- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Results for 'Keller, Andreas'
(not author) ( search as author name )
991 found
Order:
- The UN Anti-terror Sanctions regime under pressure.Helen Keller & Andreas Fischer - 2009 - Keller, Helen; Fischer, Andreas . The Un Anti-Terror Sanctions Regime Under Pressure. Human Rights Law Review, 9:257-266.
- Psychoanalytische und kognitiv-verhaltenstherapeutische Langzeittherapien bei chronischer Depression: Die LAC-Depressionsstudie.Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber, Ulrich Bahrke, Manfred Beutel, Heinrich Deserno, Jens Edinger, Georg Fiedler, Antje Haselbacher, Martin Hautzinger, Lisa Kallenbach, Wolfram Keller, Alexa Negele, Nicole Pfenning-Meerkötter, Hila Prestele, Tanja Strecker-von Kannen, Ulrich Stuhr & Andreas Will - 2010 - Psyche 64 (9):782-832.No categories
- Helen and Heidegger: Disabled Dasein, Language and Others.Andrea Hurst - 2003 - South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):98-112.Both Heidegger's Being and Time and Helen Keller's The Story of my Life address the problem of what it means for humans to be optimally human. In reading these texts together, I hope to show that Helen's life-story confirms Heidegger's existential analyses to some extent, but also, importantly, poses a challenge to them with respect to the interrelated issues of disability, language and others. Heidegger's hermeneutic explication of what it means to be human is intended to uncover supposedly basic human (...)
- Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research Integrity: Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. 31 May - 3 June 2015.Lex Bouter, Melissa S. Anderson, Ana Marusic, Sabine Kleinert, Susan Zimmerman, Paulo S. L. Beirão, Laura Beranzoli, Giuseppe Di Capua, Silvia Peppoloni, Maria Betânia de Freitas Marques, Adriana Sousa, Claudia Rech, Torunn Ellefsen, Adele Flakke Johannessen, Jacob Holen, Raymond Tait, Jillon Van der Wall, John Chibnall, James M. DuBois, Farida Lada, Jigisha Patel, Stephanie Harriman, Leila Posenato Garcia, Adriana Nascimento Sousa, Cláudia Maria Correia Borges Rech, Oliveira Patrocínio, Raphaela Dias Fernandes, Laressa Lima Amâncio, Anja Gillis, David Gallacher, David Malwitz, Tom Lavrijssen, Mariusz Lubomirski, Malini Dasgupta, Katie Speanburg, Elizabeth C. Moylan, Maria K. Kowalczuk, Nikolas Offenhauser, Markus Feufel, Niklas Keller, Volker Bähr, Diego Oliveira Guedes, Douglas Leonardo Gomes Filho, Vincent Larivière, Rodrigo Costas, Daniele Fanelli, Mark William Neff, Aline Carolina de Oliveira Machado Prata, Limbanazo Matandika, Sonia Maria Ramos de Vasconcelos & Karina de A. Rocha - 2016 - Research Integrity and Peer Review 1 (Suppl 1).Table of contentsI1 Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research IntegrityConcurrent Sessions:1. Countries' systems and policies to foster research integrityCS01.1 Second time around: Implementing and embedding a review of responsible conduct of research policy and practice in an Australian research-intensive universitySusan Patricia O'BrienCS01.2 Measures to promote research integrity in a university: the case of an Asian universityDanny Chan, Frederick Leung2. Examples of research integrity education programmes in different countriesCS02.1 Development of a state-run “cyber education program of research ethics” in (...)No categories
- Hildegard Elisabeth Keller, ed., Jakob Ruf: Leben, Werk und Studien, 1: Mit der Arbeit seiner Hände: Leben und Werk des Zürcher Stadtchirurgen und Theatermachers Jakob Ruf , with Linus Hunkeler, Andrea Kauer, and Stefan Schöbi, 2nd ed.; 2: Jakob Ruf, Werke bis 1544: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, part 1; 3: Jakob Ruf, Werke 1545–1549: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, part 2; 4: Jakob Ruf, Werke 1550–1558: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, part 3; 5: Die Anfänge der Menschwerdung: Perspektiven zur Medien-, Medizin- und Theatergeschichte des 16. Jahrhunderts. Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2008. 1: pp. 320 plus CD in back cover pocket; color figures and 108 black-and-white figures. 2: pp. 780. 3: pp. 708. 4: pp. 1020. 5: pp. 724 plus CD in back cover pocket; many black-and-white facsimiles. First ed. of vol. 1 published in 2006 by Chronos, Zurich, and reviewed in Speculum 83 , 206–7, by Melitta Weiss Adamson. [REVIEW]Melitta Weiss Adamson - 2010 - Speculum 85 (3):694-696.No categories
- Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally (...)
