It is well known that Kant seeks to discredit rational psychology on the grounds that we cannot access the nature of the soul by reflecting upon the ‘I think’ of self-consciousness. What is far less understood, however, is why Kant still believes the theorems of rational psychology are analytically true insofar as they represent the ‘I’ through the categories of substance, reality, unity, and existence. Early post-Kantian thinkers like Fichte would abandon this restriction and approach the concept of the (...) ‘I’ instead through the category of community or reciprocal interaction. The result was nothing less than a radical shift in thinking about persons after Kant, yet in a way that would bear a striking affinity to the substance monism of Spinoza. The aim of this chapter is to trace the origin of this shift and its aftermath in Fichte’s effort to defend a new conception of the ‘I’. (shrink)

Nichols and Bruno claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical (...) evidence suggesting that the folk do not consider psychological continuity to be necessary for an individual to be categorized as a person or for ascribing identity over time and through transformations. In this, we assume, along with Nichols and Bruno, that folk judgments about identity can be read off the use of proper names. Furthermore, we raise some doubts about the ability of current experimental designs to adequately distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity jud.. (shrink)

The concept and definition of personhood is central to current debates over ethics. Should 'personhood', for example, determine the allocation of scarce medical resources, and its perceived absence allow the termination of life? In a wide-ranging discussion notable for its clarity, Stanley Rudman's 1997 book traces the development of modern ideas about personhood. He argues that concepts of person are socially constructed, and that the relational understanding of persons in a number of theological discussions can act as an (...) important corrective to the individualistic notions of person which have been popular in secular philosophy since the Enlightenment. Early Christian views of divine speech, communication and relations between the Trinity can help to define an ethic which understands personhood in relation to other people, to the environment, and to God. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is that of investigating the concept of “person” in the context of Italian law on informed consent and advance healthcare directives. The following paper will first consider the importance of the concept of “person” within bioethics; secondly it will exhibit how there are different levels of bioethics, and that on the discussion level of laws and regulations, concepts worthy of metaphysical and value references cannot be used, because they must be shared (...) by everyone in a pluralistic society. I’ll then move on to discuss the law on informed consent and advance healthcare directives; first I’ll discuss the references to the Italian Constitution, showing that the implied concept of “person” is closely linked to the concepts of “equality” and “autonomy”, and finally I’ll discuss the particular case of minors and the protection that the law provides them. (shrink)

Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarily consists in, but frequently leave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paper is concerned with conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personal identity in terms of a definite description. The analysis coheres with out judgments about clear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate. The apparent indeterminacy results from attempting to apply a definite description to (...) a situation in which more than one object would satisfy the description. The definite description analysis also explains the strengths of the influential no-branching theory, while avoiding the problems with that view. The no-branching theory is in effect a second-order analysis, i.e., a combination of the definite description analysis of personal identity plus a Russellian analysis of the definite description. (shrink)

Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarily consists in, but frequently leave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paper is concerned with conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personal identity in terms of a definite description. The analysis coheres with out judgments about clear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate. The apparent indeterminacy results from attempting to apply a definite description to (...) a situation in which more than one object would satisfy the description. The definite description analysis also explains the strengths of the influential no-branching theory. while avoiding the problems with that view. The no-branching theory is in effect a second-order analysis, i.e., a combination of the definite description analysis of personal identity plus a Russellian analysis of the definite description. (shrink)

The human person is the focal point of contemporary concern. This first sentence from Andre Ligneul's Teilhard and Personalism touches on the very nature of the present status of the evolutionary object called man--the human person. To be a person is to be the ever evolving organism that represents the present pinnacle of evolutionary success on the planet Earth. The human person will be the focus of this research project. Through the many writings of Pierre Teilhard (...) de Chardin, but most specifically The Phenomenon of Man, an attempt will be made to define the process that is the human person. A further goal is to set this process in the present context of social evolution occurring in the United States. Special emphasis will be placed on some educational implications that Teilhard's process may have for the United States and the world... (shrink)

This paper offers a way to construe personality as the relatively stable hierarchy of one's desires: the fact that one prefers solitude to competition , finds dishonesty more aversive than arrogance , and so on. Several measures of the intensity of a desire are discussed: the alacrity with which one seeks to satisfy it, the persistence in one's efforts to do so, and other displays of one's willingness to sacrifice for its satisfaction. A method is offered for distinguishing preferences which (...) are features of personality from others which are insufficiently stable or otherwise to be explained. Finally the usefulness of this conception for moral theory is explored. Specifically, I argue that those attracted to utilitarianism have here an unusually congenial way of thinking about moral character, and a way to meet certain leading objections to their view. (shrink)

