The paper develops a view of interpretative cultural practice as a complex system of dynamically changing constituents which stand in definite relations to one another. These constituents are the Object of Interpretation (O), Result of Interpretation or interpretation itself (I), the Process of interpretation (P) and the interpreting Subject (S). It is argued that if such a view as this is adapted, ‘singularism’ as a norm for cultural practices necessarily gives way to ‘multiplism’. Singularism and multiplism are terms used by (...) Michael Krausz in Rightness and Reasons (1993). Krausz also talks of certain interpretative practices as imputational, in the sense that the object of interpretation changes, is ‘imputed upon’ during the course of the practice. This paper contends that all cultural practices are imputalional, for each such practice leaves its effect on the object. Not only does practice affect the object, but it affects the subject too The evolution of the subject, the self, through imputational interpretative cultural practices is explored as a major element in the making of a human individual. (shrink)

Ozone is one of the pollutants with most negative effects on human health and in general on the biosphere. Many data-acquisition networks collect data about ozone values in both urban and background areas. Usually, these data are incomplete or corrupt and the imputation of the missing values is a priority in order to obtain complete datasets, solving the uncertainty and vagueness of existing problems to manage complexity. In the present paper, multiple-regression techniques and Artificial Neural Network models are (...) applied to approximate the absent ozone values from five explanatory variables containing air-quality information. To compare the different imputation methods, real-life data from six data-acquisition stations from the region of Castilla y León are gathered in different ways and then analyzed. The results obtained in the estimation of the missing values by applying these techniques and models are compared, analyzing the possible causes of the given response. (shrink)

The problem of missingness in observational data is ubiquitous. When the confounders are missing at random, multiple imputation is commonly used; however, the method requires congeniality conditions for valid inferences, which may not be satisfied when estimating average causal treatment effects. Alternatively, fractional imputation, proposed by Kim 2011, has been implemented to handling missing values in regression context. In this article, we develop fractional imputation methods for estimating the average treatment effects with confounders missing at random. (...) We show that the fractional imputation estimator of the average treatment effect is asymptotically normal, which permits a consistent variance estimate. Via simulation study, we compare fractional imputation’s accuracy and precision with that of multiple imputation. (shrink)

International large-scale assessments have gained much attention since the beginning of the twenty-first century, influencing education legislation in many countries. This includes Spain, where they have been used by successive governments to justify education policy change. Unfortunately, there was a problem with the PISA 2018 reading scores for this country, meaning the OECD refused to initially release the results. Therefore, in this paper we attempt to estimate the likely PISA 2018 reading scores for Spain, and for each region within. The (...) figure finally published by the OECD for Spain – in terms of reading scores – was 476.5 points, which is between the lower and upper bound of the interval we find (475 to 483 test points in 2018). Additionally, we report some robustness checks for the OCED countries participating in PISA 2018, which show that the difference between the actual scores and the ones we found with the imputation methods are quite close. (shrink)

BackgroundChronic airway diseases are prevalent and costly conditions. Interdisciplinary rehabilitation programs that include Acceptance and Commitment-based components could be important to tackle the vicious circle linking progression of the disease, inactivity, and psychopathological symptoms.MethodsA retrospective evaluation of routinely collected data of an interdisciplinary rehabilitation program was performed. The program included group sessions including patient education, breathing exercise, occupational therapy and an ACT-based psychological treatment, and individual sessions of physical therapy. Demographic data, clinical characteristics of the patients and the values of (...) outcome variables before treatment, at discharge, at 3 months, and at 6 months were extracted from medical records. Multiple imputation was employed to address missing data. Linear mixed models were employed to assess changes over time. Multivariable logistic regression was performed to assess predictors of a minimum clinically important change of health status from baseline to the 6-months follow-up.ResultsData from 31 patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 12 patients with bronchiectasis were extracted. Health status improved from baseline to discharge to the 3 months follow-up, but not to the 6 months follow-up. Anxiety and depression improved across all the time points. Quality of life did not improve over time. Having a worse health status at baseline and fewer depressive symptoms were significantly associated with achieving a minimum clinically important change of health status at 6 months. The effects of the interdisciplinary program were not different for patients with COPD or with bronchiectasis.DiscussionInterdisciplinary programs including ACT-based components are promising treatments for the rehabilitation of patients with chronic airway diseases. (shrink)

This paper analyzes and compares different policy scenarios as well as discusses price elasticities and willingness to pay and to accept using revealed preference data from the French new-car market in 2014 by means of a cross-nested logit model. We focus particularly on electric and hybrid vehicles. We use interactions between the cost and the household income to analyze the sensitivity towards different policy scenarios per income level. Results show that the willingness to pay and to accept obtained in our (...) study is consistent with the real-market conditions. We also find that the most effective scenario to increase the market shares of new sold electric vehicles is that of a major technological advance such as a decrease in price due to cheaper manufacturing costs and an increase in driving range, rather than a policy-based scenario. In addition, the market segment that has more potential to increase the market shares of electric vehicle purchase is the middle-income level. In the paper, we discuss how to overcome the difficulties of working with revealed preference data, and propose multiple imputations to impute the attributes of the unchosen alternatives, by drawing from their empirical distributions. (shrink)

