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  1. Joseph Agassi (1966). The Mystery of the Ravens. Philosophy of Science 33 (4):395-402.
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  2. Peter Brössel (2013). The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
    Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this "strengthened problem of measure (...)
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  3. Roger Clarke (2010). “The Ravens Paradox” is a Misnomer. Synthese 175 (3):427-440.
    I argue that the standard Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox— generally accepted as the most successful solution to the paradox—is insufficiently general. I give an instance of the paradox which is not solved by the standard Bayesian solution. I defend a new, more general solution, which is compatible with the Bayesian account of confirmation. As a solution to the paradox, I argue that the ravens hypothesis ought not to be held equivalent to its contrapositive; more interestingly, I argue that (...)
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  4. Xinguo Dun (2007). Queries on Hempel's Solution to the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (1):131-139.
    To solve the highly counterintuitive paradox of confirmation represented by the statement, “A pair of red shoes confirms that all ravens are black,” Hempel employed a strategy that retained the equivalence condition but abandoned Nicod’s irrelevance condition. However, his use of the equivalence condition is fairly ad hoc, raising doubts about its applicability to this problem. Furthermore, applying the irrelevance condition from Nicod’s criterion does not necessarily lead to paradoxes, nor does discarding it prevent the emergence of paradoxes. Hempel’s approach (...)
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  5. Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) (2010). The Place of Probability in Science. Springer.
    To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ...
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  6. George Englebretsen (1971). Sommers' Theory and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 38 (3):438-441.
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  7. Branden Fitelson (2010). The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  8. Branden Fitelson (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1103-1105.
    The early twentieth century witnessed a shift in the way philosophers of science thought about traditional 'problems of induction'. Keynes championed the idea that Hume's Problem was not a problem about causation (which had been the traditional reading of Hume) but rather a problem about induction. Moreover, Keynes (and later Nicod) viewed such problems as having both logical and epistemological components. Hempel picked up where Keynes and Nicod left off, by formulating a rigorous formal theory of inductive logic. This spawned (...)
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  9. Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  10. Branden Fitelson (2004). Discussion: Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.
    Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X _ even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new-and-improved Bayesian account that overcomes the (...)
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  11. Branden Fitelson (2002). Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.
    Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X—even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms (...)
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  12. Branden Fitelson (2001). Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
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  13. Branden Fitelson (1999). The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
    Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of (...)
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  14. Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne (2010). How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens. In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. 247--275.
    The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts (...)
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  15. Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne (2010). Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
  16. Haim Gaifman (1979). Subjective Probability, Natural Predicates and Hempel's Ravens. Erkenntnis 14 (2):105 - 147.
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  17. L. Gibson (1969). On 'Ravens and Relevance' and a Likelihood Solution of the Paradox of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):75-80.
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  18. Ronald N. Giere (1970). An Orthodox Statistical Resolution of the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 37 (3):354-362.
    Several authors, e.g. Patrick Suppes and I. J. Good, have recently argued that the paradox of confirmation can be resolved within the developing subjective Bayesian account of inductive reasoning. The aim of this paper is to show that the paradox can also be resolved by the rival orthodox account of hypothesis testing currently employed by most statisticians and scientists. The key to the orthodox statistical resolution is the rejection of a generalized version of Hempel's instantiation condition, namely, the condition that (...)
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  19. I. J. Good (1961). The Paradox of Confirmation (II). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (45):63-64.
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  20. I. J. Good (1960). The Paradox of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42):145-149.
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  21. Theodore Hailperin (2007). Quantifier Probability Logic and the Confirmation Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):83-100.
    Exhumation and study of the 1945 paradox of confirmation brings out the defect of its formulation. In the context of quantifier conditional-probability logic it is shown that a repair can be accomplished if the truth-functional conditional used in the statement of the paradox is replaced with a connective that is appropriate to the probabilistic context. Description of the quantifier probability logic involved in the resolution of the paradox is presented in stages. Careful distinction is maintained between a formal logic language (...)
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  22. James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson, An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.
