De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue (...) that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs. (shrink)

What kind of thing do you believe when you believe that you are in a certain place, that it is a certain time, and that you are a certain individual? What happens if you get lost, or lose track of the time? Can you ever be unsure of your own identity? These are the kind of questions considered in my thesis. Beliefs about where, when and who you are are what are called in the literature de se, or self-locating beliefs. (...) This thesis examines how we can represent de se beliefs, and how we can reason about de se uncertainty. In the first part of the thesis, I present and motivate a specific account of the content of de se belief, based on the one given by David Lewis. On this account, the content of de se beliefs are centred propositions. I defend this view against a rival account, put forward by Robert Stalnaker, according to whom the content of de se beliefs are ordinary propositions. In the second part of the thesis, I explore how we can reason probabilistically about de se uncertainty. I start by defining probabilities over centred propositions, and investigate what probabilities mean in this context. As it turns out, all the main interpretations of probability can be extended to centred propositions. The only trouble seems to arise for the Bayesian principle of updating via conditionalization. After giving a diagnosis of the problem, I offer a solution by formulating a natural extension of conditionalization, which I argue preserves the essential features of Bayesian reasoning. In the final chapter, I apply my view and show that it leads to a natural resolution of a puzzle that is generally taken to be a test case for any account of centred updating. (shrink)

The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, I look ahead to a related question: how should de se beliefs be integrated into formal theories of rational choice? I argue that standard decision theoretic frameworks fail in special cases of de se uncertainty, like Sleeping Beauty. The nature of the failure reveals that sometimes rational choices are determined independently of one’s (...) credences in the kinds of ‘narrow’ de se propositions that Sleepy Beauty has set in relief. Consequently, in addition to pinpointing a failure of standard decision theoretic frameworks, this result casts doubt on a large class of strategies for determining principles for the rationally updating de se beliefs in cases like Sleeping Beauty, and also calls into question the importance of making such a determination at all. (shrink)

We develop an approach to the problem of de se belief usually expressed with the question, what does the shopper with the leaky sugar bag have to learn to know that s/he is the one making the mess. Where one might have thought that some special kind of “de se” belief explains the triggering of action, we maintain that this gets the order of explanation wrong. We sketch a very simple cognitive architecture that yields de se-like behavior on (...) which the action-triggering functionality of the belief-state is what counts it as de se rather than some prior property of being “de se” explaining the triggering of action. This functionality shows that action-triggering change in belief-state also undergirds a correlative change in the objective involved in the triggered action. This model is far too simple to have any claim to showing how the de se works for humans, but it shows, by illustration, that nothing mysteriously “subjective”” need be involved in this aspect of self-conception. While our exposition is very different from those of Perry and Recanati, all three of us are developing the same kind of view. (shrink)

Resumen El presente artículo, inspirado en la idea de Vernant de que la razón griega es “hija de la ciudad”, aborda el vínculo existente entre las circunstancias políticas y sociales de Éfeso y el pensamiento heraclíteo. En efecto, a partir de la tensión que se produjo entre la realidad histórica en que vivió Heráclito y el resultado de su propia reflexión sobre ella, el filósofo desarrolló una idea de organización de la ciudad, según la cual una pólis debería ser gobernada (...) por el mismo principio rector del universo -i. e. el lógos-, lo cual, en términos prácticos, se traduciría en un modelo político monárquico.This paper, inspired by Vernant’s belief that Greek reason is “a creature of the city”, explores the connection linking Heraclitus’ thought to the political and social circumstances prevailing at Ephesus. Indeed, the tension arising from Heraclitus’ own historical framework and this philosopher’s resulting outlook on it led him to conceive of a rule for organizing a city, according to which a pólis should be governed by the same principle guiding the universe -i. e. the lógos-, which would materialize in concrete form as a monarchical government. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza y critica los argumentos de Carl Schmitt contra la democracia liberal, y pone en cuestión su aprovechamiento por parte del pensamiento progresista contemporáneo. Primero se examina la conexión conceptual de la concepción schmittiana de lo político con la transformación del Estado liberal en el Estado totalitario. Luego se cuestiona el supuesto filosófico que subyace en la crítica de Schmitt al liberalismo: la tesis de la imposibilidad de alcanzar soluciones racionales y pacíficas a los conflictos políticos. Se analizan (...) en este contexto los dos recursos deliberativos más importantes de que dispone el liberalismo para abordar los conflictos políticos: los acuerdos y los compromisos de intereses. Por último, el artículo concluye con algunas reflexiones sobre el significado político del "neoschmittianismo" contemporáneo. This article analyses Carl Schmitt's arguments against liberal democracy, and questions the potential of these arguments for contemporary progressive political thought. The article shows the conceptual connection of the schmittian concept of the political with the transformation of the liberal State into a totalitarian State. Subsequently it tries to show that the main premise of Schmitt's critique of liberalism is false, namely the belief that it is impossible to reach a dialogical and peaceful solution to political conflicts, either by agreement or by compromise. Finally the article includes some reflections on the political significance of contemporary "neo-schmittianism". (shrink)

