Sciences able to identify appropriate analytical units for their domain, their natural kinds, have tended to be more progressive. In the biological sciences, evolutionary natural kinds are adaptations that can be identified by their common history of selection for some function. Human brains are the product of an evolutionary history of selection for component systems which produced behaviours that gave adaptive advantage to their hosts. These structures, behaviour production systems, are the natural kinds that psychology seeks. We argue these can (...) be identified deductively by classing behaviour first according to its level of behavioural control. Early animals in our lineage used only reactive production, Vertebrates evolved motivation, and later Primates developed executive control. Behaviour can also be classified by the type of evolutionary benefit it bestows: it can deliver either immediate benefits (food, gametes), improvements in the individual’s position with respect to the world (resource access, social status), or improvements in the ability to secure future benefits (knowledge, skill). Combining history and function implies the existence of seven types of behaviour production systems in human brains responsible for reflexive, instinctual, exploratory, driven, emotional, playful and planned behaviour. Discovering scientifically valid categories of behaviour can provide a fundamental taxonomy and common language for understanding, predicting and changing behaviour, and a way of discovering the organs in the brain––its natural kinds––that are responsible for behaviour. (shrink)

'Gaining control' tells the story of how human behavioral capacities evolved from those of other animal species. Exploring what is known about the psychological capacities of other groups of animals, the authors reconstruct a fascinating history of our own mental evolution. The result is a provocative and insightful book.

Mont Publishing House and Valery Vino deliver the first volume of an eclectic collection in aesthetic education. Aesthetic Literacy is an experiment in philosophy of culture, and this volume features cross-genre contributions by: Theodore Gracyk (Minnesota), Babette Babich (Fordham), David Konstan (NYU), Katya Mandoki (UNAM), Arnold Berleant (Long Island), Jale Erzen (Middle East Tech), Curtis Carter (Marquette), Clive Cazeaux (Cardiff), Fabrizio Desideri (Florence), Ken-ichi Sasaki (Tokyo), and many others... -/- .

This book is perhaps the first to open a dialogue between the two disciplines.

There is a bias in neuroscience toward localizing and modularizing brain functions. Single cell recording, imaging studies, and the study of neurological deficits all feed into the Gallian view that different brain areas do different things and the things being done are confined to particular processing streams. At the same time, there is a growing sentiment that brains probably don’t work like that after all; it is better to conceive of them as fundamentally distributed units, multi‐tasking at every level. This (...) sentiment, however, is much less congenial to the tried‐and‐true experimental protocols available today and to theorizing about the brain in general. This essay examines the tension between current experimental methods and large-scale views of the brain. We argue that this disconnection between experiment and what really are guiding theoretical metaphors seriously impedes progress in neuroscience. (shrink)

In this essay, we present three case studies which suggest that sometimes we are better off supporting a so–called irrational suicide, and that emotional or psychological distress – even if medically controllable – might justify a suicide. We underscore how complicated these decisions are and how murky a physician's moral role can be. We advocate a more individualized route to end–of–life care, eschewing well–meaning, principled, generalizations in favor of a highly contextualized, patient–centered, approach. We conclude that our Western traditions of (...) promoting reasoned behavior and life themselves may at times be counter–productive. (shrink)

A portrait of the influential western philosopher and writer is targeted to lay readers and seeks to clarify his ideas and influences, offering insight into the impact of his chronic ill health and insanity on his beliefs while challenging stereotypes that have been attributed to his character. 10,000 first printing.

Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological experience, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision...

Although research into the biosemiotic mechanisms underlying the purposeful behavior of brainless living systems is extensive, researchers have not adequately described biosemiosis among neurons. As the conscious use of signs is well-covered by the various fields of semiotics, we focus on subconscious sign action. Subconscious semiotic habits, both functional and dysfunctional, may be created and reinforced in the brain not necessarily in a logical manner and not necessarily through repeated reinforcement. We review literature that suggests hypnosis may be effective in (...) changing subconscious dysfunctional habits, and we offer a biosemiotic framework for understanding these results. If it has been difficult to evaluate any psychological approach, including hypnosis, this may be because contemporary neuroscience lacks a theory of the sign. We argue that understanding the fluid nature of representation in biological organisms is prerequisite to understanding the nature of the subconscious and may lead to more effective of treatments for dysfunctional habits developed through personal experience or culture. (shrink)

What is required to be an interdisciplinary theory in cognitive science is for it to span more than one traditional domain. Generally speaking, as I discuss ...