    Think of confirmation in the context of the Ravens Paradox this way. The likelihood ratio measure of incremental confirmation gives us, for an observed Black Raven and for an observed non-Black non-Raven, respectively, the following “full” likelihood ratios.
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  23. David Kaplan (1967). Review: R. A. Sharpe, Validity and the Paradox of Confirmation. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):251-251.
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  24. Brian Laetz (2011). Does the Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation Really Support Bayesianism? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):39-46.
    Bayesians regard their solution to the paradox of confirmation as grounds for preferring their theory of confirmation to Hempel’s. They point out that, unlike Hempel, they can at least say that a black raven confirms “All ravens are black” more than a white shoe. However, I argue that this alleged advantage is cancelled out by the fact that Bayesians are equally committed to the view that a white shoe confirms “All non-black things are non-ravens” less than a black raven. In (...)
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  25. Tony Lawson (1985). The Context of Prediction (and the Paradox of Confirmation). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):393-407.
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  26. J. L. Mackie (1963). The Paradox of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):265-277.
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  27. Floyd Merrell (2007). Toward a Concept of Pluralistic, Inter-Relational Semiosis. Sign Systems Studies 35 (1-2):9-68.
    Brief consideration of (1) Peirce’s ‘logic of vagueness’, (2) his categories, and (3) the concepts of overdetermination and underdetermination, vagueness and generality, and inconsistency and incompleteness, along with (4) the abrogation of classical Aristotelian principles of logic, bear out the complexity of all relatively rich sign systems. Given this complexity, there is semiotic indeterminacy, which suggests sign limitations, and at the same time it promises semiotic freedom, giving rise to sign proliferation the yield of which is pluralistic, inter-relational semiosis. This (...)
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  28. Luca Moretti (2006). The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism. Erkenntnis 64 (1):115-138.
    Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.
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  29. Luca Moretti (2004). Grimes on the Tacking by Disjunction Problem. Disputatio 1 (17):16-20.
    In this paper, I focus on the so-called "tacking by disjunction problem". Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis H is confirmed by a statement E, H is confirmed by the disjunction E v F, for whatever statement F. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.
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  30. Luca Moretti (2003). Why the Converse Consequence Condition Cannot Be Accepted. Analysis 63 (4):297–300.
    Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.
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  31. G. Nerlich (1964). Mr. Wilson on the Paradox of Confirmation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):401 – 405.
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  32. Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (2002). A Comparative Treatment of the Paradox of Confirmation. Journal of Indian Philosophy 30 (4):339-358.
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  33. William W. Rozeboom (1968). New Dimensions of Confirmation Theory. Philosophy of Science 35 (2):134-155.
    When Hempel's "paradox of confirmation" is developed within the confines of conditional probability theory, it becomes apparent that two seemingly equivalent generalities ("laws") can have exactly the same class of observational refuters even when their respective classes of confirming observations are importantly distinct. Generalities which have the inductive supports we commonsensically construe them to have, however, must incorporate quasi-logical operators or connectives which cannot be defined truth-functionally. The origins and applications of these "modalic" concepts appear to be intimately linked with (...)
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  34. R. A. Sharpe (1964). Validity and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (55):170-173.
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  35. Brian Skyrms (1966). Choice and Chance. Belmont, Calif.,Dickenson Pub. Co..
  36. D. Stove (1965). Hempel and Goodman on the Ravens. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):300 – 310.
  37. Peter B. M. Vranas (2004). Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.
    According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. Introduction Hempel's (...)
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  38. Ruth Weintraub (1988). A Paradox of Confirmation. Erkenntnis 29 (2):169 - 180.
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  39. Jan Woleński (2008). O paradoksie konfirmacji. Roczniki Filozoficzne 56 (1):355-361.
    This paper is devoted to analysis of co-called paradox of confirmation formulated by C. G. Hempel in the 1930s. In particular, the author proposes a solution of this puzzle. The proposal consists in refining the concept of confirmation by adding a clause that if A confirms a hypothesis h, the former must be a logical consequence of a latter, eventually derived with the help of additional assumptions. This leads to an additional constraint requiring that confirmations act relatively to sets of (...)
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