For more than 20 years, both here and abroad, significant efforts have been undertaken to provide equal access to nutritional food for all citizens. Yet, the numbers of under-nourished continue to rise, as do those afflicted with non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease. Clearly, current efforts are not working. Relying on the psychological phenomena of learned helplessness and fundamental attribution error, it is argued that certain individuals may not be willing, or able, to take actions (...) that are currently prescribed regarding access to nutritious food. The water is muddied regarding potential solutions as the various actors involved (e.g., corporations, governments, individuals) cannot agree on a starting point and continue to point fingers regarding responsibility. It is posited that emphasis needs to shift from the current “one-size-fits-all” approach to one that is more tailored to the various actors, specifically the individuals. Within the group of individuals (consumers), based on Wenar’s Least Cost Theory, even further distinction must be made between those who see themselves as capable actors and those who do not. In this conceptual piece intended to refocus the discussion surrounding food access, we propose that future research should approach these issues from a unit of analysis perspective in an attempt to identify the solutions most likely to succeed at various participating levels. (shrink)

Despite worldwide attention given to food access, very little progress has been made under the current model. Recognizing that individual engagement is likely based on individual experiences and perceptions, this research study investigated whether or not a correlation exists between one’s socioeconomic status (SES) and perceived personal responsibility for food access. Discussion of results and implications provide fresh insight into the ongoing global debate surrounding food access. Outcomes also provide insight into willing and able participants and point to least-cost solutions (...) which may be better suited to implement and initiate change. Results indicate that the issue of food access is more complex than simply lobbying for better decision-making among individuals and populations, highlighting the importance of unit of analysis considerations. (shrink)

Miscreants, in the form of deviants and dark personalities, impact organizations more than we realize. Most management instruction on ethics issues focuses on helping students to understand how to evaluate difficult situations, make ethical decisions, and engage in ethical actions. While this approach works well for the individual decision maker, it fails to help students learn how to anticipate and proactively prevent the unethical actions of others. Using ethical codes as a backdrop, “Thinking Like a Bad Guy” is a provocative (...) classroom activity to elicit critical and creative thinking among business students. The goal of this exercise is to facilitate student learning so they can anticipate the behaviors of bad actors and alter organizational processes and procedures to mitigate the ability of others to violate organizational ethical standards. (shrink)

Business ethics education is most effective when students take an active approach and must respond to various demands and feedback. In this paper we describe a classroom exercise in which students are tasked with delivering an ethics briefing to “executive teams”. Through a combination of individual analysis and group work, students become immersed in real-world ethics problem-solving, in which there are no easy solutions. Students must defend their ethical recommendations as well as challenge those from other groups. The exercise concerns (...) an existing controversial business called Seeking Arrangement. Survey results from graduate students who have participated in the exercise reveal that it is effective in producing better ethics problem solving, as well as greater confidence in addressing ethical issues. (shrink)

The Law of Inertia plays a key role in the scheme of constructive axioms for the General Theory of Relativity. A new formulation of this law which avoids the circularity problems inherent in previous formulations is presented. The empirical status of this law and the manner in which it provides a non-conventional foundation for the Law of Motion and the definition of physical forces is established. First, quite general path structures are discussed which are not defined at the outset in (...) terms of geodesic paths and which require for their description only the local differential topological structure. Secondly, a number of theorems are presented which serve as purely local differential topological criteria for singling out from among the general path structures the geodesic ones that represent the inertial structure of spacetime. (shrink)

