This chapter argues that our ambiguity toward renewable technologies arises from our understanding that the nature of the machine is somehow alien and external to us. Historically, we have thought of the machine as lacking cultural signification. As a result, the machine has been relegated to mere utility rather than having any axiological or human reality. Thinking of the machine as utterly other has exercised a certain xenophobia or misoneism as well as an uncritical technophilia. This ambiguity arises from our (...) acceptance that technology is based on the principle of conservation, a sameness underlying change that is traceable to Aristotle’s theory of causality with its implicit ontological distinction between natural and human made objects. To overcome such teleology, we need a different ontological ground on which to consider the concept of technology. Gilbert Simondon gives us such tools. His work is slowly surfacing with thinkers such as Bernard Stiegler and more recently in the English-speaking academy with thinkers such as Elizabeth Grosz and Andrew Feenberg. 1 This chapter will show how both Aristotle’s phenomenology of technology and Simondon’s ontogenesis can help to think though the challenges of renewable technologies associated with climate change. It will outline Aristotle’s phenomenology of technology and illustrate the intersection and departure of Simondon’s ontogenetic epistemology through his three-phase principle of individuation: elemental phase, individual phase, and ensemble phase. For Simondon all objects become whole (sunolos) though a process of individuation, which explains the coming into being and the existence of beings of all kinds. There are three phases: the elemental which is the spontaneous excess of being; individuation is the successive multistability of being where being splits becoming both the individual and the many; and finally the ensemble . (shrink)

This article firstly criticizes Margaret Archer’s Morphogenetic Approach for being indecisive about the realist notion of emergence it proposes as well as for her inadequate account of structural conditioning. It is argued that critical realists’ conceptualizations of emergence cannot but lead to inconsistencies about the adequate placement of agents as parts of emergent entities. The inconsistencies to which these conceptualizations lead necessitate an anti-realist model of the constitution of societies which takes into account that social structures are existentially dependent upon (...) ideational elaboration. This alternative anti-realist theoretical perspective is provided by Ontogenesis, within the framework of which the realists’ idea of the ‘necessary and internal relations’ give their place to the ontological pervasiveness of the culturally shared imaginary schemata. Archer’s denial of a collective synchronic impact to social forms is implied in her analysis of morphogenetic cycles, according to which, structural elaboration post-dates social interaction; and this denial is also expressed in this very idea of emergent structures. Instead, for Ontogenesis, social forms are synchronically dependent on the collective impact of the differently socially placed agents, who have different interests and material resources, and whose interaction only becomes meaningful when drawing on these culturally shared imaginary schemata. (shrink)

Psychologists have emphasized children's acquisition of information through firsthand observation. However, many beliefs are acquired from others' testimony. In two experiments, most 4yearolds displayed sceptical trust in testimony. Having heard informants' accurate or inaccurate testimony, they anticipated that informants would continue to display such differential accuracy and they trusted the hitherto reliable informant. Yet they ignored the testimony of the reliable informant if it conflicted with what they themselves had seen. By contrast, threeyearolds were less selective in trusting a reliable (...) informant. Thus, young children check testimony against their own experience and increasingly recognise that some informants are more trustworthy than others. (shrink)

De concordia, el último tratado escrito por Anselmo constituye un hito privilegiado en la ontogénesis de su pensamiento. Intentaré delinear en De concordia aquellos aspectos de su macroestructura que juzgo importantes y que pertenecen a ese proceso genético: a) la obra se inscribe —junto con Monologion y Cur deus homo— en la ontogénesis del pensamiento anselmiano en tanto pensamiento especulativo; b) este carácter especulativo está asociado íntimamente al lenguaje a través de la noción nihil; c) la articulación entre (...) libertad y necesidad cuanto el desdoblamiento del centro de DC, son subsidiarios del antedicho carácter especulativo. (shrink)

I consider the developmental origins of the socially extended mind. First, I argue that, from birth, the physical interventions caregivers use to regulate infant attention and emotion (gestures, facial expressions, direction of gaze, body orientation, patterns of touch and vocalization, etc.) are part of the infant’s socially extended mind; they are external mechanisms that enable the infant to do things she could not otherwise do, cognitively speaking. Second, I argue that these physical interventions encode the norms, values, and patterned practices (...) distinctive of their specific sociocultural milieu. Accordingly, not only do they enhance and extend the infant’s cognitive competence. They also entrain the infant to think and act in culturally appropriate ways. These physical interventions are thus arguably the earliest examples of social practices that scaffold the infant’s cognitive development and shape the development of their cultural education. (shrink)

La obra girardiana no es sistemática. El análisis y la síntesis de contenido de sus textos es el objeto de esta investigación. Pretendemos aquí exponer y clarificar su filosofía mimética, tanto su teoría sobre la formación de los individuos, como su filosofía interdividual del sujeto, además de contextualizarla dentro del giro intersubjetivo de la filosofía contemporánea.

