A história da linguagem adquire ao longo do Ensaio sobre a origem das línguas o andamento de uma queda acelerada na corrupção. Há uma língua primitiva que se degenera e se altera: um processo de formação e uma deformação. À medida que Rousseau identifica em suas reflexões – seja na origem seja na estrutura – música e linguagem, a perda de força expressiva que se verifica nas línguas acomete também a música e estas duas corrupções caminham juntas, de modo que (...) ambas se afastam da língua musicada ou da palavra cantada do início. A corrupção da música e das línguas corresponde ao apagamento de sua potência expressiva e refere-se a uma autonomização da harmonia artificial, ao aumento das consoantes, das articulações, da racionalidade, da prática da escrita, bem como ao desenvolvimento histórico, político, econômico e social. Todos estes processos devem ser levados em consideração numa análise sobre as línguas e a linguagem. Todavia, é possível isolar metodologicamente cada um deles. Dito isto, propomos neste artigo investigar o papel da escrita no processo de corrupção e degeneração das línguas. (shrink)

Em muitos textos, Buffon mostra-se partidário da ideia da existência de um laço conjugal natural entre homem e mulher, retomando, assim, as concepções de Locke sobre o assunto. Por sua vez, Rousseau surge como um grande crítico desta ideia. Ele imagina um estado no qual homens e mulheres viveriam em determinadas condições que não os colocariam em relação uns com os outros e, por conseguinte, não os coagiriam a obrigações e deveres recíprocos, um estado de dispersão e de isolamento absolutos (...) do homem. Buffon precisa, para fundar sua teoria, romper com Rousseau. Assim, elaborar e discutir o conteúdo desta ruptura tornam-se os objetos principais deste artigo. (shrink)

O homem-máquina de La Mettrie aparece constantemente ligado ao animal-máquina cartesiano. A partir desta relação, é possível indagar se existe verdadeiramente alguma continuidade entre a proposta cartesiana e a defendida por La Mettrie ou, ao contrário, se esta última representa de modo efetivo uma crítica e uma ruptura em relação à primeira. Nossa interpretação defende que o germe do materialismo – e La Mettrie não escapa disso – só pode desenvolver-se na condição de romper totalmente com a doutrina cartesiana. Assim, (...) longe de haver apenas um passo entre uma e outra teoria filosófica, o que existe é uma diferença radical e gigante. Não há uma continuidade teórica entre o animal-máquina cartesiano e o homem-máquina lamettriano. Diferentemente do que se passa na teoria de Descartes, particularmente, em sua concepção dualista que implica em uma descontinuidade, o Homem-máquina estabelece uma tese continuísta entre homens e animais. Para La Mettrie, a passagem da animalidade à humanidade não é uma passagem violenta, mas sim gradual. (shrink)

A exortação de Rousseau, feita dois séculos antes de Lévi-Strauss, de levar a vista ao longe, observar as diferenças entre os homens para conhecer o homem em sua especificidade e propriedade dá o tom do que se poderia chamar de antropologia rousseauísta. O conhecimento sobre o homem não é obtido ao olhar para o lado e tomar como referência um tipo qualquer imediatamente disponível. Ao contrário, é preciso de viagens bem regradas, de uma educação do olhar e da organização dos (...) dados colhidos pela observação. (shrink)

RESUMO Na flosofa de Rousseau expõe-se a paulatina construção de uma ideia ocidental de humanidade: a história de como o ser humano assim denominou-se ser, bem como a história do abuso dessa denominação. Trata-se, sobretudo, da crítica sobre a construção de um mito da dignidade exclusiva da natureza humana, tema que percorre as obras de diferentes flósofos, dos modernos aos contemporâneos, dos ocidentais aos não ocidentais. O presente artigo aborda, a partir de Rousseau e em diálogo com outros autores, o (...) “ciclo maldito” característico da modernidade, uma ideia que separa os humanos dos animais e segrega os humanos entre si. Começa-se por apartar o ser humano da natureza e constituí-lo como um ser à parte em um processo de monopolização progressiva do valor da existência: aparece em um primeiro momento o especismo, subsequentemente a desigualdade sociopolítica, o etnocentrismo e outras formas derivadas de exclusão. ABSTRACT In Rousseau’s philosophy, the gradual construction of a western idea of humanity is exposed: the history of how the human being naming himself being, as well as the history of the abuse of that denomination. It is, above all, a critique of the construction of the myth of the exclusive dignity of human nature, a theme that permeates the works of diferent philosophers, from the modern to contemporary ones, from western to non-western. This article discusses, based on Rousseau and in dialogue with other authors, the “cursed cycle” characteristic of modernity, an idea that separates humans from animals and segregates humans from each other. It starts with separating human being from nature and constituting him as a distinct part in a process of progressive monopolization of the value of existence: speciesism appears at frst, then sociopolitical inequality, ethnocentrism and other forms derived from exclusion. (shrink)