Restoration skills training is a mindfulness-based course in which participants draw support from a natural practice setting while they learn to meditate. Well-established conventional mindfulness training can improve psychological functioning but many perceive it as demanding and fail to sustain practice habits. Applying non-inferiority logic, previous research indicated that ReST overcomes compliance problems without compromising the benefits gained over 5 weeks’ training. This article applies similar logic in a 6-month follow-up. Of 97 contacted ReST and CMT course completers, 68 responded (...) and 29 were included with multiple imputation data. The online survey included questions about their psychological functioning in three domains and the forms and frequencies with which they had continued to practice mindfulness after the course. Former ReST participants continued, on average, to show higher dispositional mindfulness and fewer cognitive lapses compared to pre-course ratings. Improved psychological functioning in one or more domains was demonstrated by 35%, as determined by a reliable change index. Again, analyses detected no indications of any substantive disadvantages compared to the more demanding, established CMT approach. Compared to the CMT group, more ReST participants had also continued to practice at least occasionally. Continued practice was linked to sustained improvements for ReST but not clearly so for CMT. ReST participants thus continued to use the skills and sustained the improvements in psychological functioning that they had gained in the course, further supporting the utility of ReST as a health intervention. (shrink)

According to Agnosticism with a capital A, even if we don’t see how any reason we know of would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world and even if we lack evidential and non-evidential warrant for theism, we should not infer that there probably is no reason that would justify God. That’s because, under those conditions, we should be in doubt about whether the goods we know of constitute a representative sample of all the goods there are, (...) among relevantly similar things. In my "Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral Skepticism" (2009), I defended Agnosticism against the charge that it leaves us in doubt about whether we are obligated to intervene to prevent horrific suffering we can prevent at no risk to ourselves. In his “Agnosticism, Skeptical Theism, and Moral Obligation” (2014), Stephen Maitzen argues that, in light of my defense, Agnosticism is at odds with commonsense morality’s insistence that we have an obligation to intervene in such cases. In the present essay, I argue that the moral principle Maitzen seems to impute to commonsense (it's hard to tell what principle he has in mind) is false and that a moral principle much more in keeping with commonsense is compatible with Agnosticism and my defense of it. Along the way, I mention multiple misrepresentations Maitzen makes of Agnosticism and my defense of it. (shrink)

La citation récurrente de Sg 9, 15 : « Le corps qui se corrompt appesantit l’âme et sa demeure de terre accable l’esprit aux multiples pensées », dans le corpus augustinien, semble être l’indice d’un mépris du corps, hérité de la tradition platonicienne du corps-prison. De fait, dans ses premières œuvres, Augustin cite Sg 9, 15 pour affirmer que le corps est un obstacle à la contemplation de la vérité. Mais, dans ses œuvres ultérieures, il utilise Sg 9, 15 pour (...) établir, contre les platoni­ciens, que le corps n’est pas la prison de l’âme et que le poids du corps est à imputer, non au corps lui-même, mais à sa corruptibilité : il n’y a donc pas à « fuir tout corps », comme le veut Porphyre. Face à Julien d’Éclane, enfin, il souligne, en citant Sg 9, 15, que la condition peineuse de l’homme aujourd’hui n’est pas le propre de la nature primitive de l’homme, mais la peine du péché qui a vicié la nature. (shrink)

le present ouvrage examine le role que joue - dans la production et la perception de la signification linguistique - le contexte, concu comme l'entourage semantique du mot dans l'enonce. On impute communement au contexte le sens particulier du mot (marcher, p.ex.) dans l'enonce (le commerce marche). Or, il n'est pas difficile de trouver des enonces - comme en tete du cortege marche le commerce - dans lesquels l'influence s'exerce dans le sens oppose. Cela revient au constat que le contexte (...) est autant source que cible des influences semantiques. Ne s'ensuit-il pas que la recherche semantique est condamnee a la circularite: decrire l'unite par recours aux criteres contextuels et en meme temps decrire le contexte en s'appuyant sur l'unite? Le cercle est bien reel dans le cadre des theories formellees ou l'on considere la structure semantique comme simple et homogene et ou la signification de la phrase est concue comme la somme des significations de ses constituants. Il en va autrement des cadres theoriques ou la structure concue comme complexe, comportant en son sein variation et hierarchie. Chaque constituant peut alors contribuer a la signification de la phrase par toute une gamme de sens potentiels dont l'un ou l'autre se realise suivant le jeu varie de facteurs multiples tels que le sens des unites avoisinantes, la situation de l'echange linguistique, les savoirs culturels, l'experience du monde. L'etude du contexte nous conduit a deux demarches: d'une part, un reexamen des modeles semantiques mais aussi des principes theoriques et des fondements epistemologiques qui les sous-tendent; d'autre part des enquetes pour confronter les theses avancees aux donnees recoltees dans le comportement et l'intuition du sujet parlant. Le rapport unite/contexte n'est pas le seul paradoxe; sont aussi paradoxales les relations sens/situation, sens/culture, semantique/pragmatique, langage/pensee,... que l'ouvrage tente d'eclairer d'un jour nouveau dans la perspective d'une structure relative et ouverte. (shrink)