Mathematical objects are divided into (1) those which are autonomous, i.e., not dependent for their existence upon mathematicians’ conscious acts, and (2) intentional objects, which are so dependent. Platonist philosophy of mathematics argues that all objects belong to group (1), Brouwer’s intuitionism argues that all belong to group (2). Here we attempt to develop a dualist ontology of mathematics (implicit in the work of, e.g., Hilbert), exploiting the theories of Meinong, Husserl and Ingarden on the relations between autonomous and intentional (...) objects. In particular we develop a phenomenology of mathematical works, which has the stratified intentional structure discovered by Ingarden in his study of the literary work. (shrink)

This article develops a media philosophical framework for addressing the intersection of epigenetics and complex dynamical systems in theoretical biology. In particular, it argues that the theoretical humanities need to think critically about the computability of epigenomic regulation, as well as speculatively about the possibility of an epigenomics beyond complexity. The fact that such a conceptual framework does not exist suggests not only a failure to engage with the mathematics of complexity, but also a failure to engage with its history. (...) Both epigenetics and the application of complex dynamical systems to biology originate in the mid-twentieth-century work of Conrad Hal Waddington. The article demonstrates how this genealogy of epigenetic complexity reveals the need for a speculative conception of epigenomic mediation beyond mathematical complexity. Using Whitehead’s philosophy as a conceptual anchor, the “epimedial landscape” serves as a first pass at a media philosophical revision of the complex dynamical systems view of the epigenetic landscape. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question of when human life begins from a neo-Aristotelian perspective. In my view, the basic principles of Aristotle’s metaphysics inform an account of human life (and the human person) that offers the best available explanation of the available phenomena. This account – the substance account of the human person – can fully incorporate the contemporary findings of empirical embryology, while also recognizing the essential uniqueness of rational human nature.

“ >. Das hiess doch: Wenn du dir gewisse Tatsachen anders denkst,sie anders beschreibst, als sie sind, dann kannst du die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe dir nicht mehr vorstellen, weil die Regeln ihrer Anwendung kein Analogon unter den neuen Umständen haben.”.

Since Aristotle and the Stoa, there has been a clash, worsened by modern predicate logic, between logically defined operator meanings and natural intuitions. Pragmatics has tried to neutralize the clash by an appeal to the Gricean conversational maxims. The present study argues that the pragmatic attempt has been unsuccessful. The “softness” of the Gricean explanation fails to do justice to the robustness of the intuitions concerned, leaving the relation between the principles evoked and the observed facts opaque. Moreover, there are (...) cases where the Gricean maxims fail to apply. A more adequate solution consists in the devising of a sound natural logic, part of the innate cognitive equipment of mankind. This account has proved successful in conjunction with a postulated cognitive mechanism in virtue of which the universe of discourse is stepwise and recursively restricted, so that the negation selects different complements according to the degree of restrictedness of Un. This mechanism explains not only the discrepancies between natural logical intuitions and known logical systems; it also accounts for certain systematic lexicalization gaps in the languages of the world. Finally, it is shown how stepwise restriction of Un produces the ontogenesis of natural predicate logic, while at the same time resolving the intuitive clashes with established logical systems that the Gricean maxims sought to explain. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek omits the decisive notions of autology and re-entry in order to construe and subsequently find Luhmann’s ontology. What is more, the whole endeavour to discover ontology in Luhmann’s work is questionable. It misses the point that a systems theory based on operative constructivism is obviously developed for researching ontogenetic processes.