O Ensaio sobre a origem das línguas expõe o momento em que as línguas se enfraquecem, abrindo caminho para o cortejo da violência. O livro apresenta o lugar do discurso nos tempos antigos em oposição ao seu não-lugar nos tempos modernos, ou seja, a mudança do lugar da eloquência na antiguidade para a idade moderna. Aos olhos de Rousseau, as línguas – assim como os homens – estão profundamente atreladas ao tempo e, por conseguinte, em constantes transformações. Elas seguem as (...) vicissitudes dos costumes e se alteram ou se conservam com eles. Não por outra razão, é dito que o movimento da linguagem reproduz, a seu modo e em seu plano, o da humanidade, de sorte que é possível reconstruir uma história da liberdade e da servidão dos povos a partir da análise de suas línguas. Bem como, reconstituir história de cada língua por meio da história e das condições sociais, políticas e econômicas de cada povo. A questão que nos propomos investigar pode ser formulada nos seguintes termos: quais relações podem existir entre regimes políticos e discurso? Dois aspectos serão privilegiados: i) as características constitutivas de cada língua falada e ii) o regime de organização política do povo que a fala. (shrink)

Resumo: A narrativa de Rousseau sobre a origem do Estado foi retomada nos últimos séculos por diversas tradições, fazendo-se notar no seio do iluminismo escocês e nos trabalhos de Engels. James Scott, em seu recente livro Contra o grão, de 2017, ecoa algumas teses de Rousseau. Dentre tantos pontos de convergência, três se destacam e serão analisados no decorrer deste artigo: i) de um lado, a variedade dos modos de ser e de se relacionar com a natureza dos povos sem (...) Estado, a idade de ouro dos bárbaros; de outro, a estratificação dos povos sob o Estado, o empobrecimento dos agricultores cerealistas; ii) as condições ecológicas raras e especialíssimas favoráveis à emergência do aparelho estatal, em oposição às dificuldades de se formar o Estado, em regiões de abundância naturais, donde se faz necessário estabelecer a hipótese de mudanças climáticas que alteram as condições de existência; iii) e, por fim, a importância dos grãos para o processo civilizatório, isto é, a afinidade entre economia agrária de cereais e Estado.: Rousseau’s narrative about the origin of the State was recovered in the last centuries by several traditions, being noticed in the heart of the Scottish Enlightenment and in the works of Engels. James Scott, in his recent book Against the Grain of 2017, echoes some of Rousseau’s theses. Among many points of convergence, three stand out and will be analyzed in the course of this article: i) on the one hand, the variety of ways of being and relating to the nature of stateless peoples, the golden age of the barbarians; on the other, the stratification of peoples under the State, the impoverishment of cereal farmers; ii) the rare and very special ecological conditions favorable to the emergence of the State apparatus, as opposed to the difficulties of forming a State in regions of natural abundance, which imposes the necessity to establish the hypothesis of climate changes that alters the conditions of existence; iii) and, finally, the importance of grains for the civilizing process, that is, the affinity between the agrarian economy of cereals and the State. (shrink)