This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed (...) account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account. (shrink)

I have become more convinced, over the years, by the truth of Wittgenstein’s characterisation of philosophy as arising through misconceptions of grammar. Such a misconception of grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near (...) to the left of x such that, if he were to utter the sentence “I am hot” at t, what he would thereby say is true’ (Evans 1985: 358). But not only does this disturb the proper relation between direct and indirect speech, it continues a Fregean tradition which these very cases show to be quite mistaken about the logic of intensions. In this paper, however, I want primarily to point out how this misconception of grammar has distorted our view of people. For some of the above thinkers have tried to make out that human motivation is related to the possession of a certain category of indexical belief, by Lewis called ‘de se beliefs’. I shall look here at how the matter arises in Hugh Mellor’s work on Time. In connection with Time, indexicality arises in McTaggart’s ‘A-series’, and Mellor treats this indexicality in parallel with Evans’ language. First, therefore, I aim to show how Mellor’s discussion of Time grammatically misconceives the situation, and leads to a misrepresentation of the motivation of human action. But a larger conclusion about Fregean intensions is also then immediately available. (shrink)

This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational (...) de re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by special ‘ de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)

La presente investigación tuvo por objetivo analizar la percepción del profesorado en el constructo igualdad de género. Se diseñó un estudio cuantitativo exposfacto utilizando la Escala de Igualdad de Género Oculta que se aplicó sobre una muestra incidental de 391 docentes de la Comunidad de Madrid. Para el análisis de datos se aplicaron las pruebas de Student, ANOVA y MANOVA. Los resultados revelaron diferencias significativas en las principales dimensiones de la escala IGOE. La dimensión Situación de Género en la Escuela (...) actuó como la principal transmisora de estereotipos, actitudes y conductas sexistas mediante el currículo oculto. (shrink)

Such a misconception of grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near to the left of x such that, if he were to utter the sentence “I am hot” at t, what he would (...) thereby say is true’ (Evans 1985: 358). But not only does this disturb the proper relation between direct and indirect speech, it continues a Fregean tradition which these very cases show to be quite mistaken about the logic of intensions. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo pretendo expor sinteticamente os problemas levantados contra uma das formas de realismo científico conhecida como realismo experimental, além de propor uma formulação mais aceitável do mesmo, resistente a tais críticas. Os problemas alegados pelos oponentes do realismo experimental variam desde a acusação de inadequação em relação à prática da comunidade científica, até a inconsistência ao admitir entidades e propriedades postuladas teoricamente recusando, entretanto, as teorias em que tais entidades e propriedades aparecem. Some-se a essas críticas a de (...) que o próprio critério do realismo de entidades seria implausível, seja porque falha na produção de crenças verdadeiras ou porque não fornece garantias melhores do que outras formas de realismo científico. Argumentarei que, adotando o realismo experimental exclusivamente como um critério epistêmico e aplicando tal critério às propriedades é possível contornar as críticas, reabilitando uma proposta realista que muitos consideravam já descartada. ABSTRACT In this paper, I will expose briefly the problems raised against one kind of scientific realism known by experimental realism and also will propose an acceptable formulation of that realism, resistant to those criticisms. The problems claimed by the experimental realism’s opponents range from the accusation of inadequacy with the scientific community’s practice to the claim that the admission of entities and proprieties without accepting the theories in which those proprieties and entities are supposed is incoherent. Besides, there is another criticism which states that the entities realism’s criterion is implausible, either because it fails to produce true beliefs or because there is no better warranty in adopting it than other kinds of scientific realism. I will argue that adopting experimental realism exclusively as an epistemic criterion and applying that criterion to proprieties it is possible to escape the criticisms, rehabilitating a realist propose that many people though already discarded. (shrink)

