Eichengreen gives an overview of the connections between financial globalization, domestic autonomy, and social justice.

In The Crisis of Global Capitalism, George Soros claims that the international financial economy is inherently unstable, and that while economists have failed to recognize this because of their commitment to static equilibrium theory, politicians have failed to stabilize the global economy because of their commitment to an unquestioned faith in the complete efficiency of laissez faire. While Soros is right to argue that market participants’ expectations about the future can cause instability, he is wrong to maintain that this has (...) gone unrecognized by economists, and his notion that we live in a world of economic laissez faire is equally mistaken. Indeed, his own analysis of the Asian financial crisis points to the “moral hazard” created by expectations of government intervention, rather than to laissez faire, as the culprit. (shrink)

We present updated estimates of central bank transparency for 100 countries up through 2006 and use them to analyze both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric framework. We establish that there has been significant movement in the direction of greater central bank transparency in recent years. Transparent monetary policy arrangements are more likely to be found in countries with strong and stable political institutions. They are more likely to be found in democracies, with their (...) culture of transparency. Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that more transparency in monetary policy operating procedures is associated with less inflation variability, though not also with less inflation persistence. (shrink)

Abstract In The Crisis of Global Capitalism, George Soros claims that the international financial economy is inherently unstable, and that while economists have failed to recognize this because of their commitment to static equilibrium theory, politicians have failed to stabilize the global economy because of their commitment to an unquestioned faith in the complete efficiency of laissez faire. While Soros is right to argue that market participants? expectations about the future can cause instability, he is wrong to maintain that this (...) has gone unrecognized by economists, and his notion that we live in a world of economic laissez faire is equally mistaken. Indeed, his own analysis of the Asian financial crisis points to the ?moral hazard? created by expectations of government intervention, rather than to laissez faire, as the culprit. (shrink)

All major western countries today contain groups that differ in their religious beliefs, customary practices or ideas about the right way in which to live. How should public policy respond to this diversity? In this important new work, Brian Barry challenges the currently orthodox answer and develops a powerful restatement of an egalitarian liberalism for the twenty-first century. Until recently it was assumed without much question that cultural diversity could best be accommodated by leaving cultural minorities free to associate (...) in pursuit of their distinctive ends within the limits imposed by a common framework of laws. This solution is rejected by an influential school of political theorists, among whom some of the best known are William Galston, Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh, Charles Taylor and Iris Marion Young. According to them, this 'difference-blind' conception of liberal equality fails to deliver either liberty or equal treatment. In its place, they propose that the state should 'recognize' group identities, by granting groups exemptions from certain laws, publicly 'affirming' their value, and by providing them with special privileges or subsidies. In Culture and Equality, Barry offers an incisive critique of these arguments and suggests that theorists of multiculturism tend to misdiagnose the problems of minority groups. Often, these are not rooted in culture, and multiculturalist policies may actually stand in the way of universalistic measures that would be genuinely beneficial. (shrink)

In this accomplished, comprehensive and accessible book Barry Smart explores these questions. The book examines the social and economic processes which have shaped and continue to shape life today. It also provides exemplary critical assessments of the various `modern' and `postmodern' thinkers who have sought to explain these processes. Judicious in its judgements and superbly informed, the text is a major contribution to the debate on Modernity and Postmodernity.

See revised version in Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy, chapter 4; available online at: http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/.

In this book, Stroud delves deeper into the fundamental metaphysical questions that he began to explore in 'The Quest for Reality'.

The explanatory role of natural selection is one of the long-term debates in evolutionary biology. Nevertheless, the consensus has been slippery because conceptual confusions and the absence of a unified, formal causal model that integrates different explanatory scopes of natural selection. In this study we attempt to examine two questions: (i) What can the theory of natural selection explain? and (ii) Is there a causal or explanatory model that integrates all natural selection explananda? For the first question, we argue that (...) five explananda have been assigned to the theory of natural selection and that four of them may be actually considered explananda of natural selection. For the second question, we claim that a probabilistic conception of causality and the statistical relevance concept of explanation are both good models for understanding the explanatory role of natural selection. We review the biological and philosophical disputes about the explanatory role of natural selection and formalize some explananda in probabilistic terms using classical results from population genetics. Most of these explananda have been discussed in philosophical terms but some of them have been mixed up and confused. We analyze and set the limits of these problems. (shrink)

" Barry Allen shows what truth has come to mean in the philosophical tradition, what is wrong with many of the ways of conceiving truth, and why philosophers ...