Leitor atento de Rousseau, embora raramente o citasse em seus textos, Clastres emprega o mesmo vocabulário que ganhou fama sob a pluma do cidadão de Genebra, tomando por vezes distância de suas reflexões: 1) alusão à vontade geral; 2) a encenação do gesto fundador da sociedade civil de cercar um terreno e o discurso possessivo que inaugura a propriedade privada e a acompanha (“isto é meu”); 3) e, por fim e mais importante, a crítica direcionada às duas frentes que compõem (...) a narrativa de Rousseau sobre a origem do Estado: de um lado, a associação entre desejo de prestígio e vontade de poder; de outro, o fundamento econômico do poder político. Se é certo afirmar que a Arqueologia da violência é contra Hobbes ou uma inversão do argumento de Hobbes – pois aí Clastres politiza a guerra –, por sua vez, a Sociedade contra o Estado é em certa medida contra Rousseau ou, ainda, uma inversão do argumento de Rousseau, visto que se coloca contra a narrativa hipotética da história ocidental: não mais da economia e do prestígio para a política, mas da política para a economia, pois aí Clastres politiza a economia. (shrink)

A diversificação física e cultural humana pode ser lida na antropologia de Rousseau a partir da ideia da degenerescência e do afastamento de uma natureza originária, mas também pode ser encarada em chave positiva como a afirmação da variedade humana, independente de uma referência a um modelo originário. Assim, o pensamento antropológico de Rousseau transita entre dois polos distintos e igualmente válidos: o julgamento histórico e o saber etnográfico. Se o primeiro apoia-se em um modelo único e originário de ser (...) humano que paulatina e historicamente se degeneraria, corrompendo-se; o último multiplica as origens de modo a afirmar positivamente as diferenças, explicando-as enquanto tais. Um se constitui em escala de medida, outro em antídoto contra o etnocentrismo. O objetivo maior deste texto consiste em apresentar sobretudo o último polo. Nele, a diversidade física e cultural se afirma enquanto tal, sem que haja a necessidade de se atribuir prêmios de preservação de uma maior pureza a esta ou aquela sociedade localizada num ponto determinado do tempo e do espaço. A diversidade indicaria não mais uma corrupção, mas sim os vários caminhos assumidos e tomados pelos grupos humanos de acordo com os tempos e as circunstâncias vivenciados. (shrink)

Resumo: O século XX viu ganhar forma um efervescente debate travado em torno do Ensaio sobre a origem das línguas de Rousseau, sobretudo quanto à sua gênese, ao período em que foi escrito e às suas possíveis relações com o Discurso sobre a origem da desigualdade. O presente artigo, ao repassar a literatura crítica sobre o tema, propõe uma cronologia consonante com a produção especializada, colocando em foco os temas que, porventura, teriam guiado Rousseau, desde a redação da versão originária (...) e inicial do texto até a versão definitiva: de um texto originalmente inscrito nas polêmicas musicais entre Rousseau e Rameau, o Ensaio foi paulatinamente enriquecido, abarcando de maneira unificada as reflexões do autor sobre as sociedades, as línguas, as linguagens e os sistemas musicais.: The twentieth century saw an effervescent debate about Rousseau’s Essay on the origin of languages, especially with regard to its genesis, the period in which it was written, and its possible relations with the Discourse on the origin of inequality. The present article reviews the critical literature on the subject and proposes a chronology consonant with this literature. We focus on the themes that perhaps would have guided Rousseau, from the writing of the initial version of the text to its definitive version. Originally part of the musical polemics between Rousseau and Rameau, the Essay was gradually enriched, eventually covering in a unified way the author’s reflections on societies, languages, and musical systems. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

Highlights Merleau-Ponty’s interest in film and connects it to his aesthetic theory.

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his “most fruitful ideas” are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but Sraffa is not mentioned anywhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. This paper presents a solution to this puzzle. Sraffa's criticism led Wittgenstein away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), and towards the “anthropological (...) view,” which structures both the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