I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' ('she (...) herself', 'it itself') belongs to a "unique, irreducible logical category" of singular terms is, at best, misleading. Further, my account is superior to the well-known theories of R. Chisholm and D. Lewis, according to which de se ascriptions state that the believer "directly attributes properties to himself or herself". 1. Introduction 2. Chisholm and Lewis on de se belief ascriptions 3. Fregean and Sellarsian theories of belief ascriptions 4. Geach on the reflexive pronoun 5. Admiring and self-admiring 6. A solution to the problem de se belief ascriptions 7. Belief de se 8. Conclusion. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo, analiso um conjunto de seis cartões comerciais pertencentes a uma duradoura campanha de marketing da Liebig Extract of Meat Co. A análise crítica dos textos promocionais produzidos na virada do século XX oferece insights significativos sobre os mecanismos discursivos que contribuíram para a hegemonização do capitalismo burguês. Diferentemente de outras formas de publicidade, os cartões comerciais não são rapidamente descartados e esquecidos; pelo contrário, eles podem se distanciar dos produtos anunciados para se tornar parte dos discursos populares (...) de instrução em massa. Como produtos e produtores de ideologias capitalistas, os anúncios são um local privilegiado de inscrição do capitalismo e, portanto, se prestam a uma análise crítica. Minha análise mostra como os textos selecionados se baseiam e texturizam os discursos do progresso, impregnados como crenças colonialistas e desencadeando uma cadeia de ações pela qual, mesmo antes de realmente obterem os cartões, são promulgadas ações e crenças capitalistas. ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyze a set of six trading cards belonging to Liebig’s Extract of Meat Co. long-standing marketing campaign. The critical analysis of promotional texts produced at the turn of the 20th century offer meaningful insights on the discursive mechanisms that contributed to the hegemonization of bourgeois capitalism. Unlike other forms of advertising, trading cards are not rapidly discarded and forgotten; on the contrary, they can detach themselves from the advertised products to become part of popular discourses of mass instruction. As both products and producers of capitalist ideologies, ads are a privileged site of inscription of capitalism, and thus lend themselves to a critical analysis. My analysis shows how the selected texts draws on and textures the discourses of progress, inculcated as colonialist beliefs and triggering an actional chain whereby, even before they actually obtained the cards, capitalist actions and beliefs are enacted. (shrink)

The present text constitutes a summary of a talk given by the author at the III Conferência Brasileira de Educação. It is here claimed that there is a need to discuss the roots of the idea of rights of the individual and of its link, in Locke's founding thought, with property and, moreover, with the freedom and autonomy of the human person. Furthermore, a discussion is made of the liberal-rationalist assumption of the optimum allocation of social resources through the clash (...) and combination of private interests. A twofold crisis of our times: crisis of the view of a self-regulated Laplacean universe and the crisis of the belief in the optimum allocation via market. The idea of the intervention of the State in the economy does not mean a destruction of private property nor of the value law and of profit. It only attests to its survival and seeks to ensure its implementation. Can't the idea of education be analogously thought of as a social right guaranteed and allocated by the State; as an investment in "human capital"? What is the meaning of the expression "educational policy"?O presente texto constitui síntese de comunicação do autor à III Conferência Brasileira de Educação. Afirma-se a necessidade de discutir as raízes da idéia de direitos do indivíduo e seu vínculo, no pensamento fundador de Locke, com a propriedade e, mais ainda, a liberdade e autonomia da pessoa humana. Discute-se ainda o suposto liberal-racionalista de alocação ótima dos recursos sociais através do choque e combinação de interesses privados. Uma dupla crise de nossos tempos: crise da concepção de universo auto-regulado laplaceano e a crise da crença na alocação ótima via mercado. A idéia de intervenção do Estado na economia não significa a destruição da propriedade privada, da lei do valor e do lucro. Apenas atesta a sua sobrevivência e procura garantir seu desenvolvimento. Não se pode pensar analogamente a idéia de educação como direito social garantido e alocado pelo Estado, como investimento no "capital humano"? Qual o sentido da expressão - uma "política educacional"? (shrink)

Neste artigo exporemos os principais obstáculos à esperança de que grande parte dos filósofos e cientistas do cérebro contemporâneos tende a entender os aspectos subjetivos da vivência mental como sendo tangíveis às abordagens filosóficas ou científicas atuais. Avaliaremos se tal otimismo pode ser levado a sério à luz do que pensamos acerca das reflexões de Shoemaker sobre a possibilidade de funcionalização dos qualia. Veremos que mesmo sendo possível a discriminação numa tabela do que poderia ser pensado como “aspecto qualitativo da (...) experiência”, que se articulam enquanto crenças qualitativas que geram determinados comportamentos, razões metafísicas se colocam como entrave à ideia de se conceber como plausível a possibilidade de funcionalização dos qualia.: In this article we will expose the main obstacles to hope that most contemporary philosophers and scientists of the brain tends to understand the subjective aspects of mental experience as tangible to current philosophical and scientific approaches. Evaluate whether such optimism can be taken seriously in light of what we think about the reflections of Shoemaker about the possibility of functionalization of qualia. We will see that even being possible discrimination in a table that could be thought of as “qualitative aspect of experience,” that articulate while qualitative beliefs that generate certain behaviors, metaphysical reasons stand as obstacle to the idea of conceiving how plausible the possibility of functionalization qualia. Keywords : Functionalism; Qualitative Similarity; Causal Track. (shrink)