Barry Stroud; XV*—The Physical World, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 263–277, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

This volume of uncollected essays by Barry Stroud explores central issues and ideas in the work of individual philosophers, ranging from Descartes, Berkeley, ...

Discusses Quine's views on the impossibility of taking up a vantage point outside conceptual schemes. It explores issues in Quine's theory of language, among which are the theory of the inscrutability of reference and the doctrine of ‘being at home’ in our language.

Disputes the attribution to Wittgenstein of a ‘conventionalist’ account of necessity. Conventionalism can seem appropriate given Wittgenstein's denial that there is anything in a person's understanding of the premises and rules he or she accepts, which can ‘force’ him or her to accept a particular conclusion. This conventionalist interpretation is resisted.

Tries to ravel out Wittgenstein's dictum that meaning is used in an attempt to forestall Kripke's ‘sceptic’, who draws the conclusion that there is no such thing as meaning on the grounds that mental objects cannot be brought to bear on the question of what a person means, and that mere conformity to linguistic practice is not sufficient for the determination of meaning. It is argued that the indeterminacy or problematic nature of meaning with respect to a certain class of (...) facts does not entail that meaning is indeterminate or problematic. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such‐and‐such is so, where what we perceive (...) to be so is the very state of the world that we thereby know to be so. This is not proposed as a better answer to the philosophical problem, but as a way of seeing how that problem as traditionally understood could not really present a threat to anyone who can think about the world at all. (shrink)

This chapter sets out to extract more of the properties of objective truth. It inquires into the principles governing certification. Principles governing the logical connectives are borrowed from Crispin Wright, and tested for adequacy against intuition, particularly on the question of the distributivity of objective truth across the connectives. It is argued that objective truth can be explicated as truth with the hallmark traits, without commitment to the literal truth of the framework, which has helped us to identify them.

This chapter examines the case for natural properties made by David Lewis. Section 5.1 looks at the role such properties play in Lewis’s system. Section 5.2 sets out his reasons for believing in them: that they are required to accommodate Moorean facts about the similarity of objects; and that they are indispensable to philosophical theorizing. Section 5.3 proposes an alternative to natural properties: these are the T-cosy predicates, defined by the role predicates play in theories. Section 5.4 argues that T-cosy (...) predicates can be used to accommodate the Moorean facts as well as natural properties can do; and section 5.5 that where natural properties have an uncontroversially legitimate role to play in philosophical theory, T-cosy predicates will once again do the job. The conclusion is that natural properties constitute unnecessary metaphysical baggage, to be rejected along with the Eliteness Constraint they underpin. (shrink)

This chapter examines Crispin Wright’s account of truth as superassertibility, and the account with which Putnam proposes in Reason, Truth, and History — of truth as idealized rational acceptability. It is argued that both can be represented as attempts to take a version of Part One’s Hierarchy of Certification as a serious analytic tool rather than as a disposable heuristic ladder.

Examines the relevance of Foucault's work for developing an understanding of those issues which lie beyond the limits of Marxist theory and analysis - issues such as 'individualising' forms of power, power-knowledge relations, the rise of ...

The question of what the relevant entities or units of analysis for studying the dynamics of R&D are is central not only for adequate characterizations of the system of scientific and technological knowledge production but also for determining the correct focus for evaluation of R&D activities. Typically, R&D performance evaluations have focused not only on the wrong thing but have looked in the wrong place. Most evaluations have been project or program based. Often this focus is misleading. This article presents (...) a “knowledge value” framework as an alternative focus for understanding and evaluating scientific and technical work. This framework consists of two core concepts: the Knowledge Value Collective and the Knowledge Value Alliance. On the basis of the analysis of twenty-eight case studies of research activities, the authors present a typology of KVAs and conclude that they are a better object of evaluation than discipline-based projects. (shrink)

First Published in 1992. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The commonly perceived tension between authentic moral and ethical action and action involving tolerance is held to be the illusory product of an unduly individualistic frame of thought. Moral and ethical actions are produced not by independent individuals but by participants in cultural traditions. And even the wholly routine continuation of a single homogeneous tradition must always and invariably involve mutual tolerance: participants must interact not as independent individuals but as tolerant members. Tolerance deserves recognition, accordingly, as a primary virtue, (...) not merely compatible with authentic moral and ethical action, but required by it. An explicit rhetoric enjoining tolerance needs to be understood as performative discourse employed to change, or else to sustain, the systems of tolerances in which all cultures, whether simple or differentiated, homogeneous or diverse, unified or fragmented, invariably consist. (shrink)