Kant's conception of conscience has been relatively neglected by Kant scholars and the secondary literature offers no explanation of whether (and if so, how) his treatments of conscience fit together. To achieve a fuller understanding of Kant's general position on conscience, I question the widespread assumption that conscience is a feeling and account for the nature of conscience and its multiple functions. On my reading, conscience is ‘the internal judge’ whose verdict triggers certain emotional reactions. Through the moral self-evaluative (...) activities of this inner judge, we come to know our character better. In the judgements of conscience, we take account of various psychological conditions while judging both whether these conditions stand in the way of our establishing moral maxims and whether we hold ourselves accountable for our actions. By arousing certain feelings, these judgments also move us to moral action. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objeto o exame de três registros de gritantes e distintos paradoxos na Doutrina do Direito de Kant. Registros feitos em tempos e contextos históricos diferentes por Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek atribuiu a Kant a mais paradoxal das proposições jamais enunciadas por qualquer autor, a de que a mera ideia de soberania deve obrigar-nos a obedecer como a nosso inquestionável senhor a quem quer que se haja estabelecido como tal, sem que caiba (...) indagar quem lhe deu o direito de comandar-nos. Willaschek aponta a incompatibilidade de duas teses centrais da doutrina kantiana: a do caráter externo dos vínculos jurídicos e a da incondicionalidade obrigacional do direito positivo, pois não é possível entender como é possível termo-nos como obrigados por imperativos jurídicos e, ao mesmo, vermo-nos internamente isentados do dever de obedecê-los. O ponto crítico de Balthazar é alegar que não pode haver na filosofia kantiana uma crítica da razão político e jurídica, simplesmente porque o conceito de imputação, base da normatividade própria dessas esferas, pressupõe uma pluralidade de agentes livres que, justamente, só pode ser uma pressuposição, pois nosso acesso à normatividade prática só pode ter lugar em primeira pessoa. No exame a que o artigo submete essas alegações, o artigo argumenta, em objeção à tese de Balthazar, que o caráter universal e categórico da força que vincula o sujeito quando confrontado com a lei moral em primeira pessoa necessariamente se desvaneceria se, ao mesmo tempo, ele não fosse tomado pela evidência de que a realidade objetiva dos princípios morais é não só instanciável, mas assegurada pela múltipla instanciação. Com relação às dificuldades levantadas por Willaschek e Bouterwek, o artigo argumenta que o princípio exeundum e statu naturali, enquanto norma metapositiva, anterior à divisão do domínio prático entre doutrina do direito e doutrina da virtude, permite ao mesmo tempo compreender a exigência de obediência ao poder constituído e a restrição das obrigações jurídico-políticas exclusivamente ao foro externo.AbstractThe object of the article is to examine three claims about three distinct and allegedly blatant paradoxes in Kant's Doctrine of Right. These three critical points had been made in distinct times and contexts by Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek attributed to Kant the most paradoxical of all paradoxical propositions, the statement that by the mere idea of sovereignty we are obliged to obey as our lord who has imposed himself upon us, without questioning from where he got such right. Willaschek points out the incompatibility of two main theses of Kantian doctrine of right: the claims that the legal bounds are of external character and that they are the source of unconditional obligations, since it seems impossible to understand how it would be possible to be obliged by juridical norms and decisions and at the same time to be exempted of the internal duty of compliance. The radical objection of Professor Balthazar is the claim that in the context of Kantian Philosophy it is impossible to admit a critique of the juridical and political reason because the concept of imputation, ground of the normativity in these domains, requires not only the presupposition of free agents, but a true and secure epistemic access to them, which is, according to him, impossible considering that the moral law and the other practical principles are accessible for us only in the first person. In the course of the appraisal of such claims, the article contest that objection arguing that the universal and categorical force of the normative bound experienced by the subject when confronted with the moral law in the first person would ineluctably vanish if, at the same time, he had not been taken by the evidence that the objective reality of the moral principles is secured by multiple instancing. Regarding the difficulties raised by Willaschek and Bouterwek, the article argues that the principle exeundum e statu naturali, as a norm of meta-positive character, prior to the division of practical domains between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue, is the cue both to the understanding of the requirement of unquestioning obedience to the constituted power and to the restriction of the validity of this requirement only in foro externo. (shrink)