This article develops a media philosophical framework for addressing the intersection of epigenetics and complex dynamical systems in theoretical biology. In particular, it argues that the theoretical humanities need to think critically about the computability of epigenomic regulation, as well as speculatively about the possibility of an epigenomics beyond complexity. The fact that such a conceptual framework does not exist suggests not only a failure to engage with the mathematics of complexity, but also a failure to engage with its history. (...) Both epigenetics and the application of complex dynamical systems to biology originate in the mid-twentieth-century work of Conrad Hal Waddington. The article demonstrates how this genealogy of epigenetic complexity reveals the need for a speculative conception of epigenomic mediation beyond mathematical complexity. Using Whitehead’s philosophy as a conceptual anchor, the “epimedial landscape” serves as a first pass at a media philosophical revision of the complex dynamical systems view of the epigenetic landscape. (shrink)

1. Living organisms are characterized by complexity and uniqueness of structure, as well as by specific pattern of changes during ontogenesis programmed in their own genome.2. Although general mechanisms of gene expression and regulation are well understood, our knowledge of spatial morphogenesis is rather limited and patchy despite discovery of homeotic genes.3. Developmental biology is able to explain principles of formation of neuronal network in the brain, whereas neurophysiology provides detailed information on the role of various neurotransmitters, but we still (...) do not understand the essence of consciousness, and even more self-consciousness of the man.4. Some philosophical theories trying to explain the nature of self-consciousness, such as parallelism and interactionism, are briefly discussed. (shrink)

For the most part, this is a fairly literal translation, but I have opted for a few English idioms for the sake of readability. In that spirit, I have kept the original punctuation, which results in very long sentences, but I have inserted paragraph breaks for readability. I mark these inserted breaks with this sign [¶]; unmarked breaks are in the original. In addition to providing the French for difficult translations, I also interpolate a few English words for readability. Translator’s (...) notes appear as endnotes. (shrink)

Contingent transcranialists claim that the physical mechanisms of mind are not exclusively intracranial and that genuine cognitive systems can extend into cognizers' physical and socio-cultural environments. They further claim that extended cognitive systems must include the deep functional integration of external environmental resources with internal neural resources. They have found it difficult, however, to explicate the precise nature of such deep functional integration and provide compelling examples of it. Contingent intracranialists deny that extracranial resources can be components of genuine extended (...) cognitive systems. They claim that transcranialists fallaciously conflate coupling with constitution and construe cognition as extending always from brains into world rather than world into brains. By using insights from recent research in developmental psychology and by explicating the nature of one form that deep functional integration can take, I argue that (i) transcranialists do not fallaciously conflate coupling wth constitution, and (ii) human emotional ontogenesis is a world-to-brain transcranial achievement. Jennifer Greenwood is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at the School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics, University of Queensland. (shrink)

I demonstrate that Deleuze's identification of Aion as an empty form offers a fascinating model of temporality that prioritises variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze's identification of time as an empty form is supported by ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the measurement of existent entities. This gradual untethering of time from movement (...) gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content. It is here, with Deleuze's reading of the Platonic cosmology, that we see the first hints of the suggestion that Aion is involved with ontogenesis. Eternity is characterised as: a temporal ‘all’ that is non-reducible to the determinacy implied by any particular temporally localised existent or temporal series ; that which tends towards a diversity of possible states of affairs. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects in the long history of Aion is that – in the ancient world – it was used in magical incantations. For the Gnostics and Oracles, Aion was a deity, and a potent one at that. From the Gnostic papyri, we get a vision of Aion as a force which enjoys eternal realisation. I suggest that the papyri conjure an image of Aion as a deity that is liberated from time, in the sense that it enjoys a neutrality with respect to the movements of any particular entity or group of entities – a form, in the most general sense of the term. Then, to clarify this mercurial aspect of an empty form of time, I elaborate on a complex analogy between Aion and Deleuze's concept of an ‘ideal game’ – an analogy that Deleuze specifies through reference to Fitzgerald and Borges. The claim is that Aion is an analogue of an ideal game in the sense that both share essential properties. Both Aion and the ideal game involve the multiplication of chance. Finally, I suggest that the differential aspects of Aion imply that it is pure variability; something which can be illustrated through a differential equation. These yield the suggestion that Aion enjoys realisation as an ontogenetic force. I further claim that ontogenetic forces may enjoy expression as the content of literature and mathematics. In concrete terms, temporality is involved in the creation of existent entities, which may be illustrated as various types of continuous multiplicity. (shrink)