Este artigo busca interpretar a gravura "Melancolia I", do renascentista alemão Albrecht Dürer, segundo o pano de fundo filosófico do pensamento de Spinoza. A ideia central é a de que, nessa gravura, haveria uma intuição artístico-filosófica pela qual Dürer foi levado a associar a tristeza melancólica à ideia de um conhecimento confuso e turvado pela imaginação. Tal intuição se completaria numa outra gravura, criada no mesmo ano, o "São Jerônimo em seu gabinete", na qual a melancolia do "homem de cultura" (...) renascentista desaparece. Tais intuições permitiriam ler as duas gravuras sob a ótica das "teorias" da mente e do conhecimento de Spinoza, para quem o conhecimento está associado à alegria, desde que esteja livre das sombras da imaginação projetadas pelo medo, pelo desejo excessivo, pelas crenças ou pelas superstições. This article seeks to interpret the engraving "Melencolia I" , made by the German Renaissance’s painter Albrecht Dürer, according to the philosophical background of Spinoza’s thought. The central idea is that, in this picture, there would be an artistic-philosophical intuition by which Dürer associated melancholy to the idea of a confused and muddied knowledge caused by imagination. Another engraving, also created in 1514, completes this intuition: "St. Jerome in his study", in which the melancholy of the Renaissance’s "man of culture" disappears. Such insights allow reading the two pictures from the perspective of Spinoza’s "theories" of mind and knowledge. He assumes that knowledge is associated with joy, since it is free from the shadows of the imagination projected by fear, excessive desire, beliefs or/and superstitions. (shrink)

The approach set forth by Edward Craig in Knowledge and the State of Nature has a greater explanatory value than it has been granted to date, and his suitably modified project can resolve a number of puzzling issues regarding the value of knowledge. The paper argues that a novel theory that relates knowledge to testimony is capable of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and why it has a distinctive value. Significantly, this theory avoids the (...) recently advanced revisionism regarding the focus of epistemological research. La aproximación de Edward Craig en Knowledge and the State of Nature tiene más poder explicativo del apreciado hasta ahora, y su proyecto, adecuadamente modificado, puede resolver un número de asuntos sobre el valor del conocimiento que parecen desconcertantes. Se argumenta que una novedosa teoría de conocimiento que lo relaciona con el testimonio puede explicar por qué el conocimiento es más valioso que la mera creencia verdadera, y por qué tiene un valor distintivo. Significativamente, la teoría evita un revisionismo, recientemente avanzado, con respecto al foco de la investigación epistemológica. (shrink)

Resumo: A superstição é definida por Bayle, em diversos momentos e diversas obras do filósofo francês, como: a) algo característico da corrupção natural humana; b) a prova da facilidade do homem em se ater às mais diversas crendices, logo, estando sujeito não só a uma, mas a todo tipo de superstições; c) o fenômeno que se instaurou e se disseminou na sociedade, perseguindo a todos e gerando ilusões por toda parte, através de presságios, profecias, prodígios, e sinais. Nesse quadro de (...) diversas e intangíveis absurdidades, a superstição ganha forma, indo para além dos domínios da razão e, assim, Bayle, em seus escritos, torna manifesta a oposição entre a filosofia e a ignorância supersticiosa, entre o entendimento e a imaginação e entre as explicações científicas e os relatos fantásticos.: Superstition is defined by Bayle at various times and in various works as: a) something characteristic of natural human corruption; b) proof of the ease of man in adhering to the most diverse beliefs, being subject not only to one but to all kinds of superstitions; c) a phenomenon which arose and spread in society, following everyone and creating illusions everywhere by means of omens, prophecies, miracles, and signs. In this context of the diverse and intangible absurdities in which superstition takes shape, going beyond the realms of reason, Bayle in his writings makes manifest the opposition between philosophy and superstitious ignorance, between understanding and imagination, and between scientific explanations and fantastic tales. (shrink)

