Results for 'preference voting'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. In defense of epistocracy : enlightened preference voting.Jason Brennan - 2022 - In Chris Melenovsky (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. New York: Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  72
    Vote Buying and Voter Preferences.James Stacey Taylor - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):107-124.
    A common criticism of plurality voting is that it fails to reflect the degree of intensity with which voters prefer the candidate or policy that they vote for. To rectify this, many critics of plurality voting have argued that vote buying should be allowed. Persons with more intense preferences for a candidate could buy votes from persons with less intense preferences for the opposing candidate and then cast them for the candidate that they intensely support. This paper argues (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3. Iterative Voting with Partial Preferences.Zoi Terzopoulou, Panagiotis Terzopoulos & Ulle Endriss - forthcoming - Artificial Intelligence.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  23
    Sincere‐Strategy Preference‐Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control.Gábor Erdélyi, Markus Nowak & Jörg Rothe - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):425-443.
    We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting , a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes , with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. SP-AV combines the voters' preference rankings with their approvals of candidates, where in elections with at least two candidates the voters' approval (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5.  33
    Preferences And Voting Behavior: Smith's Impartial Spectator Revisited.Edward Saraydar - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (1):121-125.
    Why do people expend resources to vote in large-number situations where the probability of their affecting the outcome is close to zero? In a recent article, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky argue provocatively that Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments not only predicts such behavior, but further predicts that people “frequently” vote for outcomes that cost them more than they would individually be willing to pay. In other words, in the relevant environment, they claim that individuals will systematically express (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  22
    Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control.Gábor Erdélyi, Markus Nowak & Jörg Rothe - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):425-443.
    We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes a priori), with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. SP-AV combines the voters' preference rankings with their approvals of candidates, where in elections with at (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7.  7
    Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser.Eric Kamwa - 2019 - Theory and Decision 87 (3):299-320.
    Under approval voting, each voter just distinguishes the candidates he approves of from those appearing as unacceptable. The preference approval voting is a hybrid version of the approval voting first introduced by Brams and Sanver The mathematics of preference, choice and order. Springer, Berlin, pp 215–237, 2009). Under PAV, each voter ranks all the candidates and then indicates the ones he approves. In this paper, we provide an analytical representation of the limiting probability that PAV (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  10
    Voting on multi-issue domains with conditionally lexicographic preferences.Jérôme Lang, Jérôme Mengin & Lirong Xia - 2018 - Artificial Intelligence 265 (C):18-44.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  18
    VAMP (Voting Agent Model of Preferences): A computational model of individual multi-attribute choice.Anouk S. Bergner, Daniel M. Oppenheimer & Greg Detre - 2019 - Cognition 192 (C):103971.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  5
    Religion and the Gender Vote Gap: Women’s Changed Political Preferences from the 1970s to 2010.Philip Manow & Patrick Emmenegger - 2014 - Politics and Society 42 (2):166-193.
    For many years women tended to vote more conservative than men, but since the 1980s this gap has shifted direction: women in many countries are more likely than men to support left parties. The literature largely agrees on a set of political-economic factors explaining the change in women’s political orientation. In this article we demonstrate that these conventional factors fall short in explaining the gender vote gap. We highlight the importance of a religious cleavage in the party system across Western (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  6
    Complexity results for preference aggregation over (m)CP-nets: Pareto and majority voting.Thomas Lukasiewicz & Enrico Malizia - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence 272 (C):101-142.
  12.  14
    Complexity results for preference aggregation over (m)CP-nets: Max and rank voting.Thomas Lukasiewicz & Enrico Malizia - 2022 - Artificial Intelligence 303 (C):103636.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  36
    Gender and Voting Preferences in Japanese Lower House Elections.Gill Steel - 2003 - Japanese Journal of Political Science 4 (1):1-39.
    This paper analyzes voter choice in selected House of Representatives elections during the past 30 years. I estimate multinomial probit models using data from the AkaruiSenkyoSuishinKyokai (Society for the Promotion of Clean Elections) surveys and use qualitative data gathered in focus groups. I argue that no gender gap exists in the votes garnered by the main parties because, first, influential people are not simply able to votes from their networks and, second, have no special relevance to women in their vote (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Majority voting on restricted domains.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):512-543.