In recent years, numerous studies have tried to highlight, from a naturalistic point of view, the apparent mysteries of consciousness. Many authors concentrated their efforts on explaining the phylogenetic origins of consciousness. Paradoxically, comments on the ontogenesis of consciousness are almost nonexistent. By crossing the results of psychology of development with a philosophical analysis, this paper aims to make up for this omission. After having characterized the different conceptual aspects of consciousness, we combine these, with observations made by developmental psychologists, (...) to trace the empirical development of consciousness during the first months of life. This combination leads to a theoretical proposal: the intentional characteristics of consciousness, namely, aboutness and purposefulness, depend on the phenomenal properties of conscious states. From this perspective, the phenomenal aspect of conscious states (the "what it is like" effect) is therefore far from being an epiphenomenon. (shrink)

Recent literature on the development of self in child development and in human social evolution is examined in the light of Gilbert Ryle's critique of the concept of mind. As an alternative to the currently popular theory-of-mind approach, it is proposed that a better conceptual foundation for theories of self can be built around a human capacity for higher-order relational reasoning about categories of human being, loosely 'persons' and their attributes, and a capacity to generate figurative conceptual entities such as (...) mind and self. (shrink)

Becoming Human by Jennifer Greenwood is one of the most thought-provoking books on emotion and its expression I have read. At its core, it attempts to provide an account of the development of full human emotionality and in so doing argues the emotions are “transcranial.” Emotions are radically realized outside our nervous systems and beyond our skin. As children, we are functionally integrated affectively with our mothers; so much so that in a sense our emotions are not ours alone. Regardless (...) of whether one agrees with her radical claims, it is a must-read for those interested in emotion and expression. In order to appreciate the significance of this book, let me sketch its contents and raise a few criticisms.Many... (shrink)

The evolutionary scenario described in this target article parallels developmental patterns observed in human infants. Early vocalizations are largely expressive, manual control develops more rapidly than intentional vocal articulation, and vocal and manual activity are linked. In ontogenetic development, language is strongly rooted in bodily action and gesture.

The text examines Sergej Nikolajeviè Bulgakov's description of the philosopheme as thoroughly "immanent" and the corollary that such immanence necessarily excludes the problematic of the "creation of the world." Because of this resolute immanence and the notion that the creation of the world in the form of creatio ex nihilo requires a non-immanent or non-ontological thought and concept, the problematic for Bulgakov is approached only by a theologeme. Appropriating this argument as material for a cursory philosopheme, the text attempts to (...) transform Bulgakov's theologeme into a philosopheme through an elision of God and dogma that overdetermines the theologeme. This philosopheme would be a thoroughly non-ontological philosopheme, one that allows for the treatment of the problematic of "creation" or singular ontogenesis, yet with the corollary that this philosopheme must rely on an "ontological zero" Such a philosopheme qua ontologically empty formula nevertheless remains ontologically significant insofar as it is to evince the limit of ontology, in the ontological zero's non-relationality to ontology.O texto examina a descrição do filosofema de Sergej Nikolajeviè Bulgakov como completamente "imanente" [a saber, a imanência do homem qua ser, de modo que a ontologia em Bulgakov torna-se um análogo conceitual da imanência] e o corolário de que tal imanência necessariamente exclui a problemática da "criação do mundo". Em razão dessa imanência resoluta e da noção de que a criação do mundo na forma de creatio ex nihilo requer um pensamento e um conceito não-imanentes ou não-ontológicos, a problemática da "criação do mundo" para Bulgakov é abordada somente por um teologema. Apropriando-se desse argumento como material para um filosofema fugaz, o texto procura transformar o teologema de Bulgakov em filofosema, por meio de uma elisão de Deus e do dogma que sobredetermina o teologema. Esse filosofema [que nasce no interior da própria obra de Bulgakov, em sua hesitação com respeito à sobredeterminação da imanência e ao compromisso com o problema da criação] seria um filosofema completamente não-ontológico, que permite o tratamento da problemática da "criação" ou ontogênese singular, ainda que com o corolário de que ele tem de depender de um "zero ontológico". Um tal filosofema qua fórmula ontologicamente vazia permanece não obstante ontologicamente significativo, à medida que ele evidencia o limite da ontologia, na não-relacionalidade do zero ontológico com a ontologia. (shrink)

Co-morbidity of schizophrenia and autism is low because interpersonal concerns of schizophrenic patients presuppose developmental achievements that are absent in autism. Autism may arise if primary anxiety is not overcome at a key developmental stage by affective synchronisation between infant and caregiver. Schizophrenic patients will have learned to regulate primitive anxiety by affectively attuning to narrow social networks but remain highly vulnerable to exclusion from larger groups.