Resumo Os “Borboletas Azuis” de Campina Grande/PB alcançaram destaque nacional devido à propagação de uma profecia que afirmava a ocorrência de um dilúvio para o dia 13 de maio de 1980. O movimento é uma contestação às transformações da Igreja Católica Romana a partir do Concílio Vaticano II, onde foram tomadas medidas em favor de liturgias mais adequadas às culturas locais e em idioma próprio, assim como mudanças significativas nos textos e na linguagem utilizados na missa e na administração dos (...) sacramentos. A proposta do movimento é resgatar o modelo do cristianismo primitivo, em sua espera messiânica de instauração de uma nova “idade de ouro”. A identidade religiosa do movimento se constitui numa ‘bricolagem’ do cristianismo com o espiritismo, sendo sua excentricidade o motivo para os conflitos com a Igreja Católica e a imprensa local. O presente estudo analisa a trajetória dos “Borboletas Azuis” caracterizando-o como movimento messiânico-milenarista, tomando como perspectiva teórica os estudos da religião realizados por Delumeau, Queiroz, Negrão, Giddens, Weber e Andrade. Nossa metodologia consistiu a realização de entrevistas com remanescentes do movimento e análise de reportagens de jornais e documentos produzidos pela liderança. Palavras-chave: Messianismo; Milenarismo; Luta Simbólica.The "Borboletas Azuis" of Campina Grande city / PB achieved national prominence due to the spread of a prophecy that to asserted a deluge, for the day 23 de may of 1980. The movement is a challenge to the Roman Catholic Church of Vatican II, from where measures have been taken in favor of liturgies more appropriate to local culture and language, as well as significant changes in the texts and languages used in the Mass and in the administration of the sacraments. The Borboletas Azuis proposes a revival of the model of primitive Christianity, in its messianic hopes to introduce a new "golden age". The religious identity of the movement is constituted of ‘bricolage’ of Christianity with spiritism. Because of its "eccentricities", ended generating a huge controversy that culminated in a double conflict: one with the Catholic Church and other with the local press. This study analyzes the imaginary of the "Borboletas Azuis”, adopting a theoretical perspective inspired on studies about religion done by Delumeau, Queiroz, Negrão, Giddens, Weber e Andrade . The methodology we used consisted in open interviews carried out with remaining believers and the analysis of local press articles and documents produced by their leaders. Keywords : Messianism; Millenarism; Symbolic Fight. (shrink)

This paper presents new evidence on the impact of socioeconomic status and education on knowledge attribution. I examine a variety of cases, including vignettes where agents have been Gettiered, have false beliefs, and possess knowledge. Early work investigated whether SES might be associated with knowledge attribution :429–460, 2001; Seyedsayamdost in Episteme 12:95–116, 2014). But these studies used college education as a dummy variable for SES. I use the recently developed Great British Class Survey :219–250, 2013) to measure SES. The paper (...) reports evidence against an association between SES and patterns of knowledge ascription, and reports mixed evidence about education effects. (shrink)

McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks concerning the importance (...) of experience. (shrink)

How should our beliefs change over time? The standard answer to this question is the Bayesian one. But while the Bayesian account works well with respect to beliefs about the world, it breaks down when applied to self-locating or de se beliefs. In this work I explore ways to extend Bayesianism in order to accommodate de se beliefs. I begin by assessing, and ultimately rejecting, attempts to resolve these issues by appealing to Dutch books and chance-credence principles. I then propose (...) and examine several accounts of the dynamics of de se beliefs. These examinations suggest that an extension of Bayesianism to de se beliefs will require some uncomfortable choices. I conclude by laying out the options available, and assessing the prospects of each. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta a defesa da racionalidade da crença em Deus desenvolvida pelo filósofo reformado Alvin Plantinga, a partir de sua redefinição como “crença apropriadamente básica”. Após uma breve introdução, que situa a epistemologia religiosa de Plantinga no contexto das transformações recentes no campo da filosofia analítica da religião, expõe-se a crítica de Plantinga ao fundacionalismo clássico, cujo colapso teria reaberto a viabilidade epistemológica da crença em Deus. Segue-se a defesa plantingiana da crença em Deus como crença apropriadamente básica, que (...) teria bases experienciais identificáveis, mas dispensaria qualquer evidência ou demonstração racional, mostrando a orientação firme da construção plantingiana em direção a uma forma plenamente externalista de epistemologia. O final do artigo oferece uma breve reflexão sobre o significado cultural e espiritual da epistemologia reformada de Plantinga. Palavras-chave: Crença; Epistemologia; Externalismo; Fé e razão; Filosofia reformada; Fundacionalismo. ABSTRACT The article presents a defense of the rationality of the belief in God, developed by reformed philosopher Alvin Plantinga, who redefined it as a “properly basic belief”. After a brief introduction to place Plantinga’s religious epistemology in the context of recent transformations in the field of analytical philosophy of religion, Plantinga’s critique to classic foundationalism, whose collapse opened the epistemological viability of belief in God, is exposed. Then, the article focuses on the Plantingian defense of belief in God as a properly basic belief, nased on identifiable experiential grounds but independent from all evidence or rational demonstration, thus showing the firm orientation of Plantinga’s construction towards a fully externalist form of epistemology. The conclusion offers a short reflection on the cultural and spiritual meaning of Plantinga’s reformed epistemology. Key words: Belief; Epistemology; Externalism; Faith and reason; Reformed philosophy; Foundationalism. (shrink)