    In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  15.  32
    Aggregation of individual preferences by voting.Walburga Rödding - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (2):231-235.
  16. Vote Markets.Christopher Freiman - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):759-774.
    This paper argues for the legalization of vote markets. I contend that the state should not prohibit the sale of votes under certain institutional conditions. Jason Brennan has recently argued for the moral permissibility of vote selling; yet, thus far, no philosopher has argued for the legal permissibility of vote selling. I begin by giving four prima facie reasons in favour of legalizing vote markets. First, vote markets benefit both buyers and sellers. Second, citizens already enjoy significant discretion in their (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  17.  47
    Majority voting on orders.Gilbert Laffond - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (3):249-287.
    We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set ? of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of ? are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Voting Advice Applications and Political Theory: Citizenship, Participation and Representation.Joel Anderson & Thomas Fossen - 2014 - In Diego Garzia & Stefan Marschall (eds.), Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates: Voting Advice Applications in a Comparative Perspective. Ecpr Press. pp. 217-226.
    Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are interactive online tools designed to assist voters by improving the basis on which they decide how to vote. In recent years, they have been widely adopted, but their design is the subject of ongoing and often heated criticism. Most of these debates focus on whether VAAs accurately measure the standpoints of political parties and the preferences of users and on whether they report valid results while avoiding political bias. It is generally assumed that if (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  4
    Voter emotional responses and voting behaviour in the 2020 US presidential election.Heather C. Lench, Leslie Fernandez, Noah Reed, Emily Raibley, Linda J. Levine & Kiki Salsedo - forthcoming - Cognition and Emotion.
    Political polarisation in the United States offers opportunities to explore how beliefs about candidates – that they could save or destroy American society – impact people’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. Participants forecast their future emotional responses to the contentious 2020 U.S. presidential election, and reported their actual responses after the election outcome. Stronger beliefs about candidates were associated with forecasts of greater emotion in response to the election, but the strength of this relationship differed based on candidate preference. Trump (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Voting, deliberation and truth.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1-21.
    There are various ways to reach a group decision on a factual yes–no question. One way is to vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses—a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21.  27
    Expressive voting, graded interests and participation.Dominik Klein - 2021 - Public Choice 188 (1):221-239.
    I assume that voters mark ballots exclusively to express their true preferences among parties, leaving aside any considerations about an election’s possible outcome. The paper then analyzes the resulting voting behavior. In particular, it studies how effective different voting systems such as plurality rule, approval voting, and range voting are in fostering high turnout rates of such expressive voters.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  44
    Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:252–272.
    Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. The paradox of voting and the ethics of political representation.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (3):272-306.
    This paper connects the question of the rationality of voting to the question of what it is morally permissible for elected representatives to do. In particular, the paper argues that it is rational to vote to increase the strength of the manifest normative mandate of one's favored candidate. I argue that, due to norms of political legitimacy, how representatives ought to act while in office is tied to how much support they have from their constituents, where a representative’s “support” (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  24.  60
    The Budget-Voting Paradox.Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (4):447-478.
    The budget-voting paradox states that, when social alternatives are proper subsets of a finite set of decisions, choosing decision-wise according to the majority rule may select an alternative that is covered in the majority tournament among alternatives. Individual preferences are defined on single decisions, and are extended to preferences over the alternative set by means of a preference extension rule. We prove the existence of the paradox for any rank-based, monotone, and independent extension rule.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Voting and Democracy.Thomas Christiano - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):395 - 414.
    Analysis of the nature of voting is fundamental to an understanding of the nature and value of democracy. Three questions ought to be distinguished concerning voting. First, how are we to conceive of the activity of voting? What is its nature? Second, what is it that people aim at when they vote? What are the grounds on which people vote, the reasons with which they justify their vote? And third, what ought people to aim at when they (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26.  7
    Normative uncertainty meets voting theory.Lee Elkin - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-14.
    Recent attempts to provide a viable account of decision making under normative uncertainty through the use of voting procedures seem promising, but incomparable options pose a challenge. This paper focuses on the so-called Borda approach to decision making under normative uncertainty (MacAskill, Mind 125(500):967–1004, 2016 ; MacAskill et al., Moral uncertainty, Oxford University Press, 2020 ) and illustrates how an extended version of it aimed at accommodating incomplete preference orderings associated with normative theories fails. I propose a different (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  20
    Voting by Eliminating Quantifiers.Dov M. Gabbay & Andrzej Szałas - 2009 - Studia Logica 92 (3):365-379.