Against Subtle Abortion-Supporting Arguments," 1 intending to rebut Joel Feinberg's arguments for the morality of some abortions. 2 For several years now, I have regarded Feinberg's article to be one of the best on the topic, so it surprised me that DeCelles thought he could punch holes in it. In fact DeCelles does not succeed in rebutting Feinberg. One failure is that he misrepresents Feinberg's position. And the position that DeCelles does favor has disadvantages, pointed out by Feinberg, which DeCelles (...) doesn't bother answering. In addition DeCelles introduces irrelevant matters which have the effect of red herrings. My overall impression of.. (shrink)

This essay compares Scheler’s view of the person in his last (“pantheistic”) period with the views of Keiji Nishitani, a Buddhist representative of the Kyoto School of phenomenology. Scheler eschewed a “substantialist” concept of the person, as did Nishitani in view of the Buddhist “non-self” (muga) doctrine. Both had experienced spiritual crises in their lives. Why did Nishitani turn to the Buddhist concept of “absolute nothingness”? Why did Scheler turn from theism to pantheism? Both saw traditional (...) Christianity and its understanding of the person as intellectually inadequate, though for different reasons. Nishitani focuses on the inadequacies of secondary influences (like Cartesianism) in the Western concept of person, while Scheler focuses on problems of theodicy stemming from the problem of evil and of volition (divine and human) as the source of evil. Both abandon the Christian meaning of personhood. (shrink)

This essay compares Scheler’s view of the person in his last (“pantheistic”) period with the views of Keiji Nishitani, a Buddhist representative of the Kyoto School of phenomenology. Scheler eschewed a “substantialist” concept of the person, as did Nishitani in view of the Buddhist “non-self” (muga) doctrine. Both had experienced spiritual crises in their lives. Why did Nishitani turn to the Buddhist concept of “absolute nothingness”? Why did Scheler turn from theism to pantheism? Both saw traditional (...) Christianity and its understanding of the person as intellectually inadequate, though for different reasons. Nishitani focuses on the inadequacies of secondary influences (like Cartesianism) in the Western concept of person, while Scheler focuses on problems of theodicy stemming from the problem of evil and of volition (divine and human) as the source of evil. Both abandon the Christian meaning of personhood. (shrink)

It is commonly held that respect for autonomy is one of the most important principles in medical ethics. However, there are a number of interpretations as to what that respect actually entails in practice and a number of constraints have been suggested even on our self-regarding choices. These limits are often justified in the name of autonomy. In this paper, it is argued that these different interpretations can be explained and understood by looking at the discussion from the viewpoints of (...) positive and negative liberty and the various notions of a “person” that lay beneath. It will be shown how all the appeals to positive liberty presuppose a particular value system and are therefore problematic in multicultural societies. (shrink)

The term personality (ličnost') appears in Russian theological literature in the first half of the 19th century under the influence of secular writers indebted to Romantic ideology. Confronted to person it gradually acquires somatic connotations and generally means person inarnate, creative individuality. Asomatic attitude is reflected in Nesmelov. In soteriological perspective, as Sergius Stragorodskij suggests, personality should be subjectively abandonded in order to be finally glorified by God.

The paper critically discusses the proposal of identifying the subject of human rights by means of the concept of moral person, reflecting on the inherent connection between the concept of person and that of human rights in their moral dimension, that is, in the light of an ethics of human rights, an ethics in which human rights represent fundamental moral values. The thesis defended is that the concept of moral person lends itself more than (...) any other to the role of subject of human rights, if conceived as a relational, communicative and representative social value, that is as “the concept of an individual human being whose features enable him to join some segments of his life with others”. (shrink)

How does the concept of personal identity relate to the subject of the Phenomenology of Spirit? Throughout this “Bildungsroman,” the intersubjective, social, and institutional layers essential for the self become apparent. Tereza Matějčková proposes that the identity of the self rests in the person's ability to reappropriate norms, rituals, and intersubjective settings that he or she is a part of. However, identity is not essential at the level of consciousness since substantially, consciousness is negativity. As a person, (...) the human being is a consciousness of the self, where the self relates to the social and intersubjective realm and to consciousness as the negativity that makes meaning possible. Consequently, personal identity is conceived of as “personal difference,” which is the active relating of self and consciousness. Matějčková argues that Hegel's Phenomenology is not exclusively a Bildungsroman and that on the margins of the Bildungsroman, a “Kollapsgeschichte” evolves, which is a story where the protagonist learns that an essential part of one's personality is the ability to break with one's environment, occasionally even with one's self. (shrink)