Diante da realidade islâmica contemporânea e buscando estar atento às diversas vozes presentes no “outro”, este artigo tem em vista apresentar de forma sucinta o que é o Sufismo, pensando-o como uma possibilidade – entre muitas – de concretização das crenças islâmicas. Para tal, iniciar-se-á procurando compreender como a notícia acerca de sua existência chega ao Ocidente, ou seja, como os ocidentais o “descobrem”. A seguir, centrar-se-á na busca de compreender o Sufismo a partir de sua relação com o islamismo (...) por meio de suas fontes primordiais: o Corão e o Profeta Muhammad. Por fim, este artigo apresentará brevemente alguns elementos que compõem e caracterizam o repertório de crenças e práticas de várias escolas Sufis tais como a busca da Unicidade Divina, a prática meditativa da recitação dos Nomes Divinos e a submissão à orientação de um “šayh”. Palavras-chave: Sufismo; Mística islâmica; Orientalismo ABSTRACT In the face of the contemporary Islamic reality and seeking to be attentive to the diversity of voices that we can find in the “other”, this article aims to show briefly what Sufism is, thinking it as a possibility – amongst many – of the realization of the Islamic faith. To articulate this, the article will begin looking at understanding of how the news about its existence arrives in the West, that is, how westerners “discover” it. Then, the article will focus on the search to understand Sufism from its relationship with Islam through its primordial origins: the Koran and the Prophet Muhammad. Finally, this article will look briefly at some elements that make up and characterize the repertory of beliefs and practices of several Sufi schools, such as the search for the Divine Unicity, the meditative practice of the recitation of the Divine Names and the submission to a Šayh orientation. Key words: Sufism; Mystical Islamism; Orientalism. (shrink)

Significant controversy remains about what constitute correct self-locating beliefs in scenarios such as the Sleeping Beauty problem, with proponents on both the “halfer” and “thirder” sides. To attempt to settle the issue, one natural approach consists in creating decision variants of the problem, determining what actions the various candidate beliefs prescribe, and assessing whether these actions are reasonable when we step back. Dutch book arguments are a special case of this approach, but other Sleeping Beauty games have also been constructed (...) to make similar points. Building on a recent article :491–508, 2013), I show that in general we should be wary of such arguments, because unintuitive actions may result for reasons that are unrelated to the beliefs. On the other hand, I show that, when we restrict our attention to additive games, then a thirder will necessarily maximize her ex ante expected payout, but a halfer in some cases will not . I conclude that this does not necessarily settle the issue and speculate about what might. (shrink)

This paper argues that the classification of propositional attitudes into the de re, de dicto, and de se is incomplete. De se attitudes are widely agreed to be closely connected to de re attitudes. But there is a species of belief that is linked to agent-centered action in the way that de se beliefs are, but is also associated with entities, places, and especially times, under a description. These mark out a fourth kind. One way to think about what (...) makes them distinctive is that, despite being ‘essentially indexical’ they can be retained across different contexts of evaluation without having diagonal content. The paper also discusses the connection between such beliefs and the kinds of utterances (like ‘Don't put off for tomorrow what you can do today’) that are contested as examples of what David Kaplan called ‘monsters.’. (shrink)

Uno de los principales problemas de la filosofía de la psicopatología contemporánea consiste en definir qué tipo de estados mentales son aquellos que denominamos delirantes. A esto se le ha denominado el “problema tipológico de los delirios”. El principal objetivo de este artículo es examinar las principales alternativas filosóficas contemporáneas a este problema: el doxasticismo—de acuerdo con el cuál los delirios deben ser caracterizados como creencias—y al anti-doxasticismo—el cuál niega el estatuto doxásticos de los delirios y ofrece una caracterización alternativa. (...) Para examinar el debate, el artículo presentará las principales características de ambas posiciones y sus fundamentos. Después, examinaremos los principales argumentos esgrimidos contra el doxasticismo y las respuestas y contraargumentos por parte de las alternativas doxásticas. Finalmente, expondremos algunas cuestiones conceptuales y desafíos abiertos relacionados con el debate y que, a nuestro juicio, deberían de marcar la hoja de ruta de los filósofos de la mente interesados en los delirios en los próximos años. (shrink)