    Mathematical theory of voting and social choice has attracted much attention. In the general setting one can view social choice as a method of aggregating individual, often conflicting preferences and making a choice that is the best compromise. How preferences are expressed and what is the “best compromise” varies and heavily depends on a particular situation. The method we propose in this paper depends on expressing individual preferences of voters and specifying properties of the resulting ranking by means of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  8
    The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk.David Butler & Pavlo Blavatskyy - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):61-79.
    The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into asocialpreference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for anindividualaggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  19
    Ethical Considerations on Quadratic Voting.Ben Laurence & Itai Sher - 2017 - Public Choice 1 (172):175-192.
    This paper explores ethical issues raised by quadratic voting. We compare quadratic voting to majority voting from two ethical perspectives: the perspective of utilitarianism and that of democratic theory. From a utilitarian standpoint, the comparison is ambiguous: if voter preferences are independent of wealth, then quadratic voting out- performs majority voting, but if voter preferences are polarized by wealth, then majority voting may be superior. From the standpoint of democratic theory, we argue that assess- (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30.  26
    Logrolling, Earmarking, and Vote Buying.James Stacy Taylor - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):905-913.
    In an important and provocative paper Christopher Freiman recently has defended the view that vote-buying should be legal in democratic societies. Freiman offers four arguments in support of this claim: that vote buying would be ex ante beneficial to both the buyers and sellers of votes; that voters enjoy wide discretion in how they use their votes, and so this should extend to selling them; that vote markets would lead to electoral outcomes that better reflect voters’ preferences; and that vote-buying (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31.  31
    Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2021 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 335:189-209.
    In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a candidate x would be among the winners, adding another voter to the election who ranks x first does not cause x to lose. Surprisingly, a number of standard voting methods violate this natural property. In this paper, we (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Why the voting age should be lowered to 16.Tommy Peto - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (3):277-297.
    This article examines whether the voting age should be lowered to 16. The dominant view in the literature is that 16-year-olds in the United Kingdom are not politically mature enough to vote since they lack political knowledge, political interest and stable political preferences. I reject this conclusion and instead argue that the voting age should be lowered to 16. First, I look at Chan and Clayton’s empirical claims and show that these features of 16- and 17-year-olds are in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  33.  20
    Epistemic Barriers to Rational Voting: The Case of European Parliament Elections.Fabio Wolkenstein - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):294-308.
    Voting is often said to be irrational because of the incredibly small likelihood that an individual voter’s ballot will be pivotal in favour of her preferred candidate or party. A persuasive respon...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  12
    An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting.Wesley H. Holliday - 2024 - Economics Letters 236:111589.
    In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Aggregating Dependency Graphs into Voting Agendas in Multi-Issue Elections.Stephane Airiau, Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi, Daniele Porello & Joel Uckelman - 2011 - In Stephane Airiau, Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi, Daniele Porello & Joel Uckelman (eds.), {IJCAI} 2011, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16-22, 2011. pp. 18--23.
    Many collective decision making problems have a combinatorial structure: the agents involved must decide on multiple issues and their preferences over one issue may depend on the choices adopted for some of the others. Voting is an attractive method for making collective decisions, but conducting a multi-issue election is challenging. On the one hand, requiring agents to vote by expressing their preferences over all combinations of issues is computationally infeasible; on the other, decomposing the problem into several elections on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  10
    The Right to Expressive Voting Methods.Pierre-Étienne Vandamme - forthcoming - Res Publica:1-22.
    In mass democracies, voting—in elections or referendums—is the main way in which most citizens can publicly express their political preferences. And yet this means of expression is sometimes perceived by them as highly frustrating, partly because it does not allow for much expression. Dominant voting methods lead to a reduction of options, pressure citizens to vote tactically at the cost of expressing their genuine preferences, and fail to convey what they really think about different candidates, parties, or options. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Four Structures of Intransitive Preferences.Luc Bovens - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Routledge.
