increased productivity, enhanced decision making with digital-based tools, qualitative and efficient processes, improved life expectancy rate, etc., the Fourth Industrial Revolution is a desideratum for contemporary society. The need to prioritize skills and knowledge needed for the participation of Africa in the 4IR thus becomes imperative. This paper argues for indigenous knowledge systems as a possible approach to enhance African participation in the 4IR. Consequently, the paper examines the methodical perspectives that would be appropriate (...) for framing African Indigenous Knowledge Systems as a tool for advancing science and technology. It argues for the process form of ideating IKS against the content forms implicit in the various views on IKS. It is concluded that the process form of ideating IKS – which essentially focuses on the critical analysis of the systematic formations and development of IKS – unearths the epistemological basis for scientific postulations and technological advancement in Africa. (shrink)

The most prominent form of human communication and interaction is speech. It plays an indispensable role for expressing emotions, motivating, guiding, and cheering. An ill-intentioned speech can mislead people, societies, and even a nation. A misguided speech can trigger social controversy and can result in violent activities. Every day, there are a lot of speeches being delivered around the world, which are quite impractical to inspect manually. In order to prevent any vicious action resulting from any misguided speech, the development (...) of an automatic system that can efficiently detect suspicious speech has become imperative. In this study, we have presented a framework for acquisition of speech along with the location of the speaker, converting the speeches into texts and, finally, we have proposed a system based on long short-term memory which is a variant of recurrent neural network to classify speeches into suspicious and nonsuspicious. We have considered speeches of Bangla language and developed our own dataset that contains about 5000 suspicious and nonsuspicious samples for training and validating our model. A comparative analysis of accuracy among other machine learning algorithms such as logistic regression, SVM, KNN, Naive Bayes, and decision tree is performed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. The experimental results show that our proposed deep learning-based model provides the highest accuracy compared to other algorithms. (shrink)

Kant, probably more than any other philosopher, has suffered in the hands of his commentators and critics, both friendly and hostile. The regrettable tendency to truncate philosophical doctrines, to treat them as heaps of bones from which the interpreter can select or pick one or two with the view of using them in his game of intellectual skill, finds its most patent expression in the various treatments of Kant’s account of knowledge, faith and action. It is somehow inviting to look (...) upon the writer of the three Critiques as a tri-cephalous creature—each head pointing in a different direction, a self-contained centre of ideas, each to be examined differently and separately. And yet Kant, with all his failings, cannot be regarded a philosophical schizophrenic. On the contrary, by emphasizing the unitary nature of the human being in all its varied aspects—epistemic, moral and aesthetic—his philosophy is a singularly convincing plea for the rejection of an atomistic approach to human personality. As it is, there are those amongst Kant’s readers who never go beyond the Critique of Pure Reason—indeed quite a number of them, deliberately or unwittingly, get bogged down on the Preface and the Introduction—and who claim that they know their Kant inside-out. There are, again, those who rest content with reading the Critique of Practical Reason and who labour under the impression that they have penetrated to the heart of Kant’s philosophy. Both these limited attitudes are gravid with distortions and they must obviously lead to wrong conclusions. One does not need to be a Kantian scholar or even an unsuspecting convert to see at a glance that at least the first two Critiques are complementary, that only when they are pieced together can Kant’s conception of man be fully comprehended. His view is as simple as it is clear: man participates in two worlds—that of physical nature and that of morality. He is an event, an object among others, determined by certain a priori necessary conditions which, when applied to the sensory manifold, yield subjects and objects, knowledge and nature; but he is also an agent and as such he creates another dimension which, though ‘located’ in the phenomenal world, is not reducible to it. (shrink)

This is an attempt to understand the ethics of leonard nelson as dealing with some of the same problems arising from kant's moral philosophy as have concerned the rule utilitarians in anglo-American philosophy. In particular, They share the attempt to provide a rationale for specific duties in terms of ends to be achieved, And they try to correct what they see as excessive rigidity and formalism in the kantian imperatives.

This study examines discrimination in the overseas recruitment print ads of Multinational National Corporations (MNCs) in a lax regulatory environment, Singapore. Institutionalization theory suggests that in a weakly regulated environment, MNC affiliates would tend to adopt the less stringent requirements. With the lack of a strong legal framework in the host country, the home country's legal and cultural imperatives would be more salient, suggesting differences in discrimination as a function of home country imperatives. Some 1122 recruitment print ads of U.S., (...) U.K., and Japanese affiliates of MNCs were examined. While discrimination was found in the print ads of all organizations, U.S. affiliates were least discriminatory, followed by Japan and U.K. affiliates. When Singapore firms were included, they were found to be least discriminatory. However, Singapore firms became more discriminatory when the request for a recent photograph was considered in the discrimination index. Implications of the findings are discussed and suggestions for future research advanced. (shrink)