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Personal Identity

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  1. George J. Agich & Royce P. Jones (1986). Personal Identity and Brain Death: A Critical Response. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (3):267-274.
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  2. Jonny Anomaly (2009). Personal Identity and Practical Reason. Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.
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  3. Keith Arnold (1989). Personal Identity: The Galton Details. Philosophia 19 (1).
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  4. Kim Atkins (2000). Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):329 – 349.
    In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My (...)
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  5. Robert Audi (1976). Eschatological Verification and Personal Identity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4).
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  6. Marvin Belzer (2005). Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):126-164.
    Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that (...)
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  7. David Berman (2001). Book Review. Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century Raymond Martin John Barresi. Mind 110 (438).
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  8. Stephan Blatti (2008). The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity (Review). Mind 117 (465):191-95.
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  9. E. J. Borowski (1976). Identity and Personal Identity. Mind 85 (340):481-502.
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  10. Stephen E. Braude (2005). Personal Identity and Postmortem Survival. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):226-249.
    The so-called “problem of personal identity” can be viewed as either a metaphysical or an epistemological issue. Metaphysicians want to know what it is for one individual to be the same person as another. Epistemologists want to know how to decide if an individual is the same person as someone else. These two problems converge around evidence from mediumship and apparent reincarnation cases, suggesting personal survival of bodily death and dissolution. These cases make us wonder how it might be possible (...)
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  11. Baruch Brody (1974). An Impersonal Theory of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6).
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  12. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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  13. Allen Buchanan (1988). Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (4):277-302.
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  14. Christopher Buford (2009). Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3).
    Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal identity (...)
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  15. David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.
    Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that (...)
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  16. Rebecca Copenhaver, Reid on Memory and Personal Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  17. G. L. Doore (1982). Mackie on Personal Identity. Mind 91 (364):593-598.
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  18. Igor Douven (1999). Marc Slors on Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):143 – 149.
    Theories of personal identity purport to specify truth conditions for sentences of the form 'x-at-ti is the same person as y-at-tj. Most philosophers nowadays agree that such truth conditions are to be stated in terms of psychological continuity. However; opinions vary as to how the notion of psychological continuity is to be understood. In a recent contribution to this journal, Slors offers an account in which psychological continuity is spelled out in terms of narrative connectedness between mental states.The present paper (...)
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  19. Howard M. Ducharme (1986). Personal Identity in Samuel Clarke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3).
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  20. Douglas Ehring (1987). Personal Identity and Time Travel. Philosophical Studies 52 (3).
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  21. Fred Feldman, Hume's a Treatise of Human Nature (I, IV, 6): Personal Identity.
    We are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; we feel its existence and its continuing to exist, and are certain - more even than any demonstration could make us - both of its perfect identity and of its simplicity. The strongest sensations and most violent emotions, instead of distracting us from this view ·of our self·, only focus it all the more intensely, making us think about how these sensations and emotions affect our self by bringing (...)
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  22. Edward Feser (2005). Personal Identity and Self-Ownership. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):100-125.
    Defenders of the thesis of self-ownership generally focus on the “ownership” part of the thesis and say little about the metaphysics of the self that is said to be self-owned. But not all accounts of the self are consistent with robust self-ownership. Philosophical accounts of the self are typically enshrined in theories of personal identity, and the paper examines various such theories with a view to determining their suitability for grounding a metaphysics of the self consistent with self-ownership. As it (...)
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  23. John Finnis (2005). “The Thing I Am”: Personal Identity in Aquinas and Shakespeare. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):250-282.
    The four kinds of explanation identified by Aquinas at the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics are deployed to show that the identity of the human person is sui generis and mysterious, even though each of its elements is more or less readily accessible to our understanding. The essay attends particularly to the explorations by Aquinas and, with different techniques, by Shakespeare of the experience and understanding of (a) one's lasting presence to oneself as one and the same bodily (...)
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  24. John Martin Fischer & Daniel Speak (2000). Death and the Psychological Conception of Personal Identity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):84–93.
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  25. Gary Foster (2009). Bestowal Without Appraisal: Problems in Frankfurt's Characterization of Love and Personal Identity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2).
    Harry Frankfurt characterizes love as “a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for it.” As such, he views romantic love as an inauthentic paradigm for love since such love desires reciprocation, sexual gratification and so on. I argue that Frankfurt’s conception of love is (a) too general—he does not distinguish between the type of love one has for one’s partner, one’s country, a moral ideal, etc., (b) it overemphasizes the role of bestowal (...)