Le mal est un πoλλαχ ς λɛóμɛvov dont les multiples acceptions sont ordonnées selon la division traditionnelle entre le mal naturel ou physique et le mal moral. Le mal naturel désigne la violence que vit et subit l'homme lorsque la nature ou le monde contrecarre sa vie et ses projets: catastrophes naturelles, maladie, souf-france, mort. Ce mal naturel traverse et transit l'existence humaine; dans la mesure où il empêche la réalisation des projets humains et compromet l'ouverture en avant de l'existence (...) humaine, il est ce que Kant nomme anti-final. Le mal est un événement du monde indépendant de la volonté de l'homme. Le mal vient d'un autre et cet autre c'est la nature, le monde ou Dieu. Le mal n'est pas un événement inscrit dans l'horizon de la volonté du sujet mais il est imputé à un autre que soi mais qui a la particularité de conditionner mon être. Le mal est alors un concept de l'être en général, de l'être considéré comme englobant aussi bien l'être que nous sommes nousmêmes que l'être que nous ne sommes pas nous-mêmes. Cependant, cette compréhension du mal n'exclut pas tout lien avec la liberté. (shrink)

The representation of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) and the analysis of natural-language, propositional-attitude reports presents difficult problems for cognitive science and artificial intelligence. In particular, various representational approaches to attitudes involve the incorrect “imputation,” to cognitive agents, of the use of artificial theory-laden notions. Interesting cases of this problem are shown to occur in several approaches to attitudes. The imputation problem is shown to arise from the way that representational approaches explicate properties and relationships, and in particular (...) from the way they explicate propositional attitudes themselves. Another factor contributing to imputation is the compositional nature of typical semantic approaches to propositional-attitude reports. Some strategies for avoiding undesirable imputation are examined. One of the main conclusions is that the importance of imputations that arise in a representation scheme depends strongly on the use to which the scheme is put -- on whether, for instance, the scheme is used as part of a formal, objective account of natural language, or is used rather as a representational tool within an agent. (shrink)

This paper has two main goals. The first is to defend a particular account of answerability according to which a person is (morally or criminally) answerable for their conduct if it is (morally or criminally) wrongful under the same description under which it is imputable to their agency. Negating defences in law aim to defeat criminal answerability by negating some element of the charged offence while their moral analogues aim to defeat moral answerability by defeating the aptness of the description (...) under which an action is imputed. In contrast, affirmative defences and their moral analogues aim to defeat the move from answerability to liability to sanction by offering an exculpatory explanation for the wrongful conduct. The second goal of this paper is to argue that there are important differences between the way that ignorance functions in negating defences and their moral analogues and affirmative defences and their moral analogues. Specifically, when ignorance functions to defeat answerability, it need only be sincere, but it is typically limited to matters of fact, whereas both moral and non-moral ignorance can excuse one from liability but only if non-culpable. (shrink)

Multiple realizability has been at the heart of debates about whether the mind reduces to the brain, or whether the items of a special science reduce to the items of a physical science. I analyze the two central notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability: "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability." Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad conceptual traditions. The Mathematical Tradition equates realization with a form of mapping between objects. Generally speaking, x (...) realizes (or is the realization of) y because elements of y map onto elements of x. The Logico-Semantic Tradition translates realization into a kind of intentional or semantic notion. Generally speaking, x realizes (or is the realization of) a term or concept y because x can be interpreted to meet the conditions for satisfying y. The Metaphysical Tradition views realization as a species of determination between objects. Generally speaking, x realizes (or is the realization of) y because x brings about or determines y. I then turn to the subject of property variability and define it in a formal way. I then conclude by discussing some debates over property identity and scientific theory reduction where the resulting notion of multiple realizability has played a central role, for example, whether the nonreductive consequences of multiple realizability can be circumvented by scientific theories framed in terms of narrow domain-specific properties, or wide disjunctive properties. (shrink)

The notion of multiple location plays an important role in the characterization of endurantism. Several authors have recently offered cases intended to demonstrate the incoherence of multiple location. I argue that these cases do not succeed in making multiple location problematic. Along the way, several crucial issues about multiple location and its use by endurantists are clarified.

Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes are identifiable with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization, which serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed arguments that cast doubt on (...) the generality of multiple realization in the cognitive sciences. They argue that mind-brain identities have played an important role in the growth and achievements of the cognitive sciences, and suggest that there is little prospect for multiple realization in an empirically-based theory of mind. This leads Polger and Shapiro to offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, as well as in chemistry, biology, and other non-basic sciences. (shrink)

The essays in this volume consider the question of whether the self is a unity or whether it should be conceived without metaphor as divided - as a 'multiple self'. The issue is a central one for several disciplines. It bears directly on the account of rationality and the explanation of individual decision-making and behaviour. Is the hypothesis of a multiple self required to deal with the problems of self-deception and weakness of will; and can the conceptual tools (...) developed in the study of interpersonal conflict be applied to the analysis of intra-personal struggle? Most of the essays, by a number of leading philosophers, psychologists and economists, appear here for the first time. They bring out the interdisciplinary importance of the question, and will interest readers in all those areas. The volume will also usefully supplement The Foundations of Social Choice Theory, edited by Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, which appears in the same series and is also concerned with the foundations of rationality. (shrink)

