La memoria plantea el complejo problema de la inserción del sujeto en su colectividad. Ella no es, ni puramente individual pues permite al sujeto incrustarse en el orden simbólico de la cultura y el tiempo, ni enteramente social pues aún la memoria compartida debe ser procesada por el individuo. La memoria es a la vez una experiencia del sujeto consigo mismo y una experiencia de la relación del sujeto con su Otro. Esto explica que nuestro punto de partida sea mostrar (...) aquello que en la memoria permite al sujeto engancharse al orden simbólico de la cultura, para luego examinar el campo de la experiencia actual de la memoria colectiva. Se intentará pues describir brevemente el pasaje de la memoria al recuerdo, del recuerdo al pasado y de esta a la historia, bajo una idea directriz: el pasado, que es indeterminado, sólo está disponible a través de la rememoración individual y colectiva, eso está claro; la cuestión a examinar será más bien las dificultades para elaborar el recuerdo. [Fragmento]. (shrink)

Within all philosophical systems there are some categories that are fundamental to the understanding of the whole. This is the case of categories such as identity, difference and contradiction in Hegel’s philosophy. In the second book of the Logik, such categories are set in what appears to be th..

La presencia del orden se nos impone con singular insistencia. La reflexión sobre el orden, las posibilidades de su emergencia y las condiciones de su articulación y de su crítica, al igual que de su transgresión o transformación, ha constituido un eje central en el pensamiento filosófico y social continental a lo largo del siglo XX. Los trabajos que aparecen en este libro proceden de pensadores provenientes de Alemania, Francia y México y se proponen contribuir a una reflexión amplia, sistemática (...) y a la vez interdisciplinaria sobre este problema a la vez inquietante e inescapable. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es describir la percepción de riesgo y los factores de protección y de riesgo frente al consumo de sustancias psicoactivas legales e ilegales en estudiantes de la Universidad de Boyacá. Es un estudio cuantitativo y descriptivo de corte transversal, para el cual se tomó una muestra de 573 estudiantes que fueron seleccionados mediante muestreo estratificado probabilístico. El instrumento utilizado fue la encuesta sobre consumo de drogas, factores y percepción de riesgo en estudiantes universitarios (CODEU) diseñado (...) por Beverido, Salas, De San Jorge, Pavón, Blázquez, Gogeascoechea y Cruz (2012), que consta de 73 preguntas. Este instrumento fue validado y obtuvo un alpha de Cronbach de 0.787. Los hallazgos muestran que entre los factores protectores se encuentran: adecuadas relaciones familiares y practicar un deporte, como factores de riesgo se identifican principalmente: la permisividad social y las construcciones de reconocimiento social presentes ante el consumo de sustancias legales. De las sustancias ilegales, la marihuana es la que se percibe como de menor riesgo frente a la cocaína, el bazuco, los inhalantes y la heroína. (shrink)

Con la promulgación de la Ley 30 de 1986, se incluyó el concepto del consumo de la dosis personal de drogas. La Corte Constitucional, mediante sentencia C-221 de 1994, resolvió la demanda de constitucionalidad presentada por el ciudadano Alexandre Sochandamandou, ratificando el concepto de “dosis personal de consumo de drogas”, y despenalizando el mismo. En este artículo se plantea el desconocimiento de la legislación y la jurisprudencia acerca de la opinión técnico-científica en cuanto a esta temática, que originó diversas inconveniencias, (...) inconsistencias, vacíos e imprecisiones técnico-científicas que riñen con normas y tratados internacionales de ética médica, al igual que con evidencia médica encontrada sobre los efectos adversos ocasionados por las drogas en la salud de los consumidores de estas sustancias. (shrink)

El libro que nos ocupa es un texto compuesto por doce capítulos, cada uno escrito por un investigador distinto; todos los capítulos consisten en análisis filosóficos en torno a un tema eje indicado por el título: la dignidad. En esta reseña, realizaré una revisión cronológico-diacrónica del tratamiento de la dignidad por los doce investigadores, para otorgar una idea clara a los posibles lectores de en qué épocas se concentró cada una de las reflexiones. Dignidad: Perspectivas y aportaciones de la filosofía (...) moral y la filosofía política es un texto coordinado y editado por los investigadores Carmen Trueba Atienza y Sergio Pérez Cortés, profesores de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Iztapalapa, poseedores de una amplia trayectoria en la investigación filosófica, en especial en el área de la filosofía griega antigua y en el área de la filosofía política y moral en general. Tal trayectoria les permitió reunir y escoger con esmero y pertinencia a escritos de especialistas provenientes de diversos países de América Latina: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, México y Perú. (shrink)

Rational Powers in Action presents a conception of instrumental rationality as governing actions that are extended in time with indeterminate ends. Tenenbaum argues that previous philosophical theories in this area, in focusing on momentary snapshots of the mind of idealized agents, miss central aspects of human rationality.