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  26. Ruth Gamble (2008). Review of Mark Siderits, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons. Sophia 47 (1).
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  27. Jonardon Ganeri (1999). Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5).
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  28. Jay Garfield, Reductionism and Fictionalism Comments on Siderits' Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy.
    As a critic, I am in the unenviable position of agreeing with nearly all of what Mark does in this lucid, erudite and creative book. My comments will hence not be aimed at showing what he got wrong, as much as an attempt from a Madhyamaka point of view to suggest another way of seeing things, in particular another way of seeing how one might think of how Madhyamaka philosophers, such as Någårjuna and Candrak¥rti, see conventional truth, our engagement with (...)
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  29. Brian Garrett (1998). Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. Routledge.
    The first book synthesizing the many different topics that surround the issue of personal identity, this text makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology.
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  30. Don Garrett (1981). Hume's Self-Doubts About Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 90 (3):337-358.
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  31. James Giles (1993). The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200.
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  32. Rafał Godoń (2004). Understanding, Personal Identity and Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 38 (4):589–600.
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  33. Michael B. Green & Daniel Wikler (1980). Brain Death and Personal Identity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (2):105-133.
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  34. Michael J. Green (1999). The Idea of a Momentary Self and Hume's Theory of Personal Identity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1):103 – 122.
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  35. John d GreenwooD (1994). A Sense of Identity: Prolegomena to a Social Theory of Personal Identity. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (1):25–46.
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  36. Victoria S. Harrison (1999). Personal Identity and Integration: Von Balthasar's Phenomenology of Human Holiness. Heythrop Journal 40 (4):424–437.
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  37. David Hershenov, A Hylomorphic Account of Personal Identity Thought Experiments.
    Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity that maintain psychology is irrelevant to our persistence and neo-Lockean accounts that deny we are animals. A Thomistic-inspired account is provided that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones without having to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity that matters in survival nor countenance the puzzles of spatially coincident entities that plague (...)
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  38. David Hershenov (2006). Personal Identity and Purgatory. Religious Studies 42 (4):439-451.
    If Purgatory involves just an immaterial soul undergoing a transformation between our death and resurrection, then, as Aquinas recognized, it won't be us in Purgatory. Drawing upon Parfit's ideas about identity not being what matters to us, we explore whether the soul's experience of Purgatory could still be beneficial to it as well as the deceased human who didn't experience the purging yet would possess the purged soul upon resurrection. We also investigate an alternative non-Thomistic hylomorphic account of Purgatory in (...)
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  39. David Hershenov (2004). Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Philosophy 79 (3):447-474.
    Brain transplants and the dicephalus (an organism just like us except that it has two cerebrums) are thought to support the position that we are essentially thinking creatures, not living organisms. I try to offset the first of these intuitions by responding to thought experiments Peter Unger devised to show that identity is what matters. I then try to motivate an interpretation of the alleged conjoined twins as really just one person cut off from himself by relying upon what I (...)
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  40. Intisar-Ul-Haque (1970). The Person and Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1):60-72.
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  41. F. M. Kamm (2005). Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):283-307.
    In the first part of this article, I argue that even those entities that in their own right and for their own sake give us reason not to destroy them and to help them are sometimes substitutable for the good of other entities. In so arguing, I consider the idea of being valuable as an end in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I also conclude that entities that have claims to things and against others are especially nonsubstitutable. In the (...)
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  42. Daniel Kolak (2008). Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity. Synthese 162 (3).
    Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of (...)
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  43. Gereon Kopf (2002). Temporality and Personal Identity in the Thought of Nishida Kitaro. Philosophy East and West 52 (2):224-245.
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  44. Carsten Korfmacher, Personal Identity. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  45. Mark G. Kuczewski (1994). Whose Will is It, Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 8 (1):27–48.
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  46. Helga Kuhse (1999). Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4).
    : In this paper, I consider objections to advance directives based on the claim that there is a discontinuity of interests, and of personal identity, between the time a person executes an advance directive and the time when the patient has become severely demented. Focusing narrowly on refusals of life-sustaining treatment for severely demented patients, I argue that acceptance of the psychological view of personal identity does not entail that treatment refusals should be overridden. Although severely demented patients are morally (...)
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  47. Mark Lance & H. Heath White (2007). Stereoscopic Vision: Persons, Freedom, and Two Spaces of Material Inference. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (4):1-21.