Multiple authorship is the universal solution to multi-tasking in the sciences. Without a team, each with their own set of expertise, and each involved mostly in complementary ways, a research project will likely not advance quickly, or effectively. Consequently, there is a risk that research goals will not be met within a desired timeframe. Research teams that strictly scrutinize their modus operandi select and include a set of authors that have participated substantially in the physical undertaking of the research, (...) in its planning, or who have contributed intellectually to the ideas or the development of the manuscript. Authorship is not an issue that is taken lightly, and save for dishonest authors, it is an issue that is decided collectively by the authors, usually in sync with codes of conduct established by their research institutes or national ministries of education. Science, technology and medicine publishers have, through independent, or sometimes coordinated efforts, also established their own sets of guidelines regarding what constitutes valid authorship. However, these are, for the greater part, merely guidelines. A previous and recent analysis of authorship definitions indicates that the definitions in place regarding authorship and its validity by many leading STM publishers is neither uniform, nor standard, despite several of them claiming to follow the guidelines as set forward by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors or ICMJE. This disparity extends itself to ghost and guest authorship, two key authorship-related issues that are examined in this paper to assess the extent of discrepancies among the same set of STM publishers and what possible influence they might have on publishing ethics. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze demonstrated the key role of flashback in dealing with the relationship between actual image and recollection-image when interpreting the temporality of images. He established two criteria for judging whether a flashback implies a recollection-image by stating that: (1) it serves as some kind of prompt in the narrative to make the viewer perceive that the scene has entered a flashback; (2) it relies on fate or forking time. But Deleuze also mentioned that, if the context or condition disappears, (...) the recollection-image represented by the flashback will lose its support, at which point, the pure recollection will also disappear. In this case, the actual image no longer forms a connection with the sensor-motor, but is suspended, which produces a fantasmatic effect. Bi Gan extends this suspension in his film “Long Day’s Journey into Night” by removing the character being referred to in the flashback, stripping it from figure and confining it in the voice-over. The film features an extreme use of several effects in the sensory-motor situations and the flashbacks, as described in Deleuze’s “Cinema 2: Time-Image,” namely recollection, dream, and falsification. Thus, the boundary between flashback and reality is completely broken. In addition, Bi Gan uses doppelgangers in the second part of the film to reconstruct the ambiguity of actual images and recollection-images in the first part, turning them into pure fantasies. This essay will analyze issues relating to the images and characters in “Long Day’s Journey into Night” and show how this film constitutes a typical case of recollection-images transformed into fantasies through the power of falsification. (shrink)

Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience and with them new understandings of the experimental practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models (...) are culled, and argue that the multiplicity of experimental protocols used in these research areas presents specific challenges for both models. In my view, these challenges have been overlooked largely because philosophers have hitherto failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental features of experimental practice. I demonstrate that when we do pay attention to such features, evidence for reduction and integrative unity in neuroscience is simply not borne out. I end by suggesting some new directions for the philosophy of neuroscience that pertain to taking a closer look at the nature of neuroscientific experiments. (shrink)

Nowadays, the quality standards of higher education institutions pay special attention to the performance and evaluation of the students. Then, having a complete academic record of each student, such as number of attempts, average grade and so on, plays a key role. In this context, the existence of missing data, which can happen for different reasons, leads to affect adversely interesting future analysis. Therefore, the use of imputation techniques is presented as a helpful tool to estimate the value of (...) missing data. This work deals with the academic records of engineering students, in which imputation techniques are applied. More specifically, it is assessed and compared to the performance of the multivariate imputation by chained equations methodology, the adaptive assignation algorithm based on multivariate adaptive regression splines and a hybridization based on self-organisation maps with Mahalanobis distances and AAA algorithm. The results show that proposed methods obtain successfully results regardless the number of missing values, in general terms. (shrink)

The essays in this volume consider the question of whether the self is a unity or whether it should be conceived without metaphor as divided - as a 'multiple self'. The issue is a central one for several disciplines. It bears directly on the account of rationality and the explanation of individual decision-making and behaviour. Is the hypothesis of a multiple self required to deal with the problems of self-deception and weakness of will; and can the conceptual tools (...) developed in the study of interpersonal conflict be applied to the analysis of intra-personal struggle? Most of the essays, by a number of leading philosophers, psychologists and economists, appear here for the first time. They bring out the interdisciplinary importance of the question, and will interest readers in all those areas. The volume will also usefully supplement The Foundations of Social Choice Theory, edited by Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, which appears in the same series and is also concerned with the foundations of rationality. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains the purpose of the transcendental deduction of the categories by referring to the practice of legal deduction (KrV, A 84/B 116). However, he does not elaborate the details of the analogy and the reader is left to fill in the blanks concerning legal deductions and their supposed similarities with transcendental deductions. In this paper, I suggest we use judicial imputation to clarify Kant’s analogy between transcendental and legal deductions. My claim is (...) that the core of the analogy is not the similarities between the acquisition of property and that of concepts but rather similarities in the application of a law to a deed. (shrink)