- Shame and Attributability.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6. Oxford University Press.Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...)
- Deserved Guilt and Blameworthiness over Time.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2022 - In Andreas Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
- Unjust Equalities.Andreas Albertsen & Sören Flinch Midtgaard - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):335-346.In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar (...)
- Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility.Andreas Carlsson (ed.) - 2022 - New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.Self-blame is an integral part of our lives. We often blame ourselves for our failings and experience familiar unpleasant emotions such as guilt, shame, regret, or remorse. Self-blame is also what we often aim for when we blame others: we want the people we blame to recognize their wrongdoing and blame themselves for it. Moreover, self-blame is typically considered a necessary condition for forgiveness. However, until now, self-blame has not been an integral part of the theoretical debate on moral responsibility. (...)
- Responsibility and the emotions.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.According to the Strawsonian tradition, a person is responsible for an action just in case it is appropriate to hold them responsible for that action. One important way of holding people responsible for wrongdoing is by experiencing and expressing blaming emotions. This raises the questions of what blaming emotions are and in what sense they can be appropriate. In this chapter I will provide an overview of different answers to both these questions. A common thread in the chapter will be (...)
- Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):261-284.Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of authenticity that places special demands on (...)
- The only ethical argument for positive δ? Partiality and pure time preference.Andreas Mogensen - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2731-2750.I consider the plausibility of discounting for kinship, the view that a positive rate of pure intergenerational time preference is justifiable in terms of agent-relative moral reasons relating to partiality between generations. I respond to Parfit's objections to discounting for kinship, but then highlight a number of apparent limitations of this approach. I show that these limitations largely fall away when we reflect on social discounting in the context of decisions that concern the global community as a whole, such as (...)
- A plea for an experimental philosophy of medicine.Andreas De Block & Kristien Hens - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (3):81-89.This special issue aims to explore and investigate a new subfield, namely experimental philosophy of medicine. Whereas experimental philosophy is relatively new on the philosophical block, some of its takes and findings have already shaped central debates in ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Interestingly, the approach of this program was for a long time almost wholly ignored within bioethics and philosophy of medicine—although this seems to have changed somewhat recently. In this introduction, we briefly sketch the (...)
- Doomsday rings twice.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptThis paper considers the argument according to which, because we should regard it as a priori very unlikely that we are among the most important people who will ever exist, we should increase our confidence that the human species will not persist beyond the current historical era, which seems to represent a crucial juncture in human history and perhaps even the history of life on earth. The argument is a descendant of the Carter-Leslie Doomsday Argument, but I show that it (...)
- Moral demands and the far future.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptI argue that moral philosophers have either misunderstood the problem of moral demandingness or at least failed to recognize important dimensions of the problem that undermine many standard assumptions. It has been assumed that utilitarianism concretely directs us to maximize welfare within a generation by transferring resources to people currently living in extreme poverty. In fact, utilitarianism seems to imply that any obligation to help people who are currently badly off is trumped by obligations to undertake actions targeted at improving (...)
- Maximal cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptI argue that many of the priority rankings that have been proposed by effective altruists seem to be in tension with apparently reasonable assumptions about the rational pursuit of our aims in the face of uncertainty. The particular issue on which I focus arises from recognition of the overwhelming importance and inscrutability of the indirect effects of our actions, conjoined with the plausibility of a permissive decision principle governing cases of deep uncertainty, known as the maximality rule. I conclude that (...)
- Maximal Cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):141-162.I argue that many of the priority rankings that have been proposed by effective altruists seem to be in tension with apparently reasonable assumptions about the rational pursuit of our aims in the face of uncertainty. The particular issue on which I focus arises from recognition of the overwhelming importance and inscrutability of the indirect effects of our actions, conjoined with the plausibility of a permissive decision principle governing cases of deep uncertainty, known as the maximality rule. I conclude that (...)
- Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.Many moral philosophers accept the Debunking Thesis, according to which facts about natural selection provide debunking explanations for certain of our moral beliefs. I argue that philosophers who accept the Debunking Thesis beg important questions in the philosophy of biology. They assume that past selection can explain why you or I hold certain of the moral beliefs we do. A position advanced by many prominent philosophers of biology implies that this assumption is false. According to the Negative View, natural selection (...)
- The Reduction of Necessity to Essence.Andreas Ditter - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):351-380.In `Essence and Modality', Kit Fine proposes that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever. Call this view Fine's Thesis. This paper is a study of Fine's Thesis in the context of Fine's logic of essence (LE). Fine himself has offered his most elaborate defense of the thesis in the context of LE. His defense rests on the widely shared assumption that metaphysical necessity obeys the (...)
- The Paralysis Argument.Andreas Mogensen & William MacAskill - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (15).Many everyday actions have major but unforeseeable long-term consequences. Some argue that this fact poses a serious problem for consequentialist moral theories. We argue that the problem for non-consequentialists is greater still. Standard non-consequentialist constraints on doing harm combined with the long-run impacts of everyday actions entail, absurdly, that we should try to do as little as possible. We call this the Paralysis Argument. After laying out the argument, we consider and respond to a number of objections. We then suggest (...)
- Nothing but the Truth.Andreas Pietz & Umberto Rivieccio - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):125-135.A curious feature of Belnap’s “useful four-valued logic”, also known as first-degree entailment (FDE), is that the overdetermined value B (both true and false) is treated as a designated value. Although there are good theoretical reasons for this, it seems prima facie more plausible to have only one of the four values designated, namely T (exactly true). This paper follows this route and investigates the resulting logic, which we call Exactly True Logic.
- Tensions in Piketty’s Participatory Socialism: Reconciling Justice and Democracy.Andreas Albertsen & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2021 - Analyse & Kritik 43 (1):71-88.In the final parts of Piketty’s Capital and Ideology, he presents his vision for a just and more equal society. This vision marks an alternative to contemporary societies, and differs radically both from the planned Soviet economies and from social democratic welfare states. In his sketch of this vision, Piketty provides a principled account of how such a society would look and how it would modify the current status of private property through co-managed enterprises and the creation of temporary ownership (...)
- Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.Upon discovering that certain beliefs we hold are contingent on arbitrary features of our background, we often feel uneasy. I defend the proposal that if such cases of contingency anxiety involve defeaters, this is because of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I note two hurdles to our accepting this Disagreement Hypothesis. Firstly, some cases of contingency anxiety apparently involve no disagreement. Secondly, the proposal may seem to make our awareness of the influence of arbitrary background factors irrelevant in determining whether (...)
- The Hinge of History Hypothesis: Reply to MacAskill.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptSome believe that the current era is uniquely important with respect to how well the rest of human history goes. Following Parfit, call this the Hinge of History Hypothesis. Recently, MacAskill has argued that our era is actually very unlikely to be especially influential in the way asserted by the Hinge of History Hypothesis. I respond to MacAskill, pointing to important unresolved ambiguities in his proposed definition of what it means for a time to be influential and criticizing the two (...)
- Fictional names and individual concepts.Andreas Stokke - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7829-7859.This paper defends a version of the realist view that fictional characters exist. It argues for an instance of abstract realist views, according to which fictional characters are roles, constituted by sets of properties. It is argued that fictional names denote individual concepts, functions from worlds to individuals. It is shown that a dynamic framework for understanding the evolution of discourse information can be used to understand how roles are created and develop along with story content. Taking fictional names to (...)No categories
- Essence and Necessity.Andreas Ditter - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (3):653-690.What is the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence? This paper defends the view that the relation is one of identity: metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence. My argument consists in showing that the best joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity is one in which metaphysical necessity is just a special case of essence. The argument is made against the backdrop of a novel, higher-order logic of essence, whose core features are introduced in the first part of (...)
- Moral demands and the far future.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):567-585.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
- II—Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying.Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):127-147.Responding to parts of Sorensen, it is argued that the connectives therefore and but do not contribute conventional implicatures, but are rather to be treated as presupposition triggers. Their special contributions are therefore not asserted, but presupposed. Hence, given the generic assumption that one lies only if one makes an assertion, one cannot lie with arguments in the way Sorensen proposes. Yet, since conventional implicatures are asserted, one can lie with conventional implicatures. Moreover, since conventional implicatures may be asserted by (...)