We discuss the axiomatization of generalized consequence relations determined by non-deterministic matrices. We show that, under reasonable expressiveness requirements, simple axiomatizations can always be obtained, using inference rules which can have more than one conclusion. Further, when the non-deterministic matrices are finite we obtain finite axiomatizations with a suitable generalized subformula property.

This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states (...) at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid.I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions. (shrink)

Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot (...) provide an adequate account of the relation between the constitutive norms of agency and the particular ends the agent pursues. I then provide a broad outline of an interpretation of Kant’s formalism that is immune to this objection. I conclude that constitutivism is best understood as the upshot of a formalist view of categorical practical principles. (shrink)

The idea of direction of fit has been found appealing by many philosophers. Anscombe’s famous examples have persuaded many of us that there must be some deep difference between belief and desire that is captured by the metaphor of direction of fit. Most of the aim of the paper is to try to get clear on which intuitions Anscombe’s example taps into. My view is that there is more than one intuition in play here, and I will try to show (...) that various distinctions and points are confused in the literature on direction of fit. But I also want to argue that once the proper distinctions are made, it’s not clear that the notion of direction of fit can do any of the philosophically significant work that it was supposed to do. I first argue that the best way to unpack the notion of direction of fit would indeed be by means of the constitutive relation between truth and belief. In particular, the notion of direction of fit is best understood as different ideals, or formal ends, guiding the inference, from what I call “prima-facie” attitudes to what I call “all-out” attitudes respectively in the theoretical and practical realm. However, I’ll argue that there’s no non-circular way of making this distinction. But even if no definition of “belief” and “desire” come out of the distinction between directions of fit, it does elucidate the different natures of practical and theoretical enquiry. However, understood this way, the notion of direction of fit does not seem to capture the distinction illustrated by Anscombe’s example. I try to argue in the last section that Anscombe’s compelling example is best explained not by a distinction between directions of fit, but by a distinction between two different inferential mistakes: one from general to general or particular to general, and the other from general to particular. There’s an important asymmetry between practical and theoretical endeavours in this neighbourhood. However, noticing this asymmetry will also fail to deliver the philosophical payoffs that the notion of direction of fit was supposed to have. (shrink)

Most contemporary action theorists accept – or at least find plausible – a belief condition on intention and a knowledge condition on intentional action. The belief condition says that I can only intend to ɸ if I believe that I will ɸ or am ɸ-ing, and the knowledge condition says that I am only intentionally ɸ-ing if I know that I am ɸ-ing. The belief condition in intention and the knowledge condition in action go hand in hand. After all, if (...) intending implies belief, and if ɸ-ing intentionally implies intending to ɸ, then in ɸ-ing, I intend to be ɸ-ing, and, by the belief condition, I believe that I am ɸ-ing, and if this belief is justified, and we are not in a Gettier situation, etc., then, I will also satisfy the knowledge condition. Moreover, the claim that when intentions properly result in action, the corresponding belief constitutes knowledge is a relatively safe assumption, at least as an assumption about what it is generally the case. (shrink)

In the philosophy of science, abstraction has usually been analyzed in terms of the interface between our experience and the design of our concepts. The often implicit assumption here is that such interface has a definite identifiable and universalizable structure, determining the epistemic correctness of any abstraction. Our claim is that, on the contrary, the epistemic grounding of abstraction should not be reduced to the structural norms of such interface but is also related to the constraints on the cognitive processes (...) of specific abstractions. This suggests that we should understand abstraction as embodied in different kinds of abstraction practices. (shrink)

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire (...) (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues. (shrink)

Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 3, Page 384-411, June 2014.