    We discuss first a "stance" methodology toward the problem of personhood. This is to ask first, what it is to take something to be a person, and then to move via a notion of appropriateness to an answer to what it is to be a person. We argue that the distinctions between persons and non-persons, between agents and patients, and between subjects and mere objects are deeply connected. All three distinctions are themselves traced to a fundamental distinction within the space (...)
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  48. Justin Leiber (1985). Can Animals and Machines Be Persons?: A Dialogue. Hackett Pub. Co..
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  49. Michael E. Levin (1980). Reverse Discrimination, Shackled Runners, and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 37 (2).
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  50. Nir Lipsman, Rebecca Zener & Mark Bernstein (2009). Personal Identity, Enhancement and Neurosurgery: A Qualitative Study in Applied Neuroethics. Bioethics 23 (6):375-383.
    Recent developments in the field of neurosurgery, specifically those dealing with the modification of mood and affect as part of psychiatric disease, have led some researchers to discuss the ethical implications of surgery to alter personality and personal identity. As knowledge and technology advance, discussions of surgery to alter undesirable traits, or possibly the enhancement of normal traits, will play an increasingly larger role in the ethical literature. So far, identity and enhancement have yet to be explored in a neurosurgical (...)
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  51. Peter Loptson (2004). Locke, Reid, and Personal Identity. Philosophical Forum 35 (1):51–63.
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  52. Bertha Alvarez Manninen (2009). The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):190-204.
    Many bioethicists working in reproductive ethics tacitly assume some theory of diachronic personal identity. For example, Peter Singer argues that there is no identity relation between a foetus and a future individual because the former shares no robust mental connections with the latter. Consequently, abortion prevents the existence of an individual; it does not destroy an already existing individual. Singer's argument implicitly appeals to the psychological account of personal identity, which, although endorsed by many philosophers such as Derek Parfit, is (...)
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  53. Ned Markosian, Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity.
    I take Eric Olson’s account of personal identity to have two components. First there is his characterization of the problem of personal identity. Here’s a paraphrase of some things Olson says on p. 23 of The Human Animal.1..
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  54. Ned Markosian (2010). Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
    This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that (...)
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  55. Raymond Martin, Eighteenth Century British Theories of Self & Personal Identity.
    1. In the Essay, Locke’s most controversial claim, which he slipped into Book IV almost as an aside, was that matter might think (Locke1975:IV.iii.6;540-1).i Either because he was genuinely pious, which he was, or because he was clever, which he also was, he tied the denial that matter might think to the claim that God’s powers are limited, thus, attempting to disarm his critics. It did not work. Stillingfleet and others were outraged. If matter can think, then for explanatory purposes (...)
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  56. Raymond Martin (2000). Locke's Psychology of Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1).
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  57. Raymond Martin (2000). Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century. Routledge.
    Naturalization of the Soul charts the development of the concept of soul in western thought, from Plato to the present. The authors place particular emphasis on the eighteenth century which witnessed an enormous intellectual transformation in the way theorists perceived self and personal identity and paved the way for contemporary philosophical and psychological debates.
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  58. Raymond Martin & John Barresi (2003). Personal Identity. Blackwell.
    These are the very scholars that were involved in initiating the revolution in personal identity theory.
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  59. Jane L. McIntyre (1989). Personal Identity and the Passions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4).
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  60. Susan Mendus (1980). Personal Identity: The Two Analogies in Hume. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):61-68.
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  61. Trenton Merricks (1999). Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
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  62. James Lindemann Nelson (2000). Prenatal Diagnosis, Personal Identity, and Disability. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (3).
    : A fascinating criticism of abortion occasioned by prenatal diagnosis of potentially disabling traits is that the complex of test-and-abortion sends a morally disparaging message to people living with disabilities. I have argued that available versions of this "expressivist" argument are inadequate on two grounds. The most fundamental is that, considered as a practice, abortions prompted by prenatal testing are not semantically well-behaved enough to send any particular message; they do not function as signs in a rule-governed symbol system. Further, (...)
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  63. Peter Nichols (forthcoming). Substance Concepts and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies.
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on the (...)
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  64. Shaun Nichols (2010). Intuitions About Personal Identity: An Empirical Study. Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):293-312.
    Williams (1970) argues that our intuitions about personal identity vary depending on how a given thought experiment is framed. Some frames lead us to think that persistence of self requires persistence of one's psychological characteristics; other frames lead us to think that the self persists even after the loss of one's distinctive psychological characteristics. The current paper takes an empirical approach to these issues. We find that framing does affect whether or not people judge that persistence of psychological characteristics is (...)