Children and youth are typically positioned as passive subjects in learning, and when talking about working class children in particular, the common belief is that attendance at school institutions will translate into social displacement; that is, that children and young people from this economic segment who invest in the study will be able rise economically. It is in this context that recent public policies aimed at maintaining and extending the presence of children and young people in educational institutions can (...) be understood. Some of these policies aim to guarantee access by blacks and the poor to higher education, from which they have been historically excluded. This paper reports on a qualitative study that addresses the motivations that make young people from lower classes feel called to seek participation in higher education, and what are the subjective consequences of this movement. The study focused on 23 university students, beneficiaries of the Quota Law or the University for All Program, from two recognized quality higher education institutions located in Rio de Janeiro. The results demonstrate that the support of family and peers, a passion for studying per se, identification with the university as a life path, and the expectation of upward social mobility were factors that contributed to motivating young people toward higher education. As far as the university is concerned, we found that it delivers contradictory messages to young people from the lower classes. For one, entering an institution historically destined for another social class can make young people feel that they don’t belong there, which promotes uncertainties about the future. Faced with these challenges, poor young people are driven to “bet on themselves” as a way of overcoming the hardships of the present. However, it was also observed that many of these young people want to use their knowledge and university status to bring about changes in reality. It is concluded that the university in the neoliberal context can reinforce a model of individualistic subjectivation, but that, on the other hand, it can also operate to open lines of escape from this model, in instrumentalizing the poor young person for action towards the other. (shrink)

Percus & Sauerland (2003) use quantified belief reports of the form 'Only Peter thinks he's...' to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument is targeted against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re, viz. a de re belief about oneself from a first person perspective, requiring nothing but an account of de re attitudes. My acquaintance resolution framework is an attempt at just such a reduction and in this paper (...) I extend that theory with a projection mechanism to allow local accommodation of acquaintance relations. With this extension we can account for their data, as well as for some related data involving quantified belief reports familiar from arguments in the de se literature. Note: the embedded video of Peter's mistaken self-identity is urlhttp://ncs.ruhosting.nl/emar/dese.mpgavailable in .mpg here. (shrink)

Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.

This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifically, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After arguing that de se belief is best thought of as a special case of de re belief, I examine whether we can extend this unification to the realm of belief reports. I show how, despite very promising first steps, previous attempts in this direction ultimately fail with respect to some relatively recent (...) linguistic data involving quantified and infinitival reports, logophoric constructions, and monstrously shifted indexicals. Formalizing my idea of a contextual resolution of acquaintance relations in a dynamic framework, I arrive at an alternative analysis that handles all these data. (shrink)

De se exceptionalism is the view, notably championed by Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979), that our characteristically 'first-personal' ways of thinking about ourselves present unique challenges to standard views of propositional attitudes like belief. Though the view has won many adherents, it has recently come under a barrage of deserved criticism. A key claim of detractors is that classic examples used to motivate de se exceptionalism from de se ignorance or misidentification are nothing more than familiar Frege-puzzles, which raise (...) no issues exclusive to self-directed thought. After reviewing how this simple objection has substantial force against the classic defenses of exceptionalism, I provide new arguments based on cases of pure de se ignorance that avoid the criticism. Afterward, I revisit Lewis's defense of exceptionalism, diagnosing how he arrived at roughly the right conclusions on the basis of an argument that begged critical questions and obscured the representationally unique features of the de se. (shrink)