The fundamental tenet of contemporary sociobiology, namely the assumption of a single process of evolution involving the selection of genes, is critically examined. An alternative multiple-level, multiple-process model of evolution is presented which posits that the primary process that operates via selection upon the genes cannot account for certain kinds of biological phenomena, especially complex, learned, social behaviours. The primary process has evolved subsidiary evolutionary levels and processes that act to bridge the gap between genes and these complex (...) behaviours. The subsidiary levels are development, individual animal learning, and socioculture itself. It is argued that individual learning is pivotal to the derivation and biological analysis of culture. The differences between cultural and noncultural societies are stressed. It is concluded that such a multiple-level model of evolution can form the basis for reconciling opposing sides in the sociobiology debate. (shrink)

Multiple authorship is the universal solution to multi-tasking in the sciences. Without a team, each with their own set of expertise, and each involved mostly in complementary ways, a research project will likely not advance quickly, or effectively. Consequently, there is a risk that research goals will not be met within a desired timeframe. Research teams that strictly scrutinize their modus operandi select and include a set of authors that have participated substantially in the physical undertaking of the research, (...) in its planning, or who have contributed intellectually to the ideas or the development of the manuscript. Authorship is not an issue that is taken lightly, and save for dishonest authors, it is an issue that is decided collectively by the authors, usually in sync with codes of conduct established by their research institutes or national ministries of education. Science, technology and medicine publishers have, through independent, or sometimes coordinated efforts, also established their own sets of guidelines regarding what constitutes valid authorship. However, these are, for the greater part, merely guidelines. A previous and recent analysis of authorship definitions indicates that the definitions in place regarding authorship and its validity by many leading STM publishers is neither uniform, nor standard, despite several of them claiming to follow the guidelines as set forward by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors or ICMJE. This disparity extends itself to ghost and guest authorship, two key authorship-related issues that are examined in this paper to assess the extent of discrepancies among the same set of STM publishers and what possible influence they might have on publishing ethics. (shrink)

Multiple generality has long been known to cause confusion. For example, “Everyone has a donkey that is running” has two readings: either (i) there is a donkey, owned by everyone, and it is running; or (ii) everyone owns some donkey or other, and all such donkeys run. Medieval logicians were acutely aware of such ambiguities, and the logical problems they pose, and sought to sort them out. One of the most ambitious undertakings in this regard is a pair of (...) massive diagrams (magnae figurae) which map out the logical interrelations of two sets of doubly-general forms. These appear in a fourteenth-century MS of John Buridan’s Summulae de Propositionibus. In this paper, I present these diagrams, and determine the truth conditions of their different forms. To that end, I have developed a bespoke system of diagrams to display their truth conditions. As we will see, such forms present significant difficulties for an all-encompassing account of the role form plays in logic. Accordingly, they can tell us important things about the role logical form plays in Buridan’s account of logical foundations. (shrink)

In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, neurological (...) damage. Common objections and concerns are also discussed and rejected. 1 Introduction2 The GRP, Serial Lesion Effect, and Multiple Realizability2.1 A case study of the serial lesion effect2.2 Evaluating the case study’s evidence for multiple realizability3 The GRP More Generally4 Objections to the GRP as Evidence for Multiple Realizability4.1 Small plastic effects and neurological taxonomies4.2 But do neural regions and locations even matter at all?4.3 But are there not other options besides location?5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Although the Evans argument against vague identity has been much discussed, proposah for blocking it have not so far satisfied general conditions which any solution ought to meet. Moreover, the relation between ontically vague identity and ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been satisfactorily addressed. I advocate a way of resisting the Evans argument which satisfies the conditions. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in (...) general in terms of multiple actualities. This provides aprìncipled approach to ontically vague identity which is unaffected by the Evans argument. (shrink)

Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, (...) powerful language available. On a semantic view, traditional notions of multiple realizability are thus very hard to motivate. At best, one must abandon either the idea that multiple realizability is an interesting scientific notion, or else admit that multiply realizable properties do not automatically block scientific reductions. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the framework for the compositional relations of properties in the sciences, or "realization relations", offered by Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett (A&G) in a series of papers, and in particular on the analysis of "multiple realizations" they build upon it. I argue that A&G's analysis of multiple realization requires an account of levels and I try to show, then, that the A&G framework is not successful under any of the extant accounts of levels. There (...) is consequently a real concern tha thte A&G framework for realization may not be viable. (shrink)

During multiple testing, researchers often adjust their alpha level to control the familywise error rate for a statistical inference about a joint union alternative hypothesis (e.g., “H1,1 or H1,2”). However, in some cases, they do not make this inference. Instead, they make separate inferences about each of the individual hypotheses that comprise the joint hypothesis (e.g., H1,1 and H1,2). For example, a researcher might use a Bonferroni correction to adjust their alpha level from the conventional level of 0.050 to (...) 0.025 when testing H1,1 and H1,2, find a significant result for H1,1 (p < 0.025) and not for H1,2 (p > .0.025), and so claim support for H1,1 and not for H1,2. However, these separate individual inferences do not require an alpha adjustment. Only a statistical inference about the union alternative hypothesis “H1,1 or H1,2” requires an alpha adjustment because it is based on “at least one” significant result among the two tests, and so it refers to the familywise error rate. Hence, an inconsistent correction occurs when a researcher corrects their alpha level during multiple testing but does not make an inference about a union alternative hypothesis. In the present article, I discuss this inconsistent correction problem, including its reduction in statistical power for tests of individual hypotheses and its potential causes vis-à-vis error rate confusions and the alpha adjustment ritual. I also provide three illustrations of inconsistent corrections from recent psychology studies. I conclude that inconsistent corrections represent a symptom of statisticism, and I call for a more nuanced inference-based approach to multiple testing corrections. (shrink)