Jennifer Greenwood's Becoming Human: The Ontogenesis, Metaphysics, and Expression of Human Emotionality is an innovative exploration of the empirical literature on human development and its implications for the extended mind debate. Greenwood argues that an examination of the emotional and linguistic development of children, especially the unique relationship between mothers and infants, supports transcranialism. I summarize her argument and then point to some of the strengths and weaknesses of her position.

This article presents an explication of the references to the history of the calculus in the first few pages of Chapter 4 of Deleuze's _Difference and Repetition_. In those pages, Deleuze uses anachronistic readings of the calculus to explain his theory of ontogenesis, beginning with the differential, dx, that is strictly nothing by itself but that establishes singular points in relation to other differentials. He builds from the differential to power series, showing a corresponding process of determination in the ontogenesis (...) as the mathematics moves from derivative to the so-called original function. (shrink)

In his paper, in this journal, Sterelney claims that cases of extended mind are limiting cases of environmental scaffolding and that a niche construction model is a more helpful, general framework for understanding human action. He further claims that extended mind cases fit into a corner of a 3D space of environmental scaffolds of cognitive competence. He identifies three dimensions which determine where a resource fits into this space and suggests that extended mind models seem plausible when a resource is (...) highly reliable, individualised/entrenched and a single-user resource. Sterelney also claims that the most important cognition-enhancing resources are provided collectively by one generation to the next. In this paper, I argue that Sterelney is both right and wrong and this because he focuses primarily on external, physical resources and construes scaffolding as exclusively unidirectional and diachronic. Using examples of unfamiliar tool use, visual processing and human emotional ontogenesis, I argue, respectively, that extended mind cases include those which fail to meet Sterelney’s dimensional criteria; that the most important cognition—enhancing resources are those which actually build brains; that these are provided on a one-to-one basis in emotional ontogenesis; and, this depends on bidirectional and synchronic cognitive scaffolding. (shrink)

El presente texto pretende reivindicar agencias materiales en las prácticas de la pintura al óleo. El artículo comienza presentando algunos debates sobre la importancia de la materialidad desde una estética posthumana, relacional y ecológica inspirada por las teorías de los nuevos materialismos y sus distintos anclajes (la teoría del actor-red, las epistemologías feministas de la tecno-ciencia, la ontología orientada a los objetos o la cultura material post fenomenológica). A continuación, presentaré algunos ejemplos de mediaciones o hibridaciones socio-técnicas en la pintura (...) al óleo donde agencias humanas y no humanas se involucran para articular y sostener los cuadros; pero también para traicionar, interrumpir y asombrar las intenciones de sus autores, la estabilidad de sus pigmentos y la autenticidad de su apreciación estética. Finalmente, desplegaré un proceso de ontogénesis material de un instrumento pictórico, la paleta, como agenciamiento esperanzador para abandonar los dualismos de la modernidad estética. (shrink)

Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on välja töötada olenditeooria mõningad põhimõisted. Olendit määratletakse teatavate eristumisprotsesside lõimimisena ehk "läbivaatusena". Nendel protsessidel on kaks külge, "esi-" ja "isekülg". Esikülg on kõrvutuvuslik, st. paljusus, mille elemendid on üksteise kõrval; isekülg on läbistuvuslik, st. paljusus, mille elemendid läbistavad üksteist. Need kaks külge ei sarnane teineteisega ja nende vahel liikumine kätkeb taandamatut ajalisust, ontogeneesi. Artiklis laiendatakse olendi mõistet "vertikaalis" erinevatele keerukustasanditele (eluline, molekuliline, atomaarne jt) ja "horisontaalis" erinevatele individualiseeritusastmetele. Isekülge käsitletakse liigendatuna piki afekteerimis- ja afekteeritavusviise, mis tähistavad (...) seda, mida olend suudab tajuda ja teostada, ehk seda, milleks ta on võimeline. Lõpuks käsitletakse esi- ja isekülge olemise kui protsessi kahe aspektina, esinemise ja isenemisena. Esinemise ja isenemise ringluste arvukus ja tempo variatiivsus määravad olendi väehulga. A Theory of Beings The paper proposes to work out concepts for describing the individualization of beings on various levels of organization. A being with a certain degree of individuality comes into being when certain processes of differenciation are being integrated together. It is conceived of as having two aspects, self-relation (isekülg) and other-relation (esikülg). The former is a multiplicity where the elements interpenetrate each other and the latter is a multiplicity where the elements are exterior to each other (juxtaposition). The articulations of interpenetrating multiplicity determine how a being can affect its surroundings and be affected by it, and the modes of this articulation can be seen as attractors of the "phase-space" of a being. Ontogenesis is on the one hand the actualization of this virtual phase-space in an actual form with its characteristic ways of spatialization and temporalization. On the other hand, ontogenesis means the revirtualization of juxtaposing elements and processes. The number and intensity of these circuits determines the degree of power of a being. The paper proposes to extend all these notions also to pre-biotic systems.  . (shrink)