Nietzsche y Educación: conocimiento y cultura en el Estado Moderno Resumen: Este texto busca tejer algunas reflexiones sobre la relación entre la filosofía de Friedrich Nietzsche y el campo educativo, entendiendo sus indagaciones sobre las instituciones educativas modernas y los valores vinculados a este tipo de hombre. Vinculado al proceso de degeneración de la potencia instintiva humana y su animalidad, se estableció un modelo de conocimiento, basado en el ideal metafísico y la creencia incondicional de la verdad. La crítica dirigida (...) al Estado Moderno y su modelo de cultura, que pretendió instituir a filósofos/as y estudiosos/as como guías, considera que es necesario volver a hacer crecer los usos y funciones de estos sujetos en la sociedad, al buscar superar el dilema que los constituye hoy, como empleados y mantenedores del Estado. Pasando por distintas fases de su pensamiento, buscó ser un instrumento más para dotar al ámbito de la Filosofía de la Educación de un vínculo sólido con el filósofo alemán, a través del estudio de las relaciones entre Nietzsche y la Educación. Palabras-Clave: Conocimiento; Cultura; Educación; Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche e Educação: conhecimento e cultura no Estado Moderno Resumo: Este texto busca tecer algumas reflexões acerca da relação entre a filosofia de Friedrich Nietzsche e o campo educacional, compreendendo suas indagações acerca das instituições de ensino modernas e os valores vinculados ao este tipo de homem. Atrelado ao processo de degeneração da potência instintiva humana e de sua animalidade ocorreu a fixação de um modelo de conhecimento, fundamentado no ideal metafísico e na crença incondicional da verdade. A crítica dirigida ao Estado Moderno e ao seu modelo de cultura, que pretendeu instituir os filósofos e eruditos enquanto guias, entende que é necessário o resgate dos usos e funções destes sujeitos na sociedade, buscando superar o dilema que os constitui hoje, como funcionários e mantenedores do Estado. Perpassando diferentes fases de seu pensamento buscou-se ser mais um instrumento para fornecer ao âmbito da Filosofia da Educação um vínculo sólido com o filósofo alemão, por meio do estudo das relações entre Nietzsche e a Educação. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento; Cultura; Educação; Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche and Education: knowledge and culture in the Modern State Abstract: This text seeks to do some reflections on the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy and the educational field, understanding his inquiries about modern educational institutions and the values ​​linked to this type of man. United with the process of degeneration of human instinctual power and its animality, there was the establishment of a model of knowledge, based on the metaphysical ideal and on the unconditional belief of truth. The criticism directed at the Modern State and its model of culture, which intended to establish philosophers and scholars as guides, understands that it is necessary to rescue the uses and functions of these subjects in society, seeking to overcome the dilemma that constitutes them today, as employees and keepers of the state. Passing through different phases of his thought, we sought to be one more instrument to provide the scope of Philosophy of Education with a solid link with the German philosopher, through the study of the relationship between Nietzsche and Education. Keywords: Knowledge; Culture; Education; Friedrich Nietzsche. Data de registro: 10/08/2021 Data de aceite: 19/01/2022. (shrink)

Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written (...) on the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...) explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)

Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...) two contrasting accounts – a Lewisian one and a Perrian one – in the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. The received picture of linguistic communication understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. This picture is in conflict with the attractive Lewisian view of belief as self-location, which is motivated by de se attitudes – first-personal attitudes about oneself – as well as attitudes about subjective matters such as personal taste. In this paper, I provide a solution to the conflict that reconciles these views. I argue for an account of mental attitudes (...) and communication on which mental content and speech act content is understood as sets of multicentered worlds – roughly, possible worlds ‘centered’ on a sequence of individuals at a time. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on multicentered worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. The resulting picture is one on which the point of conversation is the coordination of individual perspectives. (shrink)

In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se. De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various (...) issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of our discourse about it, and also what it reveals about how humans think about themselves and the world around them. (shrink)

Chierchia (1989) and others have used the contrast between George hopes that he will win and Georges hopes to win in mistaken-self-identity scenarios, to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument, further strengthened by evidence of shiftable indexicals, appears applicable against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re. My Acquaintance Resolution framework is an attempt at such a reduction, and this paper seeks to extend that theory with a logical principle of (...) introspection for belief, to account for the data within a unified treatment of de re and de se. (shrink)

It has been long known (Perry (1977, 1979), Lewis (1981)) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says "I am hungry," the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a (...) given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handing de se assertion, i.e. contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say "I am hungry," one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense "saying the same thing". I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. Finally, I outline a new account of the content of assertion, similar to Lewis's account of de se attitudes. The proposal is, roughly, when Alma says "I am hungry", the asserted content just the property of being hungry, and it is a property that Alma asserts of herself. I then propose to generalize the account to the other cases in a way that departs from Lewis's account, and I close by showing how my proposal handles the cases discussed in the first part of the paper. (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under (...) the grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

The analysis of knowledge and belief has provoked intensive discussions in philosophy and linguistics. One of the issues in this area is the semantics of attitude verbs whose complement expresses a thought about the Self of the thinking person. What is the content of my belief when I think that I am tired? Some philosophers propose it is a proposition, others think it is a property. It will be shown in this essay that existing proposals in either direction (...) are unsatisfying. The property theorist expells the subject of the predicate "tired" from the analysis; their theory is at best incomplete. The propositionalist has difficulties with the analysis of the pronoun that refers back to the subject of the attitude, as is the case with "he" in "Wolfgang believes he is tired". The present new proposal ventures the idea that a conscious person is endowed with their own Logical Space that deviates from the standard model in providing for a separate entity, the Self, as the object or target of inner thoughts about oneself. Moreover, this Logical Space leaves room for linguistic error: in such a model, subjects may be unable to correctly identify the reference of a name or may fail to identify the Self with its bearer. By contrast, reference to the Self is immune to error through misidentification, it is a paradigm case of brute indexicality. In consequence, de se pronouns are rigid designators in the sense of Kripke. The book solves several puzzles of reference failure and explores numerous consequences for the semantics of attitude reports and for possible world semantics in general. (shrink)

I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue---a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. (...) This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of "propositional attitudes.". (shrink)