Free logics is a family of first-order logics which came about as a result of examining the existence assumptions of classical logic. What those assumptions are varies, but the central ones are that the domain of interpretation is not empty, every name denotes exactly one object in the domain and the quantifiers have existential import. Free logics usually reject the claim that names need to denote in, and of the systems considered in this paper, the positive free logic concedes that (...) some atomic formulas containing non-denoting names are true, while negative free logic rejects even the latter claim. Inclusive logics, which reject, are likewise considered. These logics have complex and varied axiomatizations and semantics, and the goal of this paper is to present an orderly examination of the various systems and their mutual relations. This is done by first offering a formalization, using sequent calculi which possess all the desired structural properties of a good proof system, including admissibility of contraction and cut, while streamlining free logics in a way no other approach has. We then present a simple and unified system of abstract semantics, which allows for a straightforward demonstration of the meta-theoretical properties, and offers insights into the relationship between different logics. The final part of this paper is dedicated to extending the system with modalities by using a labeled sequent calculus, and here we are again able to map out the different approaches and their mutual relations using the same framework. (shrink)

The Quantified argument calculus (Quarc) has received a lot of attention recently as an interesting system of quantified logic which eschews the use of variables and unrestricted quantification, but nonetheless achieves results similar to the Predicate calculus (PC) by employing quantifiers applied directly to predicates instead. Despite this noted similarity, the issue of the relationship between Quarc and PC has so far not been definitively resolved. We address this question in the present paper, and then expand upon that result. Utilizing (...) recent developments in structural proof theory, we develop a G3-style sequent calculus for Quarc and briefly demonstrate its structural properties. We put these properties to use immediately to construct direct proofs of the meta-theoretical properties of the system. We then incorporate an abstract (and, as we shall see, logical) predicate into the system in a way that preserves all the structural properties. This allows us to identify a system of Quarc which is deductively equivalent to PC, and also yields a constructive method of demonstrating the Craig interpolation theorem (which speaks in favor of the aforementioned predicate being logical). We further generalize this extension to develop a bivalent system of Quarc with defining clauses that still maintains all the desirable properties of a good proof system. (shrink)

Translated from German. Includes bibliographical references. Includes index.

This paper extends the investigations into logical properties of the quantified argument calculus (Quarc) by suggesting a series of proper subsystems which, although retaining the entire vocabulary of Quarc, restrict quantification in such a way as to make the result decidable. The proof of decidability is via a procedure that prunes the infinite branches of a derivation tree in what is a syntactic counterpart of semantic filtration. We demonstrate an application of one of these systems by showing that Aristotle’s assertoric (...) syllogistic is embeddable within, thus also providing another method of showing its decidability. (shrink)

IntroductionMentalizing is a key aspect of social cognition. Several researchers assume that mentalization has two systems, an explicit one and an implicit one. In schizophrenia, several studies have confirmed the deficit of explicit mentalizing, but little data are available on non-explicit mentalizing. However, increasing research activity can be detected recently in implicit mentalizing. The aim of this systematic review and meta-analysis is to summarize the existing results of implicit mentalizing in schizophreniaMethodsA systematic search was performed in four major databases: MEDLINE, (...) EMBASE, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, Web of Science. Eleven publications were selected. Five studies were found to be eligible for quantitative synthesis, and 9 studies were included in qualitative synthesis.ResultsThe meta-analysis revealed significantly lower accuracy, slower reaction time during implicit mentalizing in patients with schizophrenia. The systematic review found different brain activation pattern, further alterations in visual scanning, cue fixation, face looking time, and difficulties in perspective taking.DiscussionOverall, in addition to the deficit of explicit mentalization, implicit mentalization performance is also affected in schizophrenia, if not to the same extent. It seems likely that some elements of implicit mentalization might be relatively unaffected, but the effectiveness is limited by certain neurocognitive deficits. These alterations in implicit mentalizing can also have potential therapeutic consequences.Systematic Review Registration:https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/, identifier: CRD42021231312. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2014 Heft: 202 Seiten: 555-569.

Elias wrote in both English and German, and in all his work runs to 14 books and around 90 other essays, along with poems and numerous interviews. The 18 volumes of the collected works contain many writings not previously published in English, and a small number never published before. All of the texts have thoroughly checked and revised, by editors who have a deep knowledge of Elia's thinking; they have inserted many clarifications, cross-references and explanatory notes.

Bynum (Putting information first: Luciano Floridi and the philosophy of information. NY: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) identifies Floridi’s focus in the philosophy of information (PI) on entities both as data structures and as information objects. One suggestion for examining the association between the former and the latter stems from Floridi’s Herbert A. Simon Lecture in Computing and Philosophy given at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, open problems in the PI: the transduction or transception, and how we gain knowledge about the world as (...) a complex, living, information environment. This paper addresses PI across a model of interoperating levels: perception (P)—intuition (N)—computation (C)—information (I), as factored by cognitive continuity (1), temporality (2), and constitution (3). How might we begin to characterize our experience of an abstract information object across such a matrix? Chudnoff’s rationalist distinctions between perception and intuition serve as a first rung of the ladder. Turing’s brief references to the utility of intuition, in an allied, rationalist-Cartesian sense, provide the next step up to computation. Floridi provides the final link from computation to information. (shrink)

The paper explores a metaphysics of information enriched by a computational view of Buddhism consistent with onto-ethics. To the extent that Floridi has explained the new philosophy of information as borrowing methods from computer science to approach philosophical problems computationally, I believe an applied philosophy of information can return the fruits of these results back to grounding issues in the practices of information technology. With this process we also foster a cross-fertilization between Eastern and Western philosophies, in the larger, intercultural (...) arena. (shrink)