The goal of this paper is to argue that the Neptuno Alegórico and the Theatro de Virtudes Políticas, which were composed in 1680 by the Novohispanic philosophers Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz and Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora to accompany respectively two arches erected to celebrate the entry of the Spanish viceroy to Mexico City, are notable not only as examples of panegyrical Baroque literature but also as philosophical texts aimed at moral instruction. To be specific, I argue that (...) the Neptuno and the Theatro belong to a hybrid genre that I label ekphrastic moral mirrors. Ekphrastic moral mirrors, which constitute a subset of the traditional speculum principis, are characterized by offering moral instruction to a prince indirectly, by means of an elaborate ekphrasis of a work of art (which, in the case of the Neptuno and the Theatro, were the two arches that they were paired with). I also argue that, insofar as the Neptuno and the Theatro create different audiences that are mutually aware of each other in virtue of systematically relying on ekphrasis deployed in a public setting, they are potentially more effective for moral instruction than other traditional mirrors of princes. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to argue that the Neptuno Alegórico and the Theatro de Virtudes Políticas, which were composed in 1680 by the Novohispanic philosophers Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz and Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora to accompany respectively two arches erected to celebrate the entry of the Spanish viceroy to Mexico City, are notable not only as examples of panegyrical Baroque literature but also as philosophical texts aimed at moral exhortation. To be specific, I argue that (...) the Neptuno and the Theatro belong to a hybrid genre that I label ekphrastic moral mirrors. Ekphrastic moral mirrors, which make up a subset of the traditional specula principum, are characterized by offering moral exhortation and political advice to a prince indirectly, by means of an elaborate ekphrasis of a work of art (which, in the case of the Neptuno and the Theatro, were the two arches that they were respectively paired with). I also argue that the use of ekphrasis in a public setting enables the creation of a composite audience made up by various stakeholders with different interests that is intended to reflect and reinforce the creation of a unified political entity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Planning, Time, and Self-Governanace, Bratman argues that the notion of self-governance plays an important role in grounding the rational principles such as means-ends coherence in the synchronic case, and principles of stability and coherence through time in the case of self-governance over time. In this paper, I grant Bratman’s claim for the synchronic case, however I argue that it is not clear that one can extend the reasoning to the diachronic case. More specifically, I raise a number of (...) doubts about whether any notion of diachronic self-governance can play the role in the theory of practical rationality that Bratman assigns to it. (shrink)

It seems rather intuitive that if I can save either one stranger or five strangers, I must save the five. However, Kantian (and other non-consequentialist) views have a difficult time explaining why this is the case, as they seem committed to what Parfit calls “innumeracy”: roughly, the view that the values of lives (or the reasons to save them) don’t get greater (or stronger) in proportion to the number of lives saved. This chapter first shows that in various cases, it (...) is permissible to save fewer lives, contrary to what is implied by “numerate” views. Then it argues that in the cases in which it is intuitive that we must save the greater number, Kantians (and other deontologists) can not only deliver this verdict but also explain why it is correct, without presupposing that the value of our action depends on “adding up” the values of the lives saved. (shrink)

Accidie, depression, and dejection seem to be psychological phenomena that are best characterized as cases in which an agent has no motivation to pursue what he or she judges to be good or valuable. The phenomena thus seem to present a challenge to any view that draws a close connection between motivation and evaluation. ‘Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivation’ aims to show that the phenomena are actually best explained by a theory that postulates a conceptual connection between motivation and evaluation.

Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis, he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only p...

Este relato de experiência discute um eixo de um projeto de ensino, pesquisa e extensão multi e interdisciplinar sobre educação e humanização da morte. Trata-se de ações da Psicologia destinadas à saúde mental dos trabalhadores do serviço funerário da cidade de São Paulo. A intervenção dividiu-se em duas etapas: visitas aos cemitérios, para aproximação daqueles pesquisadores à realidade e às demandas desses servidores; e oficinas com técnicas de dinâmica de grupo. Estas aconteceram por cinco meses, contaram com 130 participantes — (...) motoristas, sepultadores, “veloristas”, supervisores e gestores de recursos humanos — e tiveram como facilitadoras as integrantes da graduação e da pós-graduação em Psicologia. A análise das oficinas evidenciou, da parte dos servidores, sensibilização para suas necessidades em favor da saúde mental, percepção do valor de cuidado e humanização em suas relações profissionais e pessoais. Ademais, ações como essa realçaram a relevância de frequente acolhimento psicólogico a trabalhadores de serviços funerários. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been several high-profile recalls of hybrid products. If consumers perceive a global firm to be responsible for the recall, then it will reduce their brand equity. Therefore, global firms may respond in ethically questionable ways to justify themselves to important stakeholders and avoid blame. Understanding how stakeholders attribute blame for crises involving hybrid products is important to shed light on the unethical manner in which global firms might avoid blame in such situations. The research reported (...) here shows that in a hybrid product crisis, consumers show a bias in favor of the brand company and against the manufacturing company. This bias is more pronounced when the country of manufacture has an unfavorable image or when consumers lack familiarity with the recalled brand. Ambiguous recall announcements by companies that fail to provide a specific and clear reason for the product defect prompt consumers to assume that a manufacturing flaw caused the product defect. As a result, consumers reduce their attribution of blame for the brand company, and thus its brand equity is maintained. (shrink)