The paper analyzes S.N. Spielrein’s scientific contribution to development K.G. Jung’s ideas. It starts with a list of areas pioneered by S.N. Spielrein’s and a review of literature which, as the author points out, is often biased, focusing not on the ideas of one of the first women in psychoanalysis, but on her personal life and individual characteristics. Further the paper analyzes several principal conceptions (with the exception of the original conception of destruction) where S.N. Spielrein’s contribution was essential. She (...) tried to give a more strict definition to C.G. Jung’s theory of the complex which played a key part in development of analytical psychology. S.N. Spielrein was the first to prove empirically in her dissertation the potential of the theory which contradicted classical psychoanalysis. S.N. Spielrein also played a part in development of C.G. Jung’s notions of philo- and ontogenesis of the mind in the process of the so called ‘complex intergrowth’ and gradually developing a common core in the form of I-consciousness. She also worked to define genesis of schizophrenia as a process of replacement of the personal content of the mind by collective contents. She contributed to development of the notion of the collective unconscious. The author analyzes her conception of ‘ancestral soul’ in the context of later achievements of analytical psychology, pointing out similarities in definitions. The author suggests a hypothesis on reasons why, after her separation from C.G. Jung, all mention of the collective unconscious disappeared from S.N. Spielrein’s publications. In conclusion, on the basis of characteristics of the female mind, identified by S.N. Shpilrein, the author hypothesizes on why actuality of her ideas has not been appreciated. Статья посвящена оценке научного вклада С.Н. Шпильрейн в развитие идей К.Г. Юнга. Основной текст предваряется указанием областей, в которых Шпильрейн оказалась первопроходцем, а также библиографическим обзором с выявлением слабых мест сложившейся традиции, сторонники которой предпочитают фокусироваться не на идеях одной из первых женщин-психоаналитиков, а на ее личной жизни и психологических особенностях. В основной части подробно рассматриваются несколько ключевых для аналитической психологии концепций (за исключением оригинальной концепции деструкции), вклад С.Н. Шпильрейн в развитие которых оказался наиболее существенным. Во-первых, анализируются ее усилия по уточнению сформулированной К.Г. Юнгом теории комплекса, сыгравшей ключевую роль в становлении аналитической психологии. С.Н. Шпильрейн стала первым исследователем, который в своей диссертации на конкретном эмпирическом материале доказал приемлемость этой теории, идущей вразрез с классическим психоанализом. Во-вторых, эксплицируется вклад С.Н. Шпильрейн в развитие представлений К.Г. Юнга о филогенезе и онтогенезе психики в результате так называемого комплексного срастания и постепенного обретения единого стержня в форме Я-сознания. В-третьих, отмечается роль Шпильрейн в уточнении генезиса шизофрении как процесса замещения личностных содержаний психики коллективными психическими содержаниями. В-четвертых, рассматривается вклад С.Н. Шпильрейн в развитие понятия коллективного бессознательного. В частности, анализируется ее учение о «душе рода» или «родовой душе» в контексте более поздних открытий аналитической психологии, указываются сходства формулировок. Кроме того, выдвигается гипотеза, почему после разрыва с К.Г. Юнгом в трудах С.Н. Шпильрейн полностью исчезают концепты, близкие понятию коллективного бессознательного. В заключение на основании выявленных С.Н. Шпильрейн особенностей женской психики строится предположение, почему ее идеи только сегодня стали по-настоящему актуальными. (shrink)