Given what we know about the segregated nature of the brain and the relative absence of multi-modal association areas in the cortex, how percepts become unified is not clear. However, if we could work out how and where the brain joins together segregated outputs, we would have a start in localizing the neuronal processes that correlate with conscious perceptual experiences. In this essay, I critically examine data relevant for understanding the neurophysiological underpinnings of perception. In particular, I examine the possibility (...) that 40 Hz. oscillatory firing patterns in cortex are important lower-level neuronal events related to perceptual experiences. I suggest that `binding' - understood as a process of hooking together disparate psychological units - reduces to a property inherent in the structure of our brain's firing patterns. However, this reduction may not reflect the firing rates of individual cells, but instead a `higher level' order superimposed on individual cells' activity. (shrink)

Seen in its historical context, Mazur & Booth's (M&B's) target article may come to be viewed as a turning point in the study of the biological basis of human behavior in general, and dominance in particular. To facilitate further research, suggestions are offered for making the definition of dominance more precise. From an evolutionary point of view, the testosterone-dominance link may be as important in women as it is in men.

Although statistically significant correlations have been found among political, economic, and social indices, on the one hand, and measures of sociosexuality, on the other, it is likely that these correlations are second-order effects. Underpinning the reproductive freedom associated with higher sociosexuality are factors more closely related to biology, namely, easy access to safe, effective contraception and reproductive medical care.

The focus here will be on the tension between architecture’s symbolic role and its function as a space to house and present art. ‘Symbolic’ refers both to a building as an aesthetic or sculptural form and secondly to its role in expressing civic identity. ‘Function’ refers to the intended purpose or practical use apart from its role as a form of art. As an art form, it serves important symbolic purposes; its practical purposes are linked to serving individual and community (...) functions requiring the delineation of space. In the present context of museum architecture, certain museum buildings are more likely to be seen as a sculptural object than as functioning buildings. The reasons for this development derive in part from unresolved issues pertaining to the respective roles of symbolic and practicalfunction as is seen in the analysis of architecture provided by G. W. F. Hegel, Rudolf Arnheim and Nelson Goodman. The vocabularies of contemporary architects such Frank Gehry and Santiago Calatrava do not follow the abstract geometrical patterns of Le Corbusier or Louis Kahn who envisioned a universal vocabulary of architectural forms derived from industrial technical forms that underscored Modernist conventions in architecture.By looking at this issue in the contexts provided by the theoretical discussions of Hegel, Arnheim and Goodman, it is possible to see more clearly the importance of examining with a critical eye the relative place of symbolism and function in museum architecture, and to question whether current museum practice has gone astray in allowing the sculptural symbolism to become the dominant element. When either its symbolic or its practical aspects are out of balance the result is sure to be unsatisfactory architecture. If the past is a reliable guide, it works best when the symbolic (sculptural) and the practical in architecture are worked out in harmony with each other. (shrink)

This article explores the implications of a particular view of neo-humanism, as represented by John Brockman in his two books The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution and The New Humanists: Science at the Edge, and calls for greater care by Brockman in utilizing the concept. This article argues against the idea that the “new” humanists, as Brockman implies, are primarily found within the domain of empirical minded thinkers in the natural and life sciences.

For readers looking for insights into key issues linking current Eastern and Western views on the arts, aesthetics, and philosophy, Unsettled Boundaries offers fresh and insightful perspectives on current issues as seen by leading Chinese and Western scholars. Represented in the volume are previously unpublished essays of Nöel Carroll, Garry Hagberg, Richard Shusterman, and Jason Wirth alongside writings of Chinese peers Gao Jianping, Peng Feng, Liu Yuedi, Wang Chunchen and Cheng Xiangzhan. The essays in this volume draw attention to evolving (...) cultural and philosophical connections linking the cultures of East and West, while taking note of important differences in the respective cultures. These connections draw upon both traditional Confucian ideas and Chinese Marxist-Leninist aesthetics as well as western pragmatism, somaesthetics, and Wittgenstein-based analytic philosophy. Alongside these philosophical currents, are reflections on issues linking globalization to contemporary Balinese, Chinese, and Japanese arts, by Curtis Carter, Stephen Davies, Garry Hagberg, and Mary Wiseman. (shrink)