I argue that Wittgenstein’s engagement with Russell’s The Analysis of Mind was crucial for the development of his new method. First, I show that Wittgenstein’s criticism of the causal theory of meaning (namely: that it generates an infinite regress and that it does not determine the depiction of a fact) is motivated by its incompatibility with the pictorial conception of language. Second, I show that in reacting against that theory he comes to invent the calculus conception of language. Third, I (...) argue that the calculus conception is vulnerable to critiques that parallel those presented against Russell’s theory (a rule-following regression and the indeterminacy of depicted facts). Fourth, the striking similarity between the problems present in Russell’s theory and in Wittgenstein’s own views makes him realize that both were working under misleading trains of thought and false analogies. It is this realization that brings Wittgenstein to the view that his task is to investigate the genesis of philosophical puzzlement in order to stop philosophical theorizing right from the beginning. Thus, in explaining the invention of Wittgenstein’s new method I show its relation to Russell’s philosophy and indicate the origins of the rule-following problem. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in which Derrida (...) originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que as interpretações "tradicional" e "resoluta" não livraram o "Tractatus" da aparente autoderrota paradoxal. Argumento que essas leituras apresentam apenas uma nova roupagem ao paradoxo. A leitura "tradicional" de Hacker acaba atribuindo uma conspiração metafísica ao "Tractatus", o que é incompatível com os objetivos do livro. A leitura "resoluta" de Diamond e Conant atribui a Wittgenstein uma conspiração autoral, o que contradiz suas opiniões sobre autoria e método. Com base nas dificuldades encontradas em (...) ambos os lados do debate atual, concluo este artigo propondo vários requisitos que a correta interpretação do "Tractatus" deve preencher. (shrink)

Though the target article is not without fertile suggestions, at least two problems limit its overall validity: (1) the extended gene-culture coevolutionary framework is not an alternative to standard evolutionary theory; (2) the proposed model does not explain how much time is necessary for selective pressure to determine the stabilization of a new aspect of the genotype.

In this paper, I pursue two main goals. The first is to raise three objections against Tom Roberts and Joel Krueger’s recent account of loneliness (2021). The second is to sketch an alternative, receptive account. Roberts and Krueger focus on loneliness conceived of as an occurrent emotion. According to their account, loneliness involves two components: (1) a pro-attitude (e.g., a desire) towards certain social goods and (2) an awareness that such goods “are missing and out of reach, either temporarily or (...) permanently” (p. 186). My first objection is that having a pair of pro-attitudes and cognitive states of the sort that Roberts and Krueger have in mind is neither sufficient nor necessary for an individual to experience loneliness. The second is that Roberts and Krueger’s account has trouble accounting for the unpleasant phenomenology of loneliness. The third is that their account has trouble demarcating loneliness from other negative emotions that one may experience within romantic, friendship or social relationships. Next, I sketch my own account of loneliness. According to the receptive theory (Tappolet 2022) to which I adhere, emotions are receptive experiences that non-conceptually represent their intentional objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. Accordingly, I argue that loneliness consists in a receptive experience that represents the absence of certain relational goods as bad in a particular way. I draw a distinction between the intentional object and the intentional locus of loneliness, and clarify the role that some of the individual’s pro-attitudes play in loneliness. I also show how a receptive account can explain the phenomenology of loneliness and demarcate it from other emotion types, and offer an account of degrees of loneliness, which distinguishes between the intensity and the centrality of episodes of loneliness. (shrink)

Two different definitions of numerical identity occur in Aristotle's works, namely: (i) "A" and "B" are both names of one thing; (ii) A and B constitute unity. These definitions can be traced back respectively to the following theories of predication: (i)' the sentences whose subjects are accidents are actually ill-formed; (ii)' in some cases the accidents are not eliminable subjects. Since (i)' and (ii)' are irreparably inconsistent, the theory of identity is inconsistent too; in this paper are explored the consequences (...) of such an inconsistence, mainly as far as the fallacies depending both on combination and division and on accident are concerned. (shrink)

In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...) included within the class of happiness-constituting states. Second, I argue that a plausible theory of happiness should not include mood propensities, since their inclusion is either counterintuitive or unnecessary. (shrink)

A definition of nonstandard universe which gets over the limitation to the finite levels of the cumulative hierarchy is proposed. Though necessarily nonwellfounded, nonstandard universes are arranged in strata in the likeness of superstructures and allow a rank function taking linearly ordered values. Nonstandard universes are also constructed which model the whole ZFC theory without regularity and satisfy the κ-saturation property.