The claim that distant simultaneity with respect to an inertial observer is conventional arose in the context of a space-and-time rather than a spacetime ontology. Reformulating this problem in terms of a spacetime ontology merely trivializes it. In the context of flat space, flat time, and a linear inertial structure (a purely space-and-time formalism), we prove that the hyperplanes of space for a given inertial observer are determined by a purely spatial criterion that depends for its validity only on the (...) two-way light principle, which is universally regarded as empirically verified. All (empirically determined) “spacetime” entities, such as the conformal structure or light surface equation, are used in a purely mathematical manner that is independent of and hence isneutral with respect to the ontological status that is ascribed to them. In this regard, our criterion is significantly stronger than thespacetime criterion recently advanced by D. Malament, which appeals explicitly to the conformal orthogonality of spacetime vectors and to the invariance of the conformal-orthogonal structure of spacetime under the causal automorphisms of spacetime. Once the hyperplanes of space for a given inertial observer have been determined by our empirical and purely spatial criterion, the following holds: there exists one and only one $\vec \varepsilon $ -synchronization procedure, namely the standard procedure proposed by Einstein, such that the planes of common time are thesame as the nonconventional hyperplanes of space for the inertial observer. It follows that our criterion provides an empirical even if indirect method for determining that the one-way speed of light is the same as the average two-way speed of light. In addition, two inertial observers that are not at rest with respect to each other necessarily havedifferent hyperplanes of space, and consequently their respective spatial views cannot be encompassed in a single three-dimensional space. Hence, our purely spatial criterion provides an empirical motivation for adopting the more comprehensive spacetime ontology. (shrink)

In his interesting paper on babeo and aueo published in CQ 66 , 388–98, Dr. A.S. Gratwick raised a number of questions bearing on my own discussion of the origin and development of the babeo+infinitive construction in CQ 65 , 215–31. First the collapse of the earlier future-tense system. As I said, this was ‘the product of a number of different linguistic events’, phonetic, grammatical, and semantic, which were summarized and illustrated on pp. 220–1 of my paper. Even so Dr. (...) Gratwick believes that I assigned too much weight to ‘phonetic attrition of the future simple’. (shrink)

All the extant letters of Seneca are addressed to a single correspondent, Lucilius. They are among the latest of his writings and are entirely taken up with the discussion of philosophical questions, principally to do with Ethics1—hence the title Epistulae Morales. The 115th letter could, one supposes, be taken to exemplify this particular kind of epistolary composition at its best. The objectof the following discussion is twofold: first by a detailed analysis of the letterit self to establish precisely in what (...) its distinctive literary excellence consists, and secondly by attending to its more representative qualities to form a clearer view of the genre to which it belongs. (shrink)

Ovid's great poem has held its place in the European artistic and literary tradition primarily as a collection of superbly told individual stories, in which successive generations have found inspiration and pleasure. But the poet himself clearly thought of it as something more than a series of detached narratives. In fact he describes it as perpetuum carmen. The object of the present essay is to inquire into the nature of this perpetuitas and to suggest some of the implications that it (...) has both for the poem as a whole and for the appreciation of its individual parts. The phrase perpetuum carmen has interesting ideological connotations. The mutilated first fragment of Callimachus’ Aitia clearly formed a poetic manifesto. The author proclaims his antipathy to the fashion of writing ν єισµα διηνєκές in which the deeds of kings and heroes were extolled ν πολλαις , he declares, , so he rejects , οιδήν in favour of the delicate cicada's which is heard at its best in and other poetic genres that are . Three separate but related targets are singled out for attack: long continuous poems, epic subjects, and the grand style. (shrink)

It is well known that the future indicative and conditional paradigms of most Central and West Romance languages reflect a Latin infinitival construction with habeo, e.g. Italian canterd (...) material to make inferences about its origins within the antecedent morpho-syntactic system and the structural pressures that gave rise to its development. (shrink)

The genes involved in methionine biosynthesis are scattered throughout the Escherichia coli chromosome and are controlled in a similar but not coordinated manner. The product of the metJ gene and S‐adenosylmethionine are involved in the repression of this ‘regulon’.