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  65. David A. Oakley & H. C. Plotkin (1979). Brain, Behaviour, and Evolution. Methuen and Company.
    It has always concentrated upon man, and usually the comparative approach has not been used to study the evolution of behaviour, but in the hope that ...
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  66. Eric Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press.
    One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that the bodily criterion is an (...)
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  67. Eric T. Olson (2006). Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self, by John Perry. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):434–437.
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  68. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (2005). Personal Identity. Cambridge University Press.
    What is a person? What makes me the same person today that I was yesterday or will be tomorrow? Philosophers have long pondered these questions. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates observed that all of us are constantly undergoing change: we experience physical changes to our bodies, as well as changes in our 'manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, [and] fears'. Aristotle theorized that there must be some underlying 'substratum' that remains the same even as we undergo these changes. John Locke rejected (...)
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  69. Terence Penelhum (1955). Hume on Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 64 (4):571-589.
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  70. Roy W. Perrett (2002). Personal Identity, Minimalism, and Madhyamaka. Philosophy East and West 52 (3):373-385.
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  71. Ingmar Persson (1992). The Indeterminacy and Insignificance of Personal Identity. Inquiry 35 (2):271 – 283.
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  72. Neven Petrović (2009). Equality of Opportunity and Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (2).
    One of the central theses of egalitarian liberals in the domain of distributive justice is that talented individuals should not be allowed to keep their entire market-income even if it flows solely from their greater abilities. This claim is usually supported by one of several arguments or some mixture of them, but in the present paper, I want to concentrate on the version that invokes equality of opportunity as its starting point. Namely, it is claimed that every human being should (...)
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  73. Hugh Upton ba mphil phd (2005). Personal Identity. Nursing Philosophy 6 (1):77–79.
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  74. Thane Plantikow (2008). Surviving Personal Identity Theory: Recovering Interpretability. Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109.
    Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.
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  75. Edi Pucci (1992). Review of Paul Ricoeur's Oneself as Another: Personal Identity, Narrative Identity and "Selfhood" in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur. Philosophy and Social Criticism 18 (2).
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  76. Michael Quante (1999). Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4).
    : Debates on precedent autonomy and some forms of paternalistic interventions, which are related to questions of personal identity, are analyzed. The discussion is based on the distinction between personal identity as persistence and as biographical identity. It first is shown that categorical objections to advance directives and "Ulysses contracts" are based on false assumptions about personal identity that conflate persistence and biographical identity. Therefore, advance directives and "Ulysses contracts" are ethically acceptable tools for prolonging one's autonomy. The notions of (...)
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  77. Philip L. Quinn (1978). Personal Identity, Bodily Continuity and Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2).
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  78. William J. Rapaport, Computer Processes and Virtual Persons: Comments on Cole's "Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity".
    This is a draft of the written version of comments on a paper by David Cole, presented orally at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meeting in New Orleans, 27 April 1990. Following the written comments are 2 appendices: One contains a letter to Cole updating these comments. The other is the handout from the oral presentation.
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  79. Wade L. Robison (1997). Privacy and Personal Identity. Ethics and Behavior 7 (3):195 – 205.
    What marks the traditional privacy torts of disclosure, intrusion, false light, and appropriation is that they require an invasion, an intrinsic harm caused by someone doing something to us without our consent. But we are now voluntarily giving up information about ourselves--to our physicians, for instance--that is being gathered into databases that are brought and sold and that can be appropriated by those who wish to assume our identities. The way in which our privacy is put at risk is different, (...)
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  80. Wade L. Robison (1974). Hume on Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (2).
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  81. Jacob Ross, Personal Identity and the Irrelevance of Self-Interest.
    Self-interest is widely regarded as an important, if not as the only, source of reasons for action, and hence it is widely held that one can rationally give special weight to one’s self-interest in deciding how to act. In what follows, I will argue against this view. I will do so by following the lead of Derek Parfit, and considering cases in which personal identity appears to break down. My argument will differ from Parfit’s, however, in that it will have (...)
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  82. Abraham Sesshu Roth (2000). What Was Hume's Problem with Personal Identity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):91-114.
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  83. Ruth L. Saw (1969). Personal Identity in Spinoza. Inquiry 12 (1-4):1 – 14.
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  84. Marya Schechtman (2001). Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111.
    Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access (...)
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  85. David Shoemaker (2009). The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics. Bioethics 24 (7):no-no.