I examine what happens in the brain when patients experience chronic pain and when subjects are addicted to alcohol. We can find important parallels between these two cases, and these parallels can perhaps point us toward new ways of treating (or at least understanding) both issues. Interestingly, we can understand both cases as our pleasure system gone awry. In brief, I argue that chronic pain and alcohol addiction both stem from a dysregulation in our brain’s reward structure. This dysregulation in (...) what should be our pleasure circuitry pushes individuals to behave in ways counterproductive to their needs and to feel unpleasant things. In other words, there is likely both something quite right and perhaps quite wrong about how some philosophers are thinking about pain as an evaluative state. I shall be arguing that pain is both hedonic and evaluative, though perhaps not in the ways they are imagining. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and conversational agents, emphasizing their potential benefits while also highlighting the need for vigilant monitoring to prevent unethical applications. Design/methodology/approach As AI becomes more prevalent in academia and research, it is crucial to explore ways to ensure ethical usage of the technology and to identify potentially unethical usage. This manuscript uses a popular AI chatbot to write the introduction and parts of the body of a (...) manuscript discussing conversational agents, the ethical usage of chatbots and ethical concerns for academic researchers. Findings The authors reveal which sections were written entirely by the AI using a conversational agent. This serves as a cautionary tale highlighting the importance of ethical considerations for researchers and students when using AI and how educators must be prepared for the increasing prevalence of AI in the academy and industry. Measures to mitigate potential unethical use of this evolving technology are also discussed in the manuscript. Originality/value As conversational agents and chatbots increase in society, it is crucial to understand how they will impact the community and how we can live with technology instead of fighting against it. (shrink)

B L Curtis; Learning and Intentionality, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

B L Curtis; Learning and Intentionality, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

What counts as a computation and how it relates to cognitive function are important questions for scientists interested in understanding how the mind thinks. This paper argues that pragmatic aspects of explanation ultimately determine how we answer those questions by examining what is needed to make rigorous the notion of computation used in the (cognitive) sciences. It (1) outlines the connection between the Church-Turing Thesis and computational theories of physical systems, (2) differentiates merely satisfying a computational function from true computation, (...) and finally (3) relates how we determine a true computation to the functional methodology in cognitive science. All of the discussion will be directed toward showing that the only way to connect formal notions of computation to empirical theory will be in virtue of the pragmatic aspects of explanation. (shrink)

On the one hand, we think that our conscious perceptions are tied to some stage of whatever processing stream we have. On the other hand, we think that our conscious experiences have to resemble the computational states that instantiate them. However, nothing in our alleged stream resembles our experienced perceptions. Hence, a conflict. The question is: How can we go from what we know about neurons, their connections, and firing patterns, to explaining what conscious perceptual experiences are like? No intuitive (...) answer seems plausible. Our perceptual experiences are complex and unified; however, brains divide their processing tasks into small chunks and segregate those smaller pieces across the gray matter. In this essay, I conjecture that what corresponds to our visual perceptions are higher order patterns of bifurcation in an attractor phase space. If I am correct, then the problem of the explanatory gap in philosophy, the binding problem in psychology, and the problem of perception in neuroscience disappear. If the traditional computational perspective is wrong, and sensory processing is not piece-meal, step-wise, and segregated, then there is no need for something in the head to tie things together. (shrink)

Since at least the time of Darwin, we have recognized that our human emotional life is very similar to the emotional life of other creatures. We all react in characteristic ways to emotionally valenced stimuli. Though other animals may not blush or cry, we all have prototypical ways of expressing anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, and curiosity. In assuming that the neural circuits underlying these reactions are homologous or at least analogous across species, neurophysiologists and neuropsychologists have been able to (...) construct impressive and substantial research programmes studying the neural correlates for emotion. They are to be applauded, for we now know quite a lot about where and how basic emotions are processed in the brain. At the same time, there is a dangerous trend developing in the study of emotion in neurophysiology and neuropsychology, a trend toward oversimplifying and reducing emotional responses to the point of distortion. We all know that scientists must abstract away from much of what is going on in order to produce quantitative and unambiguous data. We also know that scientists operate using several basic methodological, technological, and theoretical assumptions. The question I wish to address here is whether, in the case of emotions, scientists haven't gone too far in their tendency to modularize brain processes and to reduce reactions down to their simplest components. (shrink)

The sensation of will is not the same thing as the will itself any more than the sensation of hunger is the same thing as being devoid of nutrients. This is not a really surprising claim, but it is the only claim to which Wegner is entitled in his book.