ABSTRACTAfter the revolutionary storm, which had exported Jacobin democracy on the tips of its bayonets and after the epic deeds of the Napoleonic era, which, in the midst of remarkable contradictions, had asserted a number of principles and values of the French Revolution, the moderate or conservative liberal thinkers who wished for the introduction of a representative government and of personal freedom in France and in Italy were faced with the return of the old regime and with attempts of the (...) Restoration to eradicate the reforms of the previous period. The only way these thinkers could save or restore parliamentary institutions and civil rights was to link their efforts to the destinies of the ruling dynasties. In both countries, this move was fiercely opposed, especially by reactionary writers. Hence, this essay will deal with the structure and contours of a debate which set two alignments in opposition, from the time of the Congress of Vienna to the Revolutions of 1820-21 and hinged on the principle of monarchic legitimacy and on the foundations of political authority which, for the first time, were being openly questioned in the midst of the American and the French revolutions. (shrink)

What is the relation between virtue and wellbeing? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s wellbeing. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and wellbeing, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fitting emotions, that fitting emotions are constituents of fitting happiness, and that fitting (...) happiness is a constituent of wellbeing. What follows is that, under certain conditions, virtue disposes the individual to experience wellbeing-constituting states. We end with a discussion of two objections that may be raised against our proposal. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...) focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

In this paper, we review and connect the three essential conditions needed by the collapse model to achieve a complete and exact formulation, namely the theoretical, the experimental, and the ontological ones. These features correspond to the three parts of the paper. In any empirical science, the first two features are obviously connected but, as is well known, among the different formulations and interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, only collapse models, as the paper well illustrates with a richness of details, (...) have experimental consequences. Finally, we show that a clarification of the ontological intimations of collapse models is needed for at least three reasons: (1) to respond to the indispensable task of answering the question ’what are collapse models (and in general any physical theory) about?’; (2) to achieve a deeper understanding of their different formulations; (3) to enlarge the panorama of possible readings of a theory, which historically has often played a fundamental heuristic role. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...) is dictated by purely pragmatic reasons, we should abstain from bringing to bear pseudo-debates generated by the “tensed” or the “tenseless theories” of time on the question of understanding the philosophical implications of contemporary spacetime theories, or notions like becoming, change and persistence in time. (shrink)

The first comprehensive account of Platonism in Antiquity, from the foundation of Plato's Academy in the fourth century BC to Late Antiquity. Written in a clear language, the book shows that Platonism is philosophically engaging and very influential in the history of philosophy. Useful for both students and scholars.

This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity and individuality of material objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian ‘reductionist’ tradition, based on discernibility, and the sort of ‘primitivism’ that denies that facts of identity and individuality must be analysable has become outdated. In particular, it is argued that—contrary to a widespread consensus—‘naturalised’ metaphysics supports both the acceptability (...) of non-qualitatively grounded (both ‘contextual’ and intrinsic) identity and a pluralistic approach to individuality and individuation. A case study is offered that focuses on non-relativistic quantum mechanics, in the context of which primitivism about identity and individuality, rather than being regarded as unscientific, is on the contrary suggested to be preferable to the complicated forms of reductionism that have recently been proposed. More generally, by assuming a plausible form of anti-reductionism about scientific theories and domains, it is claimed that science can be regarded as compatible with, or even as suggesting, the existence of a series of equally plausible grades of individuality. The kind of individuality that prevails in a certain context and at a given level can be ascertained only on the basis of the specific scientific theory at hand. (shrink)

In the 80's Pierangelo Miglioli, starting from motivations in the framework of Abstract Data Types and Program Synthesis, introduced semiconstructive theories, a family of “large subsystems” of classical theories that guarantee the computability of functions and predicates represented by suitable formulas. In general, the above computability results are guaranteed by algorithms based on a recursive enumeration of the theorems of the whole system. In this paper we present a family of semiconstructive systems, we call uniformly semiconstructive, that provide computational procedures (...) only involving formulas with bounded complexity. We present several examples of uniformly semiconstructive systems containing Harrop theories, induction principles and some well-known predicate intermediate principles. Among these, we give an account of semiconstructive and uniformly semiconstructive systems which lie between Intuitionistic and Classical Arithmetic and we discuss their constructive incompatibility. (shrink)