    I taxonomize a half-century of examples of intransitive preferences into four structures: (i) Cycles of Negligible-Value-Differences and Missing-Values; (ii) Condorcet-Voting-Paradox Style Cycles (iii) Sen’s-Libertarian-Paradox Style Cycles; and (iv) Sorites Cycles.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  47
    Communication compatible voting rules.Mark Thordal-Le Quement - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (4):479-507.
    We reassess the possibility of full information pooling in a Condorcet jury environment featuring heterogeneous and privately known preference types. We find that in general, with uncorrelated preference types, only very limited heterogeneity is compatible with full pooling. We provide a sufficient condition, based on a simple measure of preference misalignment, under which the set of voting rules compatible with full pooling is at most a singleton. As a caveat to any simplistic conclusions, we identify a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Electoral Dioramas: On the Problem of Representation in Voting Advice Applications.Thomas Fossen & Bert van den Brink - 2015 - Representation 51 (3):341-358.
    Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are online tools designed to help citizens decide how to vote. They typically offer their users a representation of what is at stake in an election by matching user preferences on issues with those of parties or candidates. While the use of VAAs has boomed in recent years in both established and new democracies, this new phenomenon in the electoral landscape has received little attention from political theorists. The current academic debate is focused on epistemic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.
    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  41.  47
    What’s the Point of Voting Advice Applications? Competing Perspectives on Democracy and Citizenship.Thomas Fossen & Joel Anderson - 2014 - Electoral Studies 36:244-251.
    Voting advice applications (VAAs) are interactive online tools designed to assist voters by improving the basis on which they decide how to vote. Current VAAs typically aim to do so by matching users’ policy-preferences with the positions of parties or candidates. But this ‘matching model’ depends crucially on implicit, contestable presuppositions about the proper functioning of the electoral process and about the forms of competence required for good citizenship—presuppositions associated with the social choice conception of democracy. This paper aims (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  57
    Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods.Dan S. Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (1):59-77.
    In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter’s preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter’s non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43.  82
    A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting.Ronan Congar & Vincent Merlin - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):131-147.
    In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287–316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and Weak (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44.  23
    Solving the Paradox: The Expressive Rationality of the Decision to Vote.Bart Engelen - 2006 - Rationality and Society 18 (4):419-441.
    The renowned paradox of voting arises when one tries to explain the decision to go out and vote in an exclusively instrumental framework. Instead of postulating that voters always derive utility from the act of voting, I want to search for the reasons that underlie the absence or presence of a preference for voting. In my noninstrumental account of expressive rationality, citizens want to express who they are and what they care about. Whether or not one (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45.  47
    A procedural model of voting.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Theory and Decision 32 (3):269-301.
  46.  50
    The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections.Clark Bowman, Jonathan K. Hodge & Ada Yu - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (1):111-124.
    In referendum elections, voters are often required to register simultaneous votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter’s preferred outcome on one proposal depends on the outcomes of other proposals. This type of interdependence can lead to unsatisfactory or even paradoxical election outcomes, such as a winning outcome that is the last choice of every voter. Here we propose an iterative voting scheme that allows voters to revise their voting strategies based on the outcomes of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting.Ulle Endriss - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (3):335-355.
    Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  5
    Remarks on a procedural condition for the voting paradox.Susumu Cato - 2019 - Bulletin of Economic Research 71 (3):549–557.
    Schwartz [A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social Preference, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007), 688–695] provides a generalization of the voting paradox by using the impotence‐partition condition. This paper aims to clarify his result by providing several remarks. We show that a main result of Schwartz can be strengthened by replacing strong Pareto by weak Pareto. We also discuss how the impotence partition is related to the standard concept of decisiveness, which is widely employed in the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  32
    Expressiveness and Voting Decision: New Evidence from the Korean Parliamentary Election.J. O. O. Man-soo & Y. U. N. Sungho - 2014 - Japanese Journal of Political Science 15 (2):259-274.
    According to the expressive view of voting, a voter derives expressive utility from casting a vote. We present two possible sources of expressive utility: social interaction with voters having the same political preferences, and interestingness of the election. First, it has been suggested that a voter's expressive utility may increase when there are more voters having the same political preference. We extend this line of study and test the hypothesis that a voter's expressive utility increases as the number (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees.Bezalel Peleg - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000