As technology redefines relationships, new assumptions are emerging about the ethics of persuasion. In an increasingly global economy, technology is forcing greater transparency onto businesses and governments as the moral context of their communications is inseparable from the competitive nature of the business world. This article suggests that moral boundaries will be set naturally, that consumers have a moral obligation to excercise "due diligence" in their acceptance of messages, and that no one is in charge of the global economy's conventions (...) and morality. The system ultimately depends on participants to keep their own self-interested boat in the race. (shrink)

Few figures of the Middle Ages command the attention of so many modern disciplines as Robert Grosseteste (c. 1170-1253). Theology, Philosophy, History, and Science are all areas which his life and thought continue to have significance and to inspire re-interpretation. Accompanied by a series of original commentaries, this new edition of Grosseteste's work, with English translation, draws together the perspectives of modern scientists and medieval specialists. Volume I of a six volume series, Knowing and Speaking presents two of the (...) earliest of Grosseteste's works, the treatises On the Liberal Arts and On the Generation of Sounds. These are accompanied by a significant Middle English treatise on the Seven Liberal Arts whose anonymous fifteenth-century author translated and excerpted passages from Grosseteste's treatises in a re-imagining of their structure and function.0Each work is treated separately within the volume, which is constructed in three parts. On the Liberal Arts sets Grosseteste's thoughts on the arts subjects and emphasises moral concerns about the purpose of learning. On the Generation of Sounds builds on the theories and statements of On the Liberal Arts in connection to the production of sound, elaborating the earlier position, relating the generation of sounds to human vocal and speech production. (shrink)

How could physicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is that physicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has produced a counterexample to that solution. We show how to modify the solution to accommodate Brown’s example: physicalism could be true of a world without fundamental physical phenomena if that (...) world does not contain an infinite descent of mentally constituted mentality. This solution is independently plausible and is available to physicalists of virtually all significant varieties. (shrink)

According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue (...) that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness‐constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim's well‐known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds. (shrink)

Arthur Danto's work has always affirmed a deep relationship between philosophy and art. These essays explore this relationship through a number of concrete cases in which either artists are driven by philosophical agendas or their art is seen as solving philosophical problems in visual terms. The essays cover a varied terrain, with subjects including Giotto's use of olfactory data in _The Raising of Lazarus; _chairs in art and chairs as art; Mel Bochner's Wittgenstein drawings; the work of Robert Motherwell, (...) Andy Warhol, and Robert Irwin; Louis Kahn as "Archai-Tekt"; and visual truth in film. Also featured are a meditation on the battle of Gettysburg; and a celebration of the Japanese artist Shiko Munakata, an essay that is partly autobiographical. Arthur C. Danto is one of the most original and multitalented philosophers writing today, a thinker whose interests traverse the boundaries of traditional understandings of philosophy. Best known for his contributions to the philosophy of art and aesthetics, Danto is also esteemed for his work in the history of philosophy, the philosophy of history, philosophical psychology, and action theory. These two volumes, each with an introduction by the author, contain essays spanning more than twenty-five years that have been selected to highlight the inseparability of philosophy and art in Danto's work. Together they present the thinking of Arthur C. Danto at his very best. (shrink)

This paper offers an overview of "the species problem", arguing for a view of species as homeostatic property cluster kinds, positioning the resulting form of realism about species as an alternative to the claim that species are individuals and pluralistic views of species. It draws on taxonomic practice in the neurosciences, especially of neural crest cells and retinal ganglion cells, to motivate both the rejection of the species-as-individuals thesis and species pluralism.