Kant holds that when an agent acts contrary to a strict moral requirement, all of the resulting bad consequences are imputable to the agent, whether foreseeable or not. Conversely, no bad consequences resulting from an agent's compliance with duty are imputable. This paper analyzes the underlying rationale of Kant's principles for the moral imputation of bad consequences. One aim is to show how Kant treats imputability as a question for practical reason occurring within the context of first-order moral norms, (...) rather than a causal or metaphysical issue. This is because the actions that are candidates for imputation are those picked out as salient by moral norms, and because what is imputable depends on first determining what an agent's moral requirements are. The basic idea behind Kant's principles is that the subject to whom an action or its consequences are imputed is the agent on whose authority the action is undertaken. Bad consequences of an action are imputable to an agent who violates a moral requirement because, in transgressing the limits on action established by morality, the agent acts "on his own authority". Consequences that are unforeseeable or which occur by accident may be imputed by this general principle on these grounds: though the consequences may not have been foreseeable, since the agent was subject to a moral requirement, he had compelling reason to, and thus could have refrained from the action that led to them. Though Kant's principles are generally plausible once their basis is evident, the possibility of bad consequences that are only accidentally connected to a violation of duty indicates the need to set limits on what is imputable. The paper concludes by suggesting that an outcome resulting from a violation of duty is imputable when the requirement under which the agent stands provides a reason to act in ways that will standardly prevent or avoid outcomes of that general kind. Nach Kant werden dem Handelnden, der eine strikte moralische Pflicht verletzt, die schlechten Folgen dieses seines Verhaltens stets zugerechnet, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob diese Folgen nun vorhersehbar waren oder nicht. Umgekehrt: Schlechte Folgen, die aus einem pflichtgemäßen Verhalten hervorgehen, sind nicht zurechenbar. Der Beitrag untersucht das Konzept, das diesen Kantischen Prinzipien für die moralische Zurechnung schlechter Folgen zugrunde liegt. Ein Ziel ist es dabei zu zeigen, wie Kant Zurechenbarkeit nicht als ein metaphysisches oder als ein Problem der Kausalität behandelt, sondern als eine Frage der praktischen Vernunft, die im Zusammenhang mit den moralischen Normen erster Ordnung auftaucht. Dies deshalb, weil die Relevanz der Handlungen, die für die Zurechnung in Frage kommen, in erster Linie von den moralischen Normen herkommt, und weil, was zurechenbar ist, von der vorherigen Bestimmung dessen abhängt, was die moralischen Pflichten des Handelnden sind. Die Grundidee der Kantischen Prinzipien besteht darin, daß das Subjekt, dem eine Handlung oder deren Folgen zugerechnet werden, als Urheber der Handlung betrachtet werden muß. Schlechte Folgen einer Handlung sind einem Handelnden, der eine Pflicht verletzt, deshalb zuzurechnen, weil der Handelnde mit der Überschreitung der von der Moral gesetzten Grenzen "aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit" handelt. Unvorhersehbare oder zufällig eintretende Folgen können unter Zugrundelegung dieses Prinzips aus folgenden Gründen zugerechnet werden: Obwohl die Folgen nicht vorhersehbar gewesen sein mögen, hatte der Handelnde, da er einer moralischen Pflicht unterworfen war, doch einen zwingenden Grund dafür und deshalb auch die Möglichkeit dazu, von der Handlung Abstand zu nehmen, die zu jenen Folgen geführt hat. Wenn Kants Prinzipien, hat man ihre Grundlagen erst einmal verstanden, im allgemeinen auch plausibel sind, ist es doch so, daß die Möglichkeit von schlechten Folgen, die mit einer Pflichtverletzung nur zufälligerweise verknüpft sind, eine Einschränkung der Zurechnung fordert. Der Beitrag schließt mit dem Vorschlag, einen Erfolg, der aus einer Pflichtverletzung resultiert, nur dann zuzurechnen, wenn die moralische Verpflichtung, der der Handelnde unterworfen ist, einen Grund dafür liefert, so zu handeln, daß die Folgen dieses Typs von Handlung normalerweise verhindert oder vermieden werden. (shrink)

In three experiments, subjects attempted to track multiple items as they moved independently and unpredictably about a display. Performance was not impaired when the items were briefly (but completely) occluded at various times during their motion, suggesting that occlusion is taken into account when computing enduring perceptual objecthood. Unimpaired performance required the presence of accretion and deletion cues along fixed contours at the occluding boundaries. Performance was impaired when items were present on the visual field at the same times (...) and to the same degrees as in the occlusion conditions, but disappeared and reappeared in ways which did not implicate the presence of occluding surfaces (e.g. by imploding and exploding into and out of existence, instead of accreting and deleting along a fixed contour). Unimpaired performance did not require visible occluders (i.e. Michotte’s tunnel effect) or globally consistent occluder positions. We discuss implications of these results for theories of objecthood in visual attention. (shrink)