    It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – and I show in each (...)
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  86. David W. Shoemaker (2007). Personal Identity and Practical Concerns. Mind 116 (462).
    Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). I articulate four natural methodological assumptions made by those wanting to construct a theory of the relation between identity and practical concerns, and I point out powerful objections to each assumption, objections constituting serious methodological obstacles to the overall project. I then attempt to offer replies to each general objection in a way that leaves (...)
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  87. David W. Shoemaker (1999). Utilitarianism and Personal Identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2).
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  88. Mark Siderits (2003). Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons. Ashgate.
    This book initiates a conversation between the two traditions showing how concepts and tools drawn from one philosophical tradition can help solve problems ...
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  89. Quentin Smith (1993). Personal Identity and Time. Philosophia 22 (1-2).
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  90. Thomas W. Smythe (1975). Chisholm on Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 27 (5).
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  91. Roger W. Sperry (1979). Consciousness, Free Will and Personal Identity. In David A. Oakley & H.C. Plotkin (eds.), Brain, Behaviour, and Evolution. Methuen and Company.
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  92. Patrick Stokes (2008). Locke, Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):645 – 672.
    Personal Identity theorists as diverse as Derek Parfit, Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson have noted that the experiencing subject (the locus of present psychological experience) and the person (a human being with a career/narrative extended across time) are not necessarily coextensive. Accordingly, we can become psychologically alienated from, and fail to experience a sense of identity with, the person we once were or will be. This presents serious problems for Locke's original account of “sameness of consciousness” constituting personal identity, given (...)
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  93. J. S. Swindell (2007). Facial Allograft Transplantation, Personal Identity, and Subjectivity. Journal of Medical Ethics 33:449-453.
    An analysis of the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation is provided in this paper. The identity issues involved in organ transplantation in general, under both theoretical accounts of personal identity and subjective accounts provided by organ recipients, are examined. It is argued that the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation are similar to those involved in organ transplantation in general, but much stronger because the face is so closely linked with personal identity. Recipients of facial allograft transplantation (...)
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  94. Richard Taylor (1969). The Anattā Doctrine and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and West 19 (4):359-366.
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  95. Patrick Toner (2009). On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):no-no.
    Abstract: There is no such thing as 'the' hylemorphic account of personal identity. There are several views that count as hylemorphic, and these views can be grouped into two main families—the corruptionist view, and the survivalist view. The differentiating factor is that the corruptionist view holds that the persistence of the soul is not sufficient for the persistence of the person, while the survivalist view holds that the persistence of the soul is sufficient for the persistence of the person. In (...)
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  96. William Uzgalis (2009). Anthony Collins on the Emergence of Consciousness and Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):363-379.
    The correspondence between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins of 1706–8, while not well known, is a spectacularly good debate between a dualist and a materialist over the possibility of giving a materialist account of consciousness and personal identity. This article puts the Clarke Collins Correspondence in a broader context in which it can be better appreciated, noting that it is really a debate between John Locke and Anthony Collins on one hand, and Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler on the other. (...)
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  97. Sophia Vasalou (2008). Personal Identity as a Task. Inquiry 51 (3):288 – 311.
    In this paper, I explore a mode of concern with the question of personal identity in which the latter is raised as a problem of a practical order. What provokes this is a concern with the experience of discontinuity within the self and with the perception of continuity as a fragile and uncontrollable good. I discuss the relation which this practically oriented perspective bears to the philosophical form of engagement with personal identity, and the reasons which make the perspective of (...)
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  98. Stephen Wang (2009). Aquinas and Sartre: On Freedom, Personal Identity, and the Possibility of Happiness. Catholic University of America Press.
    Historical introduction -- Human being -- Identity and human incompletion in Sartre -- Identity and human incompletion in Aquinas -- Human understanding -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Sartre -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Aquinas -- Human freedom -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Sartre -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Aquinas -- Human fulfillment -- The possibility of human happiness in Sartre -- The possibility of human happiness in (...)
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  99. Caroline West, Personal Identity, Individual Autonomy and Group Rights.
    It is a commonplace in liberal circles that individual persons have a right to individual autonomy or self-determination. Each mentally competent adult has a right to be at liberty to live and shape their own life in accordance with their own view about what makes for a good life, free from undue coercion or interference by others, so long as they do not harm others. In the words of John Stuart Mill, mentally-competent persons should have the liberty of “framing the (...)
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  100. Kenneth Winkler (1991). Locke on Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (2).
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