The main concern of both Berdjaev's and Bulgakov's philosophical strivings consists in developing a concept of the person as the foundation of human dignity and creativity within a Christian world view. Once attracted by Marxism with its emphasis on human dignity and social justice, they started to struggle against Marxism's atheist materialism because of its lack of a concept of person. However, the same concern will lead both thinkers down very different paths with different consequences. This (...) paper argues that, even though Berdjaev has become famous as a philosopher of the person and a herald of creative ethics, Bulgakov developed a more solid Christian justification of the same claims. Both systems are presented by means of comparing some crucial notions within their concepts of personality—potentiality, trinity and autonomy. (shrink)

The concept of property is integral to personal and societal development, yet understanding of the cognitive basis of ownership is limited. Objects are the most basic form of property, so our physical interactions with owned objects may elucidate nuanced aspects of ownership. We gave participants a coffee mug to decorate, use and keep. The experimenter also designed a mug of her own. In Experiment 1, participants performed natural lifting actions with each mug. Participants lifted the Experimenter’s mug with greater (...) care, and moved it slightly more towards the Experimenter, while they lifted their own mug more forcefully and drew it closer to their own body. In Experiment 2, participants responded to stimuli presented on the mug handles in a computer-based stimulus–response compatibility task. Overall, participants were faster to respond in trials in which the handles were facing in the same direction as the response location compared to when the handles were facing away. The compatibility effect was abolished, however, for the Experimenter’s mug – as if the action system is blind to the potential for action towards another person’s property. These findings demonstrate that knowledge of the ownership status of objects influences visuomotor processing in subtle and revealing ways. (shrink)

A strong distinction is often made between personal autonomy and moral autonomy. Personal autonomy involves governing yourself in the pursuit of your own conception of the good. Moral autonomy involves legislating the moral law for yourself. Viewed in this way personal autonomy seems at best marginal and at worst a positive hindrance to moral autonomy, since personal autonomy can conflict with moral autonomy. Given that Kantian approaches to morality are closely aligned with moral autonomy, does that mean that the Kantian (...) must view personal autonomy as a moral hindrance? Can there be a legitimate role for personal autonomy within Kant’s ethical framework? This paper will seek to argue: that personal and moral autonomy need not be seen as in tension or at odds with one another; that Kant defends an attractive weak substantive theory of personal autonomy; that socialisation plays an important role (both positive and negative) in the development of autonomy competences in Kant’s theory; and that personal autonomy (properly understood) has an essential role to play in Kant’s ethical framework. (shrink)

(2004). ‘Flexible Control’: Towards a conception of personal autonomy for postmodern education. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 3-17.

(2004). ‘Flexible Control’: Towards a conception of personal autonomy for postmodern education. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 3-17.

By focusing upon three figures: a trade unionist, who can no longer understand or reconcile himself with his past misogynist behaviour; Spinoza’s Spanish poet, who loses his memory and can no longer write poetry or even recognise his earlier work; and Spinoza’s lost friend, Burgh, who became a devout Catholic, I draw out Spinoza’s description of radical change in beliefs. I explore how, for Spinoza, radical changes that involve an increase in our powers of acting are conceived differently from those (...) changes that reduce our power. These transitions—which can be viewed as both personal and political—are not symmetrical because of the way in which they can be understood in relation to selfhood. To highlight the originality of Spinoza’s argument on personal change, I then compare it with that of his contemporary John Locke, who in Chapter 27 of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding famously theorises the maintenance of personal identity. I draw out one common aspect of the work of Étienne Balibar and of Janet Coleman to compare the ways in which Spinoza and Locke produce different answers to the same questions: how do we conceptualise our encounters with bodies and with ideas? How do these encounters affect our identity over time? In the final section, I switch from analysing personal (but also political) change to consider political change itself, by juxtaposing Warren Montag’s Spinozist analysis of the will, with Carole Pateman’s feminist critique of contract and consent. (shrink)

This article analyzes whether the strategy displayed by Rawls startingwith the Dewey Lectures makes it possible to overcome the comprehensive character that some critics attribute to his political conception of person. After describing said conception, the paper reviews the objection that it is incompatible with those conceptions of the good that attribute a constitutive character to attachments and ends. Finally, it is concluded that although the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism is unstable, it is compatible with constitutive conceptions (...) of the good. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify and discuss the following feature of our judgments about hypothetical scenarios concerning the identity of persons: with respect to the vast majority of scenarios, both members of a pair of logically complementary propositions about personal identity are conceivable. I consider a number of explanations of this feature that draw on the metaphysics and the epistemology of personal identity, none of which prove to be satisfactory. I then argue that in order to give an adequate explanation, (...) one needs to recognize an important characteristic of our concept of personal identity: it is such that if there are mental substances (or the like), they constitute personal identity. At the same time, there can still be persons if there are no such substances. Since this finding casts doubts on the way that thought experiments about personal identity are usually set up, I end by outlining its potential consequences for the debate over the identity of persons. (shrink)