This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the physics (...) literature. It is argued that the same explanatory strategy used by physicists to provide understanding of universal behavior in physics can be used to explain how special science properties can be heterogeneously multiply realized. (shrink)

For Kant, moral evil of all sorts - evil that is rooted in a person's character - is manifested in action which, on the one hand, is explicable in terms of an agent's own reasons for action and so imputable, though on the other hand it is, in some sense, irrational. Because such evil is rooted in a person's character, it "corrupts the ground of all maxims" and thus deserves to be called radical evil. Moreover, according to Kant, not only (...) are human beings susceptible to such evil, being evil is an inescapable condition of being human. These claims raise a number of questions, among them the following: How can we ecxplain the possibility of irrational, yet explicable, freely done actions given Kant's views about human agency? What is the nature of radical evil? In what sense is it a corrupting ground of all maxims? What reason does Kant have for claiming that radical evil is an inescapable part of the human condition? In this paper, I focus on these questions. Sections I and II are concerned with some basic themes and distinctions pertaining to Kant's theory of action and practical rationality that will provide a basis for understanding his view of moral evil. In section III, I turn to Kant's analysis of moral evil in its varios manifestations in order to provide, in section IV, a general charcterization of moral evil. In section V, I consider Kant's claim that radical evils corrupts the ground of all maxims, and what this claim implies about the possibility of actions having moral worth. In section VI, I want to consider what we can call Kant's Universality Thesis, viz., his claim that necessarily all human beings are radically evil. In his recent book, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Henry Allison has argued that the UT represents a synthetic a priori claim, and he proceeds to provide a 'deduction' for it, something that Kant failed to do. I argue that Allison's deduction does not work, though I am afraid I don't have a deduction of my own to propose on Kant's behalf, nor do I see how to reconcile Kant's own defense of the UT with its alleged a priori status. Kant's UT remains problematic. Für Kant manifestiert sich das moralisch Böse in allen seinen Varianten - das Böse nämlich, das im Charakter einer Person wurzelt - in Handlungen, die auf der einen Seite vom eigenen Standpunkt des Handelnden her expliziert werden können und die deshalb zurechenbar sind, die aber auf der anderen Seite in einer gewissen Hinsicht als irrational bezeichnet werden müssen. Weil das Böse im Charakter der Person wurzelt, "verdirbt es den Grund aller Maximen" und verdient deshalb "das radikal Böse" genannt zu werden. Darüber hinaus sind menschliche Wesen nach Kant nicht nur für das Böse anfällig, es ist vielmehr unentrinnbar menschliches Schicksal, böse zu sein. Diese Thesen werfen eine Reihe von Fragen auf, unter ihnen die folgenden: Wie läßt sich, Kants Auffassungen über die Natur menschlichen Handelns vorausgesetzt, die Möglichkeit irrationalen, aber gleichwohl vom Standpunkt des Handelnden her explizierbaren und also freien Handelns erklären? Was ist das Wesen des radikal Bösen? In welchem Sinne verdirbt es den Grund aller Maximen? Warum behauptet Kant, das radikal Böse sei unentrinnbares Schicksal des Menschen? Der Beitrag ist diesen Fragen gewidmet. Er befaßt sich zuerst mit einigen Grundfragen und Grundunterscheidungen von Kants Handlungstheorie und seiner Theorie der praktischen Vernunft. Das erlaubt uns, Kants Auffassungen über das moralisch Böse zu verstehen. Abschnitt III wendet sich Kants Analyse des moralisch Bösen in seinen verschiedenen Ausprägungen zu, um auf dieser Grundlage eine allgemeine Charakterisierung des moralisch Bösen geben zu können. Abschnitt V befaßt sich mit Kants Behauptung, das radikal Böse verderbe den Grund aller Maximen, und mit ihren Implikationen für die Frage nach dem moralischen Wert von Handlungen überhaupt. In Abschnitt VI geht es um das, was man "Kants Universalitätsthese" nennen kann, d.i. seine Behauptung, menschliche Wesen seien notwendigerweise radikal böse. In seinem jüngst erschienenen Werk über Kant's Theory of Freedom vertritt Henry Allison die Meinung, UT enthalte einen synthetischen Satz a priori, und er legt eine "Ableitung" von UT vor, was Kant nicht getan hat. Ich versuche zu zeigen, daß Allisons Ableitung nicht schlüssig ist, obwohl ich - leider - keine eigene Deduktion anbieten kann, die Kants These stützt, noch einen Weg sehe, Kants eigene Verteidigung von UT mit ihrem angeblich apriorischen Status in Übereinstimmung zu bringen. Kants UT bleibt problematisch. (shrink)