- Racial Profiling And Cumulative Injustice.Andreas Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):452-477.This paper tries to explain why racial profiling involves a serious injustice and to do so in a way that avoids the problems of existing philosophical accounts. An initially plausible view maintains that racial profiling is pro tanto wrong in and of itself by violating a constraint on fair treatment that is generally violated by acts of statistical discrimination based on ascribed characteristics. However, consideration of other cases involving statistical discrimination suggests that violating a constraint of this kind may not (...)
- Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power.Andreas Kalyvas - 2005 - Constellations 12 (2):223-244.
- Fictional force.Andreas Stokke - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10):3099-3120.This paper argues for an account of fictional force, the central characteristic of the kind of non-assertoric speech act that authors of fictions are engaged in. A distinction is drawn between what is true in a fiction and the _fictional record_ comprising what the audience has been told. The papers argues that to utter a sentence with fictional force is to intend that its content be added to a fictional record. It is shown that this view accounts for phenomena such (...)No categories
- Protagonist Projection.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):204-232.This article provides a semantic analysis of Protagonist Projection, the phenomenon by which things are described from a point of view different from that of the speaker. Against what has been argued by some, the account vindicates the intuitive idea that Protagonist Projection does not give rise to counterexamples to factivity, and similar plausible principles. A pragmatics is sketched that explains the attitude attributions generated by Protagonist Projection. Further, the phenomenon is compared to Free Indirect Discourse, and the proposed account (...)
- Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated.Andreas Müller - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (1):2-15.Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such (...)
- Evolutionary debunking arguments and the proximate/ultimate distinction.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):196-203.Many philosophers believe that natural selection explanations debunk our moral beliefs or would do so if moral realism were true, relying on the assumption that explanations of this kind show that moral facts play no role in explaining human moral beliefs. Here I argue that this assumption rests on a confusion of proximate and ultimate explanatory factors. Insofar as evolutionary debunking arguments hinge on the assumption that moral facts play no role in explaining human moral beliefs, these arguments fall short.
- Features of referential pronouns and indexical presuppositions.Andreas Stokke - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (8):1083-1115.ABSTRACT This paper demonstrates that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons behave differently in important ways from those triggered by the 3rd person and the genders. While the 1st and 2nd persons trigger indexical presuppositions, the 3rd person and the genders do not. I show that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons are not susceptible to presupposition failure of the kind familiar from ordinary presuppositions. Such failures occur for the 3rd person and the genders. (...)No categories
- Political Metaphor Analysis: Discourse and Scenarios.Andreas Musolff - 2016No categories
- Against Hybridism: Why We Need to Distinguish between Nature and Society, Now More than Ever.Andreas Malm - 2019 - Historical Materialism 27 (2):156-187.It is fashionable to argue that nature and society are obsolete categories. The two, we are told, can no longer be distinguished from one another; continuing loyalty to the ‘binary’ of the natural and the social blinds us to the logic of current ecological crises. This article outlines an argument for the opposite position: now more than ever – particularly in our rapidly warming world – we need to sift out the social components from the natural, if we wish to (...)No categories
- The limits of corporate responsibility standards.Andreas Rasche - 2010 - Business Ethics: A European Review 19 (3):280-291.I explore the limits of corporate responsibility standards – for example Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000), the Global Reporting Initiative, the Fair Labor Association workplace code – by looking at these initiatives through Derrida's aporias of justice as set out in ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’. Based on a discussion of SA 8000, I uncover the unavoidable aporias that are associated with the use of this standard. I contribute to the literature on corporate responsibility standards in general (...)
- Fictional Names and Co-Identification.Andreas Stokke - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23:1-23.This paper provides an account of co-identification with fictional names, the way in which a fictional name can be used to talk about the same fictional character on disparate occasions. I develop a version of the view that fictional characters are roles constituted by sets of properties that is couched within a dynamic understanding of fictional discourse. I argue that this view captures what is right about both so-called name-centric and information-centric approaches to co-identification with fictional names. I show how (...)No categories
- A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice.Andreas Hüttemann - 2021 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.What are the metaphysical commitments which best 'make sense' of our scientific practice? In this book, Andreas Hüttemann provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific practice, i.e. a metaphysics that refrains from postulating any structure that is explanatorily irrelevant. Hüttemann closely analyses paradigmatic aspects of scientific practice, such as prediction, explanation and manipulation, to consider the questions whether and what metaphysical presuppositions best account for these practices. He looks at the role which scientific generalisation play in predicting, testing, and explaining (...)