In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the most prominent four (...) examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Hume Actually Said About Miracles Robert J. Fogelin Two things are commonly said about Hume's treatment ofmiracles in the first part of Section X of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: I.Hume did not put forward an a priori argument intended to show that miracles are not possible. II.Hume did put forward an a priori argument intended to show that testimony, however strong, could never make it reasonable (...) to believe that a miracle had occurred. In a recent article in this journal, Dorothy Coleman calls this the "traditional interpretation," and, since this characterization strikes me as correct, I shall call it that too. Antony Flew stands virtually alone in challenging the traditional interpretation, arguing, in particular, that Hume did not even attempt to provide an a priori argument showing that testimony can never establish the existence of a miracle. On FIeW1S reading, Hume's argument was intended to do no more than place a "check" on arguments put forward to establish the existence of miracles on the basis oftestimony. Along with others, however, Flew accepts the first partofthe traditional interpretation, namely, that whatever Hume was up to, he was certainly not trying to produce a proof showing that miracles cannot exist. He endorses the first part of the traditional interpretation in these words: What [Hume] is trying to demonstrate a priori in Part I is: not that, as amatter offact, miracles do nothappen; but that, from the very nature of the concept — 'from the very nature of the fact' — there must be a conflict of evidence required to show that they do. In opposition to these united voices, I will argue that this consensus on the first part of the traditional interpretation is unfounded, for there are clear texts — at the very heart ofHume's discussion — that go dead against it. Volume XVI Number 1 81 ROBERT J. FOGELIN Two passages, which occur in the same paragraph, are particularly relevant to this discussion: Passage I. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proofagainst a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. (E 114, emphasis added) Passage II. There must...bea uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct andfullproof, from the nature ofthe fact, against the existence ofany miracle; nor can such aproofbe destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior. (E 115, emphasis added in final clause) The clause nor such a proof be destroyed, or miracle rendered credible in Passage II is crucial for our purposes, for it simultaneously expresses two claims which, for clarity's sake, I will state separately. First, when Hume speaks??such a proof, he is referring to the direct and full proof, from the nature ofthe fact, against the existence ofany miracle mentioned in the first part of the same sentence. Thus, one thing that Hume is saying is this: Ci: Nor can such a proof(against the existence ofany miracle) be destroyed, but by an opposite proof which is superior. He is also making the following claim: C2: Nor can such a miracle be rendered credible, but by an opposite proof which is superior. Having sorted things out, it is now possible — using only direct quotations from the immediate text — to show that, contrary to the traditional interpretation, Hume does present an a priori argument against the existence ofmiracles. Argument One 1. there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature ofthe fact, against the existence ofany miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed... but by an opposite proof, which is superior. (E 115, from Passage II) 82Hume Studies WHAT HUME ACTUALLY SAID ABOUT MIRACLES 2.the proofagainst a miracle, from the very nature ofthe fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. (E 114, emphasis added, from Passage I) Therefore: 3.there is... a direct andfullproof, from the nature ofthe fact, against the existence ofany miracle... (shrink)

James Coleman attempted to reconcile rational choice theory with the classical sociological concerns: the relationship between the individual and society, and the historical and normative status of rationality. He identifies limits to the rational choice model, and suggests some promising but ultimately unconvincing ways around them. His project does, however, offer an important critique of Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which is of value in analyzing relationships between corporate actors and particular persons.

Effective public policy to mitigate climate change footprints should build on data-driven analysis of firm-level strategies. This article’s conceptual approach augments the resource-based view of the firm and identifies investments in four firm-level resource domains to develop capabilities in climate change impact mitigation. The authors denote the resulting framework as the GISTe model, which frames their analysis and public policy recommendations. This research uses the 2008 Carbon Disclosure Project database, with high-quality information on firm-level climate change strategies for 552 companies (...) from North America and Europe. In contrast to the widely accepted myth that European firms are performing better than North American ones, the authors find a different result. Many firms, whether European or North American, do not just “talk” about climate change impact mitigation, but actually do “walk the talk.” European firms appear to be better than their North American counterparts in “walk I,” denoting attention to governance, information management, and systems. But when it comes down to “walk II,” meaning actual Technology-related investments, North American firms’ performance is equal or superior to that of the European companies. The authors formulate public policy recommendations to accelerate firm-level, sector-level, and cluster-level implementation of climate change strategies. (shrink)