This article deals with the links between the enaction paradigm and artificial intelligence. Enaction is considered a metaphor for artificial intelligence, as a number of the notions which it deals with are deemed incompatible with the phenomenal field of the virtual. After explaining this stance, we shall review previous works regarding this issue in terms of artificial life and robotics. We shall focus on the lack of recognition of co-evolution at the heart of these approaches. We propose to explicitly integrate (...) the evolution of the environment into our approach in order to refine the ontogenesis of the artificial system, and to compare it with the enaction paradigm. The growing complexity of the ontogenetic mechanisms to be activated can therefore be compensated by an interactive guidance system emanating from the environment. This proposition does not however, resolve that of the relevance of the meaning created by the machine (sense-making). Such reflections lead us to integrate human interaction into this environment in order to construct relevant meaning in terms of participative artificial intelligence. This raises a number of questions with regards to setting up an enactive interaction. The article concludes by exploring a number of issues, thereby enabling us to associate current approaches with the principles of morphogenesis, guidance, the phenomenology of interactions and the use of minimal enactive interfaces in setting up experiments which will deal with the problem of artificial intelligence in a variety of enaction-based ways. (shrink)

The Ontogenesis can be explained in a double way: historically: it runs from the past to the present. idealistically: it runs from the general to the special. The development of the dimorphism of sex tells against the historical and for the idealistical perception. Therefore the idealistical morphology has to be put in the place of the phylogenetical. Idiogenesis and Morphogenesis are going analogically from the general to the special. There exists parallelism of the order of thinking and being. L'ontogenèse peut (...) être expliquée de deux manières différentes: historiquement; elle se passe du passé au présent. idéalistiquement; elle se passe de l'universel au particulier. Le développement du dimorphisme du sexe est contradictoire à l'interprétation historique et affirme la conception idéalistique. Par conséquent il faut remplacer la morphologie phylogénétique par l'idéalistique. De façon analogue l'idiogenèse et la morphogenèse se passent de l'universel au particulier. Il existe un parallélisme de l'ordre d'existence et de l'ordre des pensées. (shrink)

Many philosophers contend that selfhood involves a uniquely first-personal experiential dimension, which precedes any form of socially dependent selfhood. In this paper, I do not wish to deny the notion of such a “minimal” experiential dimension as encapsulating the very givenness of experience as for a certain subject, such that experiences are accessible to this subject in a way that they are not for others. However, I do wish to deny any temptation to view minimal experiential selfhood as ontogenetically more (...) primitive than socially constituted selfhood. That is, the ‘thinnest’ construal of minimal experiential selfhood fails to properly account for characteristics that are essential to human selfhood; namely, the intimate, embodied interactions that unfold at the incipient moments of human life. I argue that taking the ontogenesis of embodied human existence seriously involves accepting the de facto equiprimordiality of minimal experientialiasm with a ‘minimal’ form of relational selfhood, i.e. the co-constitution of experience through engagements with others. (shrink)

This essay describes and evaluates the conception of mereological structure that underpins Deleuze’s account of ontogenesis in Difference and Repetition. A theory of mereology is a theory of composition: it asks what it is to be a part making a whole, what it is to be a whole collecting its parts; in short, in what the relation of making or composing consists. The locus classicus for modern mereology is the third of Husserl’s Logical Investigations (‘On the Theory of Wholes and (...) Parts’), which deduces the definitions, axioms and principles governing the relation of parthood and associated notions, such as wholeness, separation, simplicity and complexity. My question is this: what happens to these notions when they are no longer the terms of a ‘calculus of individuals’ and, instead, become the terms of a differential calculus of individuation? (shrink)