This paper challenges a central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that empirical adequacy has a privileged epistemic status. I argue that perceptions of observables are theory-wrought, and theory-wrought in the same ways as the observation sentences we use to describe those perceptions, van Fraassen can draw no privileged or fundamental distinction between what we observe and interpreting those observations through theory. Since empirical adequacy depends upon accurately describing what we observe, and we have no theory-independent reason to believe that what (...) we ‘observe’ is a reflection of what is true, then empirical adequacy can inherit no special connection to what is real via what we observe. The epistemological significance of empirical adequacy is thereby reduced. (shrink)

There are three basic skeptical arguments against developing a scientific theory of consciousness: theory cannot capture a first person perspective; consciousness is causally inert with respect to explaining cognition; and the notion "consciousness" is too vague to be a natural kind term. Although I am sympathetic to naturalists' counter-arguments, I also believe that most of the accounts given so far of how explaining consciousness would fit into science are incorrect. In this essay, I indicate errors my colleagues on both sides (...) of the fence make in thinking about this issue, as well as outline data relevant to distinguishing conscious states from unconscious ones empirically. (shrink)

As a new trend in aesthetics appearing concurrently in the West and the East in the last ten years, the aesthetics of everyday life points to a growing diversification among existing methodologies for pursuing aesthetics, alongside the shift from art-based aesthetics. The cultural diversity manifest in global aesthetics offers common ground for the collaborative efforts of aesthetics in both the West and the East. Given the rapidly growing interest and its potential for attracting new audiences extending beyond the more narrowly (...) focused traditions of twentieth-century analytic and environmental aesthetics, it stands to command its own share of attention in the future of aesthetic studies. The aesthetics of everyday life has become a stream of thought with a global ambition. This interest has led to numerous systematic and in-depth works on this topic, some of which were conducted by the authors represented in this volume. A salient feature of this book is that it not only represents the recent developments of the aesthetics of everyday life in the West, but also highlights the interaction between scholars in the West and the East on this topic. Thus, the project is a contribution toward mutual progress in the collaboration between Western and Eastern aesthetics. What distinguishes this book from other anthologies and monographs on this topic is that it reconstructs the aesthetics of everyday life through cultural dialogue between the West and the East, with a view to building a new form of aesthetics of everyday life, as seen from a global perspective. At present, the aesthetics of everyday life as a newly emergent approach to aesthetics may encounter skepticism among aestheticians accustomed to the rigors of analytic philosophers who prefer to discuss aesthetics at the level of abstract concepts and argument, and who tolerate the particulars of experience mainly as illustrations. But, there is no reason to abandon the pursuit of the aesthetics of everyday life in the face of such objections. On the contrary, there are many benefits to gain in bringing aesthetics to bear on a wider sphere of human life, made possible through efforts to show the relevance of aesthetics to a broader range of human actions. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman (1906-2007) approached the arts and other kinds of knowledge as forms of symbolism. His principal aim in philosophy was to advance understanding and remove confusions by verbal analysis and logical constructions. Goodman's philosophical theories encompass nominalism, constructivism and a version of radical relativism. In his Languages of Art, Goodman sets forth distinctions among the various art according to differences in the forms of symbols employed. He contributed as well to arts education and to philosophy of the museum. His (...) performance work, "Hockey Seen: A Nightmare in Three Periods and Sudden Death embodies his aesthetic theories. (shrink)

What constitutes an adequate basis for feminist consciousness? What values and concerns are feminists to bring to bear in challenging present standards of well-being and articulating alternative visions of collective life? This essay takes a close and critical look at these questions as they are addressed in the work of political theorist Jean Elshtain. An outspoken defender of "pro-family feminism," Elshtain has urged contemporary feminists to reclaim the "female subject" within the private sphere. Enormous problems attend Elshtain's counsel and these (...) have as much to do with the political implications of her argument as with her reading of the Sophoclean tragedy Antigone. With an eye towards foregrounding what some of these problems are, this essay elaborates an alternative reading of Sophocles' Antigone and moves from that exposition to an examination of why it is that Elshtain's claims and conclusions are politically unsound and unsustainable. (shrink)

Many philosophers of psychology fail to appreciate the constructivist process of science as well as its pragmatic aspects. A well-developed philosophy of science helps to clear many conceptual confusions. However, ridding ourselves of popular complaints only opens more sophisticated worries regarding how we generalize specific events and how we use those generalizations to build physical systems and abstract models. These questions can still be answered though by realizing that science is largely a social enterprise, and how and what we explain (...) depends a great deal upon who is asking the question of whom and when. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “A Defence of Starmaking Constructivism: The Problem of Stuff” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I provide a brief account of key elements in Nelson Goodman’s starmaking constructivist philosophy and comment on Bin Liu’s defense of Goodman in the context of contemporary constructivist philosophy.