The first three essays by John Biro, Alexander Rosenberg, and Robert Fogelin, respectively, focus on Hume's project to develop a science of human nature that would provide a foundation for all other sciences. Biro shows that what unites Hume's science of human nature and twentieth-century cognitive sciences is their mutual commitment to explain the mind as one would any other natural phenomenon. Rosenberg traces Hume's influence on the development of philosophy of science to show how he came to be (...) regarded as the most important philosopher to have written in English. Fogelin characterizes Hume, at least with regard to his criticism of our intellectual capacities, as a "radical, unreserved, unmitigated sceptic". Though acknowledging Hume's constructive idea that nonrational aspects of our nature render these skeptical conclusions inconsequential, he stresses that this too "is a sceptical conclusion", a view endorsed by David Norton, whose introduction to the volume argues that Hume is a "post-sceptical" philosopher who "consciously developed a philosophical position that is at one and the same time fundamentally sceptical and fundamentally constructive". Addressing Hume's application of his science of human nature to religion, J. C. A. Gaskin's essay perspicaciously outlines his criticism of the design argument, his argument against the believability of miracles, and his account of the merits of secular morality over religious morality. The final section of Gaskin's essay convincingly refutes attempts to show Hume is a fideist or to find a justification of faith in his theory of natural belief. (shrink)

This paper synthesises a collaborative review of social capital theory, with particular regard for its relevance to the changing educational landscape within Scotland. The review considers the common and distinctive elements of social capital, developed by the founding fathers-Putnam, Bourdieu and Coleman-and explores how these might help to understand the changing contexts and pursue opportunities for growth.

In this dissertation I argue for a theory of rectificatory justice, and apply that theory to circumstances involving two social groups generally thought to have been historically wronged, viz., Native Americans and African Americans. ;Development of a conception of rectificatory justice is begun in Chapter 1 by examining the distinction between distributive justice and rectificatory justice, and by suggesting a theory of compensation. It is argued that the notion of compensation cannot provide an adequate ground for a species of justice. (...) ;I argue in Chapter 2 that a taxonomy of justice ought to consist of only two species, viz., distributive justice and rectificatory justice. In addition to compensation, the view of rectification argued for includes accounts of restoration, apology, and punishment. Some theories of so-called corrective justice are examined, and are found to be morally inadequate. ;In Chapter 3, I examine several views of a right to compensation, including those of Joel Feinberg and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Jules Coleman's claim that a requirement in justice for compensation can arise without the transgression of rights is examined and then rejected. ;After suggesting a theory of social groups, and adopting Allen Buchanan's account of groups rights, I argue in Chapter 4 that rectification rights can be legitimately ascribed to social groups. I assess the practical implications of my theory of rectificatory justice by applying it to two cases. In the first case, I argue that the fishing rights that were restored to Native American tribes of the Northwest as a result of U.S. v. Washington are justified when grounded on their right to rectification; hence, the claim that the restoration of these rights constituted an injustice to non-Native American fishing interests is mistaken. In the second case, I show how a right to rectification can legitimately be ascribed to African Americans as a group. ;The dissertation concludes with Chapter 5, where I consider several justificatory arguments for a moral statute of limitations on injustice. I conclude that a significant part of any such argument must ultimately rest on our judgements about competing claims. (shrink)

Atque etiam in ipsis uocalibus grammatici est uidere an ahquas pro consonantibus usus acceperit, quia ‘iam’ sicut ‘tarn’ scribitur et ‘uos’ ut ‘cos’, at quae ut uocales iunguntur aut unam longam faciunt, ut ueteres scri-pserunt, qui geminatione earum uelut apice utebantur, aut duas,—nisi quis putat etiam ex tribus uocalibus syllabam fieri, si non aliquae officio consonantium fungantur. quaeret hoc etiam, quo modo duabus demum uocalibus in se coeundi natura sit, cum consonantium nulla nisi alteram frangat. atqui littera i sibi insidit— (...) ‘conicit’ enim est ab illo ‘iacit’—et u, quo modo nunc scribitur ‘uulgus’ et ‘seruus’. sciat etiam Ciceroni placuisse ‘aiio Maiiamque’ geminata ‘i’ scribere: quod si est, etiam ‘i’ iungetur ut consonans. (shrink)

Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. The companion volume, Genes and (...) the Agents of Life, explores the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences. You can download the table of contents here. (shrink)

Written by the preeminent democratic theorist of our time, this book explains the nature, value, and mechanics of democracy. In a new introduction to this Veritas edition, Ian Shapiro considers how Dahl would respond to the ongoing challenges democracy faces in the modern world. “Within the liberal democratic camp there is considerable controversy about exactly how to define democracy. Probably the most influential voice among contemporary political scientists in this debate has been that of Robert Dahl.”—Marc Plattner, _New York (...) Times_ “An excellent introduction for novices, as well as a trusty handbook for experts and political science mavens.”—_Publishers Weekly_. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has become a central issue in the literature on business ethics / business and society. There are, however, a number of problems with stakeholder theory as currently understood. Among these are: 1) the lack of a coherent justificatory framework, 2) the problem of adjudicating between stakeholders, and 3) the problem of stakeholder identification. In this essay, I propose that a possible source of obligations to stakeholders is the principle of fairness (or fair play) as discussed in the political (...) philosophic literature of Rawls, Simmons, and Cullity among others. The principle of fairness states that, “Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, there exist obligations of fairness on the part of these persons or groups to co-operate in proportion to the benefits accepted.” In this essay I discuss the gaps in the current stakeholder literature, elucidate and defend a principle of fairness that fills the gap, compare the fairness model to other similar models of business ethics, and draw some conclusions for the future of stakeholder theory. (shrink)

This is an introductory article on sociobiology, particularly its relationship to eugenics. Sociobiology developed in the 1960s as a field within evolutionary biology to explain human social traits and behaviours. Although sociobiology has few direct connections to eugenics, it shares eugenics’ optimistic enthusiasm for extending biological science into the human domain, often with reckless sensationalism. Sociobiology's critics have argued that sociobiology also propagates a kind of genetic determinism and represents the zealous misapplication of science beyond its proper reach that characterized (...) the eugenics movement. More recently, evolutionary psychology represents a sophistication of sociobiology that attends to the mind as the "missing link" between evolution and behaviour (Cosmides and Tooby 1992, Pinker 1997). (shrink)

The impressive variation amongst biological individuals generates many complexities in addressing the simple-sounding question what is a biological individual? A distinction between evolutionary and physiological individuals is useful in thinking about biological individuals, as is attention to the kinds of groups, such as superorganisms and species, that have sometimes been thought of as biological individuals. More fully understanding the conceptual space that biological individuals occupy also involves considering a range of other concepts, such as life, reproduction, and agency. There has (...) been a focus in some recent discussions by both philosophers and biologists on how evolutionary individuals are created and regulated, as well as continuing work on the evolution of individuality. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between eugenics, disability, and dehumanization, with a focus on forms of eugenics beyond Nazi eugenics.

1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course.

Genes and the Agents of Life undertakes to rethink the place of the individual in the biological sciences, drawing parallels with the cognitive and social sciences. Genes, organisms, and species are all agents of life but how are each of these conceptualized within genetics, developmental biology, evolutionary biology, and systematics? The 2005 book includes highly accessible discussions of genetic encoding, species and natural kinds, and pluralism above the levels of selection, drawing on work from across the biological sciences. The book (...) is a companion to the author's Boundaries of the Mind (2004), also available from Cambridge, where the focus is the cognitive sciences. The book will appeal to a broad range of professionals and students in philosophy, biology, and the history of science. You can download the table of contents and the first chapter here. (shrink)

This is a critical response to "Defending Eugenics", published in MBR in 2018.