This would have been a better book if Sampson had argued his main point, the usefulness of the Simonian principle as an explanation of the evolution, structure, and acquisition of language, on its own merits, instead of making it subsidiary to his attack on ‘limited-minders’ (e.g., Noam Chomsky). The energy he has spent on the attack he might then have been willing and able to employ in developing his argument at reasonable length and detail. He might then have found that (...) argument faulty, or even wrong. Underdeveloped as it is, however, his point about the Simonian principle does seem to have thepossibility of some significance in understanding the empirical issues of this book (and the dichotomy of ‘limited’ and ‘creative’ minds is certainly not one of these).What Sampson has done inMaking Sense has the appearance of science, and theoretical linguistics, and therefore it is somewhat puzzling to find the conclusions that the human mind cannot be scientifically studied (p. 10), and that theoretical linguistics is a “mirage” (p. 210). His statement that It may still seem worthwhile to some to work out the exact implications for present-day linguistic structure of the fact that languages are evolved systems, but I cannot see that there is much glamour or, indeed, much substance in this task (p. 210) would surely be surprising to a geneticist or ethologist. We hope his apparent misunderstanding on this point will not lead him to give up his profession, in which he seems willing and able to make a significant contribution.What in particular is required is a clear indication of how the Simonian principle imposes itself in the ontogenesis of language. Consider Chomsky's example of the rule for forming questions in English. For sentence (1) below, children able to deal with such examples would give (2) but not (3) as the corresponding question (Chomsky, 1975, p. 31).The man who is tall is in the room.Is the man who is tall in the room?*Is the man who tall is in the room?Now compare Sampson's evolutionary explanation for the structure-dependence of rules which is illustrated in (1)-(3): “once a behavior-pattern has become thoroughly established, it will tend to be treated as a fixed given when used as a constituent of a more complex, later-learned behavior-pattern” (p. 183). In order for this to account for Chomsky's example it would have to be the case that children learn relative clauses before they learn questions, which simply isn't true.In conclusion, we wish not to seem unaware of the problems with the position Sampson is attacking, or unaware of the sometimes dogmatic way it too has been presented. Chomsky's hypothesis of innate linguistic ideas seems, fundamentally, to derive from the claimed rapidity and uniformity of language acquisition in the face of limited and degenerate data. Chomsky appears to have been unwilling to argue these points directly or to show their relation to others, for which he has argued, for example, the implausibility of some abstract constraint's having been learned (cf. 1971, pp. 22–44; 1975, pp. 30–33; 1980, pp. 35–52). And almost from his first invoking of rationalism in support of his linguistic method, Chomsky has himself resorted to an unnecessarily polemical attack on empiricism (cf. 1965, p. 58, n. 33). The innateness issue is just not clear or simple enough to justify so much animus, or even conviction. (shrink)

In this article, I reflect on the nature of innovation to lay the groundwork for a philosophy of innovation. First, I contrast the contemporary techno-economic paradigm of innovation with the work of Joseph Schumpeter. It becomes clear that Schumpeter’s work provides good reasons to question the techno-economic paradigm of innovation. Second, I contrast ‘innovation’ with ‘technology’ and identify five differences between the two concepts. Third, I reflect on the process-outcome dimension and the ontic-ontological dimension of innovation to develop four characteristics (...) of the phenomenon of innovation. These four characteristics move beyond the techno-economic paradigm of innovation and highlight, first, the importance of its process dimension understood as ontogenesis, second, the outcome of innovation, and third, the importance of the ontological dimension of innovation, which is considered adjacent to its fourth characteristic, i.e., the ontic level of the outcome of innovation. After drawing conclusions, a research agenda for future research is provided. (shrink)

It should now be recognized that codes are central to life and to understanding its more complex forms, including human culture. Recognizing the ‘conventional’ nature of codes provides solid grounds for rejecting efforts to reduce life to biochemistry and justifies according a place to semantics in life. The question I want to consider is whether this is enough. Focussing on Eigen’s paradox of how a complex code could originate, I will argue that along with Barbieri’s efforts to account for the (...) origins of life based on the ribosome and then to account for the refined codes through a process of ambiguity reduction, something more is required. Barbieri has not provided an adequate account of emergence, or the basis for providing such an account. I will argue that Stanley Salthe has clarified to some extent the nature of emergence by conceptualizing it as the interpolation of new enabling constraints. Clearly, codes can be seen as enabling constraints. How this actually happens, though, is still not explained. Stuart Kauffman has grappled with this issue and shown that it radically challenges the assumptions of mainstream science going back to Newton. He has attempted to reintroduce real possibilities or potentialities into his ontology, and argued that radically new developments in nature are associated with realizing adjacent possibles. This is still not adequate. What is also involved, I will suggest, utilizing concepts developed by the French natural philosopher Gilbert Simondon, is ‘transduction’ as part of ‘ontogenesis’ of individuals in a process of ‘individuation’, that is, the emergence of ‘individuals’ from preindividual fields or milieux. (shrink)