- Republican democracy: liberty, law and politics.Andreas Niederberger & Philipp Schink (eds.) - 2013 - Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.This book explores the relationship between democracy and republicanism, and its consequences; and articulates new theoretical insights into connections between liberty, law and democratic politics.
- Why Intellectualism Still Fails.Andreas Ditter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):500-515.Intellectualism about knowledge-how is the view that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing a fact. The version of intellectualism defended by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson holds that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-wh, i.e., knowledge-where, -when, -who, etc. It draws its major motivation from the uniformity between ascriptions of knowledge-how and ascriptions of knowledge-wh in English, being all infinitival embedded question constructions. My aim in this paper is to challenge intellectualism of this sort. I argue that the (...)
- Fiction and importation.Andreas Stokke - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (1):65-89.Importation in fictional discourse is the phenomenon by which audiences include information in the story over and above what is explicitly stated by the narrator. This paper argues that importation is distinct from generation, the phenomenon by which truth in fiction may outstrip what is made explicit, and draws a distinction between fictional truth and fictional records. The latter comprises the audience’s picture of what is true according to the narrator. The paper argues that importation into fictional records operates according (...)
- Source Reliability and the Conjunction Fallacy.Andreas Jarvstad & Ulrike Hahn - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (4):682-711.Information generally comes from less than fully reliable sources. Rationality, it seems, requires that one take source reliability into account when reasoning on the basis of such information. Recently, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) proposed an account of the conjunction fallacy based on this idea. They show that, when statements in conjunction fallacy scenarios are perceived as coming from such sources, probability theory prescribes that the “fallacy” be committed in certain situations. Here, the empirical validity of their model was assessed. The (...)
- In Wildness Is the Liberation of the World: On Maroon Ecology and Partisan Nature.Andreas Malm - 2018 - Historical Materialism 26 (3):3-37.For good reasons, the green movement turned from wilderness to environmental justice as its central category in the 1980s and ’90s. Today, several leading wilderness advocates seem to compete for the most reactionary positions, particularly on the issue of migration. A case can, however, be made for a progressive, cosmopolitan, Marxist view of wilderness as a space less fully subjugated to capital than others. There is a long history of exploited and persecuted people seeking freedom in and through the wild. (...)No categories
- Disagreements in Moral Intution as Defeaters.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):282-302.People may disagree about moral issues because they have fundamentally different intuitions. I argue that we ought to suspend judgement in such cases. Since we trust our own moral intuitions without positive evidence of their reliability, we must necessarily extend this trust to the moral intuitions of others: a fundamental self-other asymmetry in moral epistemology is untenable. This ensures that disagreements in moral intuition are defeating. In addition, I argue that brute conflicts in moral intuition require suspension of judgement only (...)
- Laws and dispositions.Andreas Hüttemann - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):121-135.Laws are supposed to tell us how physical systems actually behave. The analysis of an important part of physical practice--abstraction--shows, however, that laws describe the behavior of physical systems under very special circumstances, namely when they are isolated. Nevertheless, laws are applied in cases of non-isolation as well. This practice requires an explanation. It is argued that one has to assume that physical systems have dispositions. I take these to be innocuous from an empiricist's standpoint because they can--at least in (...)
- Eighteenth-century German empirical psychology and the historiography of scientific objectivity.Andreas Rydberg - 2022 - History of European Ideas 48 (7):980-997.This article contributes to the historiography of scientific objectivity as well as to the broader attempt to historicize basic epistemic categories by examining the case of empirical psychology in eighteenth-century Germany. From the time when the philosopher Christian Wolff first presented empirical psychology in the late 1720s until Kantian philosophers elaborated on the topic towards the end of the century, the discourse hinged on discussions of how to obtain scientific knowledge of the soul. Whereas the work of Wolff and his (...)
- G.A. Cohens politiske filosofi.Andreas Brøgger Albertsen - 2016 - Slagmark - Tidsskrift for Idéhistorie 73:293-295.No categories
| 1 — 50 / 991 |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-68866f